area handbook series 

Spain 

country study 



Spain 

country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Eric Solsten 
and Sandra W. Meditz 
Research Completed 
December 1988 



On the cover: Windmills at Consuegra in Toledo Province 



Second Edition, First Printing, 1990. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Spain: A Country Study. 

Area Handbook Series, DA Pam 550-179 
Research completed December 1988. 
Bibliography: pp. 355-384. 
Includes index. 

1. Spain. I. Solsten, Eric D., 1943- . II. Meditz, Sandra W., 
1950- . III. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. IV. 
Area Handbook for Spain. V. Series. VI. Series: DA Pam 550-179. 

DP17.S67 1990 946— dc20 90-6127 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-179 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the fol- 
lowing individuals who wrote the 1976 edition of Spain: A Country 
Study: David P. Coffin, Eugene K. Keefe, James M. Moore, Jr., 
Robert Rinehart, and Susan H. Scurlock. Their work provided 
some portions of the text. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various agencies of 
the United States government and in international and private 
institutions who gave of their time, research materials, and spe- 
cial knowledge, providing both information and perspective. Offi- 
cials at the World Bank and the United States Department of State 
were especially helpful in providing economic data. Similarly, offi- 
cials of the United States Department of Defense supplied up-to- 
date information about Spain's defense forces. The staff of the 
Embassy of Spain in Washington also provided valuable assistance 
and material. Patrick Buckley made insightful comments on drafts 
of some of the text. 

The authors also wish to thank those who contributed directly 
to the preparation of the manuscript. These include Richard F. 
Nyrop, who reviewed all drafts and served as liaison with the spon- 
soring agency; Richard Kollodge, Noel Beatty, Evan Raynes, and 
Gage Ricard, who edited the chapters; Martha E. Hopkins, who 
managed editing; Marilyn Majeska, who managed book produc- 
tion; and Barbara Edgerton, Janie L. Gilchrist, and Izella Watson, 
who did the word processing. Carolyn Hinton performed the final 
prepublication editorial review, and Shirley Kessel, of Communi- 
cators Connections, compiled the index. Diann J. Johnson and 
Malinda B. Neale of the Library of Congress Printing and Process- 
ing Section performed phototypesetting, under the supervision of 
Peggy Pixley. 

David P. Cabitto, who was assisted by Sandra K. Cotugno and 
Kimberly A. Lord, provided invaluable graphics support. Susan 
M. Lender reviewed the map drafts, which were prepared by 
Kimberly A. Lord and Greenhorne and O'Mara. Kimberly A. 
Lord also deserves special thanks for designing the illustrations for 
the book's cover and the title page of each chapter. Many photo- 
graphs were graciously supplied by the National Tourist Office of 
Spain in New York and the Embassy of Spain in Washington. 

The authors also would like to thank several individuals who 
provided research support. Arvies J. Staton supplied information 
on ranks and insignia, and Karen M. Sturges-Vera authored the 
section on geography in chapter 2. 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword m 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile XV 

Introduction xxvii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Robert Rinehart and Jo Ann Browning Seeley 

IBERIA 4 

HISPANIA 5 

AL ANDALUS 8 

CASTILE AND ARAGON 10 

THE GOLDEN AGE . 15 

Ferdinand and Isabella 15 

Charles V and Philip II 17 

Spain in Decline 20 

BOURBON SPAIN 20 

War of the Spanish Succession 21 

The Enlightenment 22 

The Napoleonic Era 22 

THE LIBERAL ASCENDANCY 24 

The Cadiz Cortes 24 

Rule by Pronunciamiento 25 

Liberal Rule 26 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY 29 

The Cuban Disaster and the ' 'Generation of 1898" . 30 
The African War and the Authoritarian Regime of 

Miguel Primo de Rivera 31 

REPUBLICAN SPAIN 32 

THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 36 

THE FRANCO YEARS 40 

Franco's Political System 40 

Policies, Programs, and Growing Popular Unrest ... 45 

Foreign Policy under Franco 50 

THE POST-FRANCO ERA 54 

Transition to Democracy 54 

Disenchantment with UCD Leadership 60 



vii 



Growth of the PSOE and the 1982 Elections 61 

Spanish Foreign Policy in the Post-Franco Period .... 62 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment . 65 

Robert P. Clark 

GEOGRAPHY 69 

External Boundaries and Landform Regions 69 

Drainage 74 

Climate 76 

POPULATION 77 

Size and Growth 77 

Regional Disparities 79 

Migration 82 

ETHNICITY AND LANGUAGE 87 

Government Policies 87 

The Catalans 89 

The Galicians 92 

The Basques 93 

The Andalusians 97 

The Gypsies 99 

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 102 

SOCIAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES 106 

RELIGION 110 

EDUCATION 116 

Primary and Secondary Education 118 

Higher Education 121 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 123 

Health Conditions and Mortality 124 

Public Safety and Environmental Problems 126 

Housing 128 

Government Health and Welfare Programs 129 

Chapter 3. The Economy 135 

Benjamin Martin 

CHARACTER AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 

ECONOMY 138 

The Franco Era, 1939-75 139 

The Post-Franco Period, 1975-1980s 143 

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 146 

Economic Ministries 147 

Budget and Fiscal Policy 147 

HUMAN RESOURCES 148 

The Unemployment Problem 150 

The Underground Economy 151 



viii 



Labor Relations in the Franco Era 152 

Labor Relations in the Post-Franco Period 153 

AGRICULTURE 156 

Agricultural Development 158 

Regional Variation 161 

Crops 162 

Livestock 166 

Forestry 167 

Fisheries 168 

Food Processing , 169 

INDUSTRY 169 

Industrial Development 169 

Regional Concentration 172 

National Industrial Institute 173 

Manufacturing and Construction 176 

Mining 181 

ENERGY 182 

Petroleum 182 

Coal 184 

Natural Gas 185 

Electricity 185 

SERVICES 186 

Banking , 186 

Stock Market Exchanges 190 

Transportation and Communications 190 

Tourism 195 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 198 

Trading Partners 199 

Foreign Investment 200 

Spain and the European Community 201 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 205 

Jo Ann Browning Seeley 

CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 208 

The 1978 Constitution 210 

Electoral System 212 

GOVERNMENT 213 

The Cortes 213 

The King, the Prime Minister, and the 

Council of Ministers 216 

The Judiciary 220 

Regional Government 222 

Local Government 226 

Civil Service 228 



POLITICS 229 

Political Developments, 1982-88 231 

Political Parties 237 

Political Interest Groups 246 

Mass Communications 257 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 261 

Spain and the European Community 261 

Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization . . . 263 

Spain and the United States 265 

Spain and Latin America 267 

Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla 269 

Spain and the Middle East 272 

Spain and the Soviet Union 272 

Spain and France 273 

Chapter 5. National Security 277 

Jean R. Tartter 

THE MILITARY IN NATIONAL LIFE 280 

Historical Role of the Armed Forces 281 

The Civil War and Its Aftermath 283 

The Military in Political Life 285 

The Military in Society 288 

EXTERNAL SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND 

POLICIES 290 

JURISDICTION OVER NATIONAL DEFENSE 292 

MILITARY COMMANDS AND ORGANIZATION 295 

Army , 296 

Navy 300 

Air Force 302 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 304 

SOURCES AND QUALITY OF MANPOWER 305 

TRAINING AND EDUCATION 309 

MILITARY JUSTICE 311 

THE DEFENSE BUDGET 312 

DEFENSE PRODUCTION 313 

PARTICIPATION IN NATO 316 

MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED 

STATES 320 

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY 323 

The Police System 324 

Criminal Justice and the Penal System 331 

Threats to Internal Security 334 

Appendix. Tables 339 



X 



Bibliography 355 

Glossary 385 

Index 389 

List of Figures 

1 Spain, 1988 xxiv 

2 The Reconquest: Reconquering Spain from the Moors .... 12 

3 Europe in the Sixteenth Century , 18 

4 Territorial Control During the Spanish Civil War, 

1936-37 38 

5 Topography and Drainage , , 72 

6 Population by Age and Sex, 1981 , 80 

7 Administrative Divisions of Spain, 1988 82 

8 Population Density by Province, 1986 86 

9 Spain's Education System in the 1980s 120 

10 Structure of Gross Domestic Product, 1988 ...... 160 

11 Transportation System, mid-1980s 192 

12 System of Government, 1988 214 

13 Distribution of Seats in the Congress of Deputies 

Following Selected Elections 230 

14 Organization of National Defense, 1988 294 

15 Major Military Installations, 1988 298 

16 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1988 , , . . 306 

17 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1988 307 

18 Organization of Police Services, 1988 , 326 



xi 



Preface 



Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a com- 
pact and objective manner the dominant historical, social, eco- 
nomic, political, and military aspects of contemporary Spain. 
Sources of information included scholarly books, journals, and 
monographs, official reports of governments and international 
organizations, numerous periodicals, and interviews with individ- 
uals having special competence in Spanish affairs. Chapter bib- 
liographies appear at the end of the book; brief comments on sources 
recommended for further reading appear at the end of each chap- 
ter. Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion 
table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with metric measure- 
ments (see table 1, Appendix ). A glossary is also included. 

Although there are numerous variations, Spanish surnames 
generally consist of two parts: the patrilineal name followed by the 
matrilineal. In the instance of Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, for ex- 
ample, Gonzalez is his father's surname, and Marquez, his mother's 
maiden name. In non-formal use, the matrilineal name is often 
dropped. Thus, after the first mention, we have usually referred 
simply to Gonzalez. A minority of individuals use only the 
patrilineal name. 



Xlll 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Spanish State. 
Short Form: Spain. 
Term for Citizens: Spaniard(s). 
Capital: Madrid. 

Geography 

Size: Peninsular Spain covers 492,503 square kilometers. Spanish 



xv 



territory also encompasses the Balearic Islands (Spanish, Islas 
Baleares) in the Mediterranean Sea and the Canary Islands (Span- 
ish, Canarias) in the Atlantic Ocean, as well as the city enclaves 
of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa. 

Topography: Peninsular landmass predominantly a vast highland 
plateau — the Meseta Central — surrounded and dissected by moun- 
tain ranges. Major lowland areas include narrow coastal plains, 
Andalusian Plain in southwest, and Ebro Basin in northeast. 
Islands, especially Canary Islands, mountainous. 

Climate: Predominantly continental climate with hot, dry sum- 
mers and rather harsh, cold winters. Wide diurnal and seasonal 
variations in temperature and low, irregular rainfall. Maritime cli- 
mate prevails in northern part of country, characterized by rela- 
tively mild winters, warm but not hot summers, and generally 
abundant rainfall spread throughout year. Slight diurnal and 
seasonal variations in temperature. Mediterranean climate ex- 
perienced from Andalusian Plain along south and east coasts, 
characterized by irregular, inadequate rainfall, mostly in autumn 
and winter. 

Society 

Population: 38.8 million in 1986. Projected 40 million by 1990, 
42 million by 2000. Rate of annual growth from 0.8 percent to 
1.2 percent from 1930s to 1980s. Growth rates expected to level 
off or to decline slightly for remainder of twentieth century. 

Education and Literacy: Primary education (age six to fourteen) 
free and compulsory. Insufficient number of state schools and 
teachers to meet this goal and rising enrollment. Gap filled by pri- 
vate schools subsidized by state. By early 1980s, 40 percent of all 
schools private. By 1965 country had achieved nearly universal 
enrollment in primary grades. Secondary school attendance op- 
tional, but students deciding not to attend secondary school had 
to attend vocational training until age sixteen. In 1985 estimated 
89 percent of students did attend secondary school, and 26 per- 
cent attended university. Adult population 94-97 percent literate 
in late 1980s. 

Health: Uneven provision of health care. Maldistribution of health 
care resources of state's welfare system resulted in poor service in 
many areas, especially working-class neighborhoods of large cities. 
High ratio of doctors to inhabitants, but low ratio of nurses to in- 
habitants and relatively low public expenditures on health care 



xvi 



compared with other West European countries. Tuberculosis, 
typhoid, and leprosy not eradicated. Infant mortality rate 10 per 
1,000 in 1985. Life expectancy seventy-four years for males and 
eighty for females in late 1980s. 

Languages: Castilian Spanish official language and dominant in 
usage, especially in formal settings, but estimated one of four Span- 
ish citizens had a different mother tongue. New 1978 Constitu- 
tion allows for other languages to be "co-official" within respective 
autonomous communities. Catalan, Galician, Euskera (the Basque 
language), Valencian, and Majorcan had such status by 1988. 

Ethnic Groups: Spanish state encompassed numerous distinct eth- 
nic and cultural minorities. New 1978 Constitution recognizes and 
guarantees autonomy of nationalities and regions making up Spanish 
state, and seventeen autonomous communities existed in late 1980s. 
Major ethnic groups: Basques, Catalans, Galicians, Andalusians, 
Valencians, Asturians, Navarrese, and Aragonese. Also small num- 
ber of Gypsies. Ethno-nationalistic sentiment and commitment to 
the ethnic homeland varied among and within ethnic communities. 
Nationalist and separatist sentiment ran deepest among Basques. 

Religion: 99 percent nominally Roman Catholic. Other 1 percent 
mostly other Christian faiths. Small Jewish community. Society 
generally becoming more secular as society and economy became 
more modern and developed. Religious freedom guaranteed by 
1978 Constitution, which formally disestablishes Roman Catholi- 
cism as official religion. But church still enjoyed somewhat 
privileged status. Continuing government financial aid to church 
was contentious issue in late 1980s. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US$340.1 billion in 1988 
(US$8,702 per capita). Economy stagnant during late 1970s and 
first half of 1980s, but real gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary) growth averaged 3.3 percent in 1986 and 5.5 percent in 1987, 
roughly double the West European rate. 

Agriculture: Made up about 5 percent of GDP in 1988 and em- 
ployed about 15 percent of population. Very important producer 
of citrus fruits, olive oil, vegetables, and wine. Agricultural products 
made up more than 15 percent of country's exports. Productive 
and modern farming along southern and eastern coasts able to meet 
foreign competition. Small antiquated farms of northwestern region 
threatened by Spain's membership in European Community 
(EC — see Glossary). 



xvn 



Industry: Made up about 30 percent of GDP and employed about 
one-third of work force in late 1980s. Consisted of unprofitable 
heavy industry segment, mainly government-owned, and profita- 
ble chemical and manufacturing components that accounted for 
most of Spain's exports. 

Services: Accounted for about half of GDP in 1988. Tourism vital 
to the economy, and it alone made up about a tenth of GDP. In 
1987 more than 50 million foreign tourists visited Spain. 

Imports: US$49.1 billion in 1987. Because of a surging economy, 
approximately one-fourth of this amount consisted of capital goods 
and about one-fifth of consumer goods. Fuels made up approxi- 
mately one- sixth. 

Exports: US$34.2 billion in 1987. Raw materials, chemicals, and 
unfinished goods made up about one-third of this amount, as did 
non-food consumer goods, most notably cars and trucks. Agricul- 
tural products and wine supplied about one-sixth of total exports. 

Major Trade Partners: In 1987 63.8 percent of Spain's exports 
went to the EC, which supplied Spain with 54.6 of its imports. 
France was single biggest buyer of Spanish exports, taking 18.9 
percent in 1987. Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) 
most important exporter to Spain, supplying 16.1 percent that year. 
United States accounted, respectively, for 8.3 and 8.1 of Spain's 
imports and exports. 

Balance of Payments: Spain without a positive merchandise 
balance since 1960. However, large earnings from tourism and 
remittances from Spaniards working abroad guaranteed a positive 
current account balance up through 1987. 

General Economic Conditions: Strong growth since mid-1980s 
and controlled inflation made Spain's economy one of Western 
Europe's healthiest. Full membership in EC posed a threat for 
weaker sectors of the economy, both industrial and agricultural. 
Spain had long had Western Europe's highest unemployment rate, 
more than 20 percent. 

Exchange Rate: In March 1988, 113.49 pesetas (see Glossary) to 
US$1. 

Fiscal year: Calendar year. 

Transportation and Communications 

Railroads: State railroad system in late 1980s covered about 13,000 
kilometers, half of which electrified. This national system used a 



xvm 



broad gauge. A smaller state-owned system, operating mainly in 
suburban areas of some northern cities, had over 1 ,000 kilometers 
of narrow-gauge track in operation. In addition, there were some 
small private railroads. Major modernization program for main 
state system began in late 1980s. 

Roads: Total road network amounted to about 320,000 kilometers 
in 1986, of which 2,000 kilometers were super highways and about 
20,000 were main roads. In 1980s roads were most important means 
of moving people and goods. 

Ports: About 200, of which 10 largest — Cartagena, Santa Cruz 
de Tenerife, Bilbao, Barcelona, Gijon, Aviles, Puerto de la Luz, 
Huelva, Valencia, and Seville (Spanish, Sevilla) — accounted for 
75 percent of shipping. 

Civil Airports: About forty. Half of these could receive interna- 
tional flights. 

Telecommunications: Generally adequate facilities. Telephone sys- 
tem operated by government company that was in process of moder- 
nizing the network. Countrywide radio and television reception. 
International communication provided by numerous coaxial sub- 
marine cables and two satellite ground stations. 

Government and Politics 

National Government: Parliamentary monarchy with hereditary 
constitutional monarch as head of state. Under 1978 Constitution, 
power centered in bicameral legislature — the Cortes (comprising 
lower house, Congress of Deputies, and upper house, Senate). Both 
houses elected by universal suffrage every four years (unless parlia- 
ment dissolved earlier by head of state), but 350-member Congress 
of Deputies uses proportional representation system, whereas Senate 
contains 208 members elected directly as well as 49 regional 
representatives. Congress of Deputies wields greater legislative 
power. Leader of dominant political party in Cortes designated 
prime minister and serves as head of government. Prime minister, 
deputy prime minister, and cabinet ministers together make up 
Council of Ministers, highest national executive institution with 
both policy-making and administrative functions. Constitution also 
establishes independent judiciary. Judicial system headed by 
Supreme Court. Also includes territorial courts, regional courts, 
provincial courts, courts of first instance, and municipal courts. 
Constitutional Court resolves constitutional questions. Twenty- 
member General Council of the Judiciary appoints judges and 
maintains ethical standards within legal profession. Constitution 



xix 



also provides for public prosecutor and public defender to protect 
both rule of law and rights of citizens. In 1980s legal system plagued 
by severe shortage of funds, which resulted in persistent delays in 
bringing cases to trial. Major revision of Penal Code under way 
in late 1980s. Government staffed by professional civil service, tradi- 
tionally inefficient and cumbersome. Attempts to reform and to 
streamline it under way since 1982 but not fully successful. 

Regional Government: Traditionally rigidly centralized, unitary 
state; however, 1978 Constitution recognizes and guarantees right 
to autonomy of nationalities and regions of which state is composed. 
In late 1980s, national territory divided among seventeen autono- 
mous communities, each encompassing one or more previously ex- 
isting provinces. Each autonomous community governed by statute 
of autonomy providing for unicameral legislative assembly elected 
by universal suffrage. Assembly members select president from their 
ranks. Executive and administrative power exercised by Council 
of Government, headed by president and responsible to assembly. 
Division of powers between central government and autonomous 
communities imprecise and ambiguous in late 1980s, but state had 
ultimate responsibility for financial matters and so could exercise 
a significant degree of control over autonomous community ac- 
tivities. Another means of control provided by presence in each 
region of central government delegate appointed by Council of 
Ministers to monitor regional activities. Provincial government re- 
mained centralized in late 1980s. Headed by civil governors ap- 
pointed by prime minister, usually political appointees. Provincial 
government administered by provincial council elected from among 
subordinate municipal council members and headed by president. 
Special provisions for Basque provinces, single-province autono- 
mous communities, and Balearic and Canary Islands, as well as 
North African enclaves. 

National Politics: Following death of Francisco Franco y Baha- 
monde in November 1975, King Juan Carlos de Borbon engineered 
transition to democracy that resulted in transformation of dictatorial 
regime into pluralistic, parliamentary democracy. Prior to advent 
of participatory democracy, little political involvement by citi- 
zens. Under Franco, Spanish society essentially depoliticized. But 
after forty years without elections, parties revived and proliferat- 
ed in months following Franco's death. In elections of June 1977, 
party receiving largest number of votes was Union of the Demo- 
cratic Center (Union de Centro Democratico — UCD), a centrist 
coalition led by Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez. Leading opposition 
party Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero 



xx 



Espanol — PSOE) led by Felipe Gonzalez Marquez. Country in- 
creasingly disillusioned, however, by UCD government. UCD, 
essentially a pragmatic electoral coalition, never developed coher- 
ent political program. Its brief success due almost entirely to 
charisma of Suarez. In October 1982 elections, PSOE registered 
a sweeping victory. Role of opposition party went to conservative 
Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular— AP). PSOE able to form first 
majority one-party government since Civil War. Popularity of 
Socialist government confirmed in May 1983 municipal and re- 
gional elections. PSOE adopted generally pragmatic rather than 
ideological approach to pressing economic problems. Also under- 
took military and educational reforms, attempted to resolve problem 
of Basque terrorism, and sought to develop more active interna- 
tional role for Spain. Gonzalez called for early elections in June 
1986, and, although losing some seats, PSOE retained control of 
Cortes. Official opposition embodied in Popular Coalition (Coali- 
cion Popular — CP), which included AP, Popular Democratic Party 
(Partido Democrata Popular — PDP), and Liberal Party (Partido 
Liberal — PL). But 1986 elections also saw significant support for 
Democratic and Social Center (Centro Democratico y Social — 
CDS) under Suarez. Many observers believed CDS had potential 
to develop into major opposition party, given disarray at ends of 
political spectrum and growing move of party politics to center. 
After 1986 elections, Socialists faced increasing popular discontent, 
and polls indicated decline in confidence in Gonzalez. 

Regional Politics: In addition to major national parties and their 
regional affiliates, political party system included numerous regional 
parties that participated in regional elections and, in the case of 
the larger parties, also in national elections. Most prominent main- 
stream parties were Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco — PNV) and Convergence and Union (Convergencia i 
Unio — CiU), a Catalan party. Catalan parties generally pragmatic 
and moderate, but some Basque parties regarded as extremist and 
leftist with ties to terrorist organizations. 

Foreign Relations: Traditionally isolated from mainstream Euro- 
pean affairs. Neutral in both world wars and ostracized during early 
rule of Franco because of Franco's Fascist ties and dictatorial re- 
gime. But because of strategic location at western entrance to 
Mediterranean, drawn into United States orbit during Cold War. 
Signed defense agreement with United States in 1953, subsequently 
renewed at regular intervals. Nevertheless, latent anti- Americanism 
persisted. Also permitted to join United Nations (UN). Following 
Franco's death in 1975, main diplomatic goal to establish closer 



xxi 



ties with Western Europe and to be recognized as a West Europe- 
an democratic society. Became member of Council of Europe (see 
Glossary) in 1977, EC in 1986, and Western European Union 
(WEU) in 1988. Had already joined North Atlantic Treaty Or- 
ganization (NATO) in 1982, but membership controversial within 
Spain. Socialists initially opposed membership, but ultimately came 
to support limited membership, and public referendum in March 
1986 confirmed Spain's membership. Other major foreign policy 
objectives to increase Spanish influence in Latin America, to achieve 
return of sovereignty over Gibraltar to Spain, and to serve as bridge 
between Western Europe and Arab world, in which Spain had 
adopted generally pro- Arab stance. Latter goal complicated some- 
what by Spain's involvement with Morocco in dispute over 
sovereignty of Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. 

International Agreements and Memberships: Member of UN 
and its specialized agencies, International Monetary Fund (IMF — 
see Glossary), World Bank, General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GAIT), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD — see Glossary). Within Europe, member of 
Council of Europe, EC, WEU, and NATO. Also member of Inter- 
American Development Bank (IDB) and had observer status in 
Andean Pact and Organization of American States (OAS). Bilateral 
military agreements with United States begun in 1953 and subse- 
quently renewed. 

National Security 

Armed Forces (1987): Total personnel on active duty, 320,300, 
of which about 200,000 conscripts serving for twelve months. 
Reserves totaled 1,085,000. Component services were army of 
240,000 troops, navy of 47,300 (including 11,500 marines), and 
air force of 33,000. 

Major Tactical Military Units: Army had five divisions compris- 
ing eleven brigades: one armored division with two brigades, one 
motorized division with three brigades, one mechanized division 
with two brigades, and two mountain divisions each consisting of 
two brigades. Other units included four independent brigades, two 
armored cavalry brigades, one airborne brigade, and one paratroop 
brigade — and Spanish Legion of 8,500 troops. All stationed in 
peninsular Spain except 19,000 troops in North African enclaves, 
10,000 in Canary Islands, and 5,800 in Balearic Islands. Navy com- 
bat forces included small carrier group, submarines, and missile- 
armed fast attack craft. Protective forces included destroyers, 



xxn 



frigates, corvettes, and minesweepers. Air force had seven squad- 
rons of fighter-bomber-interceptors in Combat Air Command 
(Mando Aereo de Combate — MACOM), ten squadrons of ground 
support aircraft in Tactical Air Command (Mando Aereo 
Tactico — NATAC), moderate airlift and refueling capacity in Air 
Transport Command (Mando Aereo de Transporte — MATRA), 
and mixed capabilities in Canary Islands Air Command (Mando 
Aereo de Canarias — MAC AN). 

Military Equipment (1987): Army had about 1,000 tanks, 1,200 
armored personnel carriers, 650 other armored vehicles, 1,300 
towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, 28 multiple rocket launch- 
ers, 1,200 mortars, 1,000 antitank and antiaircraft weapons, and 
180 helicopters. Main operational units of navy were one small air- 
craft carrier, eight submarines, eight frigates, nine destroyers, ten 
corvettes, and twelve fast-attack craft. Air force had more than 200 
fighter aircraft, mostly of 1960s vintage, but was in process of ac- 
quiring 72 advanced F-18 Hornets from United States. 

Military Budget (1988): Defense budget of US$6.93 billion was 
2 percent of GDP. Military expenditures among lowest in NATO 
on per capita basis and as ratio of GDP. 

Foreign Military Treaties: Bilateral military agreement with 
United States, signed in 1953 and periodically renewed, covers 
United States use of four bases and several communications sites 
in Spain. Spain joined NATO in 1982 but rejected military in- 
tegration, storage of nuclear weapons on Spanish territory, and 
use of Spanish forces abroad. 

Internal Security Forces: Principal security agencies were Civil 
Guard (force of 65,000 plus 9,000 auxiliaries) policing rural areas 
and National Police Corps (Cuerpo Nacional de Policia) of about 
50,000 uniformed and 9,000 plainclothes officers in communities 
of more than 20,000 inhabitants. Special Civil Guard and National 
Police Corps units engaged against Basque extremists and other 
terrorists. These national forces controlled by Ministry of Interior 
supplemented by locally controlled municipal police and regional 
police forces of three autonomous communities. 



xxm 



ftttantic 
Ocean 



Lisboi 



Bay of 'Biscay 




Guadalajara 
Madrid @ 



Badajoz 



Toledo 



Ciudad 
Real • 



Cordoba 



Sevilla 



Qolfo C&diz 



International 

boundary 
® National capital 
• Populated place 




Malaga 



50 100 Kilometers 

1 1 l' ' l ' I 1 



Granada 



'Gibraltar {Br,} 
i ^yStrait of QiSraCtar 

Ceuta ' s ' a de 

(So.) Atboran 
(Sp.) 




Figure 1. Spain, 1988 



XXIV 




XXV 



Introduction 



SINCE THE LATE 1950s, Spain has been transformed. A stag- 
nant, inefficient economy, with a large and backward agricultural 
sector, has become one of the most dynamic in Western Europe 
and often produces the continent's highest growth rates. This trans- 
formation brought with it tremendous changes in where Spaniards 
lived, in how they earned their livelihoods, and in their standard 
of living. It also came to mean that Spain, long sealed off from 
the social changes of Western Europe by a reactionary authoritarian 
regime, gradually opened up and, in the course of a single genera- 
tion, adopted the living habits and the attitudes of its more ad- 
vanced neighbors. Most striking of all were two political events. 
The first, the fashioning of a working democracy that most Span- 
iards supported, was unique in the country's history. Perhaps 
equally pathbreaking was the attainment of varying degrees of au- 
tonomy by the country's regions, in a radical departure from a 
centuries-old tradition of centralized control from Madrid. 

Only since the early 1960s have the doctrines of economic liber- 
alism been widely practiced in Spain. Traditional policy was based 
on high tariffs, protectionism, and a striving for economic self- 
sufficiency, practices which resulted in a backward Spanish econ- 
omy in 1960. At that time, agriculture was still very important be- 
cause slighdy under half of the population earned its living working 
on farms. The manufacturing sector consisted mainly of small, pri- 
vately owned firms, using outmoded methods of production, or 
of large, inefficient, state-run enterprises, specializing in heavy in- 
dustry. Only the Basque Country (Spanish, Pais Vasco; Basque, 
Euskadi) and Catalonia (Spanish, Catalufia; Catalan, Catalunya) 
had experienced an industrial revolution, but both the former's 
heavy industry and the latter' s textile production were dependent 
on the domestic market for sales and on protection from foreign 
competition. 

Spanish industry had profited hugely from World War I, but, 
once peace returned, it was unable to meet the demands of free 
trade. Therefore, the government resorted to traditional protec- 
tionism to keep the country's businesses running. The Civil War 
of 1936-39 so devastated the economy that the living standards 
of the mid- 1930s were not matched again until the early 1950s. 
The political regime established by the war's victor, Francisco 
Franco y Bahamonde, showed its essentially traditional character 
by embracing the principle of national economic self-sufficiency 



xxvn 



and by codifying it into the doctrine of autarchy. Stringent import 
controls and extensive state participation in the industrial sector, 
through large state-owned and state-operated enterprises, became 
characteristic features of the economy. Protectionism preserved in- 
efficient businesses, and state controls prevented agricultural in- 
novation or made it pointless. Labor was rigidly controlled, but 
job security was provided in return. 

While Western Europe's economies experienced a miraculous 
rebirth in the 1950s, Spain's economy remained dormant. Lack 
of growth eventually forced the Franco regime to countenance 
introduction of liberal economic policies in the late 1950s. The so- 
called Stabilization Plan of 1959 did away with many import re- 
strictions; imposed temporary wage freezes; devalued the nation's 
currency, the peseta (for value of the peseta — -see Glossary); tied 
Spain's financial and banking operations more closely to those of 
the rest of Europe; and encouraged foreign investment. After a 
painful start, the economy took off in the early 1960s, and, during 
the next decade, it grew at an astonishing pace. The Spanish gross 
national product (GNP — see Glossary) expanded at a rate twice 
that of the rest of Western Europe. Production per worker dou- 
bled, while wages tripled. Exports grew by 12 percent a year, and 
imports increased by 17 percent annually. Between 1960 and 1975, 
agriculture's share of the economically active population fell by 
almost half, while the manufacturing and service sectors' shares 
each rose by nearly a third. Some of this growth was caused by 
tourism, which brought tens of millions of Europeans to Spain each 
year, and by the remittances of Spaniards working abroad. Without 
the liberalization of the economy, however, the overall gains would 
not have been possible. Liberalization forced the economy to be 
more market-oriented, and it exposed Spanish businesses to for- 
eign competition. 

The first and the second oil crises of the 1970s ended this ex- 
traordinary boom. An excessive dependence on foreign oil, insuffi- 
cient long-term investments, structural defects, and spiraling wage 
costs made Spain unusually susceptible to the effects of the world- 
wide economic slump of the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Spain's 
economy languished until the second half of the 1980s, and dur- 
ing this time the country was afflicted by an unemployment rate 
that often exceeded 20 percent, higher than that of any other major 
West European country. 

The sensational victory of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party 
(Partido Socialista Obrero Espariol — PSOE) in the national elec- 
tion of 1982 gave it an absolute majority in Spain's Parliament, 
the Cortes, and allowed it to introduce further liberal economic 



xxvin 



measures that previous weak governments could not consider. The 
Socialist government, headed by the party leader and prime 
minister, Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, opted for orthodox monetary 
and fiscal policies, for wage austerity, and for the scaling down 
of wasteful state enterprises. The government's policies began to 
bear fruit in the second half of the decade, when the economy once 
again had the fastest growth rates in Western Europe. Many large 
manufacturing companies and financial institutions had record- 
breaking profits, and inflation was kept under control. 

One reason for the government's interest in reforming the econ- 
omy was Spain's admission to the European Community (EC) in 
1986. If the country were to benefit from EC membership, it would 
have to be able to meet unrestricted foreign competition. At the 
end of 1992, when a single EC market was to come into being, 
virtually all restrictions shielding Spain's economy against com- 
petition from other members of the organization would end. This 
change meant that Spanish firms had to be strong enough to thrive 
in a more rigorous commercial climate. In mid- 1989 the peseta 
was believed to be sufficiently healthy for the country to join the 
European Monetary System (EMS), which tied the peseta to the 
other EC currencies. The country's financial institutions were 
undergoing a long strengthening process of reorganization and con- 
solidation. Portions of the agricultural sector had also been modern- 
ized, and, given the advantage of Spain's Mediterranean climate, 
they were well poised to hold their own with the commercialized 
farming of other EC countries. In short, in thirty years Spain's 
economy had undergone a profound transformation and had joined 
the European mainstream. 

The economic boom of the 1960s and the early 1970s had social 
effects that transformed Spain in a single generation. First, there 
was a great movement of population from the countryside to those 
urban areas that offered employment, mainly Madrid, Barcelona, 
and centers in the Basque Country. A rapid mechanization of 
agriculture (the number of tractors in Spain increased sixfold dur- 
ing the boom) made many agricultural workers redundant. The 
need for work and the desire for the better living standards offered 
in urban centers, spurred about five million Spaniards to leave the 
countryside during the 1960s and the early 1970s. More than one 
million went to other countries of Western Europe. The extent of 
migration was such that some areas in Extremadura and in the 
high Castilian plateau appeared nearly depopulated by the mid- 
1970s. 

Urbanization in the 1960s and the 1970s caused cities to grow 
at an annual rate of 2.4 percent, and as early as 1970 migrants 



xxix 



accounted for about 26 percent of the population of Madrid and 
for 23 percent of that of Barcelona. After the mid-1970s, however, 
this mass migration slowed down appreciably, and some of the 
largest urban areas even registered a slight decrease in population 
in the 1980s. 

Another result of the economic transformation was a dramatic 
rise in living standards. In the 1940s and the 1950s, many Spaniards 
were extremely poor, so much so that, for example, cigarettes could 
be bought singly. By the late 1980s, the country's per capita in- 
come amounted to more than US$8,000 annually, somewhat lower 
than the West European average, but high enough for Spanish con- 
sumption patterns to resemble those of other EC countries. In 1960 
there were 5 passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants; in 1985, there 
were 240. In the same period, the number of television sets showed 
a similar increase, and the number of telephones per capita in- 
creased sixfold. Access to medical care was much better, and the 
infant mortality rate had decreased so greatly that it was lower than 
the EC average. In addition, many more Spaniards received higher 
education. 

However, the economic boom was not an unmixed blessing. 
Housing in many urban regions was often scarce, expensive, and 
of poor quality. Although many new dwellings were built, the results 
were frequently unappealing, and there were unhealthy tracts of 
cramped apartment buildings with few amenities. City transpor- 
tation systems never caught up with the influx of people, and the 
road network could not accommodate the explosion in car owner- 
ship made possible by increased incomes. An already inadequate 
social welfare system was also swamped by the waves of rural im- 
migrants, often ill-prepared for life in an urban environment. 
Widespread unemployment among the young, usually estimated 
at about 40 percent in the late 1980s, caused hardship. Material 
need, coupled with a way of life remote from the habits and the 
restrictions of the rural villages from which most migrants came, 
often resulted in an upsurge of urban crime. The boom also had 
not touched all sections of the country. Some areas, for example, 
had twice the per capita income of others. 

The material transformation of Spain was accompanied by a so- 
cial transformation. The Roman Catholic Church lost, in a single 
generation, its role of social arbiter and monitor. Traditionally one 
of the most rigid and doctrinaire churches in Western Europe, the 
Spanish church had enjoyed a privileged role under the Franco re- 
gime. Although significant elements of the church had fought 
against oppressive aspects of the regime and for democracy, espe- 
cially after the Second Vatican Council (1962-65), the church as 



xxx 



a whole had been comfortable with the regime. The church super- 
vised the education system, supported the bans on divorce and abor- 
tion, and in general counseled submission to political authorities. 

This close relationship ended after the death of Franco in 1975. 
The 1978 Constitution separates church and state, and it deprives 
Roman Catholicism of the status of official religion. Subsequent 
legislation brought education under secular control, liberalized press 
laws, permitted pornography; and, in the first half of the 1980s, 
both divorce and abortion became legal. More significant than these 
formal changes was the secularization of the Spanish people. Church 
attendance dropped significantly, and by the early 1980s only about 
30 percent of Spaniards viewed themselves as practicing Roman 
Catholics, compared with 80 percent in the mid-1960s. Moreover, 
about 45 percent of Spaniards declared themselves indifferent, or 
even hostile, to religion. This attitude was reflected in the precipi- 
tous drop in the number of Spaniards choosing religious vocations, 
and it was evidence of the loss of religion's central place in many 
people's lives. 

Another indication of the lessening importance of religion was 
the absence of any successful nationwide religious political party. 
Although there were impassioned debates about the legalization 
of divorce and about the proper role of the Roman Catholic Church 
in the national education system in the early 1980s, religion was 
no longer the highly divisive element it had so often been in Span- 
ish politics, and the Roman Catholic Church refrained from en- 
dorsing political parties before elections. In contrast to the Second 
Republic (1931-36), when anticlericalism was a powerful force, 
many church-going members of leftist parties in the post-Franco 
era saw no contradiction between their political affiliations and regu- 
lar church attendance. 

Some secular creeds also lost the place they had once filled in 
public life. The anarchist movement that had been so important 
for most of the century up to the end of the Civil War was nearly 
extinct by the end of Franco's rule. Other left-wing movements 
that survived the years of Francoist oppression either adapted to 
the new economic and social circumstances or were marginalized. 
Old sets of political beliefs faded away in new economic and social 
conditions. 

Social attitudes changed, too. Migration separated many people 
from old ways of thought. Moreover, the enormous influx of for- 
eign tourists brought in new social and political attitudes, as did 
the movement of large numbers of Spanish workers back and forth 
between their country and the rest of Western Europe. Migration 
broke down the patron-client relationship that had been characteristic 



xxxi 



of Spaniards' relationships with the government. Using informal 
personal networks and petitioning the well-placed to obtain desired 
government services became, within the space of a few decades, 
much less common. Persistent, but not wholly effective, reforms 
of the civil service also aimed at increasing the impartiality of public 
institutions. 

Personal relations changed as well. The position of women im- 
proved as the legalization of divorce and birth control gave women 
more freedom than they had traditionally enjoyed. Although divorce 
was still not common in Spain in the 1980s, families had become 
smaller. The extended family continued to be more important in 
Spain than it was in Northern Europe, but it had lost much of its 
earlier significance. Legal reforms made women more equal be- 
fore the law. The expanding economy of the 1960s and the late 
1980s employed ever more women, although at a rate considera- 
bly below that in Northern Europe. 

The social and the economic changes that occurred during the 
1960s and the early 1970s convinced segments of the Franco re- 
gime that autocratic rule was no longer suitable for Spain and that 
a growing opposition could no longer be contained by traditional 
means. The death of Franco made change both imperative and pos- 
sible. There was no one who could replace him. (His most likely 
successor had been assassinated in 1973.) Franco's absence allowed 
long- submerged forces to engage in open political activity. Over 
the course of the next three years, a new political order was put 
in place. A system of parliamentary democracy, rooted in a widely 
accepted modern constitution, was established. For the first time 
in Spanish history, a constitution was framed not by segments of 
society able to impose their will but by representatives of all sig- 
nificant groups, and it was approved in a referendum by the peo- 
ple as a whole. 

Given the difficulties this process entailed, Spain was fortunate 
in several regards. In addition to a population ready for peaceful 
change, there was political leadership able to bring it about. A skilled 
Francoist bureaucrat, Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez, guided the govern- 
mental apparatus of the Franco regime in disassembling itself and 
in participating peacefully in its own extinction. Another favora- 
ble circumstance was that the king, Juan Carlos de Borbon, cho- 
sen and educated by Franco to maintain the regime, worked instead 
for a constitutional monarchy in a democratic state. The king's 
role as commander in chief of the armed forces and his good per- 
sonal relations with the military served to keep the military on the 
sidelines during the several years of intense political debate about 
how Spain was to be governed. Yet another stroke of good fortune 



xxxn 



was that Spain's political leadership had learned from the terrible 
bloodletting of the Civil War that ideological intransigence pre- 
cluded meaningful political discourse among opposing groups. The 
poisonous rancors of the Second Republic, Spain's last attempt at 
democratic government, were avoided, and the political elite that 
emerged during the 1970s permitted each significant sector of so- 
ciety a share in the final political solution. Suarez's legalization 
in April 1977 of the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista 
de Espana — PCE), despite much conservative opposition, was the 
most striking example of this openness. 

The first free elections in more than forty years took place in 
June 1977, and they put Suarez's party, the Union of the Demo- 
cratic Center (Union de Centro Democratico — UCD) in power. 
The UCD also won the next elections in 1979, but it disintegrated 
almost completely in the elections of 1982. The UCD, a coalition 
of moderates of varying stripes, had never coalesced into a genuine 
party. It had, however, been cohesive enough to be the governing 
party during much of an extraordinary transition from autocratic 
rule to democracy, and it had withstood serious threats from a vio- 
lent right and left. 

The UCD's successor as a governing party was Spain's socialist 
party, the PSOE, under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, 
a charismatic young politician. Gonzalez had successfully wrested 
control of the party away from the aging leadership that had di- 
rected it from exile during the dictatorship, and he was able to 
modernize it, stripping away an encrustation of Marxist doctrine. 
Gonzalez and his followers had close ties to the West German So- 
cial Democrats and they had learned from their example how to 
form and to direct a dynamic and pragmatic political organiza- 
tion. The PSOE's victory at the polls in 1982 proved the strength 
of Spain's new democracy in that political power passed peaceful- 
ly to a party that had been in illegal opposition during all of Franco's 
rule. 

Once in office, Gonzalez and the PSOE surprised many by in- 
itiating an economic program that many regarded as free-market 
and that seemed to benefit the prosperous rather than working peo- 
ple. The government argued that only prosperity — not poverty — 
could be shared, and it aimed at an expansion of the economy rather 
than at the creation of government social welfare agencies, however 
much they were needed. Many of the large and unprofitable state 
firms were scaled down. The Socialist government also reversed 
its stand on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mem- 
bership, and it successfully urged that the voters support Spain's 
remaining in the alliance in a referendum in early 1986. One reason 



xxxin 



the PSOE reversed its position was that it came to see that NATO 
membership could contribute to the democratization of Spain's 
armed forces. The government also worked toward this goal by 
modernizing the military, by reducing its size, by reforming its 
promotion procedures, and by retiring many of its older officers. 
Nevertheless, the government retained part of its early position on 
defense by insisting that the United States close some of its mili- 
tary bases in Spain and by placing some limits on Spain's partici- 
pation in the alliance. 

The governing PSOE was faithful to its origins, in that it some- 
what reformed the education system, and it increased access to 
schooling for all. There were improvements in the country's back- 
ward social welfare system as well. Critics charged, however, that 
the Socialist government paid insufficient attention to the more im- 
mediate needs of ordinary Spaniards. In the second half of the 
1980s, even the PSOE's own labor union, the General Union of 
Workers (Union General de Trabaj adores — UGT), bitterly con- 
tested the government's economic policies. In December 1988, the 
UGT and the communist-controlled union, the Workers' Com- 
missions (Comisiones Obreras — CCOO), mounted a highly suc- 
cessful, nationwide general strike to emphasize their common 
contention that the government's economic and social policies hurt 
wage-earners. Critics within the labor movement were also incensed 
at the tight control Gonzalez and his followers had over the PSOE, 
which effectively eliminated any chance of deposing them. 

As the 1980s drew to an end, the PSOE, despite a steady ero- 
sion of electoral support in national elections, continued to be 
Spain's most powerful political party, by far. This continuing pre- 
eminence was confirmed by the national elections held on October 
29, 1989. Gonzalez had called for the elections before their origi- 
nally scheduled date of June 1990, because the party leadership 
believed that the belt-tightening measures needed to dampen in- 
flation and to cool an over-heated economy could only hurt the 
party's election chances. They thought it opportune to hold the 
elections before painful policies were imposed. In addition, the 
PSOE was encouraged by its success in the elections for the Euro- 
pean Parliament in June 1989. The Socialists based their campaign 
on the premise that Spain needed the continuity of another four 
years of their rule in order to meet the challenges posed by the coun- 
try 's projected full participation in the EC's single market at the 
end of 1992. 

In what was generally regarded as a lackluster contest, the op- 
position countered by pointing to the poor state of public services 
and to the poor living conditions of many working people; by 



xxxiv 



suggesting possible reforms of the terms of service for military con- 
scripts; and by decrying the Socialists' arrogance, abuse of power, 
and cronyism after seven years in office. An important bone of con- 
tention was the government's alleged manipulation of television 
news to benefit the PSOE's cause, a serious issue in a country where 
newspaper readership was low, compared with the rest of Western 
Europe, and where most people got their news from television. 

The PSOE was expected to suffer some losses, but probably to 
retain its absolute majority in the Congress of Deputies (the lower 
chamber of the Cortes). At first it appeared to have held its majority, 
but a rerun in late March 1990 in one voting district because of 
irregularities reduced the number of its members in the Congress 
of Deputies to 175, constituting exacdy half that body, an apprecia- 
ble drop from the 184 seats the PSOE had controlled after the 1986 
national election. The most striking gains were made by the PCE- 
dominated coalition of leftist parties, the United Left (Izquierda 
Unida — IU), which, under the leadership of Julio Anguita, in- 
creased the number of its seats in the Congress of Deputies from 
seven to seventeen. The moderately right-wing People's Party 
(Partido Popular — PP), which until January 1989 bore the name 
Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular — AP), gained 2 seats for a total 
of 107 — an excellent showing, considering that the group had a 
new leader, Jose Maria Aznar, because its long-time head, Manuel 
Fraga Iribarne, had stepped down just weeks before the election. 
One reason there was still no effective party on the right, a decade 
after the promulgation of the Constitution, was that Fraga had never 
been able to shake off his Francoist past in the eyes of many voters. 
A new, young, and effective leader of the PP could conceivably 
change this situation in the 1990s. 

Another obstacle to the PP's political dominance was the exis- 
tence of several moderately conservative regional parties that 
received support that the PP otherwise might have claimed. The 
largest of these parties, Convergence and Union (Convergencia 
i Unio — CiU), was the ruling political force in Catalonia and won 
eighteen seats in the Chamber of Deputies, a result identical to 
that of 1986. Second in importance was the venerable Basque 
Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco — PNV), which won 
five seats, one less than in 1986. As of early 1990, the PP had been 
unable to come to an accommodation with the conservative na- 
tionalist movements these parties represented. 

Suarez's new party, the Democratic and Social Center (Centro 
Democratico y Social — CDS), stumbled badly, losing a quarter 
of its seats for a total of fourteen. His party was believed to have 
been hurt by its collaboration with the PP in the previous June's 



xxxv 



European Parliament elections, a move seen by voters as yet another 
indication that Suarez still had not formed a party with a distinct 
program. 

In addition to the establishment of a democratic system of govern- 
ment, the other historic achievement of post-Franco Spain was a 
partial devolution of political power to the regional level through 
the formation of seventeen autonomous communities. This develop- 
ment was nearly as significant as the first, for it broke with the 
tradition of a highly centralized government in Madrid that had 
been a constant in Spanish history since the late Middle Ages. 
Despite the weight of this tradition, centrifugal forces had persisted. 
Various peoples within Spain remembered their former freedoms, 
kept their languages and traditions alive, and maintained some 
historical rights that distinguished them from the Castilian central 
government. Most notably conscious of their separate pasts were 
the Basques and the Catalans, both of which groups had also been 
affected by nationalist movements elsewhere in nineteenth-century 
Europe. During the Second Republic, both peoples had made some 
progress toward self-government, but their gains were extinguished 
after Franco's victory, and they were persecuted during his rule. 
Use of their languages in public was prohibited, leading nation- 
alist figures were jailed or were forced into exile, and a watchful 
campaign to root out any signs of regional nationalism was put 
in place. 

During the period of political transition after Franco's death, 
regional nationalism came into the open, most strongly in the 
Basque Country and in Catalonia, but also in Galicia, Navarre 
(Spanish, Navarra), Valencia, and other regions. Regional politi- 
cians, aware that their support was needed, were able to drive hard 
bargains with politicians in Madrid and realized some of their aims. 
The 1978 Constitution extends the right of autonomy to the regions 
of Spain. Within several years of its adoption, the Basques, the 
Catalans, the Galicians, the Andalusians, and the Navarrese had 
attained a degree of regional autonomy. Publications in Catalan, 
Galician, Basque, and other languages became commonplace; these 
languages were taught in schools at government expense, and they 
were also used in radio and television broadcasts. Dozens of regional 
political parties of varied leanings sprang up to participate in elec- 
tions for seats in the parliaments of the newly established autono- 
mous communities. 

Many conservatives regarded this blossoming of regionalism as 
an insidious attack on the Spanish state. Portions of the military 
resolved to fight decentralization at all costs, using force if neces- 
sary. Elements of the Basque nationalist movement were also 



xxxv 1 



dissatisfied with the constitutional provisions for regional auton- 
omy. In contrast to the ultraright, however, they regarded the pro- 
visions as too restrictive. They therefore decided to continue the 
armed struggle for an independent Basque state that they had begun 
in the last years of the Franco regime. They reasoned that a cam- 
paign of systematic attacks on the security forces would cause the 
military to retaliate against the new democratic order and, perhaps, 
to destroy it. 

The strategy of the Basque terrorist organization, Basque Father- 
land and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna — ETA), nearly suc- 
ceeded. During the late 1970s and the 1980s, the ETA assassinated 
hundreds, many of whom were policemen or military men. These 
killings were a key factor behind a number of planned military 
coups, nearly all of which were aborted. A large-scale coup did 
occur in February 1981, during which the Cortes was briefly oc- 
cupied by some military men; however, the courageous and expe- 
ditious intervention of King Juan Carlos, the commander in chief 
of Spain's military forces, on the side of the new democratic order, 
ended the dangerous incident. 

Many observers contend, however, that the February 1981 coup 
did cause a slowing of the movement toward regional autonomy. 
In the next two years, the remainder of Spain's regions became 
autonomous communities, but with a less extensive degree of in- 
dependence than that argued for by many regional politicians during 
constitutional negotiations. The Organic Law on the Harmoniza- 
tion of the Autonomy Process (Ley Organica de Armonizacion del 
Proceso Autonomico — LOAPA), passed in the summer of 1981, 
brought the process of devolution under tighter control. In subse- 
quent years, there were gains in political power at the regional level, 
but the goals of self-government set in the late 1970s were only 
slowly being realized. 

Separatist terrorism was still a problem in Spain at the end of 
the 1980s, but it was no longer the potentially lethal issue for Spanish 
democracy that it had been in the late 1970s. The ETA continued 
to kill, but at a greatly reduced rate. Increased Basque political 
independence and the establishment of an indigenous police force 
in the Basque Country undercut much of the popular support the 
ETA had enjoyed in the last years of the Franco era and in the 
first years of the democratic transition. Occasional terrorist outrages 
that claimed the lives of ordinary citizens also eroded local 
support. Moreover, police successes in capturing or killing many 
ETA leaders took their toll on the organization, as did belated 
international support in fighting terrorism, particularly that pro- 
vided by French authorities. A policy of granting pardons to 



xxxvn 



members of the ETA not linked to acts of violence was also effec- 
tive. 

Violence from the right also declined. Ultrarightist elements in 
the armed forces were dismissed, or they retired, and the military 
as a whole had come to accept the new democracy. The Spanish 
people's overwhelming support for democracy and the election suc- 
cesses of the PSOE also undercut any tendency of the military to 
stage a coup. Military interventions in politics had traditionally 
been based on the notion that the armed forces were acting on the 
behalf of, or at the behest of, the Spanish people, and that the mili- 
tary were therefore realizing the true will of Spain. The legitimacy 
conferred on the new political system by nearly all segments of so- 
ciety made such reasoning impossible. 

However reduced violence had become, it was still troubling. 
In November 1989, two Basques elected to the Chamber of Deputies 
were shot in a restaurant in Madrid. One of the deputies died; the 
other was seriously wounded. Police believed that ultrarightist killers 
had attacked the two men, both of whom had ties to the ETA. The 
action provoked extensive public demonstrations and some street 
violence. 

Whether or not this dark side of regional politics would continue 
to be significant through the 1990s was uncertain. It appeared likely, 
however, that regionalism would play an even greater role in the 
1990s than it had since the transition to democracy. Much politi- 
cal energy would be needed to arrange a mutually satisfactory rela- 
tionship between the Spanish state and its constituent nationalities. 
The degree to which the autonomous communities should gain full 
autonomy, or even independence, was likely to be much debated; 
however, the wrangling, fruitful or futile, could be done peace- 
fully, within the context of Spain's new democracy. 



April 9, 1990 Eric Solsten 



XXXVlll 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




El Escorial, northwest of Madrid, built by Philip II in the second half of 
the sixteenth century 



THE NATIONAL HISTORY of Spain dates back to the fifth 
century A.D., when the Visigoths established a Germanic succes- 
sor state in the former Roman diocese of Hispania. Despite a period 
of internal political disunity during the Middle Ages, Spain 
nevertheless is one of the oldest nation-states in Europe. In the late 
fifteenth century, Spain acquired its current borders and was united 
under a personal union of crowns by Ferdinand of Aragon (Span- 
ish, Aragon) and Isabella of Castile (Spanish, Castilla). For a period 
in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, Portugal was part 
of that Iberian federation. 

In the sixteenth century, Spain was the foremost European 
power, and it was deeply involved in European affairs from that 
period to the eighteenth century. Spain's kings ruled provinces scat- 
tered across Europe. The Spanish Empire was global, and the 
influence of Spanish culture was so pervasive, especially in the 
Americas, that Spanish is still the native tongue of more than 200 
million people outside Spain. 

Recurrent political instability, military intervention in politics, 
frequent breakdowns of civil order, and periods of repressive 
government have characterized modern Spanish history. In the 
nineteenth century, Spain had a constitutional framework for 
parliamentary government, not unlike those of Britain and France, 
but it was unable to develop institutions capable of surviving the 
social, economic, and ideological stresses of Spanish society. 

The Spanish Civil War (1936-39), which claimed more than 
500,000 lives, recapitulated on a larger scale and more brutally 
conflicts that had erupted periodically for generations. These con- 
flicts, which centered around social and political roles of the Roman 
Catholic Church, class differences, and struggles for regional auton- 
omy on the part of Basque and Catalan nationalists, were repressed 
but were not eliminated under the authoritarian rule of Nation- 
alist leader Generalissimo Francisco Franco y Bahamonde (in 
power, 1939-75). In the closing years of the Franco regime, these 
conflicts flared, however, as militant demands for reform increased 
and mounting terrorist violence threatened the country's stability. 

When Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon became king of Spain fol- 
lowing Franco's death in November 1975, there was little indica- 
tion that he would be the instrument for the democratization of 
Spain. Nevertheless, within three years he and his prime minister, 
AJdolfo Suarez Gonzalez (in office, 1976-81), had accomplished the 



3 



Spain: A Country Study 

historically unprecedented feat of transforming a dictatorial regime 
into a pluralistic, parliamentary democracy through nonviolent 
means. This accomplishment made it possible to begin the process 
of healing Spain's historical schisms. 

The success of this peaceful transition to democracy can be attrib- 
uted to the young king's commitment to democratic institutions 
and to his prime minister's ability to maneuver within the exist- 
ing political establishment in order to bring about the necessary 
reforms. The failure of a coup attempt in February 1981 and the 
peaceful transfer of power from one party to another in October 
1 982 revealed the extent to which democratic principles had taken 
root in Spanish society. 

West European governments refused to cooperate with an 
authoritarian regime in the immediate aftermath of World War 
II, and, in effect, they ostracized the country from the region's 
political, economic, and defense organizations. With the onset of 
the Cold War, however, Spain's strategic importance for the defense 
of Western Europe outweighed other political considerations, and 
isolation of the Franco regime came to an end. Bilateral agreements, 
first negotiated in 1953, permitted the United States to maintain 
a chain of air and naval bases in Spain in support of the overall 
defense of Western Europe. Spain became a member of the United 
Nations in 1955 and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion in 1982. 

Iberia 

The people who were later named Iberians (or dwellers along 
the Rio Ebro) by the Greeks, migrated to Spain in the third millen- 
nium B.C. The origin of the Iberians is not certain, but archaeo- 
logical evidence of their metallurgical and agricultural skills supports 
a theory that they came from the eastern shores of the Mediterra- 
nean Sea. The Iberians lived in small, tightly knit, sedentary tribal 
groups that were geographically isolated from one another. Each 
group developed distinct regional and political identities, and inter- 
tribal warfare was endemic. Other peoples of Mediterranean origin 
also settled in the peninsula during the same period and, together 
with the Iberians, mixed with the diverse inhabitants. 

Celts crossed the Pyrenees into Spain in two major migrations 
in the ninth and the seventh centuries B.C. The Celts settled for 
the most part north of the Rio Duero and the Rio Ebro, where they 
mixed with the Iberians to form groups called Celtiberians. The 
Celtiberians were farmers and herders who also excelled in metal- 
working crafts, which the Celts had brought from their Danubian 
homeland by way of Italy and southern France. Celtic influence 



4 



Historical Setting 



dominated Celtiberian culture. The Celtiberians appear to have 
had no social or political organization larger than their matriar- 
chal, collective, and independent clans. 

Another distinct ethnic group in the western Pyrenees, the 
Basques, predate the arrival of the Iberians. Their pre- Indo- 
European language has no links with any other language, and 
attempts to identify it with pre-Latin Iberian have not been con- 
vincing. The Romans called them Vascones, from which Basque 
is derived. 

The Iberians shared in the Bronze Age revival (1900 to 1600 
B.C.) common throughout the Mediterranean basin. In the east 
and the south of the Iberian Peninsula, a system of city-states was 
established, possibly through the amalgamation of tribal units into 
urban setdements. Their governments followed the older tribal pat- 
tern, and they were despotically governed by warrior and priestly 
castes. A sophisticated urban society emerged with an economy 
based on gold and silver exports and on trade in tin and copper 
(which were plentiful in Spain) for bronze. 

Phoenicians, Greeks, and Carthaginians competed with the Iberi- 
ans for control of Spain's coastline and the resources of the interior. 
Merchants from Tyre may have established an outpost at Cadiz, 
"the walled enclosure," as early as 1 100 B.C. as the westernmost 
link in what became a chain of settlements lining the peninsula's 
southern coast. If the accepted date of its founding is accurate, Cadiz 
is the oldest city in Western Europe, and it is even older than 
Carthage in North Africa. It was the most significant of the Phoe- 
nician colonies. From Cadiz, Phoenician seamen explored the west 
coast of Africa as far as Senegal, and they reputedly ventured far 
out on the Atlantic. 

Greek pioneers from the island of Rhodes landed in Spain in 
the eighth century B.C. The Greek colony at Massilia (later Mar- 
seilles) maintained commercial ties with the Celtiberians in what 
is now Catalonia (Spanish, Cataluna; Catalan, Catalunya). In the 
sixth century B.C., Massilians founded a polis at Ampurias, the 
first of several established on the Mediterranean coast of the 
peninsula. 

Hispania 

After its defeat by the Romans in the First Punic War (264- 
41 B.C.), Carthage compensated for its loss of Sicily by rebuild- 
ing a commercial empire in Spain. The country became the stag- 
ing ground for Hannibal's epic invasion of Italy during the Second 
Punic War (218-201 B.C.). Roman armies also invaded Spain and 
used it as a training ground for officers and as a proving ground 



5 



Spain: A Country Study 

for tactics during campaigns against the Carthaginians and the 
Iberians. Iberian resistance was fierce and prolonged, however, 
and it was not until 19 B.C. that the Roman emperor Augustus 
(r. 27 B.C.-A.D. 14) was able to complete the conquest of Spain. 

Romanization of the Iberians proceeded quickly after their con- 
quest. Called Hispania by the Romans, Spain was not one politi- 
cal entity but was divided into three separately governed provinces 
(nine provinces by the fourth century A.D.). More important, Spain 
was for more than 400 years part of a cosmopolitan world empire 
bound together by law, language, and the Roman road. 

Iberian tribal leaders and urban oligarchs were admitted into 
the Roman aristocratic class, and they participated in governing 
Spain and the empire. The latifundios (sing., latifundio), large 
estates controlled by the aristocracy, were superimposed on the exist- 
ing Iberian landholding system. 

The Romans improved existing cities, established Zaragoza, 
Merida, and Valencia, and provided amenities throughout the 
empire. Spain's economy expanded under Roman tutelage. Spain, 
along with North Africa, served as a granary for the Roman market, 
and its harbors exported gold, wool, olive oil, and wine. Agricul- 
tural production increased with the introduction of irrigation 
projects, some of which remain in use. The Hispano-Romans — 
the romanized Iberians and the Iberian-born descendants of Roman 
soldiers and colonists — had all achieved the status of full Roman 
citizenship by the end of the first century A.D. The emperors Trajan 
(r. 98-117), Hadrian (r. 117-38), and Marcus Aurelius (r. 161-80) 
were born in Spain. 

Christianity was introduced into Spain in the first century, and 
it became popular in the cities in the second century. Little head- 
way was made in the countryside, however, until the late fourth 
century, by which time Christianity was the official religion of the 
Roman Empire. Some heretical sects emerged in Spain, but the 
Spanish church remained subordinate to the Bishop of Rome. 
Bishops who had official civil, as well as ecclesiastical, status in the 
late empire continued to exercise their authority to maintain order 
when civil governments broke down in Spain in the fifth century. 
The Council of Bishops became an important instrument of sta- 
bility during the ascendancy of the Visigoths, a Germanic tribe. 

In 405 two Germanic tribes, the Vandals and the Suevi, crossed 
the Rhine and ravaged Gaul until the Visigoths drove them into 
Spain. The Suevi established a kingdom in the remote northwestern 
corner of the Iberian Peninsula. The hardier Vandals, never exceed- 
ing 80,000, occupied the region that bears their name — Andalusia 
(Spanish, Andalucia). 



6 



Roman aqueduct, Segovia 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress 

Because large parts of Spain were outside his control, the western 
Roman emperor, Honorius (r. 395-423), commissioned his sister, 
Galla Placidia, and her husband Ataulf, the Visigoth king, to restore 
order in the Iberian Peninsula, and he gave them the rights to set- 
tle in and to govern the area in return for defending it. The highly 
romanized Visigoths managed to subdue the Suevi and to compel 
the Vandals to sail for North Africa. In 484 they established Toledo 
as the capital of their Spanish monarchy. The Visigothic occupa- 
tion was in no sense a barbarian invasion, however. Successive 
Visigothic kings ruled Spain as patricians who held imperial com- 
missions to govern in the name of the Roman emperor. 

There were no more than 300,000 Germanic people in Spain, 
which had a population of 4 million, and their overall influence 
on Spanish history is generally seen as minimal. They were a 
privileged warrior elite, though many of them lived as herders and 
farmers in the valley of the Tagus and on the central plateau. 
Hispano-Romans continued to run the civil administration, and 
Latin continued to be the language of government and of commerce. 

Under the Visigoths, lay culture was not so highly developed 
as it had been under the Romans, and the task of maintaining for- 
mal education and government shifted decisively to the church 
because its Hispano-Roman clergy alone were qualified to manage 
higher administration. As elsewhere in early medieval Europe, the 



7 



Spain: A Country Study 

church in Spain stood as society's most cohesive institution, and 
it embodied the continuity of Roman order. 

Religion was the most persistent source of friction between the 
Roman Catholic Hispano-Romans and their Arian Visigoth over- 
lords, whom they considered heretical. At times this tension invited 
open rebellion, and restive factions within the Visigothic aristocracy 
exploited it to weaken the monarchy. In 589 Recared, a Visigoth 
ruler, renounced his Arianism before the Council of Bishops at 
Toledo and accepted Catholicism, thus assuring an alliance between 
the Visigothic monarchy and the Hispano-Romans. This alliance 
would not mark the last time in Spanish history that political unity 
would be sought through religious unity. 

Court ceremonials — from Constantinople — that proclaimed the 
imperial sovereignty and unity of the Visigothic state were intro- 
duced at Toledo. Still, civil war, royal assassinations, and usurpa- 
tion were commonplace, and warlords and great landholders 
assumed wide discretionary powers. Bloody family feuds went 
unchecked. The Visigoths had acquired and cultivated the apparatus 
of the Roman state, but not the ability to make it operate to their 
advantage. In the absence of a well-defined hereditary system of 
succession to the throne, rival factions encouraged foreign inter- 
vention by the Greeks, the Franks, and, finally, the Muslims in 
internal disputes and in royal elections. 

Al Andalus 

Early in the eighth century, armies from North Africa began 
probing the Visigothic defenses of Spain, and ultimately they initi- 
ated the Moorish epoch that would last for centuries. The people 
who became known to West Europeans as Moors were the Arabs, 
who had swept across North Africa from their Middle Eastern 
homeland, and the Berbers, inhabitants of Morocco who had been 
conquered by the Arabs and converted to Islam. 

In 711 Tariq ibn Ziyad, a Berber governor of Tangier, crossed 
into Spain with an army of 12,000 (landing at a promontory that 
was later named, in his honor, Jabal Tariq, or Mount Tariq, from 
which the name, Gibraltar, is derived). They came at the invita- 
tion of a Visigothic clan to assist it in rising against King Roderic. 
Roderic died in battle, and Spain was left without a leader. Tariq 
returned to Morocco, but the next year (712) Musa ibn Nusair, 
the Muslim governor in North Africa, led the best of his Arab troops 
to Spain with the intention of staying. In three years he had sub- 
dued all but the mountainous region in the extreme north and had 
initiated forays into France, which were stemmed at Poitiers in 732. 



8 



Historical Setting 



Al Andalus, as Islamic Spain was called, was organized under 
the civil and religious leadership of the caliph of Damascus. Gover- 
nors in Spain were generally Syrians, whose political frame of refer- 
ence was deeply influenced by Byzantine practices. 

Nevertheless, the largest contingent of Moors in Spain consisted 
of the North African Berbers, recent converts to Islam, who were 
hostile to the sophisticated Arab governors and bureaucrats and 
were given to a religious enthusiasm and fundamentalism that were 
to set the standard for the Islamic community in Spain. Berber 
settlers fanned out through the country and made up as much as 
20 percent of the population of the occupied territory. The Arabs 
constituted an aristocracy in the revived cities and on the latifun- 
dios that they had inherited from the Romans and the Visigoths. 

Most members of the Visigothic nobility converted to Islam, and 
they retained their privileged position in the new society. The coun- 
tryside, only nominally Christian, was also successfully Islamized. 
Nevertheless, an Hispano-Roman Christian community survived 
in the cities. Moreover, Jews, who constituted more than 5 per- 
cent of the population, continued to play an important role in com- 
merce, scholarship, and the professions. 

The Arab-dominated Umayyad dynasty at Damascus was over- 
thrown in 756 by the Abbasids, who moved the caliphate to Bagh- 
dad. One Umayyad prince fled to Spain and, under the name of 
Abd al Rahman (r. 756-88), founded a politically independent 
amirate, which was then the farthest extremity of the Islamic world. 
His dynasty flourished for 250 years. Nothing in Europe compared 
with the wealth, the power, and the sheer brilliance of Al Andalus 
during this period. 

In 929 Abd al Rahman III (r. 912-61), who was half European— 
as were many of the ruling caste, elevated the amirate to the status 
of a caliphate (the Caliphate of Cordoba). This action cut Spain's 
last ties with Baghdad and established that thereafter Al Andalus 's 
rulers would enjoy complete religious and political sovereignty. 

When Hisham II, grandson of Abd al Rahman, inherited the 
throne in 976 at age twelve, the royal vizier, Ibn Abi Amir (known 
as Al Mansur), became regent (981-1002) and established himself 
as virtual dictator. For the next twenty- six years, the caliph was 
no more than a figurehead, and Al Mansur was the actual ruler. 
Al Mansur wanted the caliphate to symbolize the ideal of religious 
and political unity as insurance against any renewal of civil strife. 
Notwithstanding his employment of Christian mercenaries, Al 
Mansur preached jihad, or holy war, against the Christian states 
on the frontier, undertaking annual summer campaigns against 



9 



Spain: A Country Study 

them, which served not only to unite Spanish Muslims in a common 
cause but also to extend temporary Muslim control in the north. 

The Caliphate of Cordoba did not long survive Al Mansur's dic- 
tatorship. Rival claimants to the throne, local aristocrats, and army 
commanders who staked out taifas (sing., taifa), or independent 
regional city-states, tore the caliphate apart. Some taifas, such as 
Seville (Spanish, Sevilla), Granada, Valencia, and Zaragoza, be- 
came strong amirates, but all faced frequent political upheavals, 
war among themselves, and long-term accommodations to emerging 
Christian states. 

Peaceful relations among Arabs, Berbers, and Spanish converts 
to Islam were not easily maintained. To hold together such a hetero- 
geneous population, Spanish Islam stressed ethics and legalism. 
Pressure from the puritanical Berbers also led to crackdowns on 
Mozarabs (name for Christians in Al Andalus: literally, Arab-like) 
and Jews. 

Mozarabs were considered a separate caste even though there 
were no real differences between them and the converts to Islam 
except for religion and liability to taxation, which fell heavily on 
the Christian community. They were essentially urban merchants 
and artisans. Their church was permitted to exist with few restric- 
tions, but it was prohibited from flourishing. The episcopal and 
monastic structure remained intact, but teaching was curbed and 
intellectual initiative was lost. 

In the ninth century, Mozarabs in Cordoba, led by their bishop, 
invited martyrdom by publicly denouncing the Prophet Muham- 
mad. Nevertheless, violence against the Mozarabs was rare until 
the eleventh century, when the Christian states became a serious 
threat to the security of Al Andalus. Many Mozarabs fled to the 
Christian north. 

Castile and Aragon 

Resistance to the Muslim invasion in the eighth century had been 
limited to small groups of Visigoth warriors who took refuge in 
the mountains of Asturias in the old Suevian kingdom, the least 
romanized and least Christianized region in Spain. According to 
tradition, Pelayo (718-37), a king of Oviedo, first rallied the natives 
to defend themselves, then urged them to take the offensive, begin- 
ning the 700-year Reconquest (Spanish, Reconquista), which 
became the dominant theme in medieval Spanish history (see fig. 2). 
What began as a matter of survival in Asturias became a crusade 
to rid Spain of the Muslims and an imperial mission to reconstruct 
a united monarchy in Spain. 



10 



Historical Setting 



Pelayo's successors, known as the kings of Leon, extended Chris- 
tian control southward from Asturias, tore away bits of territory, 
depopulated and fortified them against the Muslims, and then reset- 
tled these areas as the frontier was pushed forward. The kingdom's 
political center moved in the direction of the military frontier. 

In the tenth century, strongholds were built as a buffer for the 
kingdom of Leon along the upper Rio Ebro, in the area that became 
known as Castile, the "land of castles." The region was populated 
by men — border warriors and free peasants — who were willing to 
defend it, and were granted Jueros (special privileges and immuni- 
ties) by the kings of Leon that made them virtually autonomous. 
Castile developed a distinct society with its own dialect, values, and 
customs shaped by the hard conditions of the frontier. Castile also 
produced a caste of hereditary warriors whom the frontier "democ- 
ratized"; all warriors were equals, and all men were warriors. 

In 981 Castile became an independent county, and in 1004 it 
was raised to the dignity of a kingdom. Castile and Leon were 
reunited periodically through royal marriages, but their kings had 
no better plan than to divide their lands again among their heirs. 
The two kingdoms were, however, permanently joined as a single 
state in 1230 by Ferdinand III of Castile (d. 1252). 

Under the tutelage of the neighboring Franks, a barrier of pocket 
states formed along the range of the Pyrenees and on the coast of 
Catalonia to hold the frontier of France against Islamic Spain. Out 
of this region, called the Spanish March, emerged the kingdom 
of Aragon and the counties of Catalonia, all of which expanded, 
as did Leon-Castile, at the expense of the Muslims. (Andorra is 
the last independent survivor of the March states.) 

The most significant of the counties in Catalonia was that held 
by the counts of Barcelona. They were descendants of Wilfrid the 
Hairy (874-98), who at the end of the ninth century declared his 
fief free of the French crown, monopolized lay and ecclesiastical 
offices on both sides of the Pyrenees, and divided them — according 
to Frankish custom — among members of the family. By 1 100 Barce- 
lona had dominion over all of Catalonia and the Balearic Islands 
(Spanish, Islas Baleares). Aragon and the Catalan counties were 
federated in 1137 through the marriage of Ramon Berenguer IV, 
count of Barcelona, and Petronilla, heiress to the Aragonese throne. 
Berenguer assumed the title of king of Aragon, but he continued 
to rule as count in Catalonia. Berenguer and his successors thus 
ruled over two realms, each with its own government, legal code, 
currency, and political orientation. 

Valencia, seized from its Muslim amir, became federated with 
Aragon and Catalonia in 1238. With the union of the three crowns, 



11 



Spain: A Country Study 




Area 
boundary 

City 

Major battle 



Aragon 

Castile 

Leon 

Navarre 

Portugal 



Source: Based on information from Pierre Vidal-Naquet (ed.), The Harper Atlas of World 
History, New York, 1987, 93. 



Figure 2. The Reconquest: Reconquering Spain from the Moors 

Aragon (the term most commonly used to describe the federation) 
rivaled Venice and Genoa for control of Mediterranean trade. 
Aragonese commercial interests extended to the Black Sea, and the 
ports of Barcelona and Valencia prospered from traffic in textiles, 
drugs, spices, and slaves. 

Weakened by their disunity, the eleventh-century taifas fell piece- 
meal to the Castilians, who had reason to anticipate the comple- 
tion of the Reconquest. When Toledo was lost in 1085, the alarmed 
amirs appealed for aid to the Almoravids, a militant Berber party 
of strict Muslims, who in a few years had won control of the 



12 



Historical Setting 



Maghreb (northwest Africa). The Almoravids incorporated all of 
Al Andalus, except Zaragoza, into their North African empire. 
They attempted to stimulate a religious revival based on their own 
evangelical brand of Islam. In Spain, however, their movement 
soon lost its missionary fervor. The Almoravid state fell apart by 
the mid-twelfth century under pressure from another religious 
group, the Almohads, who extended their control from Morocco 
to Spain and made Seville their capital. The Almohads shared the 
crusading instincts of the Almoravids and posed an even greater 
military threat to the Christian states, but their expansion was 
stopped decisively in the epic battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212), 
a watershed in the history of the Reconquest. Muslim strength 
ebbed thereafter. Ferdinand III took Seville in 1248, reducing Al 
Andalus to the amirate of Granada, which had bought its safety 
by betraying the Almohads' Spanish capital. Granada remained 
a Muslim state, but as a dependency of Castile. 

Aragon fulfilled its territorial aims in the thirteenth century when 
it annexed Valencia. The Catalans, however, looked for further 
expansion abroad, and their economic views prevailed over those 
of the parochial Aragonese nobility, who were not enthusiastic about 
foreign entanglements. Peter III, king of Aragon from 1276 until 
1285, had been elected to the throne of Sicily when the French 
Angevins (House of Anjou) were expelled from the island king- 
dom during an uprising in 1282. Sicily, and later Naples, became 
part of the federation of Spanish crowns, and Aragon became 
embroiled in Italian politics, which continued to affect Spain into 
the eighteenth century. 

Castile, which had traditionally turned away from intervention 
in European affairs, developed a merchant marine in the Atlantic 
that successfully challenged the Hanseatic League (a peaceful league 
of merchants of various free German cities) for dominance in the 
coastal trade with France, England, and the Netherlands. The eco- 
nomic climate necessary for sustained economic development was 
notably lacking, however, in Castile. The reasons for this situa- 
tion appear to have been rooted both in the structure of the economy 
and in the attitude of the Castilians. Restrictive corporations closely 
regulated all aspects of the economy — production, trade, and even 
transport. The most powerful of these corporations, the Mesta, con- 
trolled the production of wool, Castile's chief export. Perhaps a 
greater obstacle for economic development was that commercial 
activity enjoyed little social esteem. Noblemen saw business as 
beneath their station and derived their incomes and prestige from 
landownership . Successful bourgeois entrepreneurs, who aspired 



13 



Spain: A Country Study 

to the petty nobility, invested in land rather than in other sectors 
of the economy because of the social status attached to owning land. 
This attitude deprived the economy of needed investments and 
engendered stagnation rather than growth. 

Feudalism, which bound nobles to the king-counts both economi- 
cally and socially, as tenants to landlords, had been introduced into 
Aragon and Catalonia from France. It produced a more clearly 
stratified social structure than that found in Castile, and conse- 
quently it generated greater tension among classes. Castilian society 
was less competitive, more cohesive, and more egalitarian. Castile 
attempted to compensate through political means, however, for the 
binding feudal arrangements between crown and nobility that it 
lacked. The guiding theory behind the Castilian monarchy was that 
political centralism could be won at the expense of local fueros, but 
the kings of Castile never succeeded in creating a unitary state. 
Aragon-Catalonia accepted and developed — not without conflict — 
the federal principle, and it made no concerted attempt to estab- 
lish a political union of the Spanish and Italian principalities out- 
side of their personal union under the Aragonese crown. The 
principal regions of Spain were divided not only by conflicting local 
loyalties, but also by their political, economic, and social orienta- 
tions. Catalonia particularly stood apart from the rest of the 
country. 

Both Castile and Aragon suffered from political instability in the 
fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries. The House of Trastamara 
acquired the Castilian throne in 1369 and created a new aristocracy 
to which it granted significant authority. Court favorites, or validos 
(sing., valido), often dominated their Castilian kings, and, because 
the kings were weak, nobles competed for control of the govern- 
ment. Important government offices, formerly held by members 
of the professional class of civil servants who had urban, and fre- 
quently Jewish, backgrounds, came into the possession of aristo- 
cratic families who eventually held them by hereditary right. The 
social disruption and the decay of institutions common to much 
of Europe in the late Middle Ages also affected Aragon, where 
another branch of the Trastamaras succeeded to the throne in 1416. 
For long periods, the overextended Aragonese kings resided in 
Naples, leaving their Spanish realms with weak, vulnerable govern- 
ments. Economic dislocation, caused by recurring plagues and by 
the commercial decline of Catalonia, was the occasion for repeated 
revolts by regional nobility, town corporations, peasants, and, in 
Barcelona, by the urban proletariat. 



14 



Historical Setting 



The Golden Age 
Ferdinand and Isabella 

The marriage in 1469 of royal cousins, Ferdinand of Aragon 
(1452-1516) and Isabella of Castile (1451-1504), eventually brought 
stability to both kingdoms. Isabella's niece, Juana, had bloodily 
disputed her succession to the throne in a conflict in which the rival 
claimants were given assistance by outside powers — Isabella by 
Aragon and Juana by her suitor, the king of Portugal. The Treaty 
of Alcacovas ended the war in September 1479, and as Ferdinand 
had succeeded his father in Aragon earlier in the same year, it was 
possible to link Castile with Aragon. Both Isabella and Ferdinand 
understood the importance of unity; together they effected institu- 
tional reform in Castile and left Spain one of the best administered 
countries in Europe. 

Even with the personal union of the Castilian and the Aragonese 
crowns, Castile, Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia remained con- 
stitutionally distinct political entities, and they retained separate 
councils of state and parliaments. Ferdinand, who had received 
his political education in federalist Aragon, brought a new emphasis 
on constitutionalism and a respect for local fueros to Castile, where 
he was king consort (1479-1504) and continued as regent after 
Isabella's death in 1504. Greatiy admired by Italian political theorist 
Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Ferdinand was one of the most 
skillful diplomats in an age of great diplomats, and he assigned 
to Castile its predominant role in the dual monarchy. 

Ferdinand and Isabella resumed the Reconquest, dormant for 
more than 200 years, and in 1492 they captured Granada, earn- 
ing for themselves the title of Catholic Kings. Once Islamic Spain 
had ceased to exist, attention turned to the internal threat posed 
by hundreds of thousands of Muslims living in the recently incor- 
porated Granada. "Spanish society drove itself," historian J. H. 
Elliot writes, "on a ruthless, ultimately self-defeating quest for an 
unattainable purity." 

Everywhere in sixteenth-century Europe, it was assumed that 
religious unity was necessary for political unity, but only in Spain 
was there such a sense of urgency in enforcing religious conformity. 
Spain's population was more heterogeneous than that of any other 
European nation, and it contained significant non-Christian com- 
munities. Several of these communities, including in particular some 
in Granada, harbored a significant element of doubtful loyalty. 
Moriscos (Granadan Muslims) were given the choice of voluntary 
exile or conversion to Christianity. Many Jews converted to Chris- 
tianity, and some of these conversos filled important government 



15 



Spain: A Country Study 

and ecclesiastical posts in Castile and in Aragon for more than 100 
years. Many married or purchased their way into the nobility. Mus- 
lims in reconquered territory, called Mudejars, also lived quietly 
for generations as peasant farmers and skilled craftsmen. 

After 1525 all residents of Spain were officially Christian, but 
forced conversion and nominal orthodoxy were not sufficient for 
complete integration into Spanish society. Purity of blood (limpieza 
de sangre) regulations were imposed on candidates for positions in 
the government and the church, to prevent Moriscos from becoming 
a force again in Spain and to eliminate participation by conversos 
whose families might have been Christian for generations. Many 
of Spain's oldest and finest families scrambled to reconstruct family 
trees. 

The Inquisition, a state-controlled Castilian tribunal, authorized 
by papal bull in 1478, that soon extended throughout Spain, had 
the task of enforcing uniformity of religious practice. It was origi- 
nally intended to investigate the sincerity of conversos, especially those 
in the clergy, who had been accused of being crypto-Jews. Tomas 
de Torquemada, a descendant of conversos, was the most effective 
and notorious of the Inquisition's prosecutors. 

For years religious laws were laxly enforced, particularly in Ara- 
gon, and converted Jews and Moriscos continued to observe their 
previous religions in private. In 1568, however, a serious rebel- 
lion broke out among the Moriscos of Andalusia, who sealed their 
fate by appealing to the Ottoman Empire for aid. The incident led 
to mass expulsions throughout Spain and to the eventual exodus 
of hundreds of thousands of conversos and Moriscos, even those who 
had apparently become devout Christians. 

In the exploration and exploitation of the New World, Spain 
found an outlet for the crusading energies that the war against the 
Muslims had stimulated. In the fifteenth century, Portuguese 
mariners were opening a route around Africa to the East. At the 
same time as the Castilians, they had planted colonies in the Azores 
and in the Canary Islands (also Canaries; Spanish, Canarias), the 
latter of which had been assigned to Spain by papal decree. The 
conquest of Granada allowed the Catholic Kings to divert their 
attention to exploration, although Christopher Columbus's first 
voyage in 1492 was financed by foreign bankers. In 1493 Pope 
Alexander VI (Rodrigo Borgia, a Catalan) formally approved the 
division of the unexplored world between Spain and Portugal. The 
Treaty of Tordesillas, which Spain and Portugal signed one year 
later, moved the line of division westward and allowed Portugal 
to claim Brazil. 



16 



Historical Setting 



New discoveries and conquests came in quick succession. Vasco 
Nunez de Balboa reached the Pacific in 1513, and the survivors 
of Ferdinand Magellan's expedition completed the circumnaviga- 
tion of the globe in 1522. In 1519 the conquistador Hernando Cortes 
subdued the Aztecs in Mexico with a handful of followers, and 
between 1531 and 1533 Francisco Pizzaro overthrew the empire 
of the Incas and established Spanish dominion over Peru. 

In 1493, when Columbus brought 1,500 colonists with him on 
his second voyage, a royal administrator had already been appointed 
for the Indies. The Council of the Indies (Consejo de Indias), estab- 
lished in 1524, acted as an advisory board to the crown on colonial 
affairs, and the House of Trade (Casa de Contratacion) regulated 
trade with the colonies. The newly established colonies were not 
Spanish but Castilian. They were administered as appendages of 
Castile, and the Aragonese were prohibited from trading or settling 
there. 

Charles V and Philip II 

Ferdinand and Isabella were the last of the Trastamaras, and 
a native dynasty would never again rule Spain. When their sole 
male heir, John, who was to have inherited all his parents' crowns, 
died in 1497, the succession to the throne passed to Juana, John's 
sister. But Juana had become the wife of Philip the Handsome, 
heir through his father, Emperor Maximilian I, to the Habsburg 
patrimony. On Ferdinand's death in 1516, Charles of Ghent, the 
son of Juana and Philip, inherited Spain (which he ruled as Charles 
I, r. 1516-56), its colonies, and Naples. (Juana, called Juana la 
Loca or Joanna the Mad, lived until 1555 but was judged incompe- 
tent to rule.) When Maximilian I died in 1519, Charles also in- 
herited the Habsburg domains in Germany. Shortly afterward he 
was selected Holy Roman emperor, a title that he held as Charles 
V (r. 1519-56), to succeed his grandfather. Charles, in only a few 
years, was able to bring together the world's most diverse empire 
since Rome (see fig. 3). 

Charles's closest attachment was to his birthplace, Flanders; he 
surrounded himself with Flemish advisers who were not appreciated 
in Spain. His duties as both Holy Roman emperor and king of 
Spain, moreover, never allowed him to tarry in one place. As the 
years of his long reign passed, however, Charles moved closer to 
Spain and called upon its manpower and colonial wealth to main- 
tain the Hapsburg empire. 

When he abdicated in 1556 to retire to a Spanish monastery, 
Charles divided his empire. His son, Philip II (r. 1556-98), inherited 
Spain, the Italian possessions, and the Netherlands (the industrial 



17 



Spain: A Country Study 




Spanish Habsburgs after 1556 • Populated place 



Figure 3. Europe in the Sixteenth Century 

heartland of Europe in the mid-sixteenth century). For a brief period 
(1554-58), Philip was also king of England as the husband of Mary 
Tudor (Mary I). In 1580 Philip inherited the throne of Portugal 
through his mother, and the Iberian Peninsula had a single monarch 
for the next sixty years. 

Philip II was a Castilian by education and temperament. He was 
seldom out of Spain, and he spoke only Spanish. He governed his 
scattered dominions through a system of councils, such as the Council 
of the Indies, which were staffed by professional civil servants whose 
activities were coordinated by the Council of State, which was respon- 
sible to Philip. The Council of State's function was only advisory. 
Every decision was Philip's; every question required his answer; 
every document needed his signature. His father had been a peri- 
patetic emperor, but Philip, a royal bureaucrat, administered every 
detail of his empire from El Escorial, the forbidding palace- 
monastery-mausoleum on the barren plain outside Madrid. 



18 



Historical Setting 



By marrying Ferdinand, Isabella had united Spain; however, 
she had also inevitably involved Castile in Aragon's wars in Italy 
against France, which had formerly been Castile's ally. The moti- 
vation in each of their children's marriages had been to circle France 
with Spanish allies — Habsburg, Burgundian, and English. The suc- 
cession to the Spanish crown of the Habsburg dynasty, which had 
broader continental interests and commitments, drew Spain onto 
the center stage of European dynastic wars for 200 years. 

Well into the seventeenth century, music, art, literature, theater, 
dress, and manners from Spain's Golden Age were admired and 
imitated; they set a standard by which the rest of Europe measured 
its culture. Spain was also Europe's preeminent military power, 
with occasion to exercise its strength on many fronts — on land in 
Italy, Germany, North Africa, and the Netherlands, and at sea 
against the Dutch, French, Turks, and English. Spain was the mili- 
tary and diplomatic standard-bearer of the Counter-Reformation. 
Spanish fleets defeated the Turks at Malta (1565) and at Lepanto 
(1572) — events celebrated even in hostile England. These victo- 
ries prevented the Mediterranean from becoming an Ottoman lake. 
The defeat of the Grand Armada in 1588 averted the planned 
invasion of England but was not a permanent setback for the Span- 
ish fleet, which recovered and continued to be an effective naval 
force in European waters. 

Sixteenth-century Spain was ultimately the victim of its own 
wealth. Military expenditure did not stimulate domestic produc- 
tion. Bullion from American mines passed through Spain like water 
through a sieve to pay for troops in the Netherlands and Italy, to 
maintain the emperor's forces in Germany and ships at sea, and 
to satisfy conspicuous consumption at home. The glut of precious 
metal brought from America and spent on Spain's military estab- 
lishment quickened inflation throughout Europe, left Spaniards 
without sufficient specie to pay debts, and caused Spanish goods 
to become too overpriced to compete in international markets. 

American bullion alone could not satisfy the demands of mili- 
tary expenditure. Domestic production was heavily taxed, driv- 
ing up prices for Spanish-made goods. The sale of titles to 
entrepreneurs who bought their way up the social ladder, remov- 
ing themselves from the productive sector of the economy and pad- 
ding an increasingly parasitic aristocracy, provided additional funds. 
Potential profit from the sale of property served as an incentive 
for further confiscations from conversos and Moriscos. 

Spain's apparent prosperity in the sixteenth century was not 
based on actual economic growth. As its bullion supply decreased 
in the seventeenth century, Spain was neither able to meet the cost 



19 



Spain: A Country Study 

of its military commitments nor to pay for imports of manufac- 
tured goods that could not be produced efficiently at home. The 
overall effect of plague and emigration reduced Spain's popula- 
tion from 8 million in the early sixteenth century to 7 million by 
the mid- seventeenth century. Land was taken out of production 
for lack of labor and the incentive to develop it, and Spain, although 
predominantly agrarian, depended on imports of foodstuffs. 

Spain in Decline 

The seventeenth century was a period of unremitting political, 
military, economic, and social decline. Neither Philip III (r. 1598- 
1621) nor Philip IV (r. 1621-65) was competent to give the kind 
of clear direction that Philip II had provided. Responsibility passed 
to aristocratic advisers. Gaspar de Guzman, count-duke of Olivares, 
attempted and failed to establish the centralized administration that 
his famous contemporary, Cardinal Richelieu, had introduced in 
France. In reaction to Guzman's bureaucratic absolutism, Catalonia 
revolted and was virtually annexed by France. Portugal, with 
English aid, reasserted its independence in 1640, and an attempt 
was made to separate Andalusia from Spain. In 1648, at the Peace 
of Westphalia, Spain assented to the emperor's accommodation 
with the German Protestants, and in 1654 it recognized the indepen- 
dence of the northern Netherlands. 

During the long regency for Charles II (1665-1700), the last of 
the Spanish Habsburgs, validos milked Spain's treasury, and Spain's 
government operated principally as a dispenser of patronage. 
Plague, famine, floods, drought, and renewed war with France 
wasted the country. The Peace of the Pyrenees (1659) ended fifty 
years of warfare with France, whose king, Louis XIV, found the 
temptation to exploit weakened Spain too great. As part of the peace 
settlement, the Spanish infanta Maria Teresa, had become the wife 
of Louis XIV. Using Spain's failure to pay her dowry as a pretext, 
Louis instigated the War of Devolution (1667-68) to acquire the 
Spanish Netherlands in lieu of the dowry. Most of the European 
powers were ultimately involved in the wars that Louis fought in 
the Netherlands. 

Bourbon Spain 

Charles II, the product of generations of inbreeding, was unable 
to rule and remained childless. The line of Spanish Habsburgs came 
to an end at his death. Habsburg partisans argued for allocating 
succession to the Austrian branch of the Habsburg dynasty, but 
Charles II, in one of his last official acts, left Spain to his nephew, 
Philip of Anjou, a Bourbon and the grandson of Louis XIV. This 



20 



Historical Setting 



solution appealed to Castilian legitimists because it complied with 
the principle of succession to the next in the bloodline. Spanish 
officials had been concerned with providing for the succession in 
such a way as to guarantee an integral, independent Spanish state 
that, along with its possessions in the Netherlands and in Italy, 
would not become part of either a pan-Bourbon or a pan-Habsburg 
empire. ''The Pyrenees are no more," Louis XIV rejoiced at his 
grandson's accession as Philip V (r. 1700-46). The prospect of the 
Spanish Netherlands falling into French hands, however, alarmed 
the British and the Dutch. 

War of the Spanish Succession 

The acceptance of the Spanish crown by Philip V in the face 
of counterclaims by Archduke Charles of Austria, who was sup- 
ported by Britain and the Netherlands, was the proximate cause 
of the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-14), the first "world 
war" fought by European powers. In 1705 an Anglo-Austrian force 
landed in Spain. A Franco-Castilian army halted its advance on 
Madrid, but the invaders occupied Catalonia. Castile enthusiasti- 
cally received the Bourbon dynasty, but the Catalans opposed it, 
not so much out of loyalty to the Habsburgs as in defense of their 
fueros against the feared imposition of French-style centralization 
by a Castilian regime. 

The War of the Spanish Succession was also a Spanish civil war. 
Britain agreed to a separate peace with France, and the allies with- 
drew from Catalonia, but the Catalans continued their resistance 
under the banner "Privilegis o Mort" (Liberty or Death). Catalonia 
was devastated, and Barcelona fell to Philip V after a prolonged 
siege (1713-14). 

The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) brought the war to a close and 
recognized the Bourbon succession in Spain on the condition that 
Spain and France would never be united under the same crown. 
The Spanish Netherlands (which become known as the Austrian 
Netherlands and later as Belgium) and Spain's Italian possessions, 
however, reverted to the Austrian Habsburgs. Britain retained 
Gibraltar and Minorca, seized during the war, and received trade 
concessions in Spanish America. Spain emerged from the war with 
its internal unity and colonial empire intact, but with its political 
position in Europe weakened. 

Philip V undertook to modernize Spanish government through 
his French and Italian advisers. Centralized government was insti- 
tutionalized, local fueros were abrogated, regional parliaments were 
abolished, and the aristocracy's independent influence on the coun- 
cils of state was destroyed. 



21 



Spain: A Country Study 

The Enlightenment 

Charles III (r. 1759-88), Spain's enlightened despot par excel- 
lence, served his royal apprenticeship as king of Naples. He was 
one of Europe's most active patrons of the Enlightenment, a period 
during which attempts were made to reform society through the 
application of reason to political, social, and economic problems. 
Despite Charles's attempt to reform the economy, the impact of 
the Enlightenment was essentially negative. Anticlericalism was an 
integral part of Enlightenment ideology, but it was carried to greater 
lengths in Spain than elsewhere in Europe because of government 
sponsorship. Public charities financed by the church were consid- 
ered antisocial because they were thought to discourage initiative, 
and they were therefore abolished. The state suppressed monasteries 
and confiscated their property. The Jesuits, outspoken opponents 
of regalism, were expelled. Their expulsion virtually crippled higher 
education in Spain. The state also banned the teachings of medieval 
philosophers and of the sixteenth-century Jesuit political theorists 
who had argued for the ' 'divine right of the people' ' over their kings. 
The government employed the Inquisition to discipline antiregalist 
clerics. 

Economic recovery was noticeable, and government efficiency 
was greatiy improved at the higher levels during Charles Ill's reign. 
The Bourbon reforms, however, resulted in no basic changes in 
the pattern of property holding. Neither land reform nor increased 
land use occurred. The rudimentary nature of bourgeois class con- 
sciousness in Spain hindered the creation of a middle-class move- 
ment. Despite the development of a national bureaucracy in 
Madrid, government programs foundered because of the lethargy 
of administrators at lower levels and because of a backward rural 
population. The reform movement could not be sustained without 
the patronage of Charles III, and it did not survive him. 

The Napoleonic Era 

Charles IV (r. 1788-1807) retained the trappings of his father's 
enlightened despotism, but he was dominated by his wife's favorite, 
a guards officer, Manuel de Godoy, who at the age of twenty-five 
was chief minister and virtual dictator of Spain. When the French 
National Assembly declared war in 1793, Godoy rode the popular 
wave of reaction building in Spain against the French Revolution 
and joined the coalition against France. Spanish arms suffered 
repeated setbacks, and in 1796 Godoy shifted allies and joined the 
French against Britain. Godoy, having been promised half of Por- 
tugal as his personal reward, became Napoleon Bonaparte's willing 



22 



The Giralda, 
symbol of the city 
of Sevilla, in the 
late nineteenth century 
Courtesy Prints and 
Photographs Division, 
Library of Congress 



puppet. Louisiana, Spanish since 1763, was restored to France. 
A regular subsidy was paid to France from the Spanish treasury, 
and 15,000 Spanish troops were assigned to garrisons in northern 
Europe. 

Military reverses and economic misery caused a popular upris- 
ing in March 1808 that forced the dismissal of Godoy and the abdic- 
tion of Charles IV. The king was succeeded by his son, Ferdinand 
VII (r. 1808; 1814-33). The French forced Ferdinand to abdicate 
almost immediately, however, and Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon's 
brother, was named king of Spain. A large French army was moved 
in to support the new government and to invade Britain's ally, Por- 
tugal, from Spanish soil. The afrancesados, a small but influential 
group of Spaniards who favored reconstructing their country on 
the French model, welcomed the Bonapartist regime. 

To ingratiate himself with the afrancesados, Joseph Bonaparte 
proclaimed the dissolution of religious houses. The defense of the 
Roman Catholic Church, which had long been attacked by suc- 
cessive Spanish governments, now became the test of Spanish patri- 
otism and the cause around which resistance to the French rallied. 
The citizens of Zaragoza held out against superior French forces 
for more than a year. In Asturias, local forces took back control 
of their province, and an army of Valencians temporarily forced 
the French out of Madrid. The War of Independence (1808-14), 
as the Iberian phase of the Napoleonic wars is known in Spanish 



23 



Spain: A Country Study 

historiography, attained the status of a popular crusade that united 
all classes, parties, and regions in a common struggle. It was a war 
fought without rules or regular battlelines. The Spanish painter, 
Goya, depicted the brutality practiced on both sides. 

The British dispatched an expeditionary force, originally intended 
to occupy part of Spanish America, to the Iberian Peninsula in 
1808. In the next year, a larger contingent under Arthur Wellesley, 
later duke of Wellington, followed. Elements of the Spanish army 
held Cadiz, the only major city not taken by the French, but the 
countryside belonged to the guerrillas, who held down 250,000 of 
Napoleon's best troops under Marshal Nicholas Soult, while Wel- 
lington waited to launch the offensive that was to cause the defeat 
of the French at Vitoria (1813). 

The Liberal Ascendancy 
The Cadiz Cortes 

From the first days of the War of Independence, juntas, estab- 
lished by army commanders, guerrilla leaders, or local civilian 
groups, appeared in areas outside French control. They also existed 
underground as alternatives to the French-imposed government. 
Unity extended only to fighting the French, however. Coups were 
frequent, and there was sometimes bloody competition among mili- 
tary, partisan, and civilian groups for control of the juntas. A cen- 
tral junta sat in Cadiz. It had litde authority, except as surrogate 
for the absent royal government. It succeeded, however, in call- 
ing together representatives from local juntas in 1810, with the 
vague notion of creating the Cortes of All the Spains, so called 
because it would be the single legislative body for the empire and 
its colonies. Many of the overseas provinces had by that time already 
declared their independence. Some saw the Cortes at Cadiz as an 
interim government until the Desired One, as Ferdinand VII was 
called by his supporters, could return to the throne. Many regalists 
could not admit that a parliamentary body could legislate in the 
absence of a king. 

The delegates at the Cortes at Cadiz formed into two main cur- 
rents, liberal and conservative. The liberals carried on the reformist 
philisophy of Charles III and added to it many of the new ideals 
of the French Revolution. They wanted equality before the law, 
a centralized government, an efficient modern civil service, a reform 
of the tax system, the replacement of feudal privileges by freedom 
of contract, and the recognition of the property owner's right to 
use his property as he saw fit. As the liberals were the majority, 
they were able to transform the assembly from interim government 



24 



Historical Setting 



to constitutional convention. The product of the Cortes' s delibera- 
tions reflected the liberals' dominance, for the constitution of 1812 
came to be the "sacred codex" of liberalism, and during the nine- 
teenth century it served as a model for liberal constitutions of Latin 
nations. 

As the principal aim of the new constitution was the prevention 
of arbitrary and corrupt royal rule, it provided for a limited monar- 
chy which governed through ministers subject to parliamentary con- 
trol. Suffrage, determined by property qualifications, favored the 
position of the commercial class in the new parliament, in which 
there was no special provision for the church or the nobility. The 
constitution set up a rational and efficient centralized administra- 
tive system based on newly formed provinces and municipalties 
rather than on the historic provinces. Repeal of traditional property 
restrictions gave the liberals the freer economy they wanted. 

The 1812 Constitution marked the initiation of the Spanish tra- 
dition of liberalism; by the country's standards, however, it was 
a revolutionary document, and when Ferdinand VII was restored 
to the throne in 1814 he refused to recognize it. He dismissed the 
Cadiz Cortes and was determined to rule as an absolute monarch. 

Spain's American colonies took advantage of the postwar chaos 
to proclaim their independence, and most established republican 
governments. By 1825 only Cuba and Puerto Rico remained under 
the Spanish flag in the New World. When Ferdinand was restored 
to the throne in Madrid, he expended wealth and manpower in 
a vain effort to reassert control over the colonies. The move was 
unpopular among liberal officers assigned to the American wars. 

Rule by Pronunciamiento 

In 1820 Major Rafael de Riego led a revolt among troops quar- 
tered in Cadiz while awaiting embarkation to America. Garrison 
mutinies were not unusual, but Riego issued a pronunciamiento , or 
declaration of principles, to the troops, which was directed against 
the government and which called for the army to support adop- 
tion of the 1812 constitution. Support for Riego spread from gar- 
rison to garrison, toppling the regalist government and forcing 
Ferdinand to accept the liberal constitution. The pronunciamiento, 
distributed by barracks politicians among underpaid members of 
an overstaffed officer corps, became a regular feature of Spanish 
politics. An officer or group of officers would seek a consensus 
among fellow officers in opposing or supporting a particular policy 
or in calling for a change in government. If any government were 
to survive, it needed the support of the army. If a pronunciamiento 
received sufficient backing, the government was well advised to 



25 



Spain: A Country Study 

defer to it. This "referendum in blood" was considered within the 
army to be the purest form of election because the soldiers sup- 
porting a pronunciamiento — at least in theory — were expressing their 
willingness to shed blood to make their point. A pronunciamiento was 
judged to have succeeded only if the government gave in to it 
without a fight. If it did not represent a consensus within the army 
and there was resistance to it, the pronunciamiento was considered 
a failure, and the officers who had proposed it dutifully went into 
exile. 

French intervention, ordered by Louis XVIII on an appeal from 
Ferdinand and with the assent of his conservative officers, brought 
the three years of liberal government under the 1812 constitution — 
called the Constitutional Triennium (1820-23) — to an abrupt close. 
The arrival of the French was welcomed in many sectors. Ferdi- 
nand, restored as absolute monarch, chose his ministers from the 
ranks of the old qfrancesados. 

Ferdinand VII, a widower, was childless, and Don Carlos, his 
popular, traditionalist brother, was heir presumptive. In 1829, 
however, Ferdinand married his Neapolitan cousin, Maria Cristina, 
who gave birth to a daughter, an event followed closely by the revo- 
cation of provisions prohibiting female succession. Ferdinand died 
in 1833, leaving Maria Cristina as regent for their daughter, Isabella 
II (r. 1833-68). 

Don Carlos contested his niece's succession, and he won the 
fanatical support of the traditionalists of Aragon and of Basque 
Navarre (Spanish, Navarra). The Carlists (supporters of Don 
Carlos) held that legitimate succession was possible only through 
the male line. Comprising agrarians, regionalists, and Catholics, 
the Carlists also opposed the middle class — centralist, anticlerical 
liberals who flocked to support the regency. The Carlists fielded 
an army that held off government attempts to suppress them for 
six years (1833-39), during which time Maria Cristina received 
British aid in arms and volunteers. A Carlist offensive against 
Madrid in 1837 failed, but in the mountains, the Basques continued 
to resist until a compromise peace in 1839 recognized their ancient 
fueros. Sentiment for Don Carlos and for his successor remained 
strong in Navarre, and the Carlists continued as a serious political 
force. Carlist uprisings occurred in 1847 and again from 1872 to 
1876. 

Liberal Rule 

The regency had come to depend on liberal support within the 
army during the first Carlist war, but after the end of the war against 
the traditionalists, both the liberals and the army tired of Maria 



26 



Historical Setting 



Cristina. They forced her to resign in 1840, and a liberal govern- 
ment assumed responsibility for the regency. 

The liberals were a narrowly based elite. Their abstract ideal- 
ism and concern for individual liberties contrasted sharply with the 
paternalistic attitudes of Spain's rural society. There was no 
monolithic liberal movement in Spain, but anticlericalism, the 
touchstone of liberalism, unified the factions. They theorized that 
the state was the sum of the individuals living within it and that 
it could recognize and protect only the rights of individuals, not 
the rights of corporate institutions, such as the church or universi- 
ties, or the rights of the regions as separate entities with distinct 
customs and interests. Because only individuals were subject to the 
law, only individuals could hold title to land. As nothing should 
impede the development of the individual, so nothing should impede 
the state in guaranteeing the rights of the individual. 

Liberals also agreed on the necessity of a written constitution, 
a parliamentary government, and a centralized administration, as 
well as the need for laissez-faire economics. All factions found a 
voice in the army and drew leadership from its ranks. All had con- 
fidence that progress would follow naturally from the application 
of liberal principles. They differed, however, on the methods to 
be used in applying these principles. 

The Moderates saw economic development within a free market 
as the cure for political revolution. They argued for a strong con- 
stitution that would spell out guaranteed liberties. The Progres- 
sives, like the Moderates, were members of the upper and the 
middle classes, but they drew support from the urban masses and 
favored creation of a more broadly based electorate. They argued 
that greater participation in the political process would ensure eco- 
nomic development and an equitable distribution of its fruits. Both 
factions favored constitutional monarchy. The more radical 
Democrats, however, believed that political freedom and economic 
liberalism could only be achieved in a republic. 

The army backed the Moderates, who dominated the new 
regency in coalition with supporters of Isabella's succession. Local 
political leaders, called caciques, regularly delivered the vote for 
government candidates in return for patronage and assured the 
Moderates of parliamentary majorities. The Progressives courted 
the Democrats enough to be certain of regular inclusion in the 
government. State relations with the church continued to be the 
most sensitive issue confronting the government and the most divi- 
sive issue throughout the country. Despite their anticlericalism, the 
Moderates concluded a rapprochement with the church, which 
agreed to surrender its claim to confiscated property in return for 



27 



Spain: A Country Study 

official recognition by the state and a role in education. Reconcilia- 
tion with the church did not, however, win the Moderates conser- 
vative rural support. 

Modest economic gains were made during the administration 
of General Leopoldo O'Donnell, an advocate of laissez-faire poli- 
cies, who came to power in 1856 through a pronunciamiento. O'Don- 
nell had encouraged foreign investors to provide Spain with a 
railroad system, and he had also sponsored Spain's overseas expan- 
sion, particularly in Africa. Little economic growth was stimulated, 
however, except in Catalonia and the Basque region, both of which 
had already possessed an industrial base. Promises for land reform 
were broken. 

O'Donnell was one of a number of political and military figures 
around whom personalist political parties formed in the late nine- 
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Most of these parties failed 
to survive their leaders' active political careers. O'Donnell, for 
example, formed the Liberal Union as a fusion party broad enough 
to hold most liberals and to counter the drift of left-wing Progres- 
sives to the Democrats. After several years of cooperating with the 
one-party parliamentary regime, the Progressives withdrew their 
support, and in 1866 a military coup toppled O'Donnell. 

In 1868 an army revolt, led by exiled officers determined to force 
Isabella from the throne, brought General Juan Prim, an army 
hero and popular Progressive leader, to power. Isabella's abdica- 
tion inaugurated a period of experimentation with a liberal monar- 
chy, a federal republic, and finally a military dictatorship. 

As prime minister, Prim canvased Europe for a ruler to replace 
Isabella. A tentative offer made to a Hohenzollern prince was suffi- 
cient spark to set off the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71). Prim 
found a likely royal candidate in Amadeo of Savoy, son of the Italian 
king, Victor Emmanuel II. Shortly after Amadeo' s arrival in Spain, 
Prim was assassinated, leaving the new king, without a mentor, 
at the mercy of hostile politicians. The constitution bequeathed to 
the new monarchy did not leave Amadeo sufficient power to super- 
vise the formation of a stable government. Mistrustful of Prim's 
foreign prince, factional leaders refused to cooperate with, or to 
advise, Amadeo. Deserted finally by the army, Amadeo abdicated, 
leaving a rump parliament to proclaim Spain a federal republic. 

The constitution of the First Republic (1873-74) provided for 
internally self-governing provinces that were bound to the federal 
government by voluntary agreement. Jurisdiction over foreign 
and colonial affairs and defense was reserved for Madrid. In its 
eight-month life, the federal republic had four presidents, none of 
whom could find a prime minister to form a stable cabinet. The 



28 



Early-twentieth-century stereoscope card showing Madrid's Puerta del Sol 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress 

government could not decentralize quickly enough to satisfy local 
radicals. Cities and provinces made unilateral declarations of 
autonomy. Madrid lost control of the country, and once again the 
army stepped in to rescue the "national honor." A national govern- 
ment in the form of a unitary republic served briefly as the trans- 
parent disguise for an interim military dictatorship. 

The Constitutional Monarchy 

A brigadier' 's pronunciamiento that called Isabella's son, the able, 
British-educated Alfonso XII (r. 1875-85), to the throne was suffi- 
cient to restore the Bourbon monarchy. Alfonso identified himself 
as "Spaniard, Catholic, and Liberal," and his succession was 
greeted with a degree of relief, even by supporters of the republic. 
He cultivated good relations with the army (Alfonso was a cadet 
at Sandhurst, the British military academy, when summoned to 
Spain), which had removed itself from politics because it was con- 
tent with the stable, popular civilian government. Alfonso insisted 
that the official status of the church be confirmed constitutionally, 
thus assuring the restored monarchy of conservative support. 

British practices served as the model for the new constitution's 
political provisions. The new government used electoral manipu- 
lation to construct and to maintain a two-party system in par- 
liament, but the result was more a parody than an imitation. 
Conservatives and liberals, who differed in very little except name, 
exchanged control of the government at regular intervals after 



29 



Spain: A Country Study 

general elections. Once again, caciques delivered the vote to one party 
or the other as directed — in return for the assurance of patronage 
from whichever was scheduled to win, thus controlling the elec- 
tions at the constituency level. The tendency toward party frac- 
turing and personalism remained a threat to the system, but the 
restoration monarchy's artificial two-party system gave Spain a 
generation of relative quiet. 

Alfonso XIII (r. 1886-1931) was the posthumous son of Alfonso 
XII. The mother of Alfonso XIII, another Maria Cristina, acted 
as regent until her son came of age officially in 1902. Alfonso XIII 
abdicated in 1931. 

The Cuban Disaster and the "Generation of 1898" 

Emigration to Cuba from Spain was heavy in the nineteenth cen- 
tury, and the Cuban middle class, which had close ties to the mother 
country, favored keeping Cuba Spanish. Cuba had experienced 
periodic uprisings by independence movements since 1868. Suc- 
cessive governments in Madrid were committed to maintaining 
whatever armed forces were necessary to combat insurgency. Hos- 
tilities broke out again in 1895. The United States clandestinely 
supported these hostilities, which required Spain to send substantial 
reinforcements under General Valerio Weyler. Reports of Weyler's 
suppression of the independence movement, and the mysterious 
explosion of the battleship U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor, stirred 
public opinion in the United States and led to a declaration of war 
by the United States in April 1898. The United States destroyed 
antiquated Spanish naval units at Santiago de Cuba and in Manila 
Bay. Despite a pledge by Madrid to defend Cuba "to the last 
peseta," the Spanish army surrendered after a few weeks of hostili- 
ties against an American expeditionary force. In Paris that Sep- 
tember, Spain gave up Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. 

The suddenness and the totality of Spain's defeat as well as the 
country's realization of its lack of European support during the 
war with the United States (only Germany had offered diplomatic 
backing) threw Spain into despair. The disaster called forth an intel- 
lectual reevaluation of Spain's position in the world by the so-called 
"Generation of 1898," who confronted Spaniards with the proposi- 
tions that Spain had long since ceased to be a country of conse- 
quence, that its society was archaic, and that its institutions were 
outworn and incapable of moving into the twentieth century. These 
words were painful for the proud nation. 

The traumatic events of 1898 and the inability of the govern- 
ment to deal with them prompted political reevaluation. A plethora 
of new, often short-lived, personalist parties and regional groups 



30 



Historical Setting 



on both the left and the right (that broke the hegemony of the two- 
party system and ultimately left the parliamentary structure in dis- 
array) sought solutions to the country's problems. By 1915 it was 
virtually impossible to form a coalition government that could com- 
mand the support of a parliamentary majority. 

Some politicians on the right, like the conservative, Antonio 
Maura, argued for a return to traditional authoritarianism, and 
they blamed the parliamentary regimes (kept in power by caciques) 
for corrupting the country. Maura failed in his attempt to form 
a national Catholic party, but he inspired a number of right-wing 
groups with his political philosophy. 

Regionalist movements were organized to free progressive Cata- 
lonia, the Basque areas, and Galicia from the "Castilian corpse." 
Whether on the left or on the right, residents of these regions stressed 
their distinct character and history. An electoral coalition of Catalan 
parties regularly sent strong parliamentary contingents to Madrid 
to barter their votes for concessions to Catalonian regionalism. 

Alejandro Lerroux was an effective, but demagogical, political 
organizer who took his liberal splinter group into the antimonar- 
chist camp. He formed the Radical Republicans on a national, 
middle-class base that frequently allied itself with the Catalans. 

The democratic, Marxist-oriented Spanish Socialist Workers' 
Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol — PSOE), founded in 
1879, grew rapidly in the north, especially in Asturias, where a 
trade union, the General Union of Workers (Union General de 
Trabajadores — UGT), had most effectively organized the work- 
ing class. 

The Federation of Iberian Anarchists (Federacion Anarquista 
Iberica) was well organized in Catalonia and Andalusia and had 
many members, but in keeping with anarchist philosophy, they 
remained aloof from participation in the electoral process. Their 
abstention, however, had a telling effect. They practiced terrorism, 
and the anarchist trade union, the National Confederation of Labor 
(Confederation Nacional del Trabajo — CNT), was able on several 
occasions to shut down Barcelona. The aim of the anarchists was 
not to take control of the government, but to make government 
impossible. 

The African War and the Authoritarian Regime of 
Miguel Primo de Rivera 

Spain was neutral in World War I, but the Spanish army was 
constantly engaged from 1909 to 1926 against Abd al Krim's Riff 
Berbers in Morocco, where Spain had joined France in proclaiming 



31 



Spain: A Country Study 

a protectorate. Successive civilian governments in Spain allowed 
the war to continue, but they refused to supply the army with the 
means to win it. Spanish losses were heavy to their fierce and skillful 
enemy, who was equipped with superior weapons. Riots against 
conscription for the African war spread disorder throughout the 
country, and opposition to the war was often expressed in church 
burnings. Officers, who often had served in Morocco, formed juntas 
to register complaints that were just short of pronunciamientos against 
wartime inflation, low fixed salaries for the military, alleged civilian 
corruption, and inadequate and scarce equipment. 

Conditions in Morocco, increased anarchist and communist ter- 
rorism, industrial unrest, and the effects of the postwar economic 
slump prompted the pronunciamiento that brought a general officer, 
Miguel Primo de Rivera (in power, 1923-30), into office. His au- 
thoritarian regime originally enjoyed wide support in much of the 
country and had the confidence of the king and the loyalty of the 
army. The government lacked an ideological foundation, however; 
its mandate was based on general disillusionment with both the 
parliamentary government and the extreme partisan politics of the 
previous period. 

Once in power, Primo de Rivera dissolved parliament and ruled 
through directorates and the aid of the military until 1930. His 
regime sponsored public works to curb unemployment. Protec- 
tionism and state control of the economy led to a temporary eco- 
nomic recovery. A better led and better supplied army brought 
the African war to a successful conclusion in 1926. 

The precipitous economic decline in 1930 undercut support for 
the government from special-interest groups. For seven years, Primo 
de Rivera remained a man on horseback. He established no new 
system to replace parliamentary government. Criticism from aca- 
demics mounted. Bankers expressed disappointment at the state 
loans that his government had tried to float. An attempt to reform 
the promotion system cost him the support of the army. This loss 
of army support caused him to lose the support of the king. Primo 
de Rivera resigned and died shortly afterward in exile. 

Republican Spain 

Antimonarchist parties won a substantial vote in the 1931 munici- 
pal elections. Alfonso XIII interpreted the outcome of the elections 
and the riots that followed as an indication of imminent civil war. 
He left the country with his family and appealed to the army for 
support in upholding the monarchy. When General Jose Sanjurjo, 
army chief of staff, replied that the armed forces would not support 
the king against the will of the people, Alfonso abdicated. 



32 



Historical Setting 



A multiparty coalition in which regional parties held the balance 
met at a constitutional convention at San Sebastian, the summer 
capital, to proclaim the Second Republic. The goals of the new 
republic, set forth at the convention, included reform of the army, 
the granting of regional autonomy, social reform and economic 
redistribution, the separation of church and state, and depriving 
the church of a role in education. Niceto Alcala Zamora, a non- 
party conservative, became president and called elections for June. 

The first general election of the Second Republic gave a majority 
to a coalition of the Republican Left (Izquierda Republicana — 
IR) — a middle-class radical party led by Manuel Azafia, who 
became prime minister — and labor leader Francisco Largo Cabal - 
lero's PSOE, backed by the UGT. Azafia pledged that his govern- 
ment would gradually introduce socialism through the democratic 
process. His gradualism alienated the political left; his socialism, 
the right. 

Azafia' s republicanism, like nineteenth-century liberalism and 
Bourbon regalism before it, was inevitably associated with anticleri- 
calism. His government proposed to carry out the constitutional 
convention's recommendations for complete state control of edu- 
cation. 

In 1932 the Catalan Generalitat gained recognition as the autono- 
mous regional government for Catalonia. The region remained part 
of the Spanish republic and was tied more closely to it because of 
Madrid's grant of autonomy. Representatives from Catalonia to 
the Madrid parliament played an active role in national affairs. 
Efforts to reform the army and to eliminate its political power pro- 
voked a pronunciamiento against the government by Sanjurjo. The 
pronunciamiento, though unsuccessful, forced Azafia to back down 
from dealing with the military establishment for the time being. 

Azafia' s greatest difficulties derived from doctrinal differences 
within the government between his non-Marxist, bourgeois IR and 
the PSOE, which, after an initial period of cooperation, obstructed 
Azafia at every step. Opposition from the UGT blocked attempts 
at labor legislation. The PSOE complained that Azafia' s reforms 
were inadequate to produce meaningful social change, though there 
was no parliamentary majority that would have approved Largo 
Caballero's far-reaching proposals to improve conditions for work- 
ing people. Azafia' s legislative program may not have satisfied his 
ally, but it did rally moderate and conservative opinion against the 
coalition on the eve of the second general election in November 
1932. 

Azafia' s principal parliamentary opposition came from the two 
largest parties that could claim a national constituency, Lerroux's 



33 



Spain: A Country Study 

moderate, middle-class Radical Republicans and a right-wing 
Catholic organization, the Spanish Confederation of the Autono- 
mous Right (Confederation Espanola de Derechas Autonomas — 
CEDA). Lerroux, who had grown more conservative and tolerant 
since his days as an antimonarchist firebrand, capitalized on the 
left's failures to reach a compromise with the church and to deal 
with industrial unrest and with the extragovernmental power of 
the UGT and the CNT. He appealed for conservative support by 
showing that Azana was at the mercy of the unions — as he was 
when in coalition with Largo Caballero. 

CEDA was a coalition of groups under the leadership of Jose 
Maria Gil Robles, a law professor from Salamanca who had headed 
Popular Action (Action Popular), an influential Catholic political 
youth movement. As a broadly based fusion party, CEDA could 
not afford a doctrinaire political stance, and its flexibility was part 
of its strength. Some elements in the party, however, favored a 
Christian social democracy, and they took the encyclicals of Pope 
Leo XIII as their guide. CEDA never succeeded in establishing 
a working-class base. Its electoral strength lay in the Catholic middle 
class and in the rural population. Gil Robles was primarily inter- 
ested in 1932 in working for a settlement favorable to the church 
within the constitutional structure of the republic. 

In the November election, the IR and the PSOE ran separately 
rather than placing candidates on a common slate. Combined elec- 
toral lists, permitted under the constitution, encouraged coalitions; 
they were intended to prevent parliamentary fragmentation in the 
multiparty system. 

The government parties lost seats, and CEDA emerged as the 
largest single party in parliament. CEDA's showing at the polls 
was taken as a sign of conservative Spain's disenchantment with 
the Republic and its anticlericalism. But there was no question that 
the Catholic right was being called on to form a government. Presi- 
dent Zamora was hostile to CEDA, and he urged Lerroux to head 
a minority government. Lerroux agreed, but he entered into a 
parliamentary alliance with CEDA a little more than a year later. 
Lerroux did not welcome the center-right coalition; however, he 
knew the coalition presented the only means by which a parliamen- 
tary majority that included his party could be obtained. Gil Robles 
was appointed minister for war, with a role in maintaining public 
order, in the new government. 

Unions used strikes as political weapons, much as the army had 
used the pronunciamiento. Industrial disorder climaxed in a miners' 
strike in Asturias, which Azafia openly and actively supported. The 
police and the army commanded by Franco crushed the miners. 



34 



Historical Setting 



The strike confirmed to the right that the left could not be trusted 
to abide by constitutional processes, and the suppression of the strike 
proved to the left that the right was "fascist." Azafia accused Gil 
Robles of using republican institutions to destroy the republic. 

The Lerroux-Gil Robles government had as its first priority the 
restoration of order, although the government's existence was the 
chief cause of the disorder. Action on labor's legitimate grievances 
was postponed until order was restored. The most controversial 
of Gil Robles 's programs, however, was finding the means to effect 
a reconciliation with the church. In the context of the coalition with 
Lerroux, he also attempted to expand his political base by court- 
ing the support of antirepublican elements. The government 
resigned in November 1935 over a minor issue. Zamora refused 
to sanction the formation of a new government by CEDA, without 
the cooperation of which no moderate government could be put 
together. On the advice of the left, Zamora called a new general 
election for February 1936. 

The Asturian miners' strike had polarized public opinion and 
had led to the consolidation of parties on the left from Azafia' s IR 
to the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de Espafia — 
PCE). The PSOE had been increasingly "bolshevized," and it was 
difficult for a social democrat, such as Largo Caballero, to con- 
trol his party, which drifted leftward. In 1935 Soviet leader Joseph 
Stalin had sanctioned communist participation in popular front 
governments with bourgeois and democratic socialist parties. The 
Left Republicans, the PSOE, the Republican Left of Catalonia 
(Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya), the communists, a num- 
ber of smaller regional and left-wing parties, and the anarchists, 
who had boycotted previous elections as a matter of principle, joined 
to present a single leftist slate to the electorate. 

The Spanish Popular Front was to be only an electoral coali- 
tion. Its goal was not to form a government but to defeat the right. 
Largo Caballero made it clear that the Socialists would not cooperate 
in any government that did not adopt their program for nationali- 
zation, a policy as much guaranteed to break Spain in two and 
to provoke a civil war as the appointment of the CEDA-dominated 
government that Zamora had worked to prevent. 

The general election produced a number of irregularities that 
led the left, the right, and the center to claim massive voting fraud. 
Two subsequent runoff votes, recounts, and an electoral commis- 
sion controlled by the left provided the Popular Front with an 
impressive number of parliamentary seats. Azafia formed his 
minority government, but the front's victory was taken as the 
signal for the start of the left's long-awaited revolution, already 



35 



Spain: A Country Study 

anticipated by street riots, church burnings, and strikes. Workers' 
councils, which undertook to circumvent the slow- grinding wheels 
of the constitutional process, set up governments parallel to the 
traditional bodies. Zamora was removed from office on the grounds 
that he had gone beyond his constitutional authority in calling the 
general election. Azafia was named to replace him, depriving the 
IR of his strong leadership. 

The Spanish Civil War 

Gil Robles's influence, as a spokesman for the right in the new 
parliament, waned. The National Block, a smaller coalition of 
monarchists and fascists led by Jose Calvo Sotelo, who had sought 
the army's cooperation in restoring Alfonso XIII, assumed CEDA's 
role. Calvo Sotelo was murdered in July 1936, supposedly in retalia- 
tion for the killing of a police officer by fascists. Calvo Sotelo 's death 
was a signal to the army to act on the pretext that the civilian govern- 
ment had allowed the country to fall into disorder. The army issued 
a pronunciamiento. A coup was expected, however, and the urban 
police and the workers' militia loyal to the government put down 
revolts by army garrisons in Madrid and Barcelona. Navy crews 
spontaneously purged their ships of officers. The army and the left 
rejected the eleventh-hour efforts of Indalecio Prieto (who had suc- 
ceeded Azana as prime minister) to arrive at a compromise. 

The army was most successful in the north, where General Emilio 
Mola had established his headquarters at Burgos (see fig. 4). North- 
central Spain and the Carlist strongholds in Navarre and Aragon 
rallied to the army. In Morocco, elite units seized control under 
Franco, Spain's youngest general and hero. Transport supplied 
by Germany and Italy ferried Franco's African army, including 
Moorish auxiliaries, to Andalusia. Franco occupied the major cities 
in the south before turning toward Madrid to link up with Mola, 
who was advancing from Burgos. The relief of the army garrison 
besieged at Toledo, however, delayed the attack on Madrid and 
allowed time for preparation of the capital's defense. Army units 
penetrated the city limits, but they were driven back, and the 
Nationalists were able to retain the city. 

A junta of generals, including Franco, formed a government at 
Burgos, which Germany and Italy immediately recognized. San- 
jurjo, who had been expected to lead the army movement, was killed 
in a plane crash during the first days of the uprising. In October 
1936, Franco was named head of state, with the rank of generalis- 
simo and the title el caudillo (the leader). 

When he assumed leadership of the Nationalist forces, Franco 
had a reputation as a highly professional, career-oriented, combat 



36 



Historical Setting 



soldier, who had developed into a first-rate officer. Commissioned 
in the army at the age of eighteen, he had volunteered for service 
in Morocco, where he had distinguished himself as a courageous 
leader. Serious, studious, humorless, withdrawn, and abstemious, 
he had won the respect and the confidence of his subordinates more 
readily than he had won the comradeship of his brother officers. 
At the age of thirty-three, he had become the youngest general in 
Europe since Napoleon Bonaparte. 

Franco opposed Sanjurjo in 1932; still, Azaria considered Franco 
unreliable and made him captain general of the Canaries, a virtual 
exile for an ambitious officer. Though by nature a conservative, 
Franco did not wed himself to any particular political creed. On 
taking power, he set about to reconcile all right-wing, antirepubli- 
can groups in one Nationalist organization. The Falange, a fascist 
party founded by Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera (the dictator's son), 
provided the catalyst. The Carlists, revived after 1931, merged with 
the Falange in 1937, but the association was never harmonious. 
Jose Antonio's execution by the Republicans provided the Falange 
with a martyr. The more radical of the early Falange programs 
were pushed aside by more moderate elements, and the Nation- 
alists' trade unionism was only a shadow of what Jose Antonio had 
intended. The Nationalist organization did keep its fascist facade, 
but Franco's strength lay in the army. 

Nationalist strategy called for separating Madrid from Catalonia 
(which was firmly Republican), Valencia, and Murcia (which the 
republic also controlled). The Republicans stabilized the front 
around Madrid, defending it against the Nationalists for three years. 
Isolated Asturias and Vizcaya, where the newly organized Basque 
Republic fought to defend its autonomy without assistance from 
Madrid, fell to Franco in October 1937. Otherwise the battlelines 
were static until July 1938, when Nationalist forces broke through 
to the Mediterranean Sea south of Barcelona. Throughout the Civil 
War, the industrial areas — except Asturias and the Basque prov- 
inces — remained in Republican hands, while the chief food- 
producing areas were under Nationalist control. 

The republic lacked a regular trained army, though a number 
of armed forces cadres had remained loyal, especially in the air 
force and the navy. Many of the loyal officers were either purged 
or were not trusted to hold command positions. The workers' militia 
and independently organized armed political units like those of the 
Trotskyite Workers' Party of Marxist Unification (Partido Obrero 
de Unification Marxista — POUM) bore the brunt of the fighting 
in the early months of the Civil War. For example, the anarchist 



37 



Spain: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Raymond Carr, Spain 1908-1975, Oxford, 1982, 777. 



Figure 4. Territorial Control During the Spanish Civil War, 1936-37 

UGT militia and the Assault Guards (the urban police corps estab- 
lished by the Republic to counterbalance the Civil Guard — Guardia 
Civil — the paramilitary rural police who were generally considered 
reactionary) crushed the army garrison in Barcelona. Moscow 
provided advisers, logistics experts, and some field- grade officers. 
Foreign volunteers, including more than 2,000 from the United 
States, formed the International Brigade. The communists pressed 
for, and won, approval for the creation of a national, conscript 
Republican army. 

The Soviet Union supplied arms and munitions to the republic 
from the opening days of the Civil War. France provided some 
aircraft and artillery. The republic's only other conduit for arms 
supply was through Mexico. The so-called spontaneous revolutions 



38 



Historical Setting 



that plagued the industrial centers hampered arms production 
within Spain. 

Nationalist strength was based on the regular army, which in- 
cluded large contingents of Moroccan troops and battalions of the 
Foreign Legion, which Franco had commanded in Africa. The 
Carlists, who had always maintained a clandestine militia (requetes), 
were among Franco's most effective troops, and they were em- 
ployed, together with the Moroccans, as a shock corps. Italian dic- 
tator Benito Mussolini (fascist premier, 1922-45) dispatched more 
than 50,000 Italian "volunteers" (most of them army conscripts) 
to Spain, along with air and naval units. The German Condor 
Legion, made infamous by the bombing of Guernica, provided air 
support for the Nationalists and tested the tactics and the equip- 
ment used a few years later by the Luftwaffe (German air force). 
Germany and Italy also supplied large quantities of artillery and 
armor, as well as the personnel to use this weaponry. 

A nonintervention commission, including representatives from 
France, Britain, Germany, and Italy, was established at the Lyon 
Conference in 1936 to stem the flow of supplies to both sides. France 
and Britain were concerned that escalating foreign intervention 
could turn Spain's Civil War into a European war. The commis- 
sion and coastal patrols supplied by the signatory powers were to 
enforce an embargo. The net effect of the nonintervention agree- 
ment was to cut off French and British aid to the republic. Ger- 
many and Italy did not observe the agreement. The Soviet Union 
was not a signatory. By 1938, however, Stalin had lost interest in 
Spain. 

While the Republicans resisted the Nationalists by all available 
means, another struggle was going on within their own ranks. A 
majority fought essentially to protect Republican institutions. Others, 
including the communists, were committed to finishing the Civil 
War before beginning their anticipated revolution. They were, 
however, resisted by comrades-in-arms — the Trotskyites and anar- 
chists — who were intent on completing the social and political revo- 
lution while waging war against the Nationalists. 

Largo Caballero, who became prime minister in September 1936, 
had the support of the socialists and of the communists, who were 
becoming the most important political factor in the Republican 
government. The communists, after successfully arguing for a 
national conscript army that could be directed by the government, 
pressed for elimination of the militia units. They also argued for 
postponing the revolution until the fascists had been defeated and 
encouraged greater participation by the bourgeois parties in the 
Popular Front. The UGT, increasingly under communist influence, 



39 



Spain: A Country Study 

entered into the government, and the more militant elements within 
it were purged. POUM, which had resisted disbanding its indepen- 
dent military units and merging with the communist-controlled 
national army, was ruthlessly suppressed as the communists under- 
took to eliminate competing leftist organizations. Anarchists were 
dealt with in similar fashion, and in Catalonia a civil war raged 
within a civil war. 

Fearing the growth of Soviet influence in Spain, Largo Caballero 
attempted to negotiate a compromise that would end the Civil War. 
He was removed from office and replaced by Juan Negnn, a 
procommunist socialist with little previous political experience. 

The Republican army, its attention diverted by internal politi- 
cal battles, was never able to mount a sustained counteroffensive 
or to exploit a breakthrough such as that on the Rio Ebro in 1938. 
Negnn realized that Spaniards in Spain could not win the war, 
but he hoped to prolong the fighting until the outbreak of a Euro- 
pean war, which he thought was imminent. 

Barcelona fell to the Nationalists in January 1939, and Valencia, 
the temporary capital, fell in March. When factional fighting broke 
out in Madrid among the city's defenders, the Republican army 
commander seized control of what remained of the government 
and surrendered to the Nationalists on the last day of March, thus 
ending the Civil War. 

There is as much controversy over the number of casualties of 
the Spanish Civil War as there is about the results of the 1936 elec- 
tion, but even conservative estimates are high. The most consis- 
tent estimate is 600,000 dead from all causes, including combat, 
bombing, and executions. In the Republican sector, tens of thou- 
sands died of starvation, and several hundred thousand more fled 
from Spain. 

The Franco Years 

Franco's Political System 

The leader of the Nationalist forces, General Franco, headed the 
authoritarian regime that came to power in the aftermath of the Civil 
War. Until his death in November 1975, Franco ruled Spain as 
"Caudillo by the grace of God," as his coins proclaimed. In addi- 
tion to being generalissimo of the armed forces, he was both chief 
of state and head of government, the ultimate source of legitimate 
authority. He retained the power to appoint and to dismiss ministers 
and other decision makers. Even after he grew older, began to lose 
his health, and became less actively involved in policy making, 
Franco still had the final word on every major political decision. 



40 



Civilians observing an aerial dogfight during the Civil War 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress 

Ideology or political theories were not the primary motivators 
in Franco's developing of the institutions that came to be identi- 
fied with his name. Franco had spent his life as a professional soldier, 
and his conception of society was along military lines. Known for 
his iron political nerve, Franco saw himself as the one designated 
to save Spain from the chaos and instability visited upon the country 
by the evils of parliamentary democracy and political parties, which 
he blamed for destroying the unity of Spain. His pragmatic goal 
was to maintain power in order to keep what he termed the ' ' anti- 
Spain" forces from gaining ascendancy. 

The political structures established under Franco's rule repre- 
sented this pragmatic approach. Because he never formulated a 
true, comprehensive, constitutional system, Franco had great flex- 
ibility in dealing with changing domestic and international situa- 
tions. Seven fundamental laws decreed during his rule provided 
the regime with a semblance of constitutionalism, but they were 
developed after the fact, usually to legitimize an existing situation 
or distribution of power. 

The first of these fundamental laws was the Labor Charter, 
promulgated on March 9, 1938. It set forth the social policy of the 
regime, and it stressed the mutual obligations of the state and its 
citizens: all Spaniards had the duty to work, and the state was to 
assure them the right to work. Although the decree called for 



41 



Spain: A Country Study 

adequate wages, paid vacations, and a limit to working hours, it 
ensured labor's compliance with the new regime by labeling strikes 
as treason. Later legislation required Spanish workers to join ver- 
tical syndicates in which both owners and employees were supposed 
to cooperate for the good of the nation. 

Another fundamental law, the Constituent Law of the Cortes 
(1942), provided the trappings of constitutionalism. This Cortes 
(Spanish Parliament), was purely an advisory body, and it had little 
in common with democratic legislatures. Most of its members were 
indirectly elected or appointed, and many were already part of the 
administration. The Cortes did not have the right to initiate legis- 
lation or to vote against the government; it could only approve laws 
presented by the executive. There was no vestige of power attached 
to this function because the law permitted Franco to legislate by 
decree without consulting the Cortes. The Council of Ministers, 
the members of which were appointed by, and presided over, by 
Franco, exercised executive authority. Franco had the right to dis- 
miss these ministers. 

Following the Allied victories in 1945, Franco sought to impress 
the world's democratic powers with Spain's ''liberal" credentials 
by issuing a fundamental law that was ostensibly a bill of rights — 
the Charter of Rights. The rights granted by this charter were more 
cosmetic than democratic, because the government bestowed them 
and could suspend them without justification; furthermore, the 
charter placed more emphasis on the duty of all Spaniards to serve 
their country and to obey its laws than on their basic rights as 
citizens. Thus, for example, the charter guaranteed all Spaniards 
the right to express their opinions freely, but they were not to attack 
the fundamental principles of the state. 

The Law on Referenda, also issued in 1945, was a further attempt 
by Franco to make his regime appear less arbitrary. It provided 
that issues of national concern would be submitted for the considera- 
tion of Spanish citizens by means of popular referenda. Franco 
decreed this law without having consulted the Cortes, however, 
and he retained the sole right to determine whether a referendum 
would be called. The law stipulated that after 1947, a referendum 
would have to be called in order to alter any fundamental law; 
Franco retained the right to decree such laws, however — a right 
which he exercised in 1958. 

Additional measures that were taken in the immediate postwar 
years to provide the Franco regime with a facade of democracy 
included pardons and reduced terms for prisoners convicted of Civil 
War crimes and a guarantee that refugees who returned would not 
be prosecuted if they did not engage in political activities. The 



42 



Historical Setting 



regime announced new elections for municipal councils; council 
members were to be selected indirectly by syndicates and heads 
of "families." The government retained the right to appoint all 
mayors directly. 

The Law of Succession (1947) was the first of the fundamental 
laws to be submitted to popular referendum. It proclaimed that 
Spain would be a "Catholic, social, and representative monarchy" 
and that Franco would be regent for life (unless incapacitated). 
Franco had the authority to name the next king when he thought 
the time was appropriate and also to revoke his choice at a later 
date if he so desired. The law also provided for a Council of the 
Realm to assist Franco in the exercise of executive power and for 
a three-member Regency Council to be in charge of the govern- 
ment during the period of transition to the Caudillo's successor. 
When the plebiscite was held, over 90 percent of the 15 million 
voters approved the measures. Although the Law of Succession 
ostensibly reestablished the monarchy, it actually solidified Franco's 
rule and legitimized his position as head of state by popular suffrage. 

The sixth fundamental law, the Law on the Principles of the 
National Movement — which Franco decreed unilaterally in 1958 — 
further defined the institutions of Franco's government. The 
National Movement — a coalition of right-wing groups referred to 
as political "families" — termed a "communion" rather than a 
party, was designated as the sole forum for political participation. 
The law reaffirmed the nature of Spain as a traditional, Catholic 
monarchy. All top government officials, as well as all possible future 
successors to Franco, were required to pledge their loyalty to the 
principles embodied in this law (which was presented as a synthe- 
sis of all previous fundamental laws). 

The final fundamental law, the Organic Law of the State, was 
presented in 1966. It incorporated no major changes, but was 
designed to codify and to clarify existing practices, while allowing 
for some degree of reform. It established a separation between the 
functions of the president of government (prime minister) and the 
head of state, and it outlined the procedures for the selection of 
top government officials. It included other measures designed to 
modernize the Spanish system and to eliminate vestiges of fascist 
terminology. Although presented as a move toward democratiza- 
tion, it nevertheless retained the basic structure of an authoritarian 
system. 

Franco initially derived his authority from his victory in the Civil 
War. The armed forces gave his regime security; the Roman Catho- 
lic Church and the National Movement gave it legitimacy. The 
National Movement was the only recognized political organization 



43 



Spain: A Country Study 

in Franco's Spain. It was not a political party, and it did not have 
an overt ideological basis. Its membership included monarchists, 
Falangists, conservative Catholics, members of the armed forces, 
as well as business groups (with vested interests in continuity), 
technocrats, and civil servants. Although there was some overlap 
among these groups, they had distinct, and often contradictory, 
interests. The force that fused them together was their common 
loyalty to Franco. Franco was particularly skillful in manipulating 
each of these "families," giving each a taste of power, but not allow- 
ing any group or individual to create an independent base from 
which to challenge his authority. 

Franco's political system was virtually the antithesis of the final 
government of the Republican era — the Popular Front government. 
In contrast to the anticlericalism of the Popular Front, the Fran- 
coist regime established policies that were highly favorable to the 
Catholic Church, which was restored to its previous status as the 
official religion of Spain. In addition to receiving government sub- 
sidies, the church regained its dominant position in the education 
system, and laws conformed to Catholic dogma. Gains in regional 
autonomy were reversed under Franco, and Spain reverted to being 
a highly centralized state. The regime abolished regional govern- 
mental bodies and enacted measures against the use of the Basque 
and the Catalan languages. Further contrast between the Popular 
Front government and the Franco regime was apparent in their 
bases of support. Whereas the liberal leftists and the working-class 
elements of society had supported the Popular Front, the conser- 
vative upper classes were the mainstay of Franco's government. 

Above all, Franco endeavored to remove all vestiges of parliamen- 
tary democracy, which he perceived to be alien to Spanish politi- 
cal traditions. He oudawed political parties, blaming them for the 
chaotic conditions that had preceded the Civil War. He eliminated 
universal suffrage and severely limited the freedoms of expression 
and association; he viewed criticism of the regime as treason. 

In spite of the regime's strong degree of control, Franco did not 
pursue totalitarian domination of all social, cultural, and religious 
institutions, or of the economy as a whole. The Franco regime also 
lacked the ideological impetus characteristic of totalitarian govern- 
ments. Furthermore, for those willing to work within the system, 
there was a limited form of pluralism. Thus, Franco's rule has been 
characterized as authoritarian rather than totalitarian. 

Whereas there is generally consensus among analysts in desig- 
nating the regime as authoritarian, there is less agreement con- 
cerning the fascist component of Franco's Spain. In its early period, 
the Francoist state was considered, outside Spain, to be fascist. The 



44 



Historical Setting 



Falangist program of national syndicalism reflected the pattern of 
fascism prevalent in Europe during those years; nevertheless, core 
Falangists never played a major role in the new state. Most of the 
key leaders of the Falange did not survive the Civil War, and Franco 
moved quickly to subordinate the fascist party, merging it as well 
as more conservative and traditional political forces into the broader 
and vaguer National Movement under his direct control. The links 
between Franco's regime and the Roman Catholic Church, as well 
as the course of international developments, further mitigated the 
fascist component. Thus, while there was a definite fascist element 
during the first decade of Franco's rule, most analysts have con- 
cluded that early Francoism can more accurately be described as 
semifascist. 

Policies, Programs, and Growing Popular Unrest 

Severe repression marked the early years of the regime, as Franco 
sought to impose absolute political control and to institutionalize 
the Nationalist victory in the Civil War. The schisms that had pre- 
ceded and precipitated the war were maintained as the vanquished 
were excluded from political participation. Franco restricted indi- 
vidual liberties and suppressed challenges to his authority. The 
regime imposed prison terms for "revolutionary activity," and 
executions were carried out through 1944, albeit at a decreasing 
rate. These repressive measures engendered an atmosphere of fear. 
In addition, the traumatic effect of years of internecine violence, 
widespread deprivations, suffering, and disillusionment had left 
most of the Spanish population acquiescent, willing to accept any 
system that could restore peace and stability. 

During the first phase of the regime, the military played a major 
role. The state of martial law that was declared in July 1936 
remained in effect until 1948. With the backing of the armed forces, 
Franco used his extensive powers to invalidate all laws of the Sec- 
ond Republic that offended his political and ethical beliefs. He 
banned civil marriage, made divorce illegal, and made religious 
education compulsory in the schools. Publications were subject to 
prior censorship, and public meetings required official permission. 
He returned most of the land nationalized under the republic's 
agrarian program to its original owners. The state destroyed trade 
unions, confiscating their funds and property. Vertical syndicates 
replaced the unions. 

In 1939 Franco initiated a program of reconstruction based on 
the concept of economic self-sufficiency or autarchy (see The Franco 
Era, 1939-75, ch. 3). The program, aimed at increasing national 
economic production, favored the established industrial and 



45 



Spain: A Country Study 

financial interests at the expense of the lower classes and the agricul- 
tural regions. Acute shortages and starvation wages were widespread 
in the early 1940s, a period which saw the worst inflation in Spain's 
history. By the end of the decade, Spain's level of economic devel- 
opment was among the lowest in southern Europe. Furthermore, 
the ostracism that Spain experienced because of Franco's collabora- 
tion with the Axis powers during World War II and because of 
the dictatorial nature of his regime deprived the country of the 
benefits of the Marshall Plan, which was a major factor in the 
rebuilding of Europe's postwar economy (see Foreign Policy under 
Franco, this ch.). 

As the 1940s drew to a close, agricultural imbalances, labor 
unrest, and a growing pressure for industrial development forced 
the regime to begin to modify its autarchic policies. Spain's need 
for food, raw materials, energy, and credit made it necessary for 
the country to establish some link to the international economy. 
Spain achieved this goal when the United States decided to seek 
the political and strategic advantages of Spanish friendship in the 
face of an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union. With the infusion 
of American capital, Spain's economy revived, and living standards 
began to improve. There was a degree of economic liberalization, 
and industrial production increased significandy in the 1950s. Eco- 
nomic liberalization did not result in a relaxation of authoritarian 
control, however. The regime swiftly repressed workers' demon- 
strations in the spring of 1951 and student protests in 1956. 

The regime's "families" did not agree unanimously on the new 
economic policies, and there were clashes between the progressive 
and the reactionary forces. The Falange resisted the opening of 
the regime to capitalistic influences, while the technocrats of the 
powerful Catholic pressure group, Opus Dei, de-emphasized the 
role of the syndicates and favored increased competition as a means 
of achieving rapid economic growth. The technocrats prevailed, 
and members of Opus Dei assumed significant posts in Franco's 
1957 cabinet (see Political Interest Groups, ch. 4). Although Opus 
Dei did not explicitly support political liberalization, it aspired to 
economic integration with Europe, which meant that Spain would 
be exposed to democratic influences. 

Measures proposed by these technocrats to curb inflation, to 
reduce government economic controls, and to bring Spanish eco- 
nomic policies and procedures in line with European standards were 
incorporated in the Stabilization Plan of 1959. The plan laid the 
basis for Spain's remarkable economic transformation in the 1960s. 
During that decade, Spain's industrial production and standard 
of living increased dramatically. 



46 



Medieval walls of Avila 
Courtesy National 
Tourist Office of Spain 




Rapid economic development had political and social conse- 
quences, however. Economic expansion resulted in a larger and 
better educated middle class than had ever existed in Spain, as well 
as in a new urban working class. Furthermore, the unprecedented 
degree of foreign cultural influence had a marked impact on Spanish 
society (see Social Values and Attitudes, ch. 2). All of these fac- 
tors contributed to an increasing level of dissatisfaction with the 
restrictions that Franco had imposed. These restrictions were seen 
as impediments to further growth and modernization. 

The technocrats had hoped that greater economic prosperity 
would eliminate hostility toward Francoism, but tension between 
an increasingly dynamic Spanish society and the oppressive regime 
that governed it resulted in growing domestic opposition through- 
out the 1960s. The expanding industrial labor force became increas- 
ingly militant. Workers organized clandestine commissions, and 
recurrent strikes and bombings were indications that Franco would 
not be able to maintain his repressive grip on the labor force indefi- 
nitely. 

In addition, regional discontent was giving rise to escalating 
violent protests in the Basque region and in Catalonia. Agitation 
was also growing among university students who resented the stric- 
tures of Franco's regime. There was even opposition among the 
members of one of Franco's former bastions of support, the clergy. 
The younger liberal priests in the Catholic Church in Spain had 



47 



Spain: A Country Study 

responded with enthusiasm to the Second Vatican Council, which 
emphasized individual liberties and progressive social policies. The 
priests were also increasingly vocal in their attacks on the oppres- 
sive aspects of Francoism. 

The unrest of the mid-1960s did not seriously threaten Spain's 
stability, however, and Franco — after twenty-five years in power — 
felt the regime was sufficiently secure and economically booming 
for a slight loosening of his authoritarian control. The Organic Law 
of the State, which had been approved by referendum in 1966, 
provided this modicum of liberalization while it solidified Franco's 
political system (see Franco's Political System, this ch.). The Law 
on Religious Freedom, approved in June 1967, eased restrictions 
on non-Catholics. In the same year, the regime modified censor- 
ship laws, and a considerably wider expression of opinion followed. 
In July 1969, Franco provided his regime with a greater degree 
of legitimacy and continuity by naming as his successor a legiti- 
mate heir to the throne, Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon. 

The closing years of Franco's regime were marked by increas- 
ing violence and unrest. The anticipation of the dictator's demise 
and his increasing incapacity destabilized the country, and there 
was ongoing conflict between those who sought to liberalize the 
regime in order to secure its survival and those of the bunker men- 
tality who resisted reforms. As a recession in the late 1960s over- 
took rapid economic expansion, labor agitation heightened. An 
unprecedented wave of strikes and increasing rebellion in the univer- 
sities moved Franco to proclaim a state of exception throughout 
Spain in the early months of 1969. Freedom of expression and 
assembly were among the constitutional rights that were suspended, 
and Spain appeared to be returning to the repressive conditions 
of the 1940s. The revival of dictatorial policies had international 
repercussions and threatened negotiations with the United States 
for renewal of an agreement on United States military bases. Franco 
lifted the state of exception in March 1969, but the government's 
efforts to achieve legitimacy had been seriously undermined. The 
remaining years of Franco's rule saw periods of intensified opposi- 
tion to which the government responded with harshly repressive 
measures that merely served to broaden and to inflame the resis- 
tance, leaving the regime in a state of constant turmoil. 

The most virulent opposition to the Franco regime in the late 
1960s and the early 1970s came from the revolutionary Basque 
nationalist group, Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna — ETA; see Threats to Internal Security, ch. 5). This 
extremist group used terror tactics and assassinations to gain recog- 
nition of its demands for regional autonomy. The ETA's most 



48 



Historical Setting 



daring act was the assassination in December 1973 of Luis Car- 
rero Blanco, whom Franco had appointed as his first prime minister. 
Carrero Blanco had embodied hard-line Francoism, and he was 
seen as the one who would carry on the Caudillo's policies. His 
assassination precipitated the regime's most serious governmental 
crisis and interrupted the continuity that Franco had planned. 

The tensions that had been mounting within the regime since 
the late 1960s would have made a continuation of Franco's system 
untenable even without Carrero Blanco's death. Conflicts between 
the reactionary elements of the regime and those who were willing 
to open the door to reform had plagued Carrero Blanco. These 
conflicts continued under his successor, Carlos Arias Navarro. In 
his first speech to the Cortes on February 12, 1974, the new prime 
minister promised liberalizing reforms, including the right to form 
political associations; however, diehard Francoists on the right, who 
equated any change with chaos, and radical reformers on the left, 
who were not content with anything less than a total break with 
the past, condemned Arias Navarro. 

Both camps were dissatisfied with the political associations bill 
that eventually became law in December 1974. The law required 
that political participation be in accord with the principles of the 
National Movement and placed associations under its jurisdiction. 
The law offered no significant departure from Francoism. Would- 
be reformers saw it as a sham; reactionaries criticized it as the begin- 
ning of a limited political party system. 

Opposition to the regime mounted on all sides in 1974 and 1975. 
Labor strikes, in which even actors participated, spread across the 
country. Universities were in a state of turmoil, as the popular 
clamor for democracy grew more strident. Terrorist activity reached 
such a level that the government placed the Basque region under 
martial law in April 1975. By the time of Franco's death on Novem- 
ber 20, 1975, Spain was in a chronic state of crisis. 

Franco's legacy had been an unprecedented era of peace and 
order, under girded by his authoritarian grip on the country. While 
forced political stability enabled Spain to share in the remarkable 
period of economic development experienced by Europe in the 
1960s, it suppressed, but did not eliminate, longstanding sources 
of conflict in Spanish society. The economic and social transfor- 
mation that Spain experienced in the last decades of Francoist rule 
complicated these tensions, which were exacerbated as the regime 
drew to a close. At the time of Franco's death, change appeared 
inevitable. The form that the change would take and the extent 
to which it could be controlled were less certain. 



49 



Spain: A Country Study 
Foreign Policy under Franco 

The overriding need to strengthen the regime determined for- 
eign policy in the first phase of Franco's rule. Weakened by the 
devastation of civil war, the country could not afford to become 
involved in a protracted European conflict. Although Franco was 
deeply indebted to Germany and to Italy for their decisive contri- 
bution to his victory over the Republicans, he declared Spain's neu- 
trality in the opening days of World War II. His sympathies, 
nevertheless, were openly with the Axis powers; he had, in fact, 
already joined the Anti-Comintern Pact and had signed a secret 
treaty of friendship with Germany in March 1939. There was 
genuine enthusiasm for the fascist cause among important elements 
of the Franco regime, especially the Falange. 

Spain altered its policy of neutrality following the lightning suc- 
cess of Germany's 1940 spring offensive. The German armies 
appeared invincible, and Franco was eager to assure Spain a voice 
in the postwar settlement. In June 1940, the Spanish government 
adopted a policy of nonbelligerency, which permitted German sub- 
marines to be provisioned in Spanish ports and German airplanes 
to use Spanish landing strips. This stance was widely interpreted 
as foreshadowing Spain's entry on the side of the Axis powers; the 
German Nazi leader, Adolf Hitler, and Franco discussed this move 
on more than one occasion. The two dictators could never come 
to terms, however. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 
1941 presented Franco with a unique opportunity to participate 
in the conflict without a declaration of war and to get revenge for 
the Soviet Union's aid to the Republicans. Franco agreed to a 
Falangist request for the official formation of a Blue Division of 
volunteers — which reached a maximum strength of 18,000 men — to 
fight on the eastern front. Franco still believed that the Axis powers 
would win the war, and he considered the intervention of Spanish 
volunteers to be an inexpensive way of assuring recognition of 
Spain's colonial claims after the war was over. 

The war turned in favor of the Allies with the entry of the United 
States in December 1941 and the Allied landing in Casablanca in 
November 1942. At that time, Spain replaced its pro- Axis policy 
with a genuinely neutral stance. Spain withdrew the Blue Division 
from the eastern front in November 1943, thus ending Franco's 
major collaboration with Nazi Germany. In May 1944, Spain and 
the Allies concluded an agreement. The Spanish government agreed 
to end wolfram shipments to Germany, to close the German con- 
sulate in Tangier, and to expel German espionage agents. In 



50 



Historical Setting 



exchange for these actions, the Allies were to ship petroleum and 
other necessary supplies to Spain. 

By the end of 1944, Spain had entered into a period of "benevo- 
lent neutrality" toward the Allies. Spain allowed Allied aircraft 
to land inside its borders and permitted Allied intelligence agents 
to operate in Madrid. In spite of this opportunistic policy shift, 
Spain was ostracized at the end of the war by the victorious pow- 
ers. Although the United States president, Harry S Truman, and 
the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, successfully resisted 
Stalin's proposals at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 for Allied 
intervention against Franco, Spain was denied membership in the 
United Nations (UN) because its government had come to power 
with the assistance of the Axis powers and had collaborated with 
them during the war. 

A resolution adopted by the second meeting of the UN General 
Assembly in December 1946 expressed the most severe postwar 
censure of the Franco regime. According to this resolution, Spain 
would be banned from the UN and would not be allowed to par- 
ticipate in any of its specialized agencies, as long as Franco remained 
in power. Franco did not appear seriously concerned by this cen- 
sure, nor by the subsequent exclusion of Spain from the Marshall 
Plan. In fact, he used the international ostracism to strengthen his 
hold over the Spanish government. During this period of isolation, 
the Argentine government of Juan Peron (president, 1946-55) 
provided Spain with crucial economic support. 

Franco was convinced that attacks on his regime were the work 
of communist forces, and he felt certain that the Western powers 
would someday recognize Spain's contribution in maintaining its 
solitary vigil against bolshevism. As events evolved, Spain's anti- 
communist stance proved to be a significant factor in the United 
States decision to revise its policy toward Spain in view of the Cold 
War. 

As the United States became increasingly concerned with the 
Soviet threat following the fall of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin block- 
ade in 1948, and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, United 
States policy makers also began to recognize the strategic impor- 
tance of the Iberian Peninsula; furthermore, they realized that 
ostracism had failed and that the Franco regime was stronger than 
ever. The United States government took steps to normalize its 
political and economic relations with Spain in the years 1948-50. 
In September 1950, President Truman signed a bill that appropri- 
ated US$62.5 million for aid to Spain. In the same year, the United 
States supported a UN resolution lifting the boycott on Franco's 
regime and resumed full diplomatic relations with Spain in 1951. 



51 



Spain: A Country Study 



As Spain became an increasingly important link in the overall 
defense system of the United States against the Soviet Union, the 
period of isolation came to an end. 

Two major agreements signed in 1953 strengthened the Franco 
regime: the Concordat with the Vatican and the Pact of Madrid. 
The Concordat, signed in August 1953, was to replace the 1851 
document that the republic had abrogated. The new agreement 
provided full church recognition of Franco's government. At the 
same time, it reaffirmed the confessional nature of the Spanish state; 
the public practice of other religions was not permitted. The agree- 
ment was more favorable to the Vatican than to Franco; it included 
measures that significantly increased the independence of the church 
within the Spanish system. The Concordat served, nevertheless, 
to legitimize the regime in the eyes of many Spaniards, and it was 
instrumental in strengthening Franco's hold over the country. 

The Pact of Madrid, signed shortly after the Concordat, fur- 
ther symbolized the Spanish regime's rehabilitation. It also marked 
the end of Spanish neutrality. The Pact consisted of three separate, 
but interdependent, agreements between Spain and the United 
States. It provided for mutual defense, for military aid to Spain, 
and for the construction of bases there. The United States was to 
use these bases for a renewable ten-year period, but the bases 
remained under Spanish sovereignty. Although the pact did not 
constitute a full-fledged military alliance, it did commit the United 
States to support Spain's defense efforts; furthermore, it provided 
Spain with much-needed economic assistance. During the first ten 
years of the Pact of Madrid, the United States sent approximately 
US$1.5 billion in all kinds of aid to Spain. 

Two years later, in 1955, the UN approved Spain's member- 
ship. In a visit by the United States president, D wight D. Eisen- 
hower, to the Spanish capital in 1959, the two generals received 
warm public welcomes as they toured the city together. The visit 
further emphasized Franco's acceptance and the end of Spain's 
ostracism. Franco placed a high value on Spain's relationship with 
the United States, for the prestige it conferred as well as for stra- 
tegic reasons. This relationship continued to be a dominant factor 
in the development of the country's foreign policy. 

Spain's European neighbors were less willing than the United 
States to modify their aversion to Franco's authoritarian rule. The 
West European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion (NATO) vetoed efforts to include Spain. Spain's applications 
for association with the European Community (EC — see Glossary) 
were also repeatedly rejected. Although a Trade Preference Treaty 
between Spain and the EC signed in 1970 seemed to herald a thaw 



52 




in relations, Spain's entry into the EC continued to be a political 
issue throughout Franco's lifetime. Spanish membership in the 
Community, considered by Spanish economists and businessmen 
as crucial for Spain's economic development, had to await the 
democratization of the regime (see Spain and the European Com- 
munity, ch. 4). 

A more intractable problem than Spain's entry into the EC was 
the fate of Gibraltar, a sore point in Anglo-Spanish relations since 
1713, when Spain ceded the area to Britain under the terms of the 
Treaty of Utrecht (see War of the Spanish Succession, this ch.). 
The question of sovereignty, which had been dormant during the 
years of the Second Republic, revived in the 1960s and jeopardized 
otherwise friendly relations between Britain and Spain. Spain has 
never relinquished its claim to Gibraltar, while the British have 
maintained that the inhabitants of the area should determine Gibral- 
tar' s fate. The heterogeneous population of Gibraltar enjoyed local 
democratic self-government and an increasingly higher standard 
of living than that prevailing in Spain; therefore, it was not a sur- 
prise when they voted almost unanimously in a referendum held 
in 1967 to remain under British rule. The UN repeatedly con- 
demned the "colonial situation" and demanded— to no avail — its 
termination. In 1969 Spain took steps to seal off Gibraltar from 
the mainland and to accelerate the economic development program 
for the area surrounding it, known as Campo de Gibraltar. The 



53 



Spain: A Country Study 

situation continued in stalemate throughout the remainder of the 
Franco regime. 

Franco may have been frustrated with the problem of Gibral- 
tar, but he was optimistic about his potential for maintaining a 
powerful position for Spain in North Africa. As a former command- 
ing officer of Spanish colonial garrisons in Morocco, Franco had 
developed close ties to the area, and during the postwar period, 
he placed great emphasis on maintaining Spain's position in the 
Arab world. Appealing to historical, cultural, and political ties, 
Franco endeavored to act as self-appointed protector of Arab inter- 
ests and to portray Spain as an essential bridge, or mediator, 
between Europe and the Arab countries. 

Despite the regime's position as a colonial power in northwest 
Africa, relations between Spain and the Arab countries became 
closer in the late 1940s, in part because of Spain's nonrecognition 
of Israel. A visit by Spain's foreign minister to the Middle East 
resulted in a variety of economic and cultural agreements, and the 
Arab states assumed a benevolent attitude toward Spain's position 
in Morocco. Nevertheless, France's decision to withdraw from 
Morocco in early 1956, following the successful struggle waged by 
Moroccan nationalists against French control, left little prospect 
of Spain's retaining its zone. (In the spring of the same year, France 
relinquishied the protectorate.) 

In the following decades, Spain's position in North Africa eroded 
further. A long series of conflicts with Morocco resulted in the 
abandonment of much of Spain's colonial territory in the 1960s. 
When Morocco's Mohammed V made it clear in 1958 that he had 
designs on the Spanish Sahara, Spain opposed any change of status 
for the area. In 1975, however, Spain reversed its policy and 
declared its readiness to grant full independence to the Spanish 
Sahara under UN supervision. Following the march of 300,000 
unarmed Moroccans into the territory in November 1975, Spain 
agreed to cede the Spanish Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. 
At the time of Franco's death, Spain's only remaining presence 
in North Africa consisted of the Spanish- inhabited enclave cities 
of Ceuta and Melilla and the small garrison spot called Pefion de 
Velez de la Gomera, all on Morocco's Mediterranean coast (see 
Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla, ch. 4). 

The Post-Franco Era 

Transition to Democracy 

The democratization that Franco's chosen heir, Juan Carlos, and 
his collaborators peacefully and legally brought to Spain over a 



54 



Historical Setting 



three-year period was unprecedented. Never before had a dictatorial 
regime been transformed into a pluralistic, parliamentary demo- 
cracy without civil war, revolutionary overthrow, or defeat by a 
foreign power. The transition is all the more remarkable because 
the institutional mechanisms designed to maintain Franco's 
authoritarian system made it possible to legislate a democratic con- 
stitutional monarchy into existence. 

When Prince Juan Carlos took the oath as king of Spain on 
November 22, 1975, there was little reason to foresee that he would 
be the architect of such a dramatic transformation. Franco had 
hand-picked Juan Carlos and had overseen his education. He was 
considered an enigma, having publicly sworn loyalty to the prin- 
ciples of Franco's National Movement while privately giving vague 
indications of sympathy for democratic institutions. More was 
known of his athletic skills than of his political opinions, and 
observers predicted that he would be known as ' 'Juan the Brief. ' ' 

Juan Carlos confirmed Arias Navarro's continuation in office 
as prime minister, disappointing those who were hoping for liberal 
reforms. Arias Navarro had served as minister of interior under 
Carrero Blanco, and he was a loyal Francoist. His policy speech 
of January 28, 1976, was vague — devoid of concrete plans for 
political reform. The hopes and expectations aroused by the long- 
awaited demise of Franco were frustrated in the initial months of 
the monarchy, and a wave of demonstrations, industrial strikes, 
and terrorist activity challenged the country's stability. The govern- 
ment responded with repressive measures to restore law and order. 
These measures inflamed and united the liberal opposition. At the 
same time, the cautious reforms that the Arias Navarro govern- 
ment proposed met with hostile reaction from orthodox Francoists, 
who pledged resistance to any form of change. 

It was in this volatile atmosphere that Juan Carlos, increasingly 
dissatisfied with the prime minister's ability (or willingness) to han- 
dle the immobilists as well as with his skill in dealing with the oppo- 
sition, asked for Arias Navarro's resignation. Arias Navarro 
submitted his resignation on July 1, 1976. Proponents of reform 
were both surprised and disappointed when the king chose, as Arias 
Navarro's successor, Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez, who had served 
under Franco and who had been designated secretary general of 
the National Movement in the first government of the monarchy. 
The new prime minister's Francoist links made it appear unlikely 
that he would promote major evolutionary change in Spain, but 
it was these links with the political establishment that made it pos- 
sible for him to maneuver with the existing institutions to bring 
about the reforms that Juan Carlos desired. 



55 



Spain: A Country Study 

Throughout the rapid democratization that followed the appoint- 
ment of Suarez, the collaboration between the king and his prime 
minister was crucial in assuaging opposition from both the immobil- 
ists of the old regime and those who agitated for a more radical 
break with the past. Whereas Suarez 's political expertise and prag- 
matic approach enabled him to manipulate the bureaucratic 
machinery, Juan Carlos 's ability to maintain the allegiance of the 
armed forces made a peaceful transition to democracy possible dur- 
ing these precarious months. 

In July 1976, the government declared a partial amnesty that 
freed approximately 400 political prisoners. On September 10, 
Suarez announced a program of political reform, calling for a 
bicameral legislature based on universal suffrage. With skillful 
maneuvering, he was able to persuade members of the Cortes to 
approve the law, thereby voting their own corporatist institution 
out of existence, in November. The reforms were then submitted 
to a national referendum in December 1976, in accordance with 
Franco's 1945 Law on Referenda. The Spanish people voted over- 
whelmingly in favor of reform: about 94 percent of the voters 
(78 percent of the electorate took part in the referendum) gave their 
approval. The results of the referendum strengthened the position 
of the Suarez government and of the king and represented a vin- 
dication for those who favored reform from above rather than revo- 
lution. 

In the first six months of 1977, significant reforms were enacted 
in rapid succession. There were further pardons for political 
prisoners in March; independent trade unions replaced vertical and 
labor syndicates; and the right to strike was restored. In April the 
National Movement was disbanded. 

Suarez and the king began to prepare the Spanish people for 
the first free elections — to be held on June 15, 1977 — since the Civil 
War. The legalization of political parties began in February, and 
an electoral law outlining the rules for electoral competition was 
negotiated with opposition political forces and went into effect in 
March. The government adopted the d'Hondt system of propor- 
tional representation, which favored the formation of large parties 
or coalitions (see Electoral System, ch. 4). 

A major crisis appeared to be in the offing over the issue of legaliz- 
ing the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de 
Espafia — PCE). Parties of the left and the center-left demanded 
legal recognition, refusing to participate in the elections otherwise. 
Suarez feared a strong reaction from military leaders, however, 
if such a step were taken. Members of the armed forces had been 
dedicated to the suppression of Marxism since the time of the Civil 



56 



Historical Setting 



War; moreover, Suarez had assured them the previous Septem- 
ber that the PCE would never be legalized. 

In a bold but necessary move, Suarez legalized the PCE on 
April 9, 1977. Military leaders were upset by the decision and pub- 
licly expressed their dissatisfaction with the measure, but they 
grudgingly accepted it out of patriotism. Juan Carlos 's close rela- 
tions with senior military officers were a factor in defusing a poten- 
tially explosive state of affairs. His earlier efforts to replace 
ultraconservative commanders of the armed forces with more liberal 
ones also benefited him when he took this controversial step. The 
moderation that the communists exercised in accepting the monar- 
chy in spite of their avowed republicanism also helped to normal- 
ize the political situation. 

As the country prepared for elections, a large number of diverse 
political parties began to form. Only a few of these parties gained 
parliamentary representation following the June 15, 1977, elections, 
however, and none achieved an absolute majority. The Union of 
the Democratic Center (Union de Centro Democratico — UCD), 
a centrist coalition of several groups, including Francoist reformists 
and moderate opposition democrats, led by Suarez, emerged from 
the election as the largest party, winning 34.6 percent of the vote 
(see table 2, Appendix). 

The leading opposition party was the Spanish Socialist Workers' 
Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol — PSOE), which received 
29.3 percent of the vote. Having been in existence since 1879, the 
PSOE was Spain's oldest political party. A group of dynamic young 
activists, led by a Seville lawyer, Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, had 
taken control of the party from the exiles in 1972, and their revolu- 
tionary idealism, combined with pragmatic policies, enabled the 
PSOE to appeal to a broader spectrum of the electorate. Both the 
neo-Francoist right, embodied in the Popular Alliance (Alianza 
Popular — AP), and the PCE were disappointed with the election 
results, which gave them each less than 10 percent of the popular 
vote (see Political Parties, ch. 4). Catalan and Basque regional par- 
ties accounted for most of the remaining votes. 

The election results were a victory for both moderation and the 
desire for change. They boded well for the development of democ- 
racy in Spain. The domination of Spain's party system by two rela- 
tively moderate political groups marked an end to the polarization 
that had plagued the country since the days of the Second Repub- 
lic. The political skill of Suarez, the courage and determination 
of Juan Carlos, and the willingness of opposition leaders to sacrifice 
their hopes for more radical social change to the more immediate 
goal of securing political democracy helped to end the polarization. 



57 



Spain: A Country Study 

The deferral of these hopes led to eventual disenchantment with 
the Suarez government, but in 1977 it was a key factor in the peace- 
ful transition to democracy. 

A formidable array of problems, including a growing economic 
crisis, Basque terrorism, and the threat of military subversion, con- 
fronted the new Suarez government. Long-range solutions could 
not be devised until after the new constitution had been approved, 
but in the interim, the socioeconomic difficulties had to be faced. 
It was apparent that austerity measures would have to be taken, 
and Suarez knew he needed to gain support for a national economic 
recovery program. This was achieved in October 1977 in the 
Moncloa Pacts, named for the prime minister's official residence 
where leaders of Spain's major political parties met and agreed to 
share the costs of, and the responsibility for, economic reforms. 
The parties of the left were promised an increase in unemployment 
benefits, the creation of new jobs, and other reforms; in return they 
agreed to further tax increases, credit restrictions, reductions in 
public expenditures, and a 20 percent ceiling on wage increases. 

The new government set forth a provisional solution to demands 
for regional autonomy. Preautonomy decrees were issued for Cata- 
lonia in September and for three of the Basque provinces in 
December, 1977. The significance of these decrees was primarily 
symbolic, but the decrees helped to avoid potentially disruptive con- 
flict for the time being by recognizing the distinctive political charac- 
ter of the regions and by promising autonomy when the constitution 
was ratified. The regional issue nevertheless continued to be the 
government's most intractable problem, and it became even more 
complicated as autonomist demands proliferated throughout the 
country. During the early months of the Suarez government, there 
were disturbing indications that the army's toleration of political 
pluralism was limited. Military unrest also boded ill for the regime's 
future stability. 

The major task facing the government during this transitional 
period was the drafting of a new constitution. Since previous con- 
stitutions had failed in Spain because they had usually been imposed 
by one particular group and were not the expression of the popu- 
lar will, it was imperative that the new constitution be based on 
consensus. To this end, the Constitutional Committee of the Cortes 
in August 1977 elected a parliamentary commission representing 
all the major national parties and the more important regional ones. 
This group began its deliberations in an atmosphere of compromise 
and cooperation. Although members of the group disagreed over 
issues of education, abortion, lock-outs, and regionalism, they made 



58 



Spain: A Country Study 

steady progress. The Cortes passed the document they produced — 
with amendments — in October 1978. 

The new 1978 Constitution is long and detailed, because of its 
framers' desire to gain acceptance for the document by including 
something for everyone. It proclaims Spain to be a parliamentary 
monarchy and guarantees its citizens equality before the law and 
a full range of individual liberties, including religious freedom. 
While recognizing the autonomy of the regions, it stresses the 
indivisibility of the Spanish state. The Constitution was submit- 
ted to popular referendum on December 6, 1978, and it was 
approved by 87.8 of the 67.7 percent of the eligible voters who went 
to the polls (see The 1978 Constitution, ch. 4). 

After the king had signed the new Constitution, Suarez dissolved 
the Cortes and called another general election for March. It was 
widely predicted that the results would show an erosion of support 
for Suarez and the UCD (which had begun to show signs of frag- 
mentation) and a gain for the PSOE. The PSOE was experienc- 
ing its own internal crisis, however. The party's official definition 
of itself as Marxist hampered Gonzalez's efforts to project an image 
of moderation and statesmanship. At the same time, the party's 
more radical members were increasingly resentful of Gonzalez's 
ideological moderation. Contrary to expectations, the PSOE did 
not improve its position when Spaniards went to the polls on March 
1, 1979. The election results were not significantly different from 
those of 1977, and they were seen as a reaffirmation and a consoli- 
dation of the basic power structure. 

Disenchantment with UCD Leadership 

Political change was under way. The UCD was a coalition that 
encompassed a wide range of frequently incompatible political 
aspirations. Internal conflict had been muted in the interest of main- 
taining party unity in order to protect the transition to democracy. 
When the 1979 elections appeared to affirm this transition, the cen- 
trifugal tendencies broke loose. In the succeeding months, the 
center-right UCD moved farther to the right, and its more con- 
servative members were increasingly critical of Suarez 's com- 
promises with the PSOE opposition on political and economic 
issues. At the same time, large segments of the population were 
frustrated that Suarez did not produce a more thorough reform 
program to eliminate the vestiges of authoritarian institutions and 
practices. 

Suarez' s failure to deal decisively with the regional problem fur- 
ther eroded his popularity. Repressive police measures met increas- 
ingly virulent outbreaks of Basque terrorism, and the ongoing spiral 



60 



Historical Setting 



of repression and terror contributed to a growing impression that 
the government was incompetent. The mounting violence further 
exacerbated Suarez's relations with the military, which were already 
strained because of his legalization of the PCE. Army leaders, who 
had only grudgingly accepted political reforms out of loyalty to Juan 
Carlos, grew increasingly hostile to the democratic regime as ETA 
terrorism intensified. A coup plot had been uncovered in the fall 
of 1978, and the possibility of military subversion continued to be 
a threat. 

As discontent with his leadership grew, Suarez realized that he 
had lost his effectiveness, and on January 29, 1981 , he announced 
his resignation as prime minister. The king appointed conserva- 
tive centrist Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo to replace him. Before the new 
prime minister could be confirmed, a group of Civil Guards, led 
by Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina, marched onto the 
floor of the Cortes and held the representatives hostage in an 
attempted coup. The plan of the rebellious military leaders was 
to set up an authoritarian monarchy under the protection of the 
armed forces. That the coup failed was primarily due to the deci- 
sive action of Juan Carlos, who ordered the conspirators to desist 
and persuaded other military officers to back him in defending the 
Constitution. Juan Carlos then appeared on television and reas- 
sured the Spanish people of his commitment to democracy. The 
foiled coup was over by the next day, but it demonstrated the 
fragility of Spain's democracy and the importance of Juan Carlos 
to its continued survival. On February 27, more than 3 million 
people demonstrated in favor of democracy in the capital and else- 
where throughout Spain, showing the extent of popular support 
for democratic government. 

Growth of the PSOE and the 1982 Elections 

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the various sectors within 
the UCD closed ranks briefly around their new prime minister, 
Calvo Sotelo, but internal cleavages prevented the formation of 
a coherent centrist party. Clashes between the moderate and the 
rightist elements within the UCD, particularly over the divorce bill, 
resulted in resignations of dissenting groups and the formation of 
new splinter parties and coalitions. These developments in turn 
led to a series of election defeats in 1981 and 1982, and by the time 
a general election was called in August for October 1982, the UCD's 
representation in the Cortes was down by one-third. 

As the UCD continued to disintegrate, the PSOE gained 
strength; it was considered more likely than the increasingly con- 
servative UCD to bring about the sweeping social and economic 



61 



Spain: A Country Study 

reforms that the Spanish people desired. Moreover, party leader 
Gonzalez had been successful in his efforts to direct the PSOE 
toward a more centrist-left position, as seen in his successful per- 
suasion of PSOE delegates in 1979 to drop the term "Marxist" 
from the party's definition of itself. The PSOE was thereby able 
to project an image of greater moderation and reliability, and it 
became a viable governmental alternative. The PSOE also benefited 
from the decline of the PCE. The heavy-handed management style 
of PCE leader Santiago Carrillo had aggravated the dissension in 
the party over whether to follow a more revolutionary line or to 
adopt more moderate policies. As was the case with the UCD, inter- 
necine disputes within the PCE resulted in defections from the party. 
With the PCE apparently on the point of collapse, the PSOE became 
the only feasible option for left-wing voters. 

When Spaniards went to the polls in record numbers in October 
1982, they gave a sweeping victory to the PSOE, which received 
the largest plurality (48.4 percent) in the post- 1977 period. The 
party enlarged its share of the 350 seats in the Chamber of Deputies 
to 202, while the UCD, with only 6.8 percent of the vote, won only 
1 1 seats. The conservative AP took on the role of opposition party 
(see Political Developments, 1982-88, ch. 4). The most significant 
implication of the October elections for the future of democracy 
in Spain was the transfer of power from one party to another without 
military intervention or bloodshed. The transition to democracy 
appeared to be complete. 

Spanish Foreign Policy in the Post-Franco Period 

Spain's political system underwent dramatic transformations after 
the death of Franco, but there was nevertheless some degree of con- 
tinuity in Spanish foreign policy. The return of Gibraltar to Span- 
ish sovereignty continued to be a foreign policy goal, as did greater 
integration of Spain into Western Europe. In spite of frequent 
ongoing negotiations, neither of these goals had been accomplished 
by the time Gonzalez came to power in 1982. Foreign policy mak- 
ers also endeavored to maintain an influential role for Spain in its 
relations with Latin American nations. 

Spanish opinion was more ambivalent with regard to member- 
ship in NATO and relations with the United States, although 
defense agreements, allowing the United States to continue using 
its naval and air bases in Spain, were signed periodically. When 
Spain joined NATO in May 1982, under Calvo Sotelo's govern- 
ment, the PSOE leadership strongly opposed such a commitment 
and called for withdrawal from the Alliance. One of Gonzalez's 
campaign promises was a national referendum on Spain's NATO 



62 



Historical Setting 



membership. In 1982 the role the new Socialist government envi- 
sioned for Spain in the West's economic, political, and security 
arrangements remained to be seen. 

Stanley G. Payne presents a comprehensive general introduc- 
tion to the history of the Iberian Peninsula in his two- volume study, 
A History of Spain and Portugal. Henry Kamen's clearly written and 
amply illustrated Concise History of Spain provides a briefer treat- 
ment. The late Spanish historian Jaime Vicens Vives dealt with 
the dominant questions of Spanish historiography and analyzed 
the major interpretations in Approaches to the History of Spain. Whereas 
Vicens Vives emphasized the pre- 1500 period in his work, Richard 
Herr's Historical Essay on Modern Spain gives more attention to the 
country's evolution in recent centuries. 

An excellent introduction to the Spanish Middle Ages can be 
found in Gabriel Jackson's The Making of Medieval Spain. Angus 
MacKay's Spain in the Middle Ages emphasizes the continuity between 
medieval and early modern Spain. J. H. Elliott's Imperial Spain, 
1469-1716 is an insightful account of Spain at the apogee of its 
empire as well as of the transition into the modern period. For a 
balanced study of eighteenth-century Spanish reformism and the 
impact of the French Revolution on Spain, see Richard Herr's The 
Eighteenth- Century Revolution in Spain. Raymond Carr's Spain, 
1808-1975 contains a definitive treatment of nineteenth-century 
Spain. 

There is an extensive, if not always balanced, literature on the 
Spanish Civil War. An excellent introduction to the subject is Gerald 
Brenan's The Spanish Labyrinth, which offers a lucid account of the 
social and political conflicts that divided the country. Hugh 
Thomas's comprehensive and thoroughly researched study, The 
Spanish Civil War, is considered the standard work on the subject. 
The evolution of the Nationalist side receives thorough treatment 
in Stanley G. Payne's Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism. 

J. W. D. Trythall's biography of Franco, El Caudillo, provides 
an illuminating description of the regime's politics, while Brian 
Crozier's Franco deals more extensively with its wartime diplomacy. 
A more recent biography by Juan Pablo Fusi, Franco, presents the 
most balanced portrayal of Francoism to date. Another recent pub- 
lication, Stanley G. Payne's authoritative and detailed analysis 
entitled The Franco Regime: 1936-1975, is likely to remain the major 
treatise on the political history of Francoist Spain. 



63 



Spain: A Country Study 



A concise, clearly written account of the transformation of Fran- 
coist structures into a democratic regime, with an emphasis on social 
and economic developments, appears in Spain: Dictatorship to Democ- 
racy by Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi. Paul Preston's The 
Triumph of Democracy in Spain and E. Ramon Arango's Spain: From 
Repression to Renewal also provide penetrating accounts of the tran- 
sition period. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



64 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



The town of Casares in Malaga Province 



IN THE DECADE after the death of Francisco Franco y 
Bahamonde (in power, 1939-75) in 1975, Spain experienced several 
powerful transformations. The political transition from a rigid dic- 
tatorship to an active parliamentary democracy was widely acknowl- 
edged as a highly significant event in West European history. Much 
more subtle, but equally significant in the long run, was Spain's 
social and economic transition, described as Spain's "economic 
miracle," which brought a relatively isolated, conservative social 
order to the threshold of an advanced industrial democracy. In the 
decades after the 1930s' Civil War, Spain still possessed the social 
structures and values of a traditional, less developed country. By 
the late 1980s, Spanish society had already taken on most of the 
principal characteristics of postindustrial Europe, including a declin- 
ing rate of births and of population growth generally, an erosion 
of the nuclear family, a drop in the proportion of the work force 
in agriculture, and changes in the role of women in society. 

Changes in Spain's population reflected this transition quite 
clearly. Falling birth rates and increased life expectancy combined 
to produce a rapidly aging population that grew at an extremely 
slow pace. Spain also experienced massive shifts in the location of 
its people. Between 1951 and 1981, more than 5 million individuals 
left the poverty of rural and small-town Spain. Many headed for 
the more prosperous countries of Western Europe, but the more 
significant flow was from farm and village to Spain's exploding 
cities, especially Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao (see fig. 1, fron- 
tispiece). 

Spain's diverse ethnic and linguistic groups have existed for cen- 
turies, and they have presented Spanish governments with severe 
challenges since the nineteenth century. In the late 1980s, about 
one citizen in four spoke a mother tongue other than Castilian Span- 
ish (primarily Catalan or one of its variants; the Basque language, 
Euskera; or Galician), but Castilian continued to be the dominant 
language throughout the country. Indeed, after nearly 150 years 
of industrial development and the migration of millions of nonethnic 
Spaniards to the ethnic homelands, particularly Barcelona and 
Bilbao, the non-Castilian languages were in danger of disappear- 
ing. Although the Franco regime began to liberalize its approach 
to the minority languages late in the 1960s, the overall effect of 
the dictatorship on these languages was very nearly disastrous. The 
1978 Constitution made possible the establishment of regional 



67 



Spain: A Country Study 

autonomous governments with the requisite powers and resources 
to salvage their respective cultures and to make their languages 
co-official with Castilian in their own regions. Whether this experi- 
ment in regional bilingualism would succeed, however, remained 
to be seen. 

In social values, Spain began to resemble its West European 
neighbors to the north. The status of women, for example, was 
one of the most notable of these changes, as women began to figure 
more prominently in education, politics, and the work force gener- 
ally. Closely associated with these changes were a number of other 
social characteristics including a more liberal stance on abortion, 
contraception, divorce, and the role of the large and extended 
family. The Roman Catholic Church, long a dominant power in 
Spanish life, opposed these developments, but as Spain became 
a more materialistic and more secular society, the church's ability 
to determine social mores and policies was strikingly eroded. 

Spain also underwent major changes in its educational system. 
In 1970 Spanish law made education free and compulsory through 
the age of fourteen; the challenge in the 1980s was to provide the 
resources necessary to fulfill this obligation. Although the schools 
enrolled essentially all the school-age population and the country's 
illiteracy rate was a nominal 3 percent, the school system was 
plagued by serious problems, including a rigid tracking system, 
a high failure rate, and poorly paid instructors. In 1984 the Social- 
ist government passed the Organic Law on the Right to Educa- 
tion (Ley Organica del Derecho a la Educacion — LODE) in an 
attempt to integrate into a single system the three school systems: 
public, private secular, and Roman Catholic. Changes reached the 
university level as well, as the Law on University Reform (Ley 
de Reforma Universitaria — LRU) made each public university 
autonomous, subject only to general rules set down in Madrid. 

In the late 1980s, Spain continued to rank at the low end of the 
list of advanced industrial democracies in terms of social welfare. 
Its citizens enjoyed the usual range of social welfare benefits, includ- 
ing health coverage, retirement benefits, and unemployment in- 
surance, but coverage was less comprehensive than that in most 
other West European countries. The retirement system was under 
increasing pressure because of the aging population. Housing con- 
struction just barely managed to keep pace with rapid urbaniza- 
tion in the 1970s, and by the late 1980s the country had to begin 
to address some of the "quality of life" issues connected with hous- 
ing. The society ranked high on some indicators of health care, 
such as physician availability, but there were still residual health 
problems more reminiscent of the Third World, particularly a high 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



incidence of communicable diseases. There were dramatic gains 
in reducing the infant mortality rate, but severe problems in the 
areas of public health, safety, and environmental concerns — indus- 
trial accidents and air, water, and noise pollution — were a direct 
outgrowth of uncontrolled, rapid industrialization. 

Geography 

Spanish territory comprises nearly five-sixths of the Iberian 
Peninsula, which the nation shares with Portugal, the micro-state 
of Andorra, and the British possession of Gibraltar. Spanish terri- 
tory also includes two sets of islands — the Balearic Islands (Span- 
ish, Islas Baleares) in the Mediterranean Sea and the Canary Islands 
(Spanish, Canarias) in the Atlantic Ocean — and two city enclaves 
in North Africa, Ceuta and Melilla (see fig. 1). Peninsular Spain, 
covering an area of 492,503 square kilometers, consists of a cen- 
tral plateau known as the Meseta Central, which is enclosed by 
high mountains on its north, south, east, and part of its western 
sides. The area that is predominantly plateau also encompasses 
several mountain systems that are lower than the peripheral moun- 
tains. Although Spain thus has physical characteristics that make 
it, to some extent, a natural geographic unit, there are also inter- 
nal geographic features that tend to compartmentalize the country. 

The topographical characteristics also generate a variety of cli- 
matic regimes throughout the country. By far the greatest part of 
the country, however, experiences a continental climate of hot, dry 
summers and rather harsh, cold winters. Where these conditions 
prevail, the soils have eroded, vegetation is sparse, and agricul- 
ture is difficult. Irrigation is practiced where possible, but it is 
difficult because the flow in most streams is seasonally irregular, 
and the stream beds of larger rivers are frequentiy much lower than 
the adjacent terrain. 

External Boundaries and Landform Regions 

Most of Spain's boundary is water: the Mediterranean Sea on 
the south and east from Gibraltar to the French border; and the 
Atlantic Ocean on the northwest and southwest — in the south as 
the Golfo de Cadiz and in the north as the Bay of Biscay. Spain 
also shares land boundaries with France and Andorra along the 
Pyrenees in the northeast, with Portugal on the west, and with the 
small British possession of Gibraltar at the southern tip. Although 
the affiliation of Gibraltar continued to be a contentious issue 
between Spain and Britain in the late 1980s, there were no other 
disputes over land boundaries, and no other country claimed the 



69 



Spain: A Country Study 

insular provinces of the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands 
(see Gilbraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla, ch. 4). 

The majority of Spain's peninsular landmass consists of the 
Meseta Central, a highland plateau rimmed and dissected by moun- 
tain ranges (see fig. 5). Other landforms include narrow coastal 
plains and some lowland river valleys, the most prominent of which 
is the Andalusian Plain in the southwest. The country can be divided 
into ten natural regions or subregions: the dominant Meseta Cen- 
tral, the Cordillera Cantabrica and the northwest region, the Iberico 
region, the Pyrenees, the Penibetico region in the southeast, the 
Andalusian Plain, the Ebro Basin, the coastal plains, the Balearic 
Islands, and the Canary Islands. These are commonly grouped into 
four types: the Meseta Central and associated mountains, other 
mountainous regions, lowland regions, and islands. 

The Meseta Central and Associated Mountains 

The Meseta Central, a vast plateau in the heart of peninsular 
Spain, has elevations that range from 610 to 760 meters. Rimmed 
by mountains, the Meseta Central slopes gently to the west and 
to the series of rivers that form some of the border with Portugal. 
The Sistema Central, described as the "dorsal spine" of the Meseta 
Central, divides the Meseta into northern and southern subregions, 
the former higher in elevation and smaller in area than the latter. 
The Sistema Central rims the capital city of Madrid with peaks 
that rise to 2,400 meters north of the city and to lower elevations 
south of it. West of Madrid, the Sistema Central shows its highest 
peak of almost 2,600 meters. The mountains of the Sistema Cen- 
tral, which continue westward into Portugal, display some glacial 
features; the highest of the peaks are snow-capped for most of the 
year. Despite their height, however, the mountain system does not 
create a major barrier between the northern and the southern por- 
tions of the Meseta Central because several passes permit road and 
railroad transportation to the northwest and the northeast. 

The southern portion of the Meseta is further divided by twin 
mountain ranges, the Montes de Toledo running to the east and 
the Sierra de Guadalupe, to the west. Their peaks do not rise much 
higher than 1,500 meters. With many easy passes, including those 
that connect the Meseta with the Andalusian Plain, the Montes 
de Toledo and the Sierra de Guadalupe do not present an obstacle 
to transportation and communication. The two mountain ranges 
are separated from the Sistema Central to the north by the Tagus 
River (Spanish, Rio Tajo). 

The mountain regions that rim the Meseta Central and are 
associated with it are the Sierra Morena, the Cordillera Cantabrica, 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



and the Sistema Iberico. Forming the southern edge of the Meseta 
Central, the Sierra Morena merges in the east with the southern 
extension of the Sistema Iberico and reaches westward along the 
northern edge of the Rio Guadalquivir valley to join the moun- 
tains in southern Portugal. The massif of the Sierra Morena extends 
northward to the Rio Guadiana, which separates it from the Sistema 
Central. Despite their relatively low elevations, seldom surpass- 
ing 1,300 meters, the mountains of the Sierra Morena are rugged. 

The Cordillera Cantabrica, a limestone formation, runs parallel 
to, and close to, the northern coast near the Bay of Biscay. Its 
highest points are the Picos de Europa, surpassing 2,500 meters. 
The Cordillera Cantabrica extends 182 kilometers and abruptly 
drops 1 ,500 meters some 30 kilometers from the coast. To the west 
lie the hills of the northwest region. 

The Sistema Iberico extends from the Cordillera Cantabrica 
southeastward and, close to th£ Mediterranean, spreads out from 
the Rio Ebro to the Rio Jucar. The barren, rugged slopes of this 
mountain range cover an area of close to 21 ,000 square kilometers. 
The mountains exceed 2,000 meters in their northern region and 
reach a maximum height of over 2,300 meters east of the head- 
waters of the Rio Duero. The extremely steep mountain slopes in 
this range are often cut by deep, narrow gorges. 

Other Mountainous Regions 

External to the Meseta Central lie the Pyrenees in the northeast 
and the Sistema Penibetico in the southeast. The Pyrenees, extend- 
ing from the eastern edge of the Cordillera Cantabrica to the 
Mediterranean Sea, form a solid barrier and a natural border 
between Spain and both France and Andorra that, throughout his- 
tory, has effectively isolated the countries from each other. Pas- 
sage is easy in the relatively low terrain at the eastern and western 
extremes of the mountain range; it is here that international rail- 
roads and roadways cross the border. In the central section of the 
Pyrenees, however, passage is difficult. In several places, peaks 
rise above 3,000 meters; the highest, Pico de Aneto, surpasses 3,400 
meters. 

The Sistema Penibetico extends northeast from the southern tip 
of Spain, running parallel to the coast until it merges with the 
southern extension of the Sistema Iberico near the Rio Jucar and 
with the eastern extension of the Sierra Morena. The Sierra 
Nevada, part of the Sistema Penibetico south of Granada, includes 
the highest mountain on the peninsula, Mulhacen, which rises to 
3,430 meters. Other peaks in the range also surpass 3,000 meters. 



73 



Spain: A Country Study 

Lowland Regions 

The major lowland regions are the Andalusian Plain in the south- 
west, the Ebro Basin in the northeast, and the coastal plains. The 
Andalusian Plain is essentially a wide river valley through which 
the Rio Guadalquivir flows. The river broadens out along its course, 
reaching its widest point at the Golfo de Cadiz. The Andalusian 
Plain is bounded on the north by the Sierra Morena and on the 
south by the Sistema Penibetico; it narrows to an apex in the east 
where these two mountain chains meet. The Ebro Basin is formed 
by the Rio Ebro valley, contained by mountains on three sides — 
the Sistema Iberico to the south and west, the Pyrenees to the north 
and east, and their coastal extensions paralleling the shore to the 
east. Minor low-lying river valleys close to the Portuguese border 
are located on the Tagus and the Rio Guadiana. 

The coastal plains regions are narrow strips between the coastal 
mountains and the seas. They are broadest along the Golfo de 
Cadiz, where the coastal plain adjoins the Andalusian Plain, and 
along the southern and central eastern coasts. The narrowest coastal 
plain runs along the Bay of Biscay, where the Cordillera Cantabrica 
ends close to shore. 

The Islands 

The remaining regions of Spain are the Balearic and the Canary 
Islands, the former located in the Mediterranean Sea and the latter 
in the Atlantic Ocean. The Balearic Islands, encompassing a total 
area of 5,000 square kilometers, lie 80 kilometers off Spain's cen- 
tral eastern coast. The mountains that rise up above the Mediter- 
ranean Sea to form these islands are an extension of the Sistema 
Penibetico. The archipelago's highest points, which reach 1,400 
meters, are in northwestern Majorca, close to the coast. The cen- 
tral portion of Majorca is a plain, bounded on the east and the 
southeast by broken hills. 

The Canary Islands, ninety kilometers off the west coast of Africa, 
are of volcanic origin. The large central islands, Gran Canaria and 
Tenerife, have the highest peaks; on Gran Canaria they rise to 1 ,950 
meters and on Tenerife, to 3,700 meters. 

Drainage 

Of the roughly 1 ,800 rivers and streams in Spain, only the Tagus 
is more than 960 kilometers long; all but 90 extend less than 
96 kilometers. These shorter rivers carry small volumes of water 
on an irregular basis, and they have seasonally dry river beds; 
however, when they do flow, they often are swift and torrential. 



74 



View of Montefrio, Granada Province 
Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain 
Panoramic view of Jaen 
Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain 



75 



Spain: A Country Study 

Most major rivers rise in the mountains rimming or dissecting the 
Meseta Central and flow westward across the plateau through Por- 
tugal to empty into the Atlantic Ocean. One significant exception 
is the Rio Ebro, which flows eastward to the Mediterranean. Rivers 
in the extreme northwest and in the narrow northern coastal plain 
drain directly into the Atlantic Ocean. The northwestern coast- 
line is also truncated by Has, waterbodies similar to fjords. 

The major rivers flowing westward through the Meseta Central 
include the Rio Duero, the Tagus, the Rio Guadiana, and the Rio 
Guadalquivir. The Rio Guadalquivir is one of the most significant riv- 
ers in Spain because it irrigates a fertile valley, thus creating a rich 
agricultural area, and because it is navigable inland, making Seville 
(Spanish, Sevilla) the only inland river port for ocean-going traffic 
in Spain. The major river in the northwest region is the Rio Mino. 

Climate 

Peninsular Spain experiences three climatic types: continental, 
maritime, and Mediterranean. The locally generated continental 
climate covers the majority of peninsular Spain, influencing the 
Meseta Central, the adjoining mountains to the east and the south, 
and the Ebro Basin. A continental climate is characterized by wide 
diurnal and seasonal variations in temperature and by low, irregular 
rainfall with high rates of evaporation that leave the land arid. Annual 
rainfall generally is thirty to sixty-four centimeters; most of the 
Meseta region receives about fifty centimeters. The northern Meseta, 
the Sistema Central, and the Ebro Basin have two rainy seasons, 
one in spring (April-June) and the other in autumn (October- 
November), with late spring being the wettest time of the year. In 
the southern Meseta, also, the wet seasons are spring and autumn, 
but the spring one is earlier (March), and autumn is the wetter sea- 
son. Even during the wet seasons, rain is irregular and unreliable. 
Continental winters are cold, with strong winds and high humidity, 
despite the low precipitation. Except for mountain areas, the northern 
foothills of the Sistema Iberico are the coldest area, and frost is com- 
mon. Summers are hot and cloudless, producing average daytime 
temperatures that reach the mid- or upper 30sC in the northern 
Meseta and the upper 30sC in the southern Meseta; nighttime tem- 
peratures, however, drop to the upper teens. The Ebro Basin, at 
a lower altitude, is extremely hot during the summer, and temper- 
atures can exceed 43 °C. Summer humidities are low in the Meseta 
Central and in the Ebro Basin, except right along the shores of in 
the Rio Ebro, where humidity is high. 

A maritime climate prevails in the northern part of the coun- 
try, from the Pyrenees to the northwest region, characterized by 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



relatively mild winters, warm but not hot summers, and generally 
abundant rainfall spread out over the year. Temperatures vary only 
slightly, both on a diurnal and a seasonal basis. The moderating 
effects of the sea, however, abate in the inland areas, where tem- 
peratures are 9° to 18°C more extreme than temperatures on the 
coast. Distance from the Atlantic Ocean also affects precipitation, 
and there is less rainfall in the east than in the west. Autumn 
(October through December) is the wettest season, while July is 
the driest month. The high humidity and the prevailing off-shore 
winds make fog and mist common along the northwest coast; this 
phenomenon is less frequent a short distance inland, however, 
because the mountains form a barrier keeping out the sea moisture. 

The Mediterranean climatic region extends from the Andalusian 
Plain along the southern and eastern coasts up to the Pyrenees, 
on the seaward side of the mountain ranges that parallel the coast. 
Total rainfall in this region is lower than in the rest of Spain, and 
it is concentrated in the late autumn- winter period. Generally, rain- 
fall is slight, often insufficient, irregular, and unreliable. Tempera- 
tures in the Mediterranean region usually are more moderate in 
both summer and winter, and diurnal temperature changes are 
more limited than those of the continental region. Temperatures 
in January normally average 10° to 13°C in most of the Mediter- 
ranean region, and they are 9°C colder in the northeastern coastal 
area near Barcelona. In winter, temperatures inland in the Anda- 
lusian Plain are slightly lower than those on the coasts. Tempera- 
tures in July and August average 22° to 27°C on the coast and 
29° to 31°C farther inland, with low humidity. The Mediterranean 
region is marked by Leveche winds — hot, dry, easterly or south- 
easterly air currents that originate over North Africa. These winds, 
which sometimes carry fine dust, are most common in spring. A 
cooler easterly wind, the Levante, funnels between the Sistema 
Penibetico and the Atlas Mountains of North Africa. 

Population 

Size and Growth 

In mid- 1985, Spain's population reached 38.8 million, making 
it Western Europe's fifth most populous nation. The country's 
population grew very slowly throughout the latter half of the 
nineteenth century and most of the twentieth. In the 1860s, the 
population increased by only about one-third of one percent annu- 
ally; by the first decades of the twentieth century, this rate of increase 
had grown to about 0.7 percent per year. Between the 1930s 
and the 1980s, population growth rates hovered between 0.8 and 



77 



Spain: A Country Study 

1.2 percent annually (see table 3, Appendix). In the postwar years, 
Spain began to exhibit population growth patterns very similar to 
those of most other advanced industrial societies. Growth rates were 
projected to level off, or to decline slightly, through the remainder 
of the twentieth century; Spain was expected to reach a population 
of 40 million by 1990 and 42 million by the year 2000. Observers 
estimated that the country's population would stabilize in the year 
2020 at about 46 million. 

One significant factor in Spain's population growth has been a 
declining rate of births. Between 1965 and 1985, Spain experienced 
a dramatic reduction in its birth rate, from 21 to 13 per 1,000, 
a drop of approximately 38 percent. In 1975, with an estimated 
base population of about 35.5 million, the country recorded about 
675,000 live births; in 1985, with an estimated base population of 
more than 38 million, Spain had only about 475,000 live births. 
In other words, ten years after the death of Franco, despite an 
increase of nearly 3 million in the base population, the country 
registered more than one- third fewer births. 

Part of this change can be attributed to the increase in the per- 
centage of women using contraceptives. Whereas in the 1960s such 
data were not even reported, by 1984 the World Bank (see Glos- 
sary) estimated that over half of Spanish women of child-bearing 
age practiced birth control. Demographers have observed, however, 
that this increased use of contraceptive devices was only the sur- 
face reflection of other more significant changes in Spanish society 
during the period from 1960 to 1985. The economic causes included 
an economic slump, unemployment, insufficient housing, and the 
arrival of the consumer society. Also, changes in cultural patterns 
reflected women's increased access to employment, expanded wom- 
en's rights, a decline in the number of marriages (between 1974 
and 1984, the marriage rate dropped from 7.6 to 5.0 per 1,000), 
an improved image of couples without children, a decline in the 
belief that children were the center of the family, increased access 
to abortion and divorce, and in general a break in the linkage 
between woman and mother as social roles. 

At the same time that the birth rate was dropping sharply, Spain's 
low death rate also declined slightly, from 8 to 7 per 1,000. By the 
mid-1980s, life expectancy at birth had reached seventy-seven years, 
a level equal to or better than that of every other country in Europe 
except France, and superior to the average of all the world's 
advanced industrial countries. Male life expectancy increased 
between 1965 and 1985 from sixty-eight to seventy-four years, while 
female life expectancy rose from seventy-three to eighty years. 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



By the early 1980s, Spain, like all advanced industrial countries, 
had begun to experience the aging of its population (see fig. 6). 
In 1980 a reported 10.6 percent of its population was over sixty- 
five years of age, a figure that was only a bare point or two behind 
the percentages in the United States and the Netherlands. By 1986 
the percentage over sixty-five had climbed to 12.2; officials estimated 
that by 2001, the percentage over sixty-five would exceed 15. In 
1985 children under the age of fourteen constituted 25 percent of 
the population; specialists anticipated that, by the year 2001, this 
proportion would decline to 18 percent. 

Regional Disparities 

Spain is more a subcontinent than a country, and its climate, 
geography, and history produced a state that was little more than 
a federation of regions until Philip V, a grandson of Louis XIV, 
brought the centralization of the Bourbon monarchy to the coun- 
try in the eighteenth century (see Bourbon Spain, ch. 1). Modern- 
day Spain contains a number of identifiable regions, each with its 
own set of cultural, economic, and political characteristics. In many 
instances, the loyalty of a population is still primarily to its town 
or region, and only secondarily to the abstract concept of "Spain." 
Administratively, Spain is organized into seventeen autonomous 
communities comprising fifty provinces (see fig. 7). However, when 
an autonomous community is made up of only one province, 
provincial institutions have been transferred to the autonomous 
community. 

On the map, the Iberian Peninsula resembles a slightly distort- 
ed square with the top bent toward the east and spread wide where 
it joins the rest of Europe. In the center lies the densely populated 
Spanish capital, Madrid, surrounded by the harsh, sparsely popu- 
lated Meseta Central. King Philip II made Madrid the capital of 
Castile (Spanish, Castilla) in the sixteenth century, partly because 
its remoteness made it an uncontroversial choice (see Charles V 
and Philip II, ch. 1). The city, surrounded by a demographic desert, 
in the late 1980s was still regarded by many Spaniards as an 
"artificial" capital even though it had long been established as the 
political center of the country. 

Around the periphery of the peninsula are the peoples that have 
competed with Castilians for centuries over control of Iberia: in 
the west, the Portuguese (the only group successful in establishing 
its own state in 1640); in the northwest, the Galicians; along the 
northern coast of the Bay of Biscay, the Asturians, and, as the coast 
nears France, the Basques; along the Pyrenees, the Navarrese and 
the Aragonese; in the northeast, the Catalans; in the east, the 



79 



Spain: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUPS 




3,200 2,400 1.600 800 800 1,600 2,400 3,200 
POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



Source: Based on information from Spain, Institute Nacional de Estadfstica, Anuario estadistica 
de Espana, Madrid, 1986, 36-37. 

Figure 6. Population by Age and Sex, 1981 

Valencians; and in the south, the Andalusians. Although most of 
these peoples would decline to identify themselves first, foremost, 
and solely as "Spanish," few of them would choose to secede from 
Spain. Even among Basques, whose separatist sentiment ran deepest 
in the late 1980s, those advocating total independence from Spain 
probably comprised only one-fifth of the ethnic Basque population. 
Whereas culture provided the centrifugal force, economic ties linked 
the regions together more closely than an outsider might conclude 
from their rhetoric. 

Spain's seventeen regions, defined by the 1978 Constitution as 
autonomous communities, vary greatly in size and population, as 
well as in economic and political weight (see table 4, Appendix). 
For example, Andalusia (Spanish, Andalucia), nearly the size of 
Portugal, encompasses 17 percent of Spain's land area. The two 
regions carved out of sparsely populated Castile — Castilla-La 
Mancha (larger than Ireland) and Castilla y Leon (larger than Aus- 
tria) — account for 15.6 and 18.7 percent, respectively, of Spain's 
total area. These three large regions combined account for about 
52 percent of the country's total territory. No other autonomous 
region contains more than 10 percent of the total. The three richest, 
most densely populated, and most heavily industrialized regions — 
Madrid, Catalonia (Spanish, Cataluna; Catalan, Catalunya), and 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



the Basque, Country (Spanish, Pais Vasco; Basque, Euskadi) — 
together account for 9.3 percent of the total. The remaining 40 per- 
cent is made up of two medium-sized regions — Aragon (Spanish, 
Aragon) and Extremadura — each of which holds 8 to 9 percent, 
and seven much smaller regions that together account for about 
20 percent of the national territory. 

Regional economic disparities between "Rich Spain" and "Poor 
Spain" were also highly significant, and they continued to shape 
the country's political debate despite a century of efforts to redis- 
tribute the wealth of the country. Imagine a line drawn from about 
the middle of the north coast, in Asturias, southeastward to Madrid, 
and then to Valencia. To the north and east of the line lived the 
people of Rich Spain, sometimes referred to as "Bourgeois Spain," 
an area already substantially modernized, industrialized, and 
urbanized, where the transition to an information and services econ- 
omy was already well under way in the 1980s. To the south and 
west of the line lay Poor Spain, or "Traditional Spain," where 
agriculture continued to dominate and where semi-feudal social 
conditions could still be found. To aggravate this cleavage still fur- 
ther, Rich Spain, with the exception of Madrid, tended to be made 
up disproportionately of people who felt culturally different from 
the Castilians and not really "Spanish" at all. 

Indicators of economic disparity are stark reminders that not all 
Spaniards shared in the country's economic miracle. The autono- 
mous communities of Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Madrid 
accounted for half of Spain's gross national product (GNP — see 
Glossary) in the late 1980s. Income per capita was only 55 percent 
of the Catalan level in Extremadura, 64 percent in Andalusia, and 
70 percent in Galicia. In Galicia, 46 percent of the population still 
worked on the land; in Extremadura and the two Castilian regions, 
30 to 34 percent did so; but in Catalonia and the Basque Country, 
only 6 percent depended on the land for their livelihood. In Anda- 
lusia, unemployment exceeded 30 percent; in Aragon and in 
Navarre (Spanish, Navarra) it ran between 15 and 20 percent. A 
1987 report by Spain's National Statistics Institute revealed that 
the country's richest autonomous community, Madrid, exceeded 
its poorest, Extremadura, by wide margins in every economic 
category. With the national average equal to zero, Madrid's stan- 
dard of living measured 1.7 while Extremadura scored -2.0; in 
family income, the values were Madrid 1.0, Extremadura, -2.1; 
in economic development, Madrid, 1.7, Extremadura, -2.0; and 
in endowment in physical and human resources, Madrid, 1.4, 
Extremadura , -1.7. 



81 



Spain: A Country Study 




Autonomous community 
boundary 

Provincial boundary 

within autonomous community 



® National capital 

• Autonomous community 
capital 



Figure 7. Administrative Divisions of Spain, 1988 



Migration 

The poverty of rural Spain led to a marked shift in population 
as hundreds of thousands of Spaniards moved out of the poor south 
and west in search of jobs and a better way of life. Between 1951 
and 1981, more than 5 million Spaniards left Poor Spain, first for 
the prosperous economies of France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany (West Germany), then for the expanding industrial 
regions of Spain itself. Nearly 40 percent, or 1.7 million, left Anda- 
lusia alone; another million left Castilla y Leon; and slightly fewer 
than 1 million left Castilla- La Mancha. 

By 1970 migrants accounted for about 26 percent of the popu- 
lation in Madrid, 23 percent in Barcelona, and more than 30 percent 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



Administrative Divisions of Spain 



Alava (7) 
Albacete (30) 
Alicante (33) 
Almerfa (41) 
Avila (23) 
Badajoz (25) 
Barcelona (12) 
Burgos (17) 
Caceres (24) 
Cadiz (38) 
Castellon (31) 
Ciudad Real (29) 
Cordoba (36) 
La Coruha (1) 
Cuenca (28) 



PROVINCES " 

Gerona (13) 
Granada (40) 
Guadalajara (27) 
Guipuzcoa (6) 
Huelva (34) 
Huesca (9) 
Jaen (37) 
Leon (15) 
Lerida (11) 
Lugo (2) 
Malaga (39) 
Orense (4) 
Palencia (16) 
Las Palmas (43) 
Puntavedra (3) 



Salamanca (22) 
Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife (42) 
Segovia (20) 
Sevilla (35) 
Soria (21) 
Tarragona (14) 
Teruel (10) 
Toledo (26) 
Valencia (32) 
Valladolid (19) 
Vizcaya (5) 
Zamora (18) 
Zaragoza (8) 



AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES 

Andalusia (XIV) Cantabria (III)* Madrid (X)* 

Aragon (VI) Castilla-La Mancha (XII) Murcia (XV)* 

Asturias (II)* Castilla y Leon (VIII) Navarre (V)* 

Balearic Islands (XVI)* Catalonia (VII) La Rioja (IX)* 

Basque Country (IV) Extremadura (XI) Valencia (XIII) 
Canary Islands (XVII) Galicia (I) 

*Both an autonomous community and a province. 



in the booming Basque province of Alava. In the years after 
Franco's death, when the economies of some of the industrial areas, 
especially the Basque region, began to sour, some tens of thou- 
sands of these people returned to their provinces of origin. The 
majority of the migrants of the 1960s and the 1970s, however, were 
husbands and wives who had moved their families with the idea 
of staying for a long period, if not permanently. Thus, the great 
bulk of the migrants stayed on to shape the culture and the politics 
of their adopted regions. In the long run, this may turn out to be 
the most significant impact of the Spanish economic miracle on 
the country's intractable regional disparities. 

During the last decade of the Franco era and the first decade 
of democracy, the population became steadily more urbanized, 



83 



Spain: A Country Study 

although Spain was already a fairly urban country even in the 1960s. 
Between 1965 and 1985, the population living in urban areas rose 
from 61 to 77 percent of the total, a level slightly higher than the 
average for the advanced industrial countries. Urbanization inten- 
sified during the 1960s and the 1970s, when cities grew at the rate 
of 2.4 percent annually, but the rate slowed to 1.6 percent during 
the first half of the 1980s. The mid-decennial census of April 1, 
1986, showed that the Madrid area, accounting for 12.5 percent 
of the total population, continued to dominate the country. The 
six cities of over half a million — Barcelona, Madrid, Malaga, 
Seville, Valencia, Zaragoza — together accounted for approximately 
19 percent (see table 5). 

A comparison of population densities among the provinces illus- 
trates dramatically the drain of the rural population toward the 
major cities (see fig. 8). In 1986 Spain's overall population density 
was 77 persons per square kilometer, about the same as that of 
Greece or Turkey and far below the average of such heavily urban- 
ized countries as West Germany. Population densities ranged, 
however, from the practically deserted interior Castilian provinces, 
like Soria (9 per square kilometer) and Guadalajara (12), to some 
of the most densely populated territory in Europe, such as Madrid 
(607 per square kilometer), Barcelona (592 per square kilometer), 
and Vizcaya (527 per square kilometer). In terms of the autono- 
mous community system, four regions — Madrid (4.9 million peo- 
ple), Catalonia (6.0 million), Valencia (3.8 million), and Andalusia 
(6.9 million) — held 50 percent of the country's population in 1986. 
None of the remaining 13 autonomous regions had more than 2.8 
million people. 

A comparison of regional population distribution changes from 
1962 to 1982 shows clearly the effects of urbanization and the trans- 
formation of the work force. In this 20-year period, three regions 
increased their share of the country's population by three percent- 
age points or more: Catalonia (from 13.1 to 16.6), Madrid (from 
8.7 to 12.5), and Valencia (from 7.0 to 10.0). Several other regions, 
notably the Canary Islands and the Basque Country, registered 
moderate gains of about one percentage point. In contrast, the big 
losers (declines of three percentage points or more) were Anda- 
lusia (19.3 to 16.2) and Castilla y Leon (9.1 to 6.1). Other regions 
also losing their historical share of the country's population were 
Castilla-La Mancha, Galicia, and Extremadura. It is clear that dur- 
ing these two decades Spain's population balance shifted dramati- 
cally from the poor and rural provinces and regions to the much 
richer and more urbanized ones. Since the birth rates in the more 
modernized and more urbanized parts of the country tended to 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



be even lower than the national average (the Spanish birth rate 
averaged between 14 and 15 per 1,000 in 1980-85, whereas the 
Basque Country rate averaged only 12), it is equally clear that this 
shift in the population balance was due principally to internal migra- 
tion rather than to changes in birth rates. 

Internal migration concentrated primarily on the huge cities of 
Madrid and Barcelona in the 1960s and the 1970s, but by the 1980s 
a significant change began to appear in the migration data. An 
examination of the data for 1983 and 1984 — years in which, respec- 
tively, 363,000 and 387,000 persons changed residence in Spain — 
revealed several trends. First, the major losers of population were 
small towns (of fewer than 2,000 inhabitants each), which sustained 
a combined net loss of about 10,000 people each year, and large 
cities (of more than 500,000), which together had a net annual loss 
of more than 20,000. Second, the major net gains in population 
were made by cities of between 100,000 and 500,000, which had 
a net annual increase of more than 20,000. Third, all the other 
town or city size categories either had stable populations or experi- 
enced only small losses or gains. Thus, while provinces like Barce- 
lona, dominated by a single huge city, actually lost population (more 
than 15,000 people in each of the years 1983 and 1984), provinces 
like Seville or Las Palmas, with large cities that had not yet reached 
the bursting point, experienced significant net in-migration. This 
reflected a more mature form of population relocation than the sim- 
ple frantic movement from the farm to Madrid or Barcelona that 
had characterized the earlier decades of the Spanish economic boom. 

Migration was significant not only among regions within the 
country but abroad as well. The movement of the Spanish popu- 
lation abroad resembled that of many Third World countries that 
sent large waves of migrants to Western Europe and to North 
America in the late 1960s and the early 1970s in search of better 
jobs and living standards and in response to labor shortages in the 
more advanced industrial countries. Between 1960 and 1985, nearly 
1.3 million Spaniards emigrated to other West European countries. 
More than 500,000 went to Switzerland; more than 400,000, to 
West Germany; and about 277,000, to France. This flow of migrant 
workers reached its peak in the 1969 to 1973 period, when 512,000 
Spanish citizens — some 40 percent of the entire 25-year total, an 
average of more than 102,000 each year — migrated. Following the 
economic downturn in Europe in the mid-1970s, Spanish migra- 
tion dwindled to between 10,000 and 20,000 each year, although 
there was a slight increase in the early 1980s in response to wors- 
ening economic conditions in Spain itself. In contrast, the late 1970s 
saw the return of many Spaniards from abroad, especially from 



85 



Spain: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from John Paxton (ed.), The Statesman 's Year-Book, 1989-1990, 
New York, 1989, 1114-1115. 

Figure 8. Population Density by Province, 1986 

Europe, as economic opportunities for Spaniards declined in Europe 
and as democracy returned to Spain. In the peak return year, 1975, 
some 110,000 Spaniards returned from Europe, and Spain's net 
emigration balance was minus 89,000. 

In 1987, according to the government's Institute on Emigration, 
more than 1 . 7 million Spanish citizens resided outside the coun- 
try. About 947,000 lived in the Western Hemisphere, principally 
in Argentina (374,000), Brazil (1 18,000), Venezuela (144,000), and 
the United States (74,000). More than 750,000 Spanish citizens 
lived in other West European countries, primarily France (321,000), 
West Germany (154,000), and Switzerland (108,000). Aside from 
these two heavy concentrations, the only other significant Spanish 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



populations abroad were in Morocco (10,000) and in Australia 
(22,500). 

Ethnicity and Language 

One of the clearest indicators of Spain's cultural diversity is lan- 
guage. Ethnic group boundaries do not coincide with administra- 
tive jurisdictions, so exact figures are impossible to confirm, but 
observers generally agreed that about one Spanish citizen in four 
spoke a mother tongue other than Castilian in the late 1980s. 
Nevertheless, Castilian Spanish was the dominant language 
throughout the country. Even in the homelands of the other Iberian 
languages, the native tongue was used primarily for informal com- 
munication, and Castilian continued to dominate in most formal 
settings. 

Spain has, besides its Castilian ethnic core, three major peripheral 
ethnic groups with some claim to an historical existence preceding 
that of the Spanish state itself. In descending order of size, they 
are the Catalans, the Galicians, and the Basques. In descending 
order of the intensity of the pressure they brought to bear on Spanish 
society and politics in the late 1980s, the Basques came first, fol- 
lowed by the less intransigent and less violent Catalans, and, at 
a great distance, by the much more conservative and less volatile 
Galicians. In addition, heavily populated Andalusia had become 
the center of fragmenting regionalism in the south; and the Gypsies, 
although few in number, continuing to be a troublesome and 
depressed cultural minority. 

Government Policies 

Franco's policies toward cultural, ethnic, and linguistic minori- 
ties were directed at the suppression of all non-Spanish diversity 
and at the unification, integration, and homogenization of the coun- 
try (see Policies, Programs, and Growing Popular Unrest, ch. 1). 
Until 1975 Spain's policy toward its ethnic minorities was more 
highly centralized and unifying than that of its neighbor, France, 
where a liberal democratic framework allowed private-sector initia- 
tives to keep regional cultures and languages alive. 

With the restoration of democracy, Spanish elites (many of whom 
come from one of the peripheral ethnic homelands, especially 
Catalonia) were much more tolerant of cultural, ethnic, and lin- 
guistic differences. Article 2 of the 1978 Constitution includes this 
wording: "The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of 
the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible fatherland of all 
Spaniards, and it recognizes and guarantees the autonomy of the 
nationalities and regions that comprise it [the Spanish Nation] , and 



87 



Spain: A Country Study 

the solidarity among them." It should be pointed out, however, 
that the word "autonomy" is never defined in the Constitution, 
leaving a serious ambiguity in Spain's treatment of its ethnic minori- 
ties (see Regional Government, ch. 4). While requiring that Cas- 
tilian be the official language throughout the country, the 
Constitution also recognizes the possibility that other languages 
may be "co-official" (an ambiguous term that is taken to mean 
"having co-equal status with Castilian for governmental purposes") 
in their respective autonomous communities. By 1988 five languages 
had been accorded such treatment: Catalan, Galician, Euskera (the 
Basque language), Valencian, and Majorcan. 

From the vantage point of the state, the Basque, the Catalan, 
and the Galician peoples were "nationalities" within the larger and 
more inclusive Spanish nation. There was only one nation, and 
its capital was Madrid; ethnic minorities were prohibited from using 
the term "nation" in reference to themselves. For the Basque or 
the Catalan nationalist, however, there was no Spanish nation, only 
a Spanish state made up of a number of ethnic nations, of which 
theirs was one. 

It should be noted that ethno-nationalist sentiment varied greatly 
within and among Spain's important ethnic minorities, through- 
out the years. In other words, not all Basques or Catalans felt them- 
selves to be solely Basque or Catalan, and even those who did 
possessed varying levels of identification with, and commitment 
to, their ethnic homeland, depending upon the circumstances of 
the moment. For example, a 1979 study by Goldie Shabad and 
Richard Gunther revealed that, in the Basque provinces of Alava, 
Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya, 28 percent of their respondents identi- 
fied themselves as "Spanish only" or "more Spanish than Basque," 
24 percent said they were "equally Spanish and Basque," 11 per- 
cent said they were "more Basque than Spanish," and 37 percent 
identified themselves as "solely Basque." In the Basque province 
of Navarre, in contrast, 26 percent said they were "Spanish only"; 
52 percent, "Navarrese only"; and 15 percent, "Basque only." 
In Catalonia, the figures were as follows: "Spanish or more Span- 
ish than Catalan," 38 percent; "equally Catalan and Spanish," 
36 percent; "more Catalan than Spanish," 12 percent; and "Cata- 
lan only," 15 percent. 

Such variation in ethnic identity was related to two factors: the 
migration of non-ethnics into the ethnic homelands from other parts 
of Spain, especially in the economic boom years of the 1950s and 
the 1960s; and the impact of industrialization, modernization, and 
urbanization on the usage of non-Castilian languages. After several 
decades of migration of non-ethnics into the Basque and Catalan 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



regions, the native-born population represented between one-half 
and two- thirds of the total; and in many working-class neighbor- 
hoods and large cities, the non-ethnics were actually in the majority. 
Whereas many migrants were able to learn Catalan because of its 
close similarity to Castilian Spanish, the number of migrants who 
learned the Basque language was insignificant because Euskera is 
not an Indo-European language. Moreover, the impact of mass 
media, urbanization, and other modernizing mass cultural influ- 
ences gradually weakened the place of the non-Castilian languages. 
This was especially true in the Basque region, where non-Basque 
speakers found it pointless to learn a minority language that appar- 
ently had little utility in the modern world. 

For these reasons, the Basque, the Catalan, and the Galician 
autonomous community governments placed the highest empha- 
sis on policies to save their respective languages. In each of these 
regions, the local language was declared co-official along with 
Castilian Spanish; residents of the regions came to expect that they 
could communicate with their government in their native tongues 
when dealing with the courts and the police, and in a wide variety 
of other contexts in which citizens interacted directly with the state. 
Trials were conducted in both languages. The regional parliaments 
and governments, as well as most other institutions of government, 
were bilingual in theory if not in practice. Each government sub- 
sidized native-language schools through the high-school years and 
supported a television system that broadcast largely, or, in the 
Basque case, entirely, in the native language. The Basque autono- 
mous government placed great emphasis on recruiting a native 
police force made up of bilingual officers able to interact with the 
local population in the language of their choice (see The Police Sys- 
tem, ch. 5). 

At the end of the 1980s, it was still too early to assess whether 
or not such policies could salvage these minority languages. Cata- 
lan seemed assured of survival, even if as a subordinate language 
to Castilian, but Euskera and Galician were spoken by such a small 
portion of the modern, urbanized population that their fate would 
probably not be known for another generation. Under the best of 
circumstances, the representation of such complexity in Spanish 
society and politics will present a major challenge to the country's 
political elites and opinion leaders through the 1990s. 

The Catalans 

The four Spanish provinces in the northeast corner of the Iberian 
Peninsula constitute the principal homeland of the Catalans. The 
Catalan autonomous community covers about 6.5 percent of Spain's 



89 



Spain: A Country Study 

total peninsular land area. The region consists of the provinces of 
Barcelona, Gerona, Lerida, and Tarragona. Elsewhere in Spain, 
there were also significant Catalan-speaking populations in the 
Balearic Islands, along the east coast to the south of Valencia, and 
as far west as the eastern part of the Aragonese province of Huesca. 
Outside Spain, the principal Catalan populations were found in 
France, at the eastern end of the Pyrenees, and in Andorra. 

The population of the Catalan region in 1986 was approximately 
6.0 million, of which 4.6 million lived in densely populated Barce- 
lona Province. The other three provinces were more sparsely popu- 
lated. As one of the richest areas of Spain and the first to 
industrialize, Catalonia attracted hundreds of thousands of 
migrants, primarily from Andalusia and other poor parts of the 
country. From 1900 to 1981, the net in-migration into Catalonia 
was about 2.4 million. In the 1980s, over half of Catalonia's working 
class, and the vast majority of its unskilled or semi-skilled workers, 
were cultural outsiders. 

Catalan was one of five distinct Romance languages that emerged 
as the Islamic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula began to ebb (see 
Al Andalus, ch. 1). The others were Aragonese, Castilian, Leonese, 
and Galician. By the late Middle Ages, the kingdoms of Catalo- 
nia, Aragon, and Valencia had joined together in a federation, forg- 
ing one of the most advanced constitutional systems of the time 
in Europe (see Castile and Aragon, ch. 1). 

After the union of the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile in 1479, 
the Spanish crown maintained a loose administrative hold over its 
component realms. Although it occasionally tried to assert more 
centralized control, in the case of Catalonia its efforts generally 
resulted in failure. Nonetheless, attempts by Catalans in the seven- 
teenth century to declare their independence were likewise unsuc- 
cessful (see Spain in Decline, ch. 1). In the War of the Spanish 
Succession, Catalonia sided with the English against the Spanish 
crown, and the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 opened 
the way for the conquest of Catalonia by Spanish troops (see War 
of the Spanish Succession, ch. 1). In September 1714, after a long 
siege, Barcelona fell, and Catalonia's formal constitutional indepen- 
dence came to an end. 

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, Catalonia exper- 
ienced a dramatic resurgence as the focal point of Spain's indus- 
trial revolution (see The Cuban Disaster and the "Generation of 
1898," ch. 1). There were also a cultural renaissance and a renewed 
emphasis on the Catalan language as the key to Catalan cultural 
distinctiveness. Catalan nationalism was put forward by the nascent 
Catalan bourgeoisie as a solution that coupled political and cultural 



90 




Romanesque church in Lerida Province 
Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain 



91 



Spain: A Country Study 

autonomy with economic integration in the Spanish market. For 
a brief period during the 1930s, the freedom of the Second Republic 
gave the Catalans a taste of political autonomy, but the door was 
shut for forty years by the Franco dictatorship (see Republican 
Spain, ch. 1). 

There were, in principle, several different criteria that were used 
to determine who was, or was not, Catalan. One's place of birth, 
or the place of birth of one's parents, was often used by second- 
generation migrants to claim Catalan status, but relatively few 
whose families had been Catalan for generations agreed with these 
claims. Biological descent was seldom used among either natives 
or migrants, because Catalans, unlike Basques, did not usually 
define their ethnic identity in such terms. Sentimental allegiance 
to Catalonia was important in separating out from the category 
those native Catalans who no longer felt any identification with 
their homeland, but preferred to identify themselves as Spanish. 
Thus, the most significant and powerful indicator of Catalan iden- 
tity, for both Catalans and migrants alike, was the ability to speak 
the Catalan language. 

According to one estimate, the population (including those out- 
side Spain) speaking Catalan or one of its variants (Valencian or 
Majorcan) numbered about 6.5 million in the late 1980s. Within 
the Catalan autonomous community, about 50 percent of the people 
spoke Catalan as a mother tongue, and another 30 percent could 
at least understand the language. In Valencia and the Balearic 
Islands, perhaps as many as 50 to 70 percent of the population spoke 
one of the variants of Catalan as a mother tongue, although a great 
majority used the language only in the home. 

The Galicians 

Galicians live in the four Spanish provinces located along the 
far northwest coast of the Iberian Peninsula, but their language 
zone shades into northern Portugal as well. The autonomous region 
of Galicia covers about 6 percent of the total peninsular territory 
of Spain. The four provinces that make up the region are La 
Coruna, Lugo, Orense, and Pontevedra. The total population of 
these provinces in 1986 was about 2.8 million. None of the provinces 
was densely populated. Unlike the Basque and the Catalan regions, 
which were rich, urbanized, and industrialized, Galicia remained 
relatively poor, agricultural and dominated by rural and village 
society, as industry had yet to make its appearance there on a large 
scale. Moreover, its agricultural sector continued to be among the 
most backward in Spain, and farm productivity was severely ham- 
pered by the tiny size of the individual plots, known as minifundios. 



92 



Galician bagpipe players 
in regional dress 
Courtesy National 
Tourist Office of Spain 



Canary Islanders 
in regional dress 
Courtesy National 



Tourist Office of Spain 



remainder refraining, at least partly, out of a sense of inferiority. 
In any case, only an insignificant percentage would be unable to 
understand the language, given its similarities to Castilian Span- 
ish. Nevertheless, like Catalan, Galician seemed condemned to 
second-class status while Castilian continued to enjoy the role of 
the dominant language in official and formal contexts. Galician 
nationalists were sharply critical of what they termed the ' ' so-called 
bilingualism policy," because they believed that Galician, unless 
it were given privileged status vis-a-vis Castilian, would eventually 
be overwhelmed by the more popular and more dominant official 
language. 

The Basques 

The homeland of the Basques, known by Basque nationalists as 
Euzkadi, occupies the littoral of the Bay of Biscay as it curves north 
into France. The region extends inland some 150 kilometers, 
through the juncture of the Pyrenees and the Cordillera Cantabrica, 
and thence south to the Rio Ebro. The region covers nearly 21 ,000 



93 



Spain: A Country Study 



The minifundio was the product of an attempt to distribute land par- 
cels in a closed rural system to a growing population by requiring 
that equal shares be left to each heir. After just a few generations, 
the land had been subdivided so much that most of the parcels were 
too small to support a family or to be economically viable. For these 
reasons, Galicia was a net exporter of population to the rest of Spain. 
Between 1900 and 1981, the net outflow of people from Galicia 
was more than 825,000. 

Galician nationalism, which appeared as early as the 1840s, 
recalled a mythical "Golden Age" when the medieval kingdom 
of Galicia had existed. There had indeed been a king of Galicia 
who was crowned in 1111; the kingdom was partitioned some years 
later, however, leaving the northern half hemmed in and isolated 
while the southern portion expanded southward in the wake of the 
Moors' withdrawal. This southern part of the realm eventually 
became Portugal; the northern part fell into disorder. Finally, in 
1483 Castilian forces restored order in Galicia, and the kingdom 
of Castile incorporated the region into its realm. Castilian rule also 
brought on economic and cultural stagnation that lasted into the 
nineteenth century. 

The emergence of Galician nationalism in the 1840s was prin- 
cipally a literary and cultural phenomenon; its economic and politi- 
cal strength had been sapped by the continuation of its traditional, 
rural, even anti-industrial social structure. The peasantry was con- 
servative; the bourgeoisie was tiny and was largely non-Galician; 
the church opposed modernization. The Galician language survived 
principally as a rural vernacular, but it had no official standing. 
Despite Galicia' s contemporary nationalist movement, which dates 
from 1931, and the activities of the region's autonomous govern- 
ment, in power since 1981, Galician nationalism continued to be 
almost silent in comparison with the louder demands of Basques 
and Catalans in the late 1980s. The use of Galician in political and 
official forums remained principally a strategy of parties on the left 
of the political spectrum; more conservative political figures con- 
tinued to use Castilian either predominantly or exclusively. 

About 60 percent of the population of the autonomous commu- 
nity can be identified as ethnic Galician, the great majority of whom 
retained some use of their language, if not in formal settings, at 
least in the home. According to one source, some 80 percent of 
the population could at least understand the language, although 
it remained primarily a language for the rural and village poor of 
Galicia and was not much heard in the larger cities. Another source 
argues that at least 80 percent could speak the language but probably 
only about 60 percent actually did so on a regular basis, the 



94 



Typical regional dress 
in Cdceres Province 
Courtesy National 
Tourist Office of Spain 

square kilometers, of which about 3,000 lie on the French side of 
the international frontier. The 18,000 square kilometers on the 
Spanish side constitute about 3.6 percent of Spain's total land area. 

About 3 million people lived in this area in the late 1980s. 
Approximately 300,000 people were on the French side of the 
border, while the remaining 2.7 million people were concentrated 
primarily in the two Spanish coastal provinces of Guipuzcoa and 
Vizcaya and, less densely, in the two inland provinces of Alava 
and Navarre. This population lived under two distinct autonomous 
communities: the Basque Country, which incorporated the three 
smaller provinces, and Navarre, which by itself constituted a 
"uniprovincial" regional government. 

The Basques are among the oldest peoples of Europe. Despite 
their having been visited by numerous waves of invaders, the 
Basques reached the tenth century still fairly isolated from the flow 
of West European history. In the tenth and the eleventh centu- 
ries, the rising kingdom of Navarre absorbed most of the rest of 
the Basque peoples, and it created for the first time a more or less 



95 



Spain: A Country Study 

unified Basque political entity. With the kingdom's decline, how- 
ever, the region fell into disorder, and by the sixteenth century, 
the Basque provinces had been integrated into the kingdom of 
Castile. From this time until the nineteenth century, relations 
between Castile and the Basque provinces were governed by the 
fueros, local privileges and exemptions by which the Spanish king 
recognized the special nature of the Basque provinces and even 
a number of Basque towns (see Rule by Pronunciamiento; Liberal 
Rule, ch. 1). As a result of the centralization of the Spanish state 
and the Carlist Wars, the fueros had been abolished by the end of 
the nineteenth century. The Second Republic in the 1930s offered 
the chance to create a new autonomous Basque regime, but all such 
efforts were doomed by the Spanish Civil War. After the war, the 
Franco dictatorship sought — unsuccessfully — to suppress all signs 
of Basque distinctiveness, especially the use of the language. 

Through most of the twentieth century, the thriving Basque econ- 
omy, centered on the steel and the shipbuilding industries of Vizcaya 
and the metal-processing shops in Guipuzcoa, attracted thousands 
of Spaniards who migrated there in search of jobs and a better way 
of life. Between 1900 and 1980, the number of people moving into 
the region exceeded those who left by nearly 450,000, the heaviest 
flow occurring during the decade of the 1960s. In the 1970s, the 
flow began to reverse itself because of political upheaval and eco- 
nomic decline. Between 1977 and 1984, the net outflow was nearly 
51,000. The consequence of this heavy in-migration was a popu- 
lation in the late 1980s that was only marginally ethnic Basque and 
that in many urban areas was clearly non- Basque in both language 
and identity. One authoritative study found that only 52 percent 
of the population had been born in the Basque region of parents 
also born there, 1 1 percent had been born in the region of parents 
born elsewhere, and 35.5 percent had been born outside the region. 

The Basque region has been for decades the arena for a clash 
between an encroaching modern culture and its values (speaking 
Spanish, identifying with Spain, working in industry, living in a 
large city) and a native, traditional culture and its values (speak- 
ing Euskera, identifying with one's village or province, working 
on a small farm or in the fishing sector, living on a farm or in a 
small village). The former population was found concentrated in 
the larger cities such as Bilbao, while the latter lived in the small 
fishing villages along the Bay of Biscay or in mountain farmsteads, 
called caserios, located in the mountains of Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, 
and Navarre. These centers of Basque traditional culture have been 
in constant decline since the introduction of heavy industry to the 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



region in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and they could 
well disappear by the end of the twentieth century. 

The use of the Basque language has also been in steady decline 
for centuries, but the erosion has accelerated since the 1950s with 
the rise in non-Basque migration to the region. A 1984 language cen- 
sus confirmed what unofficial estimates had already observed: that 
Basque was a weakened minority language, although not yet mori- 
bund. Of the 2.1 million people in the Basque Country autonomous 
region, 23 percent could understand Euskera, 21 percent could speak 
it, but only 13 percent could read the language and only 10 percent 
could write it. These data indicate that the Basque language has 
survived principally as an oral language without much of a written 
tradition, and that it is conserved not by formal teaching in schools 
but by informal teaching in the home, Officials in the Basque Coun- 
try launched a number of important programs, especially in tele- 
vision and education, to restore the language to a level of parity 
with Castilian Spanish, but the success of these efforts will not be 
confirmed for at least a generation. Officially, the objective was to 
make the Basque population bilingual in Spanish and in Basque; 
but that goal seemed quite remote in the late 1980s. 

The Andalusians 

The Andalusians cannot be considered an ethnically distinct peo- 
ple because they lack two of the most important markers of dis- 
tinctiveness: an awareness of a common, distant mythological 
origin, and their own language. Nevertheless, it is clear that they 
do constitute a culturally distinct people, or region, that has become 
increasingly important in an industrial and democratic society. 

The Andalusians live in Spain's eight southernmost provinces: 
Almeria, Cadiz, Cordoba, Granada, Huelva, Jaen, Malaga, and 
Seville. In 1986 their total population stood at 6.9 million. In 
general, it had grown more slowly than had the country's total popu- 
lation, and the region continued to be sparsely populated. Since 
1960, the region's share of total population had declined, despite 
birth rates ranging from 20 to 25 per 1 ,000, about 40 percent higher 
than the Spanish average. The causes of the depopulation of the 
region can be found in the distinctive characteristics of its culture 
and economy: the large, poorly utilized estates and the agro- towns; 
rural poverty and landlessness; a rigid class structure and sharp 
class conflict; and emigration to Spain's industrial cities and to other 
parts of Europe. 

Most descriptions of Andalusia begin with the landowner- 
ship system, for the most powerful forces in the region have for 
centuries been the owners of the large, economically backward 



97 



Spain: A Country Study 

estates, called latifundios (see Hispania, ch. 1). These wide expanses 
of land held by relatively few owners had their origins in landowning 
patterns that stretch back to Roman times; in grants of land made 
to the nobility, to the military orders, and to the church during 
the Reconquest (Reconquista); and in laws of the nineteenth cen- 
tury by which church and common lands were sold in large tracts 
to the urban middle class. The latifundio system is noted for two 
regressive characteristics: unproductive use of the land (agricul- 
tural production per capita in Andalusia was only 70 percent of 
that in Spain as a whole during the late 1980s) and unequal and 
absentee landownership patterns (1 percent of the agricultural popu- 
lation owned more than half of the land; the landed aristocracy 
made up no more than . 3 percent of the population) . The work- 
ers of this land, called jornaleros, were themselves landless; they did 
not even live on the land. Instead, they resided in what Spaniards 
refer to as pueblos, but with populations ranging as high as 30,000, 
these population centers were far too large to be considered "vil- 
lages" or "towns." Anthropologists have coined the term "agro- 
towns" to describe such urban areas, because they served almost 
solely as a habitat for agricultural day-workers and had themselves 
declined in economic, cultural, and political significance. 

This economic and cultural system produced a distinctive out- 
look, or perspective, that involved class consciousness and class con- 
flicts as well as significant out-migration. In contrast to the much 
smaller farm towns and villages of northern Spain, where the land 
was worked by its owners, where parcels were of more nearly equal 
size, and where class differentiations were softened, class distinc- 
tions in the agro-towns of Andalusia stood out with glaring clarity. 
Devices used in other parts of rural Spain to diffuse class conflict, 
such as kinship and religious rituals, were of little value here (see 
Social Stratification, this ch.). The families of the landless farmers 
lived at, or near, the poverty level, and their relations with the 
landed gentry were marked by conflict, aggression, and hostility. 
The two main forces that kept Andalusia's rural society from fly- 
ing apart were external to the region. The first was the coercive 
power of the state, the political power emanating from Madrid, 
as exemplified by Spain's rural constabulary, the Civil Guard 
(Guardia Civil — see The Police System, ch. 5). The second was 
the safety valve offered by the opportunities to migrate to other 
parts of Spain, or to other countries in Western Europe. This free- 
dom resulted in the remaining facet of Andalusian culture: the will 
to leave the region behind. Much of this migration was seasonal; 
in 1982, for example, 80,000 Spaniards, mostly Andalusians, 
migrated to France for the wine harvest. Much of the migration, 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 

however, consisted of entire families who intended to remain in 
their new home for long periods, or perhaps forever. This is why 
Andalusia during the 1960s lost some 14 percent of its population, 
perhaps the greatest European exodus in peacetime in this century. 

The Gypsies 

The term "Gypsies" is used by outsiders to label an ethnic group 
the members of which refer to themselves as Rom and speak a lan- 
guage known as Romany. No one knows exactly how many Gyp- 
sies there are, either in general or in Spain in particular. Estimates 
of the Spanish Gypsy population range as low as 50,000 and as 
high as 450,000, and other estimates place the world Gypsy popu- 
lation at between 3 and 6 million. Correct estimates are made 
difficult by the nomadic life- style followed by a portion of the group, 
by their cultural isolation, by the sense of mystery surrounding them 
and their origins, and by the division of the population into a num- 
ber of distinctive subgroups. 

It is generally accepted that Gypsies migrated out of India into 
Europe as early as the eleventh century. There are records of their 
having arrived in Spain as early as 1425 and in Barcelona, in par- 
ticular, by 1447. At first they were well received and were even 
accorded official protection by many local authorities. In 1492, 
however, when official persecution began against Moors and Jews 
to cleanse the peninsula of non-Christian groups, the Gypsies were 
included in the list of peoples to be assimilated or driven out. For 
about 300 years, Gypsies were subject to a number of laws and 
policies designed to eliminate them from Spain as an identifiable 
group: Gypsy settlements were broken up and the residents dis- 
persed; Gypsies were required to marry non-Gypsies; they were 
denied their language and rituals as well as being excluded from 
public office and from guild membership. By the time this period 
had drawn to a close, Gypsies had been driven into a permanently 
submerged underclass from which they had not escaped in the late 
1980s. " 

Spanish Gypsies are usually divided into two main groups: gitanos 
and hungaros (for Hungarians). The former, in turn, are divided 
into subgroups classified by both social class and cultural differ- 
ences. In the late 1980s, the gitanos lived predominantly in southern 
and central Spain. Many of them took up a sedentary form of life, 
working as street vendors or entertainers. Although poor and largely 
illiterate, they were usually well integrated into Spanish society. 
The hungaros, however, are Kalderash, one of the divisions of the 
group from Central Europe (hence the name). They were much 
poorer than the gitanos and lived an entirely nomadic lifestyle, 



99 



View of Grazalema, Cadiz Province 
Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain 



101 



Spain: A Country Study 

usually in tents or shacks around the larger cities. They made their 
living by begging or stealing, and they were much more of a 
problem for Spanish authorities. Many gitanos denied the hungaros 
the status of being in their same ethnic group, but outsiders tend 
to regard them all as basically Gypsies. In any case, whatever com- 
mon ethnic consciousness they possessed was not sufficient to make 
them a significant political force. 

Under Franco, Gypsies were persecuted and harassed, as indeed 
they were throughout the areas of Europe controlled by Nazi Ger- 
many. In the post-Franco era, however, Spanish government policy 
has been much more sympathetic toward them, especially in the 
area of social welfare and social services. Since 1983, for example, 
the government has operated a special program of compensatory 
education to promote educational rights for the disadvantaged, 
including those in Gypsy communities. The challenge will be to 
devise programs that bring the Gypsy population into the main- 
stream of the country's economic and political life without erod- 
ing the group's distinctive cultural and linguistic heritage. 

Social Stratification 

Spain in the 1980s possessed a socioeconomic class structure typi- 
cal of countries entering the advanced stage of industrialization. 
In general terms, society was becoming more differentiated along 
class, occupational, and professional lines, with an expanding mid- 
dle class and a decreasing proportion of rural poor. Although Spain 
had not yet reached the degree of social differentiation seen in other 
advanced industrial democracies in Western Europe, it was clearly 
moving in the same direction. As in other areas, however, Spain 
was modernizing in a distinctiy Iberian style, retaining some impor- 
tant social characteristics from an earlier era. 

By the mid-1980s, the structure of Spain's economy had come 
increasingly to resemble that of most other West European coun- 
tries, as evidenced by changes in the distribution of its work force. 
Throughout the twentieth century there was a steady decline in the 
proportion of workers employed in agriculture and other primary 
sectors (from 60.4 percent of the work force in 1900 to 14.4 percent 
in 1981); a gradual increase in the proportion employed in the ser- 
vices sector (from 15.1 percent to 40.4); and an increase in the pro- 
portion employed in industry and construction, until the 1970s when 
the percentage leveled off and even declined slightly (13.6 percent 
in 1900, to 37.4 percent in 1970, then 35.3 percent in 1981). (The 
residual percentages are accounted for by "other" and "unclassi- 
fied" economic activities.) Changes were especially dramatic dur- 
ing the fifteen-year period from 1965 to 1980. According to a 1983 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



study, the Spanish work force consisted of 15 percent in agricul- 
ture, 33 percent in industry, 25 percent in non-information-related 
services, and 27 percent in the information sector (compared with 
40 percent in the United States and 30 percent or more in West 
Germany, in France, and in Britain). 

There were, however, worrisome signs that certain key sectors 
of the work force had not kept pace with the country's transition 
to advanced industrial status. In 1980 administrative and managerial 
workers, the key to guiding a complex industrial economy, consti- 
tuted a tiny portion — only 1.3 percent — of Spain's work force, which 
put Spain on a par with Uruguay and Brazil. Professional and tech- 
nical workers, the sector relied upon to provide basic and applied 
research for a country's industrial base, constituted only 5.9 per- 
cent of the work force, which placed Spain on about the same level 
as Mexico and the Philippines. In both cases, among West Euro- 
pean nations, Spain was close to only Greece and Portugal. The 
rest of Western Europe was still far ahead in these crucial areas. 

Changes in Spain's economic structure have been reflected in class 
structure changes as well. By 1970 Spanish sociologist Amando de 
Miguel had reported that the country's occupation structure was 
dominated by a growing middle (including upper-middle) class of 
administrators, service personnel, and clerical workers. On the basis 
of the 1970 census, de Miguel found that fully 40 percent of Spain's 
working population was employed in the category of "nonmanual 
and service workers"; the country's industrial labor force, or blue 
collar- workers, constituted 35 percent of the work force; the rural 
workers (including employed farm workers, day workers, and farm 
owners) accounted for 25 percent (still high by West European stan- 
dards). The occupational structure differed markedly among Spain's 
various regions. In the more industrial, urbanized north and north- 
east (the Basque Country and Catalonia), white-collar service and 
administrative workers made up about 45 percent of the work force; 
industrial blue collar workers, about 47 percent; and rural workers, 
about 8 percent. In the more traditional, rural and agrarian south 
and west of the country (Andalusia and Extremadura), the relative 
percentages were 35 percent white-collar, 30 percent blue-collar, and 
35 percent rural. A decade later, American political scientists Richard 
Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad studied the class impli- 
cations of the 1979 Spanish elections and discovered, first, that the 
country's class structure had become more differentiated in the 
preceding decade, and second, that the upper and middle classes 
had grown in size, while the urban and rural working classes had 
contracted. Gunther and his associates found that 12.6 percent of 
their respondents classified themselves in the highest status group 



103 



Spain: A Country Study 

(entrepreneurs, professionals, large landowners, etc.), an increase 
from 5.2 percent in the de Miguel study. Another 36.3 percent 
could be classified as upper-middle class (these in technical profes- 
sions, small businessmen, mid-level public and private employees), 
up from 15.4 percent in 1970; and 16.3 percent fell within the lower- 
middle class category (sales and supervisory personnel and small 
farmers), down from 21.8 percent a decade earlier. Thus, the num- 
ber included in the general category of middle class rose from about 
one-third of the work force to about one-half in a decade. As a per- 
centage of the total, blue-collar workers and rural farm workers 
fell from about 60 percent in 1970 to only 33.3 percent in Gun- 
ther's 1979 study. 

Later studies, using less precisely differentiated categories, found 
that many Spaniards continued to classify themselves as working- 
class people regardless of the color of their collar. In one 1979 study, 
done by American political scientists Peter McDonough and Samuel 
Barnes and their Spanish colleague Antonio Lopez Pina, 48 per- 
cent of their respondents classified themselves as "working class"; 
36 percent, as "low-middle"; and 16 percent, as "middle-high." 
In a 1984 study, these same three researchers reported that self- 
classified working-class respondents were 55.9 percent of the sam- 
ple, middle-class people were 33 percent, and upper-class subject 
were 11.1 percent. Allowing for a considerable degree of overlap 
and ambiguity in answers across surveys, particularly in aggregating 
the responses for working class and lower-middle class into a sin- 
gle statistic, it still seems clear that Spanish society had become 
more middle class and less poor over the decade and a half between 
1970 and 1985. 

Data on class structure from 1984 have been analyzed in a study 
by Spanish sociologists Salustiano del Campo and Manuel Navarro, 
who divided the Spanish work force into two broad groups: salaried 
employees, constituting approximately 68 percent of the work force, 
and owners, managers, and professionals, making up about 31 per- 
cent. The first group was further divided into nonmanual and 
service workers, who accounted for about 34 percent of the work 
force, and blue-collar workers, who also constituted approximately 
34 percent. The second group had the categories of capitalist busi- 
ness class, with about 5 percent of the work force; and the liberal 
professional class (e.g., attorneys) and self-employed small busi- 
ness owners, merchants, and small farmers, who accounted for 
approximately 27 percent. 

Although Spaniards experienced many of the same social and 
class cleavages that occurred in other advanced industrial socie- 
ties, they retained a distinctive commitment to greater income 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



equality, an egalitarian value that stands out in comparison with 
their wealthier and more industrialized neighbors. In a 1985 study, 
McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Pina asked their respondents, "Do 
you think there should be a great deal of difference, some difference, 
or almost no difference in how much people in different occupations 
earn?" The proportions of respondents answering "a great differ- 
ence" were 3 percent from the working class, 4 percent from the 
middle class, and 7 percent from the upper class, compared with 
26 percent, 32 percent, and 49 percent from comparable classes in 
the United States. Thus, McDonough and his colleagues call our 
attention to "the salient fact [of] the high level of egalitarian/populist 
expectations in Spain. The pattern is understandable in light of the 
poverty which for many Spaniards is not a vicarious memory and 
in view, as well, of the paternalistic legacy of Latin Catholicism. 
On the one hand, then, economic and social issues are probably 
not as conflict-ridden as caricatures of Spanish politics imply — relative 
to the symbolic-moral issues, for example. On the other hand, the 
public seems to entertain high expectations about the benefits and 
social equity to be delivered by the government." 

According to data from 1980 and 1981 , Spain's household income 
was distributed in the following pattern: the poorest quintile of the 
population received 6.9 percent; the second poorest, 12.5; the mid- 
dle quintile, 17.3; the fourth quintile, 23.2; the richest quintile, 
40.0; and the richest decile, 24.5. The ratio between the richest 
and the poorest quintiles was 5.8:1, a fairly equitable distribution 
pattern compared with other advanced industrial West European 
democracies. The Spanish pattern of income distribution did not 
differ dramatically from that of advanced welfare states like Sweden 
or Denmark. The crucial difference was, of course, that in those 
countries there was much more income to distribute. Outside 
Spain's urban areas, in the small and mid-sized towns where more 
than a quarter of the country's population still lived, there were 
two distinctive models of class structure and conflict. In the small 
villages of Castile and the north, where land was more evenly dis- 
tributed, and where the land was worked by its owners, social 
cleavages were much less acute, and class conflict was much less 
strident. There, the sense of community was reinforced by the still- 
powerful forces of kinship and religion. Moreover, modernization, 
principally by raising the salaries of laborers and by diminishing 
the gap in material possessions between rich and poor, had erased 
the few class or status differences that had existed previously. As 
the ownership of automobiles, refrigerators, and television sets 
spread to practically the entire population, upper-class status became 
largely meaningless in these small villages. 



105 



Spain: A Country Study 

In the larger agro-towns of the south, however, a totally differ- 
ent picture was found. In Andalusia, land was distributed in a highly 
unequal way and the land was worked principally by day laborers 
who owned no land and who seldom even lived on it. In these towns, 
class structure was very sharply delineated and class conflict was 
aggressive and often violent. Traditional values of kinship and 
religion failed to diffuse these conflicts, and the towns and villages 
were held together by what anthropologist David Gilmore calls the 
''coercive integration" imposed by external forces, primarily the 
government in Madrid. 

Social Values and Attitudes 

After the restoration of democracy, the changes in everyday Span- 
ish life were as radical as the political transformation. These changes 
were even more striking when contrasted with the values and social 
practices that had prevailed in Spanish society during the Franco 
years, especially during the 1940s and the early 1950s. In essence, 
Spanish social values and attitudes were modernized at the same 
pace, and to the same degree, as the country's class structure, eco- 
nomic institutions, and political framework. 

To say that Spanish social values under Franco were conserva- 
tive would be a great understatement. Both public laws and church 
regulations enforced a set of social strictures aimed at preserving 
the traditional role of the family, distant and formal relations 
between the sexes, and controls over expression in the press, film, 
and the mass media, as well as over many other important social 
institutions. By the 1960s, however, social values were changing 
faster than the law, inevitably creating tension between legal codes 
and reality. Even the church had begun to move away from its 
more conservative positions by the latter part of the decade. The 
government responded haltingly to these changes with some new 
cabinet appointments and with somewhat softer restrictions on the 
media. Yet underneath these superficial changes, Spanish society 
was experiencing wrenching changes as its people came increas- 
ingly into contact with the outside world. To some extent, these 
changes were due to the rural exodus that had uprooted hundreds 
of thousands of Spaniards and had brought them into new urban 
social settings. In the 1960s and the early 1970s, however, two other 
contacts were also important: the flow of European tourists to 
"sunny Spain" and the migration of Spain's workers to jobs in 
France, Switzerland, and West Germany. 

One of the most powerful influences on Spanish social values 
has been the country's famous "industry without smokestacks" — 
tourism. In the years before the Civil War, tourists numbered only 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



about one quarter of a million, and it took more than a decade 
after World War II for them to discover Spain's climate and low 
prices. When they finally did, the trickle of tourists became a flood 
(see table 6, Appendix). The leading countries sending tourists to 
Spain were France, Portugal, Britain, and West Germany. Of 
course tourists brought much more than British pounds or Ger- 
man deutsche marks; they also brought the democratic political 
and social values of northern Europe. 

The other population flow that affected Spanish cultural values 
involved Spanish workers who returned from having worked in the 
more industrialized and more liberal countries of Western Europe. 
The exact number of returning migrants fluctuated greatly from 
year to year, depending on economic conditions in Spain and in 
the rest of Europe. The peak period was 1965 to 1969, when more 
than 550,000 returned; but nearly 750,000 returned during the 
decade of the 1970s. The return flow ebbed somewhat during the 
1980s, when only about 20,000 came back per year. The principal 
problems encountered by these returning Spaniards were both eco- 
nomic (finding another job) and cultural (what the Spanish refer 
to as "social reinsertion," or becoming accustomed again to the 
Spanish ways of doing things). Many of the returnees came back 
with a small sum of money that they invested in a small business 
or shop, from which they hoped to advance up the economic lad- 
der. Above all, they brought back with them the cultural habits 
and tastes of France, West Germany, and Switzerland, contribut- 
ing thereby to the cultural transformation of post-Franco Spain. 

Outsiders who still thought of Spain as socially restrained and 
conservative were surprised to note the public changes in sexual 
attitudes in the country since the late 1970s. Once state censor- 
ship was relaxed on magazines and films in 1976 and in 1978, the 
market for pornography flourished. In a country where Playboy was 
outlawed until 1976, ten years later this and other foreign "adult" 
magazines were already considered tame and were outsold by 
domestic magazines. Throughout Spain's large cities, uncensored 
sex films were readily available in government-licensed theaters, 
and prostitutes and brothels freely advertised their services in even 
the most serious press. Despite these attention-getting changes in 
public attitudes, however, Spanish government policy for some 
years remained quite distant from social practice in two important 
areas related to private sexual behavior, contraception and abortion. 

During the Franco years, the ban on the sale of contraceptives 
was complete, at least in theory, even though the introduction of 
the pill had brought artificial contraception to at least half a mil- 
lion Spanish women by 1975. The ban on the sale of contraceptives 



107 



Spain: A Country Study 

was lifted in 1978, but no steps were taken to ensure that they were 
used safely or effectively. Schools offered no sex education courses, 
and family planning centers existed only where local authorities 
were willing to pay for them. The consequence of a loosening of 
sexual restraints, combined with a high level of ignorance about 
the technology that could be substituted in their place, was a rise 
in the number of unwanted pregnancies, which led to the second 
policy problem — abortion. 

Illegal abortions were fairly commonplace in Spain even under 
the dictatorship. A 1974 government report estimated that there 
were about 300,000 such abortions each year. Subsequently, the 
number rose to about 350,000 annually, which gave Spain one of 
the highest ratios of abortions to live births among advanced indus- 
trial countries. Abortion continued to be illegal in Spain until 1985, 
three years after the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Espafiol — PSOE) came to power on an electoral 
platform that promised a change. Even so, the law legalized abor- 
tions only in certain cases: pregnancy resulting from rape, which 
must be reported to the authorities prior to the abortion; reason- 
able probability of a malformed fetus, attested to by two doctors; 
or to save the mother's life, again in the opinion of two physicians. 
In the 1980s, this was as far as public opinion would permit the 
state to go; surveys showed that a clear majority of the electorate 
remained opposed to abortion on demand. 

Perhaps the most significant change in Spanish social values, 
however, involved the role of women in society, which, in turn, 
was related to the nature of the family. Spanish society, for centu- 
ries, had embraced a code of moral values that established strin- 
gent standards of sexual conduct for women (but not for men); 
restricted the opportunities for professional careers for women, but 
honored their role as wives and (most important) mothers; and pro- 
hibited divorce, contraception, and abortion, but permitted prosti- 
tution. After the return of democracy, the change in the status of 
women was dramatic. One significant indicator was the changing 
place of women in the work force. In the traditional Spanish world, 
women rarely entered the job market. By the late 1970s, however, 
22 percent of the country's adult women, still somewhat fewer than 
in Italy and in Ireland, had entered the work force. By 1984 this 
figure had increased to 33 percent, a level not significantly differ- 
ent from Italy or the Netherlands. Women still made up less than 
one-third of the total labor force, however, and in some important 
sectors, such as banking, the figure was closer to one- tenth. A 1977 
opinion poll revealed that when asked whether a woman's place 
was in the home only 22 percent of young people in Spain agreed, 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



compared with 26 percent in Britain, 30 percent in Italy, and 
37 percent in France. The principal barrier to women in the work 
place, however, was not public opinion, but rather such factors 
as a high unemployment rate and a lack of part-time jobs. In edu- 
cation, women were rapidly achieving parity with men, at least 
statistically. In 1983, approximately 46 percent of Spain's univer- 
sity enrollment was female, the thirty-first highest percentage in 
the world, and comparable to most other European countries. 

During Franco's years, Spanish law discriminated strongly 
against married women. Without her husband's approval, referred 
to as the permiso marital, a- wife was prohibited from almost all eco- 
nomic activities, including employment, ownership of property, 
or even travel away from home. The law also provided for less strin- 
gent definitions of such crimes as adultery and desertion for hus- 
bands than it did for wives. Significant reforms of this system were 
begun shordy before Franco's death, and they have continued at 
a rapid pace since then. The permiso marital was abolished in 1975; 
laws against adultery were cancelled in 1978; and divorce was legal- 
ized in 1981 . During the same year, the parts of the civil code that 
dealt with family finances were also reformed. 

During the Franco years, marriages had to be canonical (that 
is, performed under Roman Catholic law and regulations) if even 
one of the partners was Catholic, which meant effectively that all 
marriages in Spain had to be sanctioned by the church. Since the 
church prohibited divorce, a marriage could be dissolved only 
through the arduous procedure of annulment, which was available 
only after a lengthy series of administrative steps and was thus 
accessible only to the relatively wealthy. These restrictions were 
probably one of the major reasons for a 1975 survey result show- 
ing that 71 percent of Spaniards favored legalizing divorce; however, 
because the government remained in the hands of conservatives 
until 1982, progress toward a divorce law was slow and full of con- 
flict. In the summer of 1981 , the Congress of Deputies (lower cham- 
ber of the Cortes, or Spanish Parliament) finally approved a divorce 
law with the votes of about thirty Union of the Democratic Center 
(Union de Centro Democratico — UCD) deputies who defied the 
instructions of party conservatives. As a consequence, Spain had 
a divorce law that permitted the termination of a marriage in as 
little as two years following the legal separation of the partners. 
Still, it would be an exaggeration to say that the new divorce law 
opened a floodgate for the termination of marriages. Between the 
time the law went into effect at the beginning of September 1981 , 
and the end of 1984, only slighdy more than 69,000 couples had 
availed themselves of the option of ending their marriages, and the 



109 



Spain: A Country Study 

number declined in both 1983 and 1984. There were already more 
divorced people than this in Spain in 1981 before the law took effect. 

Despite these important gains, observers expected that the gaining 
of equal rights for women would be a lengthy struggle, waged on 
many different fronts. It was not until deciding a 1987 case, for 
example, that Spain's Supreme Court held that a rape victim need 
not prove that she had fought to defend herself in order to verify 
the truth of her allegation. Until that important court case, it was 
generally accepted that a female rape victim, unlike the victims 
of other crimes, had to show that she had put up * 'heroic resistance" 
in order to prove that she had not enticed the rapist or otherwise 
encouraged him to attack her. 

Another important sign of cultural change involved the size and 
the composition of the family. To begin with, the marriage rate 
(the number of marriages in proportion to the adult population) 
has declined steadily since the mid-1970s. After holding steady at 
7 per 1 ,000 or more for over 100 years, the marriage rate declined 
to about 5 per 1,000 in 1982, a level observed in West Germany 
and in Italy only a few years earlier. Fewer people were marrying 
in Spain, and the family structure was changing dramatically as 
well. In 1970, of the 8.8 million households recorded in the cen- 
sus, 59 percent consisted of small nuclear families of two to five 
persons, 15 percent were somewhat larger nuclear families that 
included other relatives as well as guests, and 10.6 percent were 
households of unrelated individuals who had no nuclear family. 
Large families of more than three children were only 9 percent of 
the total. In a 1975 municipal survey that dealt only with families, 
the following results were registered: couples without children con- 
stituted 16 percent of all families; and two-children families made 
up 34 percent of the total. Although the number of family units 
increased more than 20 percent between 1970 and 1981, the aver- 
age size of the family decreased by about 10 percent, from 3.8 per- 
sons to 3.5. The typical extended family of traditional societies (three 
generations of related persons living in the same household) hardly 
appeared at all in the census data. Clearly, that characteristic of 
Spanish cultural values was a thing of the past. 

Religion 

Spain, it has been observed, is a nation-state born out of reli- 
gious struggle between Catholicism and, in turn, Islam, Judaism, 
and Protestantism. After centuries of the Reconquest, in which 
Christian Spaniards fought to drive Muslims from Europe, the 
Inquisition sought to complete the religious purification of the 
Iberian Peninsula by driving out Jews, Protestants, and other 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



nonbelievers (see Ferdinand and Isabella, ch. 1). The Inquisition 
was finally abolished only in the 1830s, and even after that religious 
freedom was denied in practice, if not in theory. Catholicism became 
the state religion in 1851, when the Spanish government signed 
a Concordat with the Vatican that committed Madrid to pay the 
salaries of the clergy and to subsidize other expenses of the Roman 
Catholic Church. This pact was renounced in 1931, when the secu- 
lar constitution of the Second Republic imposed a series of anticleri- 
cal measures that threatened the church's very existence in Spain 
and provoked its support for the Franco uprising five years later 
(see Republican Spain, ch. 1). 

The advent of the Franco regime saw the restoration of the 
church's privileges. During the Franco years, Roman Catholicism 
was the only religion to have legal status; other worship services 
could not be advertised, and only the Roman Catholic Church could 
own property or publish books. The government not only continued 
to pay priests' salaries and to subsidize the church, but it also 
assisted in the reconstruction of church buildings damaged by the 
war. Laws were passed abolishing divorce and banning the sale 
of contraceptives. Catholic religious instruction was mandatory, 
even in public schools. Franco secured in return the right to name 
Roman Catholic bishops in Spain, as well as veto power over 
appointments of clergy down to the parish priest level. In 1953 this 
close cooperation was formalized in a new Concordat with the 
Vatican that granted the church an extraordinary set of privileges: 
mandatory canonical marriages for all Catholics; exemption from 
government taxation; subsidies for new building construction; cen- 
sorship of materials the church deemed offensive; the right to estab- 
lish universities, to operate radio stations, and to publish newspapers 
and magazines; protection from police intrusion into church proper- 
ties; and exemption of clergy from military service (see Foreign 
Policy under Franco, ch. 1). 

The proclamation of the Second Vatican Council in favor of the 
separation of church and state in 1965 forced the reassessment of 
this special relationship. In the late 1960s, the Vatican attempted 
to reform the church in Spain by appointing liberals as interim, 
or acting, bishops, thereby circumventing Franco's stranglehold 
on the country's clergy. In 1966 the Franco regime passed a law 
that freed other religions from many of the earlier restrictions, 
although it also reaffirmed the privileges of the Catholic Church. 
Any attempt to revise the 1953 Concordat met the dictator's rigid 
resistance. 

In 1976, however, King Juan Carlos de Borbon unilaterally 
renounced the right to name the bishops; later that same year, 



111 



Spain: A Country Study 

Madrid and the Vatican signed a new accord that restored to the 
church its right to name bishops, and the church agreed to a revised 
Concordat that entailed a gradual financial separation of church 
and state. Church property not used for religious purposes was 
henceforth to be subject to taxation, and gradually, over a period 
of years, the church's reliance on state subsidies was to be reduced. 
The timetable for this reduction was not adhered to, however, and 
the church continued to receive the public subsidy through 1987 
(US$110 million in that year alone). Indeed, by the end of 1987 
issues such as financing and education had not been definitively 
resolved, and the revised Concordat still had not been agreed to 
in final form, even though the 1953 Concordat had expired in 1980. 

It took the new 1978 Constitution to confirm the right of 
Spaniards to religious freedom and to begin the process of disestab- 
lishing Catholicism as the state religion (see The 1978 Constitu- 
tion, ch. 4). The drafters of the Constitution tried to deal with the 
intense controversy surrounding state support of the church, but 
they were not entirely successful. The initial draft of the Constitu- 
tion did not even mention the church, which was included almost 
as an afterthought and only after intense pressure from the church's 
leadership. Article 16 disestablishes Roman Catholicism as the offi- 
cial religion and provides that religious liberty for non-Catholics 
is a state-protected legal right, thereby replacing the policy of limited 
toleration of non-Catholic religious practices. The article further 
states, however, that "The public authorities shall take the reli- 
gious beliefs of Spanish society into account and shall maintain the 
consequent relations of cooperation with the Catholic Church and 
the other confessions." In addition, Article 27 also aroused con- 
troversy by appearing to pledge continuing government subsidies 
for private, church- affiliated schools. These schools were sharply 
criticized by Spanish Socialists for having created and perpetuated 
a class-based, separate, and unequal school system. The Consti- 
tution, however, includes no affirmation that the majority of Spani- 
ards are Catholics or that the state should take into account the 
teachings of Catholicism. 

Government financial aid to the church was a difficult and con- 
tentious issue. The church argued that, in return for the subsidy, 
the state had received the social, health, and educational services 
of tens of thousands of priests and nuns who fulfilled vital func- 
tions that the state itself could not have performed. Nevertheless, 
the revised Concordat was supposed to replace direct state aid to 
the church with a scheme that would allow taxpayers to designate 
a certain portion of their taxes to be diverted directly to the church. 
Through 1985, taxpayers were allowed to deduct up to 10 percent 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



from their taxable income for donations to the Catholic Church. 
Partly because of the protests against this arrangement from 
representatives of Spain's other religious groups, the tax laws were 
changed in 1987 so that taxpayers could choose between giving 
0.52 percent of their income tax to the church and allocating it to 
the government's welfare and culture budgets. For three years, the 
government would continue to give the church a gradually reduced 
subsidy, but after that the church would have to subsist on its own 
resources. The government would continue, however, its program 
of subsidizing Catholic schools, which in 1987 cost the Spanish tax- 
payers about US$300 million, exclusive of the salaries of teachers, 
which were paid directly by the Ministry of Education and Science 
(see Education, this ch.). 

Anyone visiting Spain must be constantly aware of the church's 
physical presence in buildings, museums, and religious celebra- 
tions. In a population of about 39 million, the number of non- 
Catholics was probably no more than 300,000. About 250,000 of 
these were of other Christian faiths, including several Protestant 
denominations, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Mormons. The num- 
ber of Jews in Spain was estimated at about 13,000. More than 

19 out of every 20 Spaniards were baptized Catholics; about 60 per- 
cent of them attended Mass; about 30 percent of the baptized 
Catholics did so regularly, although this figure declined to about 

20 percent in the larger cities. As of 1979, about 97 percent of all 
marriages were performed according to the Catholic religion. A 
1982 report by the church claimed that 83 percent of all children 
born the preceding year had been baptized in the church. 

Nevertheless, there were forces at work bringing about fun- 
damental changes in the place of the church in society. One such 
force was the improvement in the economic fortunes of the great 
majority of Spaniards, making society more materialistic and less 
religious. Another force was the massive shift in population from 
farm and village to the growing urban centers, where the church 
had less influence over the values of its members. These changes 
were transforming the way Spaniards defined their religious 
identity. 

Being a Catholic in Spain had less and less to do with regular 
attendance at Mass and more to do with the routine observance 
of important rituals such as baptism, marriage, and burial of the 
dead. A 1980 survey revealed that, although 82 percent of Spaniards 
were believers in Catholicism, very few considered themselves to 
be very good practitioners of the faith. In the case of the youth 
of the country, even smaller percentages believed themselves to be 
"very good" or "practicing" Catholics. 



113 



Spain: A Country Study 



In contrast to an earlier era, when rejection of the church went 
along with education, in the late 1980s studies showed that the more 
educated a person was, the more likely he or she was to be a prac- 
ticing Catholic. This new acceptance of the church was due partly 
to the church's new self-restraint in politics. In a significant change 
from the pre-Civil War era, the church had accepted the need for 
the separation of religion and the state, and it had even discouraged 
the creation of a Christian Democratic party in the country. 

The traditional links between the political right and the church 
no longer dictated political preferences; in the 1982 general election, 
more than half of the country's practicing Catholics voted for the 
PSOE. Although the Socialist leadership professed agnosticism, 
according to surveys between 40 and 45 percent of the party's rank- 
and-file members held religious beliefs, and more than 70 percent 
of these professed to be Catholics. Among those entering the party 
after Franco's death, about half considered themselves Catholic. 

One important indicator of the changes taking place in the role 
of the church was the reduction in the number of Spaniards in Holy 
Orders. In 1984 the country had more than 22,000 parish priests, 
nearly 10,000 ordained monks, and nearly 75,000 nuns. These 
numbers concealed a troubling reality, however. More than 70 per- 
cent of the diocesan clergy was between the ages of 35 and 65; the 
average age of the clergy in 1982 was 49 years. At the upper end 
of the age range, the low numbers reflected the impact of the Civil 
War, in which more than 4,000 parish priests died. At the lower 
end, the scarcity of younger priests reflected the general crisis in 
vocations throughout the world, which began to be felt in the 1960s. 
Its effects were felt especially acutely in Spain. The crisis was seen 
in the decline in the number of young men joining the priesthood 
and in the increase in the number of priests leaving Holy Orders. 
The number of seminarists in Spain fell from more than 9,000 in 
the 1950s to only 1 ,500 in 1979, even though it rose slightly in 1982 
to about 1,700. 

Changes in the social meaning of religious vocations were perhaps 
part of the problem; having a priest in the family no longer seemed 
to spark the kind of pride that family members would have felt in 
the past. The principal reason in most cases, though, was the 
church's continued ban on marriage for priests. Previously, the 
crisis was not particularly serious because of the age distribution 
of the clergy. As the twentieth century nears an end, however, a 
serious imbalance will appear between those entering the priest- 
hood and those leaving it. The effects of this crisis were already 
visible in the decline in the number of parish priests in Spain — 
from 23,620 in 1979 to just over 22,000 by 1983. 



114 



Salamanca Cathedral 
Courtesy James Scofield 




Another sign of the church's declining role in Spanish life was 
the diminishing importance of the controversial secular religious 
institute, Opus Dei (Work of God). Opus Dei was a worldwide 
lay religious body that did not adhere to any particular political 
philosophy and was allegedly nonpolitical. The organization was 
founded in 1928 by a Spanish priest, Jose Maria Escriva de Balaguer 
y Albas, as a reaction to the increasing secularization of Spain's 
universities, and higher education continued to be one of the insti- 
tute's foremost priorities. Despite its public commitment to a non- 
political stance, Opus Dei members rose to occupy key positions 
in the Franco regime, especially in the field of economic policy- 
making in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Opus Dei members 
dominated the group of liberal technocrats who engineered the open- 
ing of Spain's autarchic economy after 1957. After the 1973 assas- 
sination of Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco (often rumored 
to be an Opus Dei member), however, the influence of the insti- 
tute declined sharply. The secrecy of the order and its activities 
and the power of its myth helped it maintain its strong position 
of influence in Spain; but there was little doubt that, compared 
with the 1950s and the 1960s, Opus Dei had fallen from being one 
of the country's chief political organizations to being simply one 
among many such groups competing for power in an open and 
pluralist society (see Political Interest Groups, ch. 4). 

In the late 1980s, however, the church showed signs of becoming 



115 



Spain: A Country Study 

more conservative than liberal. After years of being the minority 
in the church hierarchy, conservative Catholic leaders had reas- 
serted their power and influence, and they were beginning to wrest 
power from the liberals. One telling indicator of the return of con- 
servatives to control within the church was the battle in late 1987 
over the editorial policy of the leading Spanish Catholic weekly 
magazine, Vida Nueva, which ended with the liberal editor's being 
forced out of office and his being replaced with a conservative. 

Education 

In the 1980s, Spain spent about 8 percent of its national budget 
on education. In 1983 education expenditures amounted to only 
about US$120 per capita, which placed Spain forty-fifth in the world 
in per capita spending on education, far behind most other coun- 
tries in Western Europe. In the government's 1988 budget, expendi- 
tures on education were scheduled to increase by 18 to 20 percent 
over 1987, to about US$170 per person. Nevertheless, rapid 
increases in other areas meant that spending on education declined 
as a proportion of the total budget, to about 6.7 percent. This level 
of expenditure was not only too little in an advanced industrial 
society, but it was also distributed in a way that was skewed toward 
the expensive private-sector schools. 

In the 1970s, the Ministry of Education and Science began to 
confront the paradox that, although the General Law on Educa- 
tion (Ley General de Educacion — LGE) made primary education 
free and obligatory, the reality was that the state could not build 
schools or hire teachers fast enough to keep up with the demand. 
The consequence was a widening gap between the rising student 
population and the number of places available for them. The 
solution lay in the short run in state subsidies to private schools 
that enabled them to offer basic primary education free or for a 
reduced fee. Thus, although the government could claim that by 
1977 there were enough places in school to go around, in some 
major cities, such as Madrid, more than half were provided by pri- 
vate schools. 

By the early 1980s, about 40 percent of all schools were private. 
Of these, just over half were run by the Roman Catholic Church 
and enrolled some 1 .2 million pupils in primary schools and 230,000 
in secondary schools. The remainder of the private schools were 
operated as profit-making enterprises by secular owners. The reli- 
gious schools often were highly regarded, and the instruction they 
offered probably was superior to that provided by the state-run 
institutions. The other private-sector schools varied greatly in 
quality. Although a few were excellent, many others were seriously 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



underfunded and poorly staffed, so that private secular education 
was not automatically associated with elite education as was the 
case in some other West European countries. 

Between 1977 and 1982, the government's annual subsidy to 
private education nearly tripled. As a result, by the time the center- 
right coalition UCD government left office in late 1982, most 
primary schools were free. Unfortunately, this policy had to be paid 
for by drawing on funds available for state schools, with a conse- 
quent loss of teachers and instructional quality in the public system. 

The Socialist government that came to power in 1982 sought 
to soften the conflict between private (largely Catholic) schools and 
public schools by integrating the private schools into the country's 
overall education system. To accomplish this goal, in 1984 the 
government passed the Organic Law on the Right to Education 
(Ley Organica del Derecho a la Educacion — LODE), which estab- 
lished three categories of schools. Free public schools were account- 
able to either the Ministry of Education and Science or to the 
governments of the autonomous communities. Instruction was sub- 
ject to the principles of the Constitution, in that it had to be ideo- 
logically neutral and it had to respect diverse religious beliefs. The 
second category, private schools, usually secular, could be organized 
by any person or group as long as constitutional limits were 
observed. These schools were to receive no state assistance so that 
all costs were borne by the students' families. The third category, 
mixed schools, usually religious, were financed by the state. 
Nevertheless, the director and the faculty were chosen by a school 
council, or consejo escolar (pi. , consejos escolares), made up of represen- 
tatives of the school's diverse constituencies, including parents and 
faculty. Although the state did not try to control this subsidized 
sector, the consejos were a clear signal that it intended increased 
democratization in this all important realm of society. In all three 
models, students enjoyed the right not to receive instruction that 
violated their religious beliefs. 

As a result of these educational reforms, during the two decades 
after 1965 Spain had made great strides, enrolling essentially the 
entire population in the age- group of the primary grades and reduc- 
ing the country's illiteracy to a nominal 3 to 6 percent. The really 
impressive gains, however, were in the secondary grades and in 
higher education, especially for women. In 1965 only 38 percent 
of Spain's youth were enrolled in secondary schools, one of the 
lowest percentages in Western Europe and only about 60 percent 
of the average of all advanced industrial countries. Only 29 per- 
cent of the country's females, less than half the industrial coun- 
tries' average, were enrolled in the secondary grades. By 1985, an 



117 



Spain: A Country Study 

estimated 89 percent of all students and 9 1 percent of females were 
attending secondary schools. These figures conformed to the aver- 
age of the industrial democracies and were noticeably higher than 
those in Italy, Britain, or Sweden. At the university level, enroll- 
ment more than quadrupled in percentage terms, from 6 percent 
in 1965 to 26 percent in 1985, a level about 30 percent lower than 
the industrial countries' average, but still higher than that of Britain 
or Switzerland. In 1980 women constituted 40 percent of university 
enrollment (48 percent in 1984), a level only four to six percentage 
points behind France, Belgium, and Italy. 

Nevertheless, in terms of the school-age population per teacher, 
Spain still ranked forty- seventh in the world, and in terms of the 
percentage of school-age population in school, it ranked twenty- 
second. In this area, demographics were working in favor of Spain's 
educational planners, however. Spain's "baby boom" lasted about 
a decade longer— until the mid-1970s — than similar phenomena did 
in the rest of Europe, but after 1977 the birth rate fell at a faster 
rate than it did in any other country in Western Europe. As a result, 
planners expected that the school population pressures of the 1960s 
and the 1970s would soon abate, giving the country's educational 
system some much-needed breathing space. 

The minister of education and science through most of the 1980s, 
Jose Maria Maravall Herrero, has written that the country's educa- 
tional system must fulfill four important functions: to promote the 
cohesion of the nation (i.e., cultural integration); to contribute to 
the integration of society (i.e., social integration); to foster equality 
of opportunity (i.e., economic integration); and to socialize citizens 
to hold democratic values (i.e., political integration). Spanish politi- 
cal elites recognized that, despite the remarkable political and eco- 
nomic transformation of their country, they were still presiding over 
a society split by cultural, social, economic, and political differences 
that had endured for generations. The country's educational sys- 
tem did little to overcome these divisions until the restoration of 
democracy; since then, education has become one of the principal 
instruments in national integration. 

Primary and Secondary Education 

From 1970 until 1984, Spain's education system was based entirely 
on the LGE, often referred to as the Villar Palasi Law after the 
minister of education and science at the time, Jose Luis Villar Palasi. 
This law was the Franco government's attempt to modernize Spain's 
public education system. Although it has been added to, and modi- 
fied by, the LODE since the return of democracy, the structure it 
established was still nearly completely intact in the 



118 



The Society and Its Environment 



late 1980s (see fig. 9). The law provided that primary education 
(Educacion General Basica — EGB) would be free and compulsory 
from the ages of six to fourteen. In the 1986-87 school year, there 
were about 185,000 primary institutions that provided instruction 
to about 6.6 million students, 70 percent of whom were in state 
schools. Secondary education (Bachillerato Unificado Polivalente — 
BUP) lasted from age fourteen to sixteen and terminated in the 
state graduation examination, the bachillerato. Those who completed 
the bachillerato could then enroll in an additional one-year program 
(Curso de Orientacion Universitaria — COU) to prepare themselves 
for the university entrance exams. In the 1986-87 school year, more 
than 2,600 secondary schools enrolled about 1 .2 million students. 
Studies at all institutions were organized around an academic year 
that ran from about mid-September to the middle or latter part 
of June. 

Secondary school attendance was optional, but if students did not 
go on to secondary school, they had to enroll in vocational training 
for the period when they were fifteen to sixteen years of age. Stu- 
dents in the vocational program (Formacion Professional — FP) gener- 
ally completed their studies with an equivalent exam, the labor 
bachillerato. In the 1986-87 school year, about 2,200 vocational centers 
provided instruction to more than 700,000 students. The FP was 
divided into two two-year phases. The first, which was obligatory 
for everyone who did not enter the BUP, provided a general intro- 
duction to applied vocations, such as clerical work or electronics, 
while the second phase offered more specialized vocational train- 
ing. Special education for the physically and the mentally impaired 
was provided in schools run by both state and private organizations. 

Perhaps sensing that this model of education imposed a choice 
between academic and vocational studies on children at too young 
an age, the government began to experiment in the 1980s with an 
alternate model that kept students on a single, unified track until 
the age of sixteen. An equally troublesome aspect of the system, 
however, was the irreversibility of the choice between BUP and 
FP. Once a student had chosen the FP program, it was impossible 
to go on to the university, so many youngsters chose the BUP even 
if, at the time, they were more suited for vocational training or 
were better able to use the more practical skills taught in the FP. 
This dimension of the educational system, plus the traditional dis- 
dain of many Spaniards toward manual labor, caused the BUP to 
enroll nearly twice as many students as the FP. Observers believed, 
however, that if the economic cramp of the 1980s continued to 
shrink the job market, the balance might shift toward the FP 
because the acquisition of a marketable skill might look more 



119 



Spain: A Country Study 



GRADUATE 
STUDY 



School Year 
18 

17 



UNIVERSITY 



UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOLS 



COLLEGE PREPARATORY 



ACADEMIC 
HIGH SCHOOL 




SPECIALIZED 
VOCATIONAL SCHOOL 



FIRST-LEVEL 
VOCATIONAL SCHOOL 



BASIC 
GENERAL EDUCATION 



PRESCHOOL 



Figure 9. Spain's Education System in the 1980s 



important than the gaining of academic qualifications. Indeed, 
between the 1979-80 and 1986-87 academic years, enrollment in 
the vocational programs increased nearly 35 percent (from 515,000 
to 695,000), while enrollment in the academic program grew by 
only about 8 percent (from 1.055 million to 1.142 million). 



120 



The Society and Its Environment 

Another major problem with Spanish education was the con- 
tinued high failure rate. The standards set for graduation from the 
EGB were not especially demanding, yet between one-fifth and one- 
third of all students failed to complete the course of study. Failure 
rates ran much higher in state schools than in private institutions. 
Critics blamed principally the poor quality of instruction and thus, 
indirectly, teacher training. In 1981 the government published a 
revised EGB curriculum that set forth goals for both teachers and 
students. This revised curriculum was not adopted easily or without 
resistance, and there were those who argued that it was too rigid 
and centralized and that it placed too much emphasis on rote 
memory. 

The uneven spread of nursery schools contributed to the high 
failure rate in later years. In the 1960s and the 1970s, pre-school 
education began to gain in popularity to such an extent that, in 
the mid-1980s, some 80 percent of Spain's children between the 
ages of four and six went to nursery schools (1.3 million in 1986-87). 
Many primary teachers thus assumed that their students had com- 
pleted a year or two of pre-school education. About one-third of 
the 39,000 nursery schools in operation in the 1986-87 school year 
were still in the private sector, however, and the public nurseries 
were little more than day-care centers. The effect was to create a 
disadvantaged student population right from the beginning — one 
that was likely to persist for many years and to continue to con- 
tribute to the high failure rate within the system. The solution — 
universal, public- supported pre-schools — was not a likely prospect 
as of the late 1980s. 

Another source of deficiencies in the public educational system 
was the low pay teachers received. Even though teachers' salaries 
were raised by more than 40 percent between 1983 and 1985, in 
1988 the average salary for teachers in the public schools at both 
the elementary and the secondary levels was still only about 
US$15,000 per year. In 1988 more than 200,000 teachers went 
out on strike to gain a 14 percent pay increase that would have 
raised their monthly salary by about US$175. The government put 
down the strike after street demonstrations led to extensive violence. 

Higher Education 

In the late 1980s, Spain had thirty-four universities, four of which 
were run by the Catholic Church (three by Jesuits and one by Opus 
Dei). Although the Catholic universities enrolled only 30,000 of 
the country's 900,000 students, they were highly regarded, espe- 
cially by conservative, middle-class Spaniards, and therefore they 
exerted an influence in higher education far out of proportion to 



121 



Spain: A Country Study 

their size. The two largest and most respected state universities, 
the Complutense in Madrid, which by the late 1980s enrolled about 
100,000 undergraduates, and the Central in Barcelona, which had 
about 80,000, together accounted for almost 20 percent of all univer- 
sity students. 

Until the 1980s, the universities were under the direct control 
of the central government's Ministry of Education and Science. 
In 1983 the Socialist government passed the Law on University 
Reform (Ley de Reforma Universitaria- — LRU), which weakened 
central government control over universities and gave increased 
autonomy to each public university. Universities were relatively 
free to offer new programs and to restructure themselves internally 
so long as they met the qualifications imposed on all state univer- 
sities. The law also weakened (at least on paper) the control of the 
universities that had been exercised by the catedrdticos , the senior 
professors who held the highly prestigious chairs in each depart- 
ment. The new law provided that control of the universities would 
shift to the claustro constituyente or university council made up of 
professors of all ranks, as well as administrators, staff, and occa- 
sionally, for certain purposes, students. 

The university system offered two distinct tracks that empha- 
sized either academic or vocational subjects. Students could pur- 
sue a five-year or a six-year course of study in the liberal and 
professional programs offered by the conventional facultades (pi.; 
sing. ,facultad) or departments, or a three-year program at the escuelas 
universitarias, which offered training in nursing, teaching, and other 
less elite professions. Not surprisingly, the degrees offered by the 
escuelas usually had a lower status than those given in the more tradi- 
tional academic programs. 

Spain's universities grew even more rapidly during the 1960s 
than the elementary and secondary schools; enrollments increased 
from 77,000 to 241,000 between 1960 and 1972. The 1970 General 
Law on Education prescribed that each student completing the 
bachillerato course should have a university place available to him 
or to her, but by the mid-1970s the government reintroduced 
entrance exams to slow the explosive growth of the university sys- 
tem. Growth continued nevertheless, and by the 1986-87 academic 
year, the universities enrolled about 900,000 students. Of these, 
about two-thirds were studying in the traditional facultades and the 
rest, in the more applied programs in the escuelas. 

In the late 1980s, Spain had the second highest ratio of univer- 
sity students to population in Western Europe, yet spending per 
student was only one- third of the West European average, lead- 
ing to poorly paid faculty (the average university professor earned 



122 



The Society and Its Environment 



only slightly more than US$21,000 per year) and inadequate 
facilities, such as laboratories and libraries. Only a few of the more 
modern universities had student residences or dormitories; students 
at the older, urban universities lived at home or in apartments with 
other students. Instruction emphasized rote memory rather than 
independent analysis, and university faculties rarely combined 
research and teaching. In addition, the university system seemed 
poorly attuned to the needs of the rest of the country because it 
was preparing far too many young people for career fields already 
filled to overflowing (medicine, for example) and far too few for 
the jobs needed in an advanced industrial society, such as those 
involving computers and information science. 

To a much greater degree than was true for elementary and 
secondary education, higher education tended to perpetuate long- 
standing social cleavages. Writing in 1985, Minister of Education 
and Science Maravall observed that 10 years earlier, 66 percent 
of the children of university-educated parents were able to attend 
university, while only 3 percent of the children of parents with just 
a primary education had had this opportunity. In 1980 children 
of parents in the upper education levels were twenty-eight times 
more likely to enter a university than were children of unskilled 
workers. Even after a decade of education reform, most university 
students depended completely on their parents for support through 
the end of their studies. The country's high unemployment rate, 
as well as the tradition that university students did not work while 
completing their studies, meant that few students could pay their 
own education costs. The country still lacked programs of scholar- 
ships and student subsidies that would enable education expenses 
to be borne by society as a whole. The result was that a university 
education was largely the privilege of the middle and the upper 
classes. To some degree, the same was true of the place of women 
in higher education. Although in 1984 about 47 percent of the coun- 
try's university enrollment was female (a figure higher than that 
in most other countries in Western Europe), relatively few women 
went on to become university professors. The majority of university- 
educated women continued to pursue the professions traditionally 
open to them, especially pharmacy, journalism, and teaching at 
the elementary and the secondary levels. 

Health and Welfare 

According to several summary measures of social welfare, Spain 
could best be described as being at the low end of the list of advanced 
industrial countries. One such measure is the Physical Quality of 
Life Index (PQLI) developed by the Overseas Development Council, 



123 



Spain: A Country Study 

an average of three indices — life expectancy, infant mortality, and 
literacy. In 1980, on a scale of from 1 to 100, Iceland, Japan, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden all ranked at the top with scores of 98; 
Spain was twenty-eighth out of 1 64 countries — between Puerto Rico 
and Bulgaria — with a score of 92. Another measure, the Index of 
Net Social Progress (INSP), developed by Dr. Richard Estes of 
the University of Pennsylvania, uses data from eleven subindices, 
including education, health, the status of women, and welfare. On 
this scale, Spain, with a score of 122 for the 1979-80 period, ranked 
thirty- seventh out of 107 countries, quite far behind most other 
West European countries and comparable to several advanced Third 
World states, such as Mexico and Argentina. This lower rating 
stemmed from Spain's poor score in the Cultural Diversity Sub- 
index, where ethnic and linguistic fragmentation caused Spain to 
fall in the ratings. 

Health Conditions and Mortality 

On a number of indicators of health care, Spain ranked fairly 
high among the advanced industrial countries. In both 1965 and 
1981, the country had a better population-to-physician ratio than 
the average of the industrial democracies (800 to 1 versus 860 to 
1, respectively, in 1965 and 360 to 1 versus 530 to 1, respectively, 
in 1981). In 1983, with more than 115,000 physicians, Spain ranked 
sixth in the world in its ratio of inhabitants to physicians. Despite 
dramatic strides in adding nursing personnel (causing a decline in 
the population-to-nurse ratio of from 1,220 to 1 to 280 to 1 in less 
than 20 years), the country remained near the bottom of the list 
of advanced industrial countries on this scale. Spain also ranked 
below most other West European countries in per capita public 
expenditures on health care — only US$220 per person in 1983. In 
1981 there were in Spain slightly more than 1,000 hospitals and 
about 194,000 beds, or about 5.4 beds per 1,000 population. 

As these figures suggest, the provision of health care in Spain 
was highly uneven. Even with a high ratio of doctors to inhabit- 
ants, the country had still not managed to eradicate such diseases 
as tuberculosis (more than 9,000 cases in 1983) and typhoid (5,500 
cases); and there were still even a few new cases of leprosy reported 
each year. The root of this problem seems to be the maldistribution 
of the health care resources of the state's welfare system. Hospitals 
in one area of the country might be seriously understaffed, while 
those in other regions lay virtually empty. By and large, the worst- 
served areas were the workers' suburbs near large cities. One press 
report cited the neighborhood of Vallecas, near Madrid, where 
a population of 700,000 had no hospital at all and had only 



124 



3 doctors in residence, who were reduced to seeing patients at the 
rate of 1 per minute. A principal reason for understaffing was the 
system of multiple hospital assignments arranged by physicians to 
augment their salaries. Although regulations prohibited this prac- 
tice, many doctors arranged to be on duty at more than one hospital 
at a time, thereby reducing their effectiveness in meeting patient 
needs. 

In terms of the causes of death, Spain fairly closely resembled 
other advanced industrial societies, although cancer and heart 
disease appeared less frequently in Spain than in more industrial- 
ized countries. Of the nearly 290,000 deaths registered in 1980, 
almost half (45 . 8 percent) were due to a variety of circulatory sys- 
tem problems, principally heart attacks and strokes. The single most 
prevalent cause of death was malignant neoplasms; about one-fifth 
(20.2 percent) of all deaths were caused by cancer of one sort or 
another. About one-tenth (9.2 percent) of all deaths were occasioned 
by respiratory ailments. (Spaniards were the second heaviest smok- 
ers in the European Community — EC, after Greeks. About 40 per- 
cent of adults smoked, as did 50 percent of teenagers; the average 
14-year-old reportedly smoked 2,700 cigarettes a year.) About 
2 percent of deaths were caused by automobile accidents, and about 
0.5 percent, by suicides. 

In the third quarter of 1987, there were 112 cases of acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) reported in Spain, bringing 



125 



Spain: A Country Study 

to 620 the total number of Spaniards afflicted by this disease. 
Although high, the Spanish figure was still less than half that of 
France, and it was far behind the more than 40,000 cases in the 
United States. Slightly more than half the AIDS victims contracted 
the disease through narcotics-related practices; about one-fifth, from 
homosexual contact; and about one-tenth were hemophiliacs. 

During the 1960s and the 1970s, Spain achieved dramatic gains 
in reducing infant mortality. Between 1965 and 1985, the infant 
mortality rate dropped from being the highest among the indus- 
trial market economies, 38 per 1,000, to only 10 per 1,000 in 1985, 
which placed it ninth lowest in the world, on a par with other 
advanced industrial societies. The death rate for children less than 
1 year old declined from slightly fewer than 13 per 1,000 in 1975 
to fewer than 9 per 1 ,000 in 1979, and for children less than 5 years 
of age, it declined from 15 per 1,000 to fewer than 10 per 1,000 
in the same period. 

Spain also registered some improvement in food consumption 
during the 1960s and the 1970s, with per capita caloric supply grow- 
ing by about 1 percent per year (from 2,844 in 1965 to 3,358 in 
1985). In 1983 Spain ranked twenty-ninth in the world in calorie 
supply per capita. Spaniards daily consumed more calories than, 
or about the same number of calories as, the residents of Britain, 
France, Finland, Japan, Sweden, or Norway. 

Public Safety and Environmental Problems 

The reform and improvement of the country's food regulations 
and inspection procedures were long overdue. In 1981 Spain experi- 
enced a major public health disaster, a 1 'toxic syndrome" still 
unexplained, but believed to be connected with the consumption 
of rapeseed oil intended for industrial use, but marketed by door- 
to-door salesmen as olive oil. More than 300 people died from this 
substance, and hundreds more were permanently disabled. 

The rapeseed tragedy was only one of a number of man-made 
or man- aggravated disasters that Spain has experienced since it 
crossed the threshold into industrial society. Airplane crashes, train 
derailments, bus collisions, hotel fires, gas explosions — these and 
other tragedies were nearly commonplace in Spain. Far more people 
died in train accidents in Spain, for example, than in any other 
country in Europe. Spain suffered these disasters largely because 
of a combination of the advanced technology of an industrializing 
and urbanizing society, low standards of professional competence 
and private sector morality (themselves the product of rapid 
growth), and the state's unwillingness or inability to step in to regu- 
late this increasingly sophisticated and complex society. Two 



126 



The Society and Its Environment 



problems of special importance can be cited here: public health and 
environmental contamination. 

As the rapeseed tragedy illustrates, one of the chief problems 
in the public health field had to do with food and drink inspection 
and regulation. Although food containers and additives were ana- 
lyzed by government chemists, the food and drink themselves were 
not tested before being put on sale. One report on the subject in 
the mid-1980s estimated that, in the whole of Spain, there were 
fewer than 1,000 people working full-time to check the quality of 
the food and drink in the 225,000 places where they were manufac- 
tured, distributed, sold, and consumed. Another check of the 3,000 
restaurants, bars, and hotels in Madrid found that 35 percent of 
the wine, 41 percent of the spirits, and 75 percent of the milk and 
ice were unfit for human consumption. 

Rapid and uncontrolled industrialization and urbanization had 
left a legacy of air, water, and noise pollution that would take a major 
government effort many years to correct. The rivers flowing through 
Spain's major cities, such as Madrid or Bilbao, were little more than 
open sewers. One survey of Bilbao's Rio Nervion showed that 385 
factories dumped their untreated effluents into it, and that the oxygen 
content was only 5 percent compared with the 60 percent needed 
to sustain fish. In Madrid, air pollution was a major problem dur- 
ing the late 1970s and the early 1980s, when the suspended particle 
count reached an average of more than 200 micrograms per cubic 
meter of air, compared with the government's recommended maxi- 
mum level of 80. Bilbao's atmospheric carbon dioxide level was the 
highest of all the cities in Western Europe. Air pollution was a 
problem, because of the heavy automobile traffic (in the late 1970s 
only seven countries in the world had more registered passenger cars 
than Spain), oil-fired space heating, and heavy industry. 

Although there had been significant improvement in environ- 
mental protection in such large cities as Bilbao and Madrid in the 
late 1980s, the mid-sized industrial cities around the country were 
still experiencing rising populations and pollution at alarming rates. 
According to a 1987 study by the Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD), Spain was one of Europe's 
noisiest countries, principally because there were no regulations 
covering industrial or automobile noise levels. In late 1987, the 
Ministry of Public Works and City Planning finally drafted several 
government decrees that, for the first time, set maximum noise 
levels for industrial and construction machinery, motorcycles, and 
automobiles, and established new regulations in building codes that 
would require soundproofing for residences, hospitals, schools, and 
cultural centers. A survey of 226 firms in Madrid showed that 



127 



Spain: A Country Study 

60 percent of their 165,000 employees were working in noise higher 
than government- approved limits. In 1988 a government report 
revealed that Spanish industry was producing 1,700,000 tons of 
toxic waste material each year, of which only 240,000 tons could 
be disposed of by burning. When the international agency, the Oslo 
Convention, denied Spain the right to dump some of these wastes 
in the North Sea, the government had to store thousands of tons 
of highly toxic chemicals in warehouses along the coast of the Bay 
of Biscay because there was no way that they could be released into 
the environment safely. 

Housing 

Housing was another area in which Spaniards had to respond 
to the challenges of dramatic change. During the late 1950s and 
the 1960s, about 14 percent of the total population changed resi- 
dence permanently from one part of the country to another, and 
most of these people lacked suitable housing. One of the most press- 
ing challenges of the government and of the private sector was to 
find or to build housing for these millions of uprooted people. The 
government became involved in housing policy relatively late and 
then only as a source of subsidy for the private sector. The govern- 
ment's 1961 National Housing Plan called for the construction of 
4 million new dwellings by 1976. In the hope that home owner- 
ship would help dilute the working-class radicalism that had fueled 
the economic crises of the 1930s, most of these dwellings were to 
be for sale, not for rent. About half of these residences were built 
and were financed through the unsubsidized private sector; for most 
of the remainder, the government subsidized only the lending insti- 
tution. Thus, government-owned housing accounted for only a very 
small percentage of the total number of dwellings. 

The private construction sector surpassed the target of 4 mil- 
lion new dwellings. In every major city of Spain, slums were 
replaced by high-rise apartment buildings that ringed the older town 
centers. Despite this building boom, however, by the time the wave 
of urban migration had subsided in the 1970s, there were still about 
1.5 million people without homes, and the figure was about 230,000 
as of the 1981 census. The government's housing policy had 
produced millions of new homes, but, by relying entirely on the 
private sector to produce them, the government ensured that new 
construction would be directed principally toward the growing mid- 
dle class because there were greater profits to be made on large, 
expensive dwellings than there were on small, modest ones. The 
government attempted to offset these market forces by placing ceil- 
ings on sale prices and on the size of units to be subsidized, but 



128 



The Society and Its Environment 



the limits they imposed were so high that they did little to enlarge 
the market for cheap working-class housing. Not only was hous- 
ing scarce, but much of it was in poor condition. According to the 
1980 housing census, of the 6.5 million buildings tallied, one-fifth 
(1.3 million) had been built before 1900 and another one-fifth, 
between 1900 and 1940. Only 37 percent could be considered to 
be relatively modern, having been constructed since 1961. About 
70 percent of the available buildings were classified as being in good 
condition, but nearly 10 percent were categorized as being seri- 
ously run down and in need of repair. Some 90 percent of the build- 
ings had running water and indoor toilets, and 94 percent had 
electricity; but only 20 percent had central hot water service, and 
only 4 percent had central heating. 

The Socialist government elected in 1982 estimated that the coun- 
try's housing stock must be increased by between 250,000 and 
310,000 units each year, if all citizens were to have their own homes 
by the early 1990s. Still, only about 10 percent of the new dwell- 
ings were to be government-built; 200,000 units would continue 
to be built, financed, and sold, annually, through the private sec- 
tor. Nevertheless, by the late 1980s many believed that the hous- 
ing crisis was substantially over, and that Spaniards were within 
a decade of achieving their goal of minimally acceptable dwellings 
for all. In terms of quality, however, the people had to continue 
to live with the legacy of the 1960s construction boom — huge, 
impersonal apartment complexes; shoddy construction and high 
maintenance costs; and high purchase costs — for the foreseeable 
future. 

Government Health and Welfare Programs 

Following the reform of the government's social services in 1978, 
all social security benefits were under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Labor and Social Security. In addition, the Ministry of Health 
and Consumer Affairs was responsible for public health and health 
education programs. In the government's 1988 budget, these pro- 
grams were allocated about US$22.5 billion, a 9 percent increase 
over 1987 and about 23.3 percent of the total budget. 

Except for unemployment benefits, most social security programs 
were administered under a single set of institutions created by the 
1978 reform to replace the patchwork system of unions, insurance 
companies, mutual aid associations, and state-run programs that 
had evolved in haphazard fashion throughout the century. These 
institutions were not the only weFare system, but they did cover 
about 80 percent of the population, and they offered a complete 
range of welfare benefits, including cash payments, medical care, 



129 



Spain: A Country Study 

and social services. The programs were administered by three 
government agencies, together with the General Social Security 
Treasury, which was responsible for financial control. Cash pay- 
ments were administered by the National Social Security Institute 
(Instituto Nacional de Seguridad Social — INSS); medical care, by 
the National Health Institute (Instituto Nacional de Salud — 
INSALUD); and social services, by the National Institute for Social 
Services (Instituto Nacional de Servicios Sociales — INSERSO). 
After the advent of the autonomous community system, several 
autonomous governments sought to have responsibility for social 
security transferred to their jurisdictions. The health care responsi- 
bilities of INSALUD were transferred to the regional government 
of Catalonia in 1982 and to that of Andalusia in 1983. The Basque 
Country and Valencia were scheduled to receive their authority 
in the health field in 1988. 

As of 1984, residents had access to a fairly comprehensive pro- 
gram of health insurance coverage, paid for by joint contributions 
from workers and employers; the state added a subsidy to cover 
deficits. Sickness benefits ranged between 60 and 75 percent of 
covered earnings, and maternity benefits amounted to 75 percent 
of covered earnings, paid both 6 weeks before, and 8 weeks after, 
childbirth. Medical services of all kinds were provided to patients 
directly through state-run hospitals and clinics, or through insti- 
tutions under contract to the state. Pension insurance or retire- 
ment coverage was available to all employees in industry, including 
the service industry, and to their dependents. Benefits were financed 
by workers, employers, and the state under the same general scheme 
as that used for health insurance. There were separate systems in 
effect for sectors that were difficult to cover in this way, including 
farm workers, domestic servants, seamen, public employees, 
miners, and so forth. Old-age pensions were payable in most cases 
at age sixty-five, and they constituted 50 percent of covered earn- 
ings (the average of the highest-paid two of the last seven years) 
plus 2 percent per year of contributions made from eleven to thirty- 
five years, up to a maximum of 100 percent. Pensions — usually 
reduced to a certain percentage of the original pension, but equalling 
100 percent under certain conditions — were also payable to sur- 
vivors of the covered worker. 

Unemployment insurance has been available in Spain since 1919, 
but the state has provided benefits to those out of work only since 
1961. Insured workers contributed between 1.1 and 6.3 percent 
of covered earnings according to twelve occupational classes, while 
employers contributed between 5.2 and 6.3 percent of payroll, and 
the state added a variable subsidy. Benefits covered the insured 



130 



The Society and Its Environment 



for up to twenty-four months under normal circumstances, and 
they could range between 60 and 80 percent of covered earnings. 
Only about 60 percent of the registered unemployed received 
benefits, however, because the law excluded short-term and casual 
employees as well as those seeking their first jobs and because 
agricultural workers were covered under a special program. 

During the 1980s, the state's share of funding for social security 
programs expanded rapidly, while the proportion contributed by 
employers and employees declined correspondingly. In the 1970s, 
the state was contributing only 5 percent; however, by the 1980s 
the figure had risen to more than 20 percent, still quite low by West 
European standards. Many employers complained because of the 
relatively high proportion (85 percent) that they had to contribute 
to the non-state portion of social security funding; some even fal- 
sified records or refused to make the payments, leaving their 
employees without benefits. Slightly less than two-thirds of social 
security expenditures were paid out in cash benefits, principally 
in the form of pensions to the aged, widows, orphans, and the dis- 
abled. The remaining third was spent on health, on social services, 
and, in small part, on administration. 

As in many other advanced industrial countries, Spain's wel- 
fare system was under increasing financial pressure throughout the 
1980s. This was due in part to the country's economic distress, 
which created the dual pressures of declining contributions and tax 
receipts on the one hand, and increased claims for unemployment 
assistance on the other. Another important reason was the decline 
of the extended family, which in earlier times had absorbed part 
of the cost of helping unemployed or distressed family members. 
However, the main reason was that, like those in other Western 
countries, Spain's population was aging rapidly and therefore the 
state had to pay more and more in old-age pensions. These pen- 
sions tended to be quite generous, the highest, in fact, after 
Sweden's, in Western Europe. Between 1972 and 1982, the num- 
ber of pensioners rose by an average of 184,000 each year. By 1983, 
when there were 4.7 million pensioners, for every beneficiary of 
the pension program there were only 2.3 contributors, compared 
with an average of 5 in the rest of Western Europe. Thus, in the 
1980s, officials began to talk seriously about the possibility of the 
bankruptcy of the old-age pension system. The private sector needed 
to become more heavily involved through private pension plans, 
but in the late 1980s, legislation that would make these plans pos- 
sible had failed to win government approval. In a country where 
the elderly have traditionally been held in high esteem and have 
generally been well treated, the dramatic aging of the population 



131 



Spain: A Country Study 

was still a relatively new experience that would greatly affect pub- 
lic policies as well as the country's social values. In 1982 there were 
only 62 homes for the elderly, and these cared for some 12,500 
persons; by 1986 the number of centers had increased by approxi- 
mately 16 percent, to 72, and the number of elderly residents had 
increased by 25 percent, to about 15,700. Also in 1982, some 385 
day-care centers provided services to about 1.1 million elderly; by 
1986, just four years later, the number of these centers had increased 
by 13 percent to 435, and the number of elderly served by them 
had increased by 55 percent, to about 1.7 million. In this same four- 
year period, government expenditures on social services for the 
elderly rose by 87 percent, direct payments to the elderly rose by 
more than 170 percent, and investments in facilities for the aged 
increased by 160 percent. It was clear that these figures would con- 
tinue to increase well into the twenty-first century, raising the highly 
controversial political question of who would bear this fiscal burden. 

* * * 

Spain's transition to an advanced industrial democracy has been 
amply documented in a number of excellent books, most of which 
deal with the politics of the transition. Two recent works, however, 
stand out as readable accounts of the social transformation as well. 
Both are by British journalists who lived in Spain for a number 
of years during the transition. John Hooper's book, The Spaniards: 
A Portrait of the New Spain, contains a lengthy section on the regional 
and the ethnic problems of contemporary Spain, while Robert Gra- 
ham's book, Spain: A Nation Comes of Age, focuses primarily on the 
rise of the country's middle class and on important institutions. 
Also helpful are: Spain: The Root and the Flower by John Crow and 
Spain: A Guide to Political and Economic Institutions by Peter Donaghy 
and Michael Newton. 

Several American cultural anthropologists have written books 
on Spanish culture in recent years, thereby increasing greatly our 
understanding of life in rural and small- town Spain. The principal 
of these works are William Douglass's Echalar and Murelaga: Oppor- 
tunity and Rural Exodus in Two Spanish Basque Villages, Susan Free- 
man's The Pasiegos: Spaniards in No Man 's Land, and David Gilmore's 
Aggression and Community: Paradoxes of Andalusian Culture. The politics 
and culture of Spain's ethnic groups have been dealt with by several 
American political scientists, including these: Robert Clark, The 
Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond; Oriol Pi-Sunyer, Nationalism 
and Societal Integration: A Focus on Catalonia; and Kathryn Woolard, 
The Politics of Language and Ethnicity in Barcelona. 



132 



The Society and Its Environment 



Several Spanish sociologists have produced significant studies 
of key elements of the Spanish transformation, of which the most 
readable and important are: Salustiano del Campo and Manuel 
Navarro, Nuevo andlisis de la poblacion espanola; Salustiano del Campo, 
Manuel Navarro, and J. Felix Tezanos, La cuestion regional espano la; 
Amando de Miguel, Manual de estructura social de Espana; and 
Amando de Miguel, Recursos humanos, closes, y regiones en Espana. 
The standard work on Spanish geography, now in its fifth edition, 
is by Manuel de Teran, L. Sole Sabaris, and J. Vila Valenti, 
Geografia regional de Espana. 

Finally, for those who wish to remain abreast of current affairs 
in Spain, an accessible and readable periodical that covers Spain 
fairly regularly is The Economist, published in London. For those 
able to read Spanish, the best source is the international edition 
of El Pais, published weekly in Madrid. (For further information 
and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



133 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Workers in an olive orchard 



IN THE MID-1980S, Spain's per capita gross domestic product 
ranked low among the industrial countries represented in the Orga- 
nisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, though well 
ahead of such nations as Greece, Yugoslavia, and Portugal. In the 
latter half of the decade, however, the Spanish economy entered 
a phase of strong expansion and employment. 

Spain was a latecomer to economic and industrial moderniza- 
tion. Early in the twentieth century, economic progress was made 
in fitful starts, but in the 1960s the process of renewal began in 
earnest. Before then, the Spanish economy was one of the most 
underdeveloped in Western Europe, and it was sometimes charac- 
terized as a Third World economy. A spectacular period of growth 
and modernization during the 1960s and the early 1970s profoundly 
transformed the Spanish economy, bringing it much closer to the 
West European consumer society prototype. However, in late 1975, 
when the authoritarian rule of Francisco Franco y Bahamonde (in 
power, 1939-75) came to an end, and democratic processes were 
restored, there were huge increases in the price of imported oil upon 
which Spain was heavily dependent for its energy needs. Vigorous 
economic expansion was replaced by recession, stagnation, and a 
dizzying increase in the number of unemployed wage earners. 

The Socialist government, headed by Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, 
that came to power in late 1982 — the first post-Franco government 
with an absolute parliamentary majority — was committed to a pro- 
gram of industrial renewal and economic modernization and, at 
the same time, to lowering the rate of inflation. Under its guidance, 
in the second half of the 1980s the economy experienced a growth 
rate and a level of foreign capital investment that were the highest 
in Europe. Budget deficits were reduced, inflation was lowered, 
foreign currency reserves were greatly increased, private enterprise 
enjoyed record profits, and consumer spending grew. A major 
accomplishment during this period was the liquidation of excess 
personnel and overcapacity in key industries, such as steel and ship- 
building, and the redirection of substantial capital resources to more 
promising high-technology industries. 

Despite the excellent economic performance of the late 1980s, 
the Gonzalez government was unable to reduce an unemployment 
rate that was then the highest among the members of the European 
Community (EC — see Glossary). The number of workers employed 
as a result of the economic boom was equivalent to the number 



137 



Spain: A Country Study 

of new entrants into the labor market, so that the boom only mar- 
ginally reduced the number of job seekers. A mitigating circum- 
stance, however, was that although the official unemployment rate 
was 20 percent, perhaps as many as one-third of those registered 
as unemployed were working in the "underground economy." 

Spain's accession to the EC on January 1, 1986, was a driving 
force behind the country's accelerated modernization effort. Under 
the terms of its entry into the EC, Spain was required to adapt 
to EC norms and regulations, over a period of seven years. The 
EC plan to eliminate existing barriers to trade, employment, and 
the flow of capital throughout the EC by the end of 1992 was still 
another impetus. Observers believed that, barring unforeseeable 
adverse developments in the international economic situation, by 
the year 2000 Spain would at last closely resemble its neighbors, 
who, for most of the twentieth century, had been socially and eco- 
nomically more advanced. 

Character and Development of the Economy 

Economic historians generally agree that during the nineteenth 
century and well into the twentieth, at a time when Western Europe 
was engaged in its great economic transformation, Spain "missed 
the train of the industrial revolution." Much of the chronic social 
and political turmoil that took place in Spain during this period 
can in large measure be attributed to the great difficulties the coun- 
try encountered in striving for economic modernization. Through- 
out this period, Spanish social and economic development lagged 
far behind the levels attained by the industrializing countries of 
Western Europe. Spain's economic "take-off" began belatedly dur- 
ing the 1950s and reached its height during the 1960s and the early 
1970s. A second cycle of economic expansion began in the mid- 
1980s, and if this one continues, it might catapult Spain into the 
company of Western Europe's more advanced industrial societies. 

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Spain was still mostly 
rural; modern industry existed only in the textile mills of Catalonia 
(Spanish, Catalufia; Catalan, Catalunya) and in the metallurgical 
plants of the Basque provinces (see fig. 1). Even with the stimulus 
of World War I, only in Catalonia and in the two principal Basque 
provinces, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, did the value of manufactur- 
ing output in 1920 exceed that of agricultural production. Agricul- 
tural productivity was low compared with that of other West 
European countries because of a number of deficiencies — backward 
technology, lack of large irrigation projects, inadequate rural credit 
facilities, and outmoded land-tenure practices. Financial institu- 
tions were relatively undeveloped. The Bank of Spain (Banco de 



138 



The Economy 



Espana) was still privately owned, and its public functions were 
restricted to currency issuance and the provision of funds for state 
activities. The state largely limited itself to such traditional activi- 
ties as defense and the maintenance of order and justice. Road build- 
ing, education, and a few welfare activities were the only public 
services that had any appreciable impact on the economy. 

Considerable economic progress was made during World War 
I and in the 1920s, particularly during the regime of Miguel Primo 
de Rivera (1923-30). The Primo de Rivera government initiated 
important public works projects, including construction of new high- 
ways, irrigation facilities, and modernization of the railroad sys- 
tem. It also made a start on reforestation programs. Industry and 
mining were growing, and there was an average annual increase 
in the industrial and mining index of 6.4 percent between 1922 
and 1931. An income tax, however ineffectively collected, was intro- 
duced in 1926, and a number of new banks were started with state 
backing, to invest in projects considered to have national interest. 
Certain economic functions were turned over to private monopolis- 
tic operations — of which the most important was the petroleum dis- 
tribution company, Compama Arrendataria del Monopolio de 
Petroleos (CAMPS A); others, such as transportation, were put 
under state control. 

These steps toward a modern economic structure were slowed 
drastically by the political turmoil of the period, which culminated 
in the Spanish Civil War, and they were further exacerbated by 
the worldwide depression of the early 1930s. When the Civil War 
broke out in 1936, it eliminated what litde chance Spain might have 
had to recover from the economic malaise of the period (see The 
Spanish Civil War, ch. 1). 

The Franco Era, 1939-75 

Spain emerged from the Civil War with formidable economic 
problems. Gold and foreign exchange reserves had been virtually 
wiped out, and the neglect and devastation of war had reduced 
the productive capacity of both industry and agriculture. To com- 
pound the difficulties, even if the wherewithal had existed to pur- 
chase imports, the outbreak of World War II rendered many needed 
supplies unavailable. The end of the war did not improve Spain's 
plight because of subsequent global shortages of foodstuffs, raw 
materials, and peacetime industrial products. Spain's European 
neighbors faced formidable reconstruction problems of their own, 
and, because of their awareness that the Nationalist victory in the 
Spanish Civil War had been achieved with the help of Adolf Hitler 
and Benito Mussolini, they had little inclination to include Spain 



139 



Spain: A Country Study 

in any multilateral recovery program. For a decade following the 
Civil War's end in 1939, the economy remained in a state of severe 
depression. 

Branded an international outcast for its pro-Axis bias during 
World War II, Franco's regime sought to provide for Spain's well- 
being by adopting a policy of economic self-sufficiency. Autarchy 
was not merely a reaction to international isolation; it was also 
rooted for more than half a century in the advocacy of important 
economic pressure groups. Furthermore, from 1939 to 1945, Spain's 
military chiefs genuinely feared an Allied invasion of the peninsula 
and, therefore, sought to avert excessive reliance on foreign arma- 
ments. 

Spain was even more economically retarded in the 1940s than 
it had been ten years earlier, for the residual adverse effects of the 
Civil War and the consequences of autarchy and import substitu- 
tion were generally disastrous. Inflation soared, economic recov- 
ery faltered, and, in some years, Spain registered negative growth 
rates. By the early 1950s, per capita gross domestic product (GDP — 
see Glossary) was barely 40 percent of the average for West Euro- 
pean countries. Then, after a decade of economic stagnation, a 
tripling of prices, the growth of a black market, food rationing, 
and widespread deprivation, gradual improvement began to take 
place. The regime took its first faltering steps toward abandoning 
its pretensions of self-sufficiency and toward inaugurating a far- 
reaching transformation of Spain's retarded economic system. Pre- 
Civil War industrial production levels were regained in the early 
1950s, though agricultural output remained below that level until 
1958. 

A further impetus to economic liberalization came from the Sep- 
tember 1953 signing of a mutual defense agreement, the Pact of 
Madrid, between the United States and Spain (see Military Cooper- 
ation with the United States, ch. 5). In return for permitting the 
establishment of United States military bases on Spanish soil, the 
Eisenhower administration provided substantial economic aid to 
the Franco regime. More than 1 billion dollars in economic assis- 
tance flowed into Spain during the remainder of the decade as a 
result of the agreement. Between 1953 and 1958, Spain's gross 
national product (GNP — see Glossary) rose by about 5 percent per 
annum. 

The years from 1951 to 1956 were marked by substantial eco- 
nomic progress, but the reforms of the period were only spasmodi- 
cally implemented, and they were poorly coordinated. One large 
obstacle to the reform process was the corrupt, inefficient, and 
bloated bureaucracy. A former correspondent of London's Financial 



140 



The Economy 



Times, Robert Graham, described the Franco era as "the triumph 
of paleocapitalism — primitive market skills operating in a jungle 
of bureaucratic regulations, protectionism, and peddled influence." 
By the mid-1950s, the inflationary spiral had resumed its upward 
climb, and foreign currency reserves that had stood at US$58 mil- 
lion in 1958 plummeted to US$6 million by mid- 1959. The stan- 
dard of living remained one of the lowest in Western Europe, and 
the backwardness of agriculture and of the land-tenure system, 
despite lip service to agrarian reform, kept farm productivity low. 
The growing demands of the emerging middle class — and of the 
ever greater number of tourists — for the amenities of life, particu- 
larly for higher nutritional standards, placed heavy demands on 
imported foodstuffs and luxury items. At the same time, exports 
lagged, largely because of high domestic demand and institutional 
restraints on foreign trade. The peseta (for value of the peseta — 
see Glossary) fell to an all-time low on the black market, and Spain's 
foreign currency obligations grew to almost US$60 million. 

A debate took place within the regime over strategies for extricat- 
ing the country from its economic impasse, and Franco finally opted 
in favor of a group of neoliberals. The group included bankers, 
industrial executives, some academic economists, and members of 
the semi- secret Roman Catholic lay organization, Opus Dei (Work 
of God — see Religion, ch. 2; Political Interest Groups, ch. 4). 

During the 1957-59 period, known as the pre- stabilization years, 
economic planners contented themselves with piecemeal measures 
such as moderate anti-inflationary stopgaps and increases in Spain's 
links with the world economy. A combination of external develop- 
ments and an increasingly aggravated domestic economic crisis, 
however, forced them to engage in more far-reaching changes. 

As the need for a change in economic policy became manifest 
in the late 1950s, an overhaul of the Council of Ministers in Febru- 
ary 1957 brought to the key ministries a group of younger men, 
most of whom possessed economics training and experience. This 
reorganization was quickly followed by the establishment of a com- 
mittee on economic affairs and the Office of Economic Coordina- 
tion and Planning under the prime minister. 

Such administrative changes were important steps in eliminat- 
ing the chronic rivalries that existed among economic ministries. 
Other reforms followed, the principal one being the adoption of 
a corporate tax system that required the confederation of each indus- 
trial sector to allocate an appropriate share of the entire industry's 
tax assessment to each member firm. Chronic tax evasion was 
consequently made more difficult, and tax collection receipts rose 



141 



Spain: A Country Study 

sharply. Together with curbs on government spending, in 1958 
this reform created the first government surplus in many years. 

More drastic remedies were required as Spain's isolation from 
the rest of Western Europe became exacerbated. Neighboring states 
were in the process of establishing the EC and the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA — see Glossary). In the process of liber- 
alizing trade among their members, these organizations found it 
difficult to establish economic relations with countries wedded to 
trade quotas and bilateral agreements, such as Spain. 

Spanish membership in these groups was not politically possi- 
ble, but Spain was invited to join a number of other international 
institutions. In January 1958, Spain became an associate member 
of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), 
which became the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD — see Glossary) in September 1961, and 
which included among its members virtually every developed coun- 
try in the noncommunist world. In 1959 Spain joined the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) and the World Bank 
(see Glossary). These bodies immediately became involved in help- 
ing Spain to abandon the autarchical trade practices that had 
brought its reserves to such low levels and that were isolating its 
economy from the rest of Europe. 

Spain traditionally paid close attention to events in France and 
was often influenced by them. In December 1958, the French 
government adopted a stabilization program in order to overcome 
a severe economic slump; this program included devaluation of the 
franc, tax increases, and the removal of restrictions on most of 
France's trade with OECD countries. The French action removed 
whatever doubts the Spanish authorities had harbored about 
embarking on a wholesale economic transformation. After seven 
months of preparation and drafting, aided by IMF and French 
economists, Spain unveiled its Stabilization Plan on June 30, 1959. 
The plan's objectives were twofold: to take the necessary fiscal and 
monetary measures required to restrict demand and to contain infla- 
tion, while, at the same time, liberalizing foreign trade and encour- 
aging foreign investment. 

The plan's initial effect was deflationary and recessionary, leading 
to a drop in real income and to a rise in unemployment during 
its first year. The resultant economic slump and reduced wages 
led approximately 500,000 Spanish workers to emigrate in search 
of better job opportunities in other West European countries. 
Nonetheless, its main goals were achieved. The plan enabled Spain 
to avert a possible suspension of payments abroad to foreign banks 
holding Spanish currency, and by the close of 1959 Spain's foreign 



142 



The Economy 



exchange account showed a US$100 million surplus. Foreign capi- 
tal investment grew sevenfold between 1958 and 1960, and the 
annual influx of tourists began to rise rapidly. 

As these developments steadily converted Spain's economic struc- 
ture into one more closely resembling a free-market economy, the 
country entered the greatest cycle of industrialization and prosperity 
it had ever known. Foreign aid played a significant role. Such aid 
took the form of US$75 million in drawing rights from the IMF, 
US$100 million in OEEC credits, US$70 million in commercial 
credits from the Chase Manhattan Bank and the First National 
City Bank, US$30 million from the United States Export-Import 
Bank, and funds from United States aid programs. Total foreign 
backing amounted to US$420 million. The principal lubricants of 
the economic expansion, however, were the hard currency remit- 
tances of 1 million Spanish workers abroad, which are estimated 
to have offset 17.9 percent of the total trade deficit from 1962 to 
1971 ; the gigantic increase in tourism that drew more than 20 mil- 
lion visitors per year by the end of the 1960s and that accounted 
for at least 9 percent of the GNP; and direct foreign investment, 
which between 1960 and 1974 amounted to an impressive US$7.6 
billion. More than 40 percent of this investment came from the 
United States, almost 17 percent came from Switzerland, and the 
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and France each 
accounted for slightly more than 10 percent. By 1975 foreign capi- 
tal represented 12.4 percent of all that invested in Spain's 500 largest 
industrial firms. An additional billion dollars came from foreign 
sources through a variety of loans and credit devices. 

The success of the stabilization program was attributable to both 
good luck and good management. It took place at a time of eco- 
nomic growth and optimism in Western Europe, which as a result 
was ready to accept increased Spanish exports, to absorb Spain's 
surplus labor, and to spend significant sums of money on vaca- 
tions in Spain and on investments in Spanish industry. 

The Post-Franco Period, 1975-1 980s 

Franco's death in 1975 and the ensuing transition to democratic 
rule diverted Spaniards' attention from urgent economic problems. 
The return to democracy coincided with an explosive quadrupling 
of oil prices, which had an extremely serious effect on the economy 
because Spain imported 70 percent of its energy, mostly in the form 
of Middle Eastern oil. Nonetheless, the centrist government of 
Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez, which had been named to succeed the 
Franco regime by King Juan Carlos de Borbon, did little to shore 
up the economy or even to reduce Spain's heavy dependence on 



143 



Spain: A Country Study 



imported oil. A virtually exclusive preoccupation with the politics 
of democratization and the drafting of a new political system 
prevailed. 

Because of the failure to adjust to the drastically changed eco- 
nomic environment brought on by the two oil price shocks of the 
1970s, Spain quickly confronted plummeting productivity, an 
explosive increase in wages from 1974 to 1976, a reversal of migra- 
tion trends as a result of the economic slump throughout Western 
Europe, and the steady outflow of labor from agricultural areas 
despite declining job prospects in the cities. All these factors joined 
in producing a sharp rise in unemployment. Government budget- 
ary deficits swelled, as did large social security cost overruns and 
the huge operating losses incurred by a number of public-sector 
industries. Energy consumption, meanwhile, remained excessive. 
The years of economic recession, beginning in 1975, were not solely 
attributable to the oil crisis, but they revealed, in the words of one 
Spanish economist, Eduardo Merigo, "an institutional structure 
that was creaking at the seams, unable to function in a country 
in which output had increased nearly five times in thirty years." 
These structural deficiencies made Spain more vulnerable than most 
other modern economies to the oil crises of the 1970s. 

When the Socialist government headed by Felipe Gonzalez took 
office in late 1982, the economy was in dire straits. Inflation was 
running at an annual rate of 16 percent, the external current account 
was US$4 billion in arrears, public spending had gotten out of hand, 
and foreign exchange reserves had become dangerously depleted. 
In coping with the situation, however, the Gonzalez government 
had one asset that no previous post-Franco government had 
enjoyed, namely, a solid parliamentary majority in both houses 
of the Cortes (Spanish Parliament). With this majority, it was able 
to undertake unpopular austerity measures that earlier weak and 
unstable governments had been unable even to consider. 

The Socialist government opted for pragmatic, orthodox mone- 
tary and fiscal policies, together with a series of vigorous retrench- 
ment measures. In 1983 it unveiled a program that provided a more 
coherent and long-term approach to the country's economic ills. 
Renovative structural policies — such as the closing of large, unprof- 
itable state enterprises — helped to correct the more serious imbal- 
ances underlying the relatively poor performance of the economy. 
The government launched an industrial reconversion program, 
brought the problem-ridden social security system into better 
balance, and introduced a more efficient energy-use policy. Labor 
market flexibility was improved, and private capital investment was 
encouraged with incentives. 

144 



The Economy 



By 1985 the budgetary deficit was brought down to 5 percent 
of GNP, and it dropped to 4.5 percent in 1986. Real wage growth 
was contained, and it was generally kept below the rate of infla- 
tion. Inflation was reduced to 4.5 percent in 1987, and analysts 
believed it might decrease to the government's goal of 3 percent 
in 1988. 

Efforts to modernize and to expand the economy were greatly 
aided by a number of factors that fostered the remarkable economic 
boom of the 1980s: the continuing fall in oil prices, increased 
tourism, a sharp reduction in the exchange value of the United 
States dollar, and a massive upsurge in the inflow of foreign invest- 
ment. These exogenous factors allowed the economy to undergo 
rapid expansion without experiencing balance of payments con- 
straints, despite the fact that the economy was being exposed to 
foreign competition in accordance with EC requirements. Were 
it not for these factors, the process of integration with the EC would 
have been a good deal more painful, and inflation would have been 
much higher. 

In the words of the OECD's 1987-88 survey of the Spanish econ- 
omy, "following a protracted period of sluggish growth with slow 
progress in winding down inflation during the late 1970s and the 
first half of the 1980s, the Spanish economy has entered a phase 
of vigorous expansion of output and employment accompanied by 
a marked slowdown of inflation." In 1981 Spain's GDP growth 
rate had reached a nadir by registering a rate of negative 0.2 per- 
cent; it then gradually resumed its slow upward ascent with increases 
of 1.2 percent in 1982, 1.8 percent in 1983, 1.9 percent in 1984, 
and 2.1 percent in 1985. The following year, however, Spain's real 
GDP began to grow by leaps and bounds, registering a growth rate 
of 3.3 percent in 1986 and 5.5 percent in 1987. The 1987 figure 
was the highest since 1974, and it was the strongest rate of expan- 
sion among OECD countries that year. Analysts projected a rise 
of 3.8 percent in 1988 and of 3.5 percent in 1989, a slight decline 
but still roughly double the EC average. They expected that declin- 
ing interest rates and the government's stimulative budget would 
help sustain economic expansion. Industrial output, which rose by 
3.1 percent in 1986 and by 5.2 percent in 1987, was also expected 
to maintain its expansive rate, growing by 3.8 percent in 1988 and 
by 3.7 percent in 1989. 

A prime force generating rapid economic growth was increased 
domestic demand, which grew by a steep 6 percent in 1986 and 
by 4.8 percent in 1987, in both years exceeding official projections. 
During 1988 and 1989, analysts expected demand to remain strong, 
though at slightly lower levels. Much of the large increase in 



145 



Spain: A Country Study 

demand was met in 1987 by an estimated 20 percent jump in real 
terms in imports of goods and services. 

In the mid-1980s, Spain achieved a strong level of economic per- 
formance while simultaneously lowering its rate of inflation to within 
two points of the EC average. However, its export performance, 
though increasing by a creditable 5.5 percent, raised concerns over 
the existing imbalance between import and export growth. 

Role of Government 

The public sector of the postwar Spanish economy was not con- 
spicuously large, compared with the corresponding sectors of most 
other West European countries. Much of it came into existence 
under the Franco regime. Spain's communication and transpor- 
tation facilities were publicly operated, as was the case on most 
of the rest of the continent . State trading monopolies were main- 
tained for petroleum products, tobacco, and some agricultural 
products, but most industry other than coal mining, iron and steel 
making, shipbuilding, and aircraft assembly, was privately owned. 
Most of the major financial institutions were also privately owned. 
Yet agriculture, which was largely in private hands, was affected 
by a panoply of subsidies and marketing controls. Irrigation projects 
and reforestation and land reform programs were also important 
official concerns. 

The single largest component of the public sector was the National 
Industrial Institute (Instituto Nacional de Industria — INI), a 
government holding company that was primarily, though not exclu- 
sively, involved in industry (see National Industrial Institute, this 
ch.). In addition to INI, the public sector included the Grupo 
Patrimonio, founded in the late nineteenth century. Formally 
referred to as the Directorate General for State Assets (Direccion 
General del Patrimonio del Estado — DGPE), it functioned under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Commerce. 
In the mid-1980s, there were about two dozen companies in the 
DGPE, operating in a variety of sectors, such as communications, 
finance, transportation, agriculture, and textiles. Three companies 
dominated the group: the National Telephone Company of Spain 
(Compama Telefonica Nacional de Espana — CTNE), the tobacco 
distributor (Tabacalera), and the Overseas Trade Bank (Banco 
Exterior de Espana). Together they accounted for the bulk of the 
employment and the financial holdings of the group's members. 
The shares of these companies were held directiy by the state, rather 
than indirectly through a holding company, as was the case with 
INI. One of the main purposes of the DGPE was to channel to 
the government the revenues from the sale of certain commodities 



146 



The Economy 



placed in the hands of monopoly distributors, though such monopo- 
lies were coming to an end as a result of Spain's entry into the 
EC . The DGPE had also taken an active role in restructuring the 
textile industry. 

Economic Ministries 

Under the Felipe Gonzalez government, the minister of economy, 
finance, and commerce served as ''superminister" and chief govern- 
ment spokesman with the responsibility of advising the prime 
minister on economic and financial policies. The Ministry of Econ- 
omy, Finance, and Commerce formulated general economic poli- 
cies; prepared the budget; audited the state's accounts; supervised 
expenditures; managed the public debt; supervised the banks, insur- 
nce companies, and stock exchanges; and collected taxes. It there- 
fore had a major role in the conduct of both fiscal and monetary 
policy. It was also responsible for all matters concerned with pub- 
licly owned properties involved in industrial, agricultural, and 
commercial ventures, including supervision of those under the day- 
to-day management of other ministries. 

Other ministries having primarily economic functions included 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food; the Ministry of 
Transportation, Tourism, and Communications; the Ministry of 
Industry and Energy; the Ministry of Labor and Social Security; 
and the Ministry of Public Works and City Planning. There was 
also an interministerial Economic Affairs Committee (Comision 
de Asuntos Economicos), which consisted of the heads of economi- 
cally important ministries and the undersecretary of state for the 
economy. 

Budget and Fiscal Policy 

The budget of the central government reflected only a part of 
the financial resources involved in the execution of fiscal policy. 
Other official receipts and expenditures, including social security 
revenues and payments, local and regional government taxation 
and spending, and the operations of autonomous organizations 
associated with defense, education, and agrarian development, 
brought the total amount of government outiays in 1987 to 13,200 
billion pesetas, or 41 percent of GDP. Thus, despite the sharp rise 
in revenues recorded in 1987, the central government deficit nar- 
rowed only from 1,659 billion pesetas to 1,623 billion pesetas on 
a national accounts basis. 

Government spending tended to be expansionary. Even in 1987, 
when government receipts were unusually high because of strong 
economic growth, a crackdown on tax fraud, and the introduction 



147 



Spain: A Country Study 

of a value-added tax in 1986, state expenditures outstripped state 
income and the government's deficit amounted to about 3.8 per- 
cent of 1987's GDP. When regional and local government expen- 
ditures were figured in, the total deficit amounted to approximately 
5 percent. Budgetary estimates for 1988 indicated that the central 
government deficit could be held to approximately 3 percent of 
GDP. Initial budgets, however, have usually underestimated ulti- 
mate spending. 

Human Resources 

Throughout much of the twentieth century, there has been a dra- 
matic shift in the makeup of the Spanish population and in the 
nature of its employment. As late as the 1920s, 57 percent of Spain's 
active population was concentrated in agriculture. During the next 
30 years, the number of people employed in this sector fell by only 
10 percent. Starting in 1950, however, the sector's share of the work 
force fell by close to 10 percent each decade, so that by the early 
1980s its share had shrunk to about 15 percent. Even after the eco- 
nomic transformation in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, 
agricultural employment continued to fall steadily — by an estimated 
4 percent per year between 1976 and 1985. Migration from rural 
regions to areas where employment was available led to the virtual 
depopulation of a number of rural towns and provinces, especially 
those in the middle of the country (see Migration, ch. 2.) 

The evolution in the size and the composition of the working 
population offered an index to the country's modernization process. 
Since the 1920s, the number of workers employed in industry and 
services had virtually doubled. Industry's share of the work force 
had gone from about 20 percent in 1920 to a high point of 38 per- 
cent in 1975, after which it had begun to decline, dropping to 
32 percent by 1985. The service sector had grown steadily, from 
20 percent of the work force in 1920 to 52 percent in 1985, declin- 
ing only during the bleak 1940s. It had surpassed the industrial 
sector at the end of the boom years in the mid-1970s, when it 
accounted for about 40 percent of the work force. Despite the eco- 
nomic slump of the 1975-85 period, the service sector grew 
strongly — an indication of Spain's development toward a postin- 
dustrial society and its increasing resemblance to the economic struc- 
tures of other West European countries. 

Spain has been fairly constant in the portion of its population 
actively involved in the economy. For all of the twentieth century, 
just over one-third of the population has either had a job or has 
been looking for one. A high point was reached in 1965, when 



148 



Plowed fields in Valencia Province 
Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain 



149 



Spain: A Country Study 

38.5 percent of all Spaniards were in the work force. During the 
1980s, the figure hovered at about 33 to 34 percent. 

Compared with other West European countries, however, Spain 
has been distinguished by the low participation of women in the 
work force. In 1970 only 18 percent of the country's women were 
employed, compared with 26 percent in Italy and 30 to 40 percent 
in northern Europe. During the 1980s, female employment in- 
creased, but women still made up less than 30 percent of the eco- 
nomically active population, considerably less than they did in 
Finland, for example, where nearly half of all those employed were 
female and where three-quarters of all women worked outside the 
home. Female participation in the labor market was increasing in 
the second half of the 1980s, and it had jumped 2 percent between 
1985 and 1987, when, according to an OECD report, it reached 
29.9 percent in mid-1987. El Pais, a respected daily, reported that 
there were 3.5 million women in the work force of 15 million at 
the end of 1987, which gave them a share of about 32 percent of 
the total. 

The Unemployment Problem 

Spain's most nagging and seemingly intractable economic 
problem has been the persistence of high unemployment. The indus- 
try shakeout of the 1975-85 period, declining job opportunities in 
agriculture, and the virtual drying up of the need for Spanish work- 
ers in Western Europe led to an unemployment rate that, through- 
out the 1980s, rarely went below 20 percent, the highest rate in 
Europe. Overall employment between 1976 and 1985 declined by 
almost 25 percent. The sharp slowdown in labor demand, follow- 
ing the first oil shock, coincided with the growing exodus from rural 
areas. The decline in industrial employment was due not only to 
production cutbacks in a number of key sectors, but also to prior 
widespread overmanning and to the abrupdy urgent need to address 
deteriorating economic conditions by stressing higher productivity 
and lower unit labor costs. The ensuing slowdown in real wage 
growth did not moderate before 1980. As a result, real wages sur- 
passed productivity between 1976 and 1979 by 22 percent. 

Though government programs, such as the strengthened Employ- 
ment Promotion Programs, led to the hiring of more than 1 mil- 
lion people in 1987 — more than double the average of about 450,000 
per year between 1979 and 1984 — they did not appreciably alter 
the level of joblessness. With almost 3 million people unemployed 
in 1988, the official unemployment level of 20.5 percent was almost 
double the OECD average. Record numbers of new job openings 
were created in the buoyant economy of 1987, and total employment 



150 



The Economy 



increased by 3 percent, but the new jobs barely kept pace with the 
growth of the labor force. Undoubtedly, the unemployment rate 
would have been much higher were it not for the relatively low 
level of participation of women in the labor force. The unemploy- 
ment rate for women in the labor force was about one-third higher 
than that for men. 

Youth unemployment was particularly high. The under-25 age- 
group accounted for nearly 55 percent of all unemployment, a factor 
that contributed to juvenile delinquency and street crime. Thus, 
the increasing participation of young people and women in the work 
force contributed to a persistence of high unemployment in the 
booming economy of the late 1980s because of the relatively low 
rates of employment among both groups. Another reason was that, 
although the economy was growing, part of the expansion was due 
to improved equipment, and not to increased employment. Indus- 
trial production, for example, rose by 4.7 percent in 1987, but 
industrial employment grew only by 2.5 percent. Nonetheless, these 
official unemployment rates were believed to be too high, for they 
did not take account of those persons believed to be working in 
the underground economy. 

The Underground Economy 

With the growth in unemployment, rising labor costs, rigid legal 
regulations, increasing numbers of layoffs and discharges, and high 
employer social security taxes, since the 1970s Spain has experienced 
the growth of an increasingly important underground economy 
(economia sumergida). Its rise has been of growing concern to govern- 
ment policymakers. Observers estimated that it accounted for 
10 percent to 15 percent of the GNP, and a 1985 government study 
suggested that the number of those employed in the underground 
economy amounted to 18 percent of the entire active labor force. 
Other analysts believed that as many as 33 percent of those offi- 
cially listed as unemployed — about 20 percent of the working 
population — were actually working in the shadow economy. Work- 
ers in this sector were particularly numerous in labor-intensive 
industries and services. According to official estimates, agriculture 
accounted for the largest share, estimated at perhaps 30 percent; 
services claimed up to 25 percent; construction, 20 percent; and 
industry, a little less than 20 percent. Most of those involved in 
the service sector worked as domestics. 

Typically, workers in the underground economy were young peo- 
ple with minimal educational and professional qualifications. Many 
were single women, more often than not, those without family 
responsibilities. This sector of the economy was marked by high 



151 



Spain: A Country Study 

labor turnover; its employees earned substandard wages, and they 
often toiled in unhealthy surroundings, frequently at home. Though 
wages were low, those who worked in the underground economy 
could avoid paying taxes and social security contributions — an 
aspect of the sector that made it attractive to employers as well as 
to laborers. 

Labor Relations in the Franco Era 

Labor relations until the late 1950s were generally of a fascist, 
authoritarian type. Wages and working conditions were set by 
decrees issued by the government, and all wage earners were 
required to be members of the government body, the Spanish 
Syndical Organization (Organizacion Sindical Espanola — OSE). 
Collective bargaining, independent labor organizations, and strikes 
were prohibited. In conjunction with the general economic liberal- 
ization of the late 1950s, the 1958 Collective Bargaining Law (Ley 
de Convenios Colectivos) for the first time permitted limited local 
collective bargaining between employers and labor within the frame- 
work of the OSE. 

Despite police repression and the heavy penalties that were given 
to striking workers — striking was considered the equivalent of a 
treasonable offense — there were a number of labor conflicts dur- 
ing the 1950s, especially in Barcelona and in the Basque region, 
both pre-Civil War trade-union strongholds. Through harsh police 
measures and the imprisonment of workers, these conflicts were 
readily brought under control. They were, however, harbingers 
of a tidal wave of labor unrest that was to inundate the country 
during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. 

As workers and their clandestine labor organizations grew more 
assertive during the mid-1960s, they sought a larger share of the 
country's growing prosperity. An oppositional grass-roots labor 
movement, which became known as the Workers' Commissions 
(Comisiones Obreras — CCOO), arose within the official labor orga- 
nization. During the 1960s and 1970s, the CCOO became the prin- 
cipal opposition to government-controlled labor organizations. The 
CCOO had links to the Roman Catholic Church, which during 
the same period was undergoing a growing liberalization with the 
encouragement of Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI. The church 
dissociated itself from the Franco regime, and it championed 
Spanish trade union freedoms and collective bargaining rights. 
Some church-sponsored labor groups were permitted to operate 
openly, most notably the Catholic Action Workers' Brotherhood 
(Hermandad Obrera de Accion Catolica — HOAC). On July 24, 
1968, the Bishops' Conference condemned Spain's government 



152 



The Economy 



labor organizations and issued a call for free trade unions. Churches 
provided a sanctuary for striking workers and served as a refuge 
from the police. 

Oppositional union groups became more active in elections for 
shop-level representatives. As slates of candidates sponsored by the 
CCOO and others increasingly won elections for factory shop 
stewards (jurados de empresa), the OSE became more and more 
dysfunctional. Meanwhile, the influence of the Catholic leadership 
of the CCOO lessened, as communists became increasingly domi- 
nant and as the movement became more active. Labor unrest 
underwent an explosive expansion. There were 777 strikes in 1963, 
484 in 1965, and the number mushroomed in 1970 to 1,595. The 
strikes resulted in major wage gains, frequently exceeding official 
guidelines. 

Semiclandestine independent trade unions began to emerge dur- 
ing the final decade of the Franco regime. In addition to the CCOO, 
other groups began to make their presence felt. The socialist General 
Union of Workers (Union General de Trabajadores — UGT), his- 
torically, the labor arm of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party 
(Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol — PSOE), belatedly emerged 
as a leading contender for worker leadership. In the Basque region, 
the Basque Workers' Solidarity (Eusko Langilleen Alkartasuna- 
Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos — ELA-STV), the labor 
adjunct of the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco — PNV), also made a reappearance. In addition, various 
organizations spawned by the church's active defense of workers' 
rights, the most notable being the Workers' Syndical Union (Union 
Sindical Obrera — USO), vied for workers' support. The anarcho- 
syndicalist National Confederation of Labor (Confederacion 
Nacional del Trabajo — CNT), which had been one of the two 
dominant trade union centers before 1939, reappeared sporadically 
in post-Franco Spain as a tiny, marginal force. 

Labor Relations in the Post-Franco Period 

The Franco regime ended amidst a wave of worker ferment and 
considerable strike activity. By 1975, brutal repression no longer 
sufficed to snuff out social discontent, as worker militancy over- 
whelmed an increasingly dysfunctional OSE and forced employ- 
ers to negotiate directly with representatives of the semilegal 
independent unions. The strike waves that crested between 1974 
and 1976 coincided with the huge oil price increases that began 
in 1973. The country's political elite, because it was engrossed with 
the transition to parliamentary democracy, gave only passing atten- 
tion to labor unrest and to the increasing deterioration of the 



153 



Spain: A Country Study 

economy. The institutional changes of this period had not yet 
established channels for collective bargaining, nor did consultative 
machinery exist to negotiate general wage guidelines. 

Industrial workers, having inadequately partaken of the grow- 
ing prosperity of earlier years, resented rising inflation and sought 
to make up for lost time despite mounting economic difficulties. 
A virtual wage explosion took place as workers and their semilegal 
spokesmen extracted large pay increases from their employers. From 
1974 to 1976, wages rose much more rapidly than did the cost of 
living. Analysts estimated that wage increases in those years aver- 
aged 20 to 30 percent per annum. Price controls managed to keep 
inflation well below these levels, at least for a time. Profits declined 
sharply, while the wage component of Spain's national income rose 
steeply — by four percentage points between 1974 and 1975. Out- 
put was maintained at fairly normal levels, as increased wage lev- 
els led to rapid growth in consumption, but depressive factors soon 
had an adverse effect on the economy. Unemployment rose from 
an insignificant 2.5 percent in 1973 to 8.5 percent in 1979, and 
thereafter it continued to rise steadily. 

Free trade unions were formally legalized on April 28, 1977, and 
the first post-Franco parliamentary elections, which were held the 
following June, saw Suarez and his center-right Union of the 
Democratic Center (Union de Centro Democratico — UCD) emerge 
victorious, but with only a plurality of the parliamentary seats. In 
October 1977, government and opposition parties agreed on an 
economic package, the Moncloa Pacts. The pacts were designed 
to prevent further economic deterioration and to buy time while 
the country awaited the October referendum on the new 1978 Con- 
stitution. The pacts called for a 2 2 -percent wage increase ceiling. 
This figure was below the rate of inflation, and it signified a 
reduction in popular purchasing power. In 1979, however, the 
government-labor consensus came to an end; partisan politics 
resumed, as unions sought wage adjustments that were at least equal 
to increases in the cost of living. 

The Workers' Statute, adopted in March 1980, articulated trade 
union rights as guaranteed by the Constitution. The statute elimi- 
nated direct government intervention in labor relations. It also 
included provisions for minimum wage standards, for access to 
social security funds, and for a delineation of the contractual nature 
of wage accords. Democratically elected works councils (comites de 
empresa) were established as spokesmen for employees, and unions 
were given responsibility for arriving at industry-wide and at local 
wage agreements. 



154 



The Economy 



During the 1970s, Spain's economic recession and the critical 
situation confronting many firms led to the establishment of implicit 
or explicit social contracts in which government, employers, and 
unions participated. Unions tended to accept wage restraint, and 
they increased productivity in exchange for improved job security 
and for promises to create more job opportunities. In 1980 the UGT 
and the Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organizations (Con- 
federacion Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales — CEOE) 
negotiated a pact called the Inter-Confederation Framework Agree- 
ment (Acuerdo Marco Interconfederal — AMI), embodying these 
features. The agreement set the pattern for 800,000 companies. 
These companies had an aggregate work force of 6 million per- 
sons, or half of the country's economically active population. 

Since the death of Franco, the UGT and the CCOO have been 
engaged in a fierce rivalry for hegemony in the labor movement. 
The struggle has had strong political ramifications because the UGT 
served as the trade union arm of the governing PSOE, and the 
CCOO was controlled by the Communist Party of Spain (Partido 
Comunista de Espana— PCE) and by other communist splinter 
groups. In the 1978 elections for members of the works councils, 
the CCOO elected 34 percent of their candidates, compared with 
the UGT's 20 percent. By 1980, however, the tide began to turn, 
and the UGT succeeded in electing close to 30 percent of its sup- 
porters, having made inroads into CCOO voting strongholds. The 
decision of a large number of USO affiliates to merge with the UGT 
also enhanced its strength. In 1982 the UGT managed to edge out 
the CCOO by a 36 percent to 33 percent margin, and in the suc- 
ceeding election, held in October-December 1986, it gained a fur- 
ther 4 percentage points, garnering a total of 41 percent, while the 
CCOO advanced only slightly to 34 percent. The UGT's strength 
was concentrated in smaller enterprises, whereas the CCOO's 
popularity advanced in public- sector companies and in the bank- 
ing sector. In the late 1980s, the CCOO dominated the works coun- 
cils in all the leading companies of INI, except for the tobacco 
monopoly. The ELA-STV continued to maintain its position as 
the single largest labor organization in the Basque region, but it 
was closely followed by the UGT. 

Not long after coming to power in late 1982, the Socialist govern- 
ment became increasingly embroiled in an acrimonious relation- 
ship with the equally socialist UGT. To advance its program for 
industrial restructuring and for the revitalization of the economy, 
in order to prepare for integration into the EC, the government 
considered it necessary to enforce wage restraint, to carry out large- 
scale personnel cutbacks in a number of public-sector companies, 



155 



Spain: A Country Study 



to limit social spending, and to permit employers greater latitude 
in hiring, firing, and laying off workers. In exchange for docility 
and low wages, workers during the Franco era received virtual life- 
time job security, making it practically impossible for employers 
to engage in personnel retrenchment; however, a free-market econ- 
omy, especially one linked to the EC, required the elimination of 
this rigid employment status — a goal toward which the Gonzalez 
government was gradually moving. Though such measures con- 
tributed to the economic boom of the late 1980s, they seriously 
undercut the standing of trade unions. Furthermore, labor mili- 
tants were incensed to find that in 1987 company profits greatly 
increased — an average of 40 percent — while the government con- 
tinued to insist on wage restraint. The two-year Economic and 
Social Agreement, which covered wages and related matters and 
was signed by the government, employers, and workers, expired 
at the end of 1986. Thereafter, government efforts to persuade 
unions to accept a social compact failed because of union insistence 
on wage increases appreciably higher than those proposed by the 
government and because of union opposition to further personnel 
reductions in state enterprises that operated at a loss. The result 
was that union contract renewals in early 1987 led to a resurgence 
of labor disputes and to an increase in the number of work 
stoppages. 

Trade unions entered the post-Franco era with great prestige 
and large memberships. According to the unions, their combined 
membership totalled 3 million workers. Since then, however, orga- 
nized labor has steadily lost strength because of rising unemploy- 
ment and limitations on wage increases. As a consequence, most 
workers professed sympathy and regard for the unions, but few 
bothered to pay dues. In the late 1980s, probably fewer than 15 
percent of all workers possessed union cards. Nonetheless, a much 
larger proportion heeded union calls during negotiations for eco- 
nomic agreements and participated in strikes and other job-related 
actions. 

Agriculture 

Viewed in terms of land mass, Spain is one of the largest coun- 
tries of Western Europe, and it ranks second in terms of its eleva- 
tion, after Switzerland. A large part of the country is semiarid, 
with temperatures that range from extremely cold in the winter 
to scorching in the summer. Rainfall, which is often inadequate, 
tends to be concentrated in two generally brief periods during the 
year. Summer droughts occur frequently. Of Spain's 50.5 million 
hectares of land, 20.6 million, or about 40 percent, are suitable 



156 



The Economy 



for cultivation; however, the soil is generally of poor quality, and 
only about 10 percent of the land can be considered excellent. In 
addition, the roughness of the terrain has been an obstacle to agricul- 
tural mechanization and to other technological improvements. Fur- 
thermore, years of neglect have created a serious land erosion 
problem, most notably in the dry plains of Castilla-La Mancha. 

Compared with other West European countries, the proportion 
of land devoted to agricultural purposes is low. In the 1980s, about 
5 million hectares were devoted to permanent crops: orchards, olive 
groves, and vineyards. Another 5 million lay fallow each year 
because of inadequate rainfall. Permanent meadows and pasture- 
land occupied 13.9 million hectares. Forests and scrub woodland 
accounted for 11.9 million hectares, and the balance was wasteland 
or was taken up by populated and industrial areas. 

The primary forms of property holding in Spain have been large 
estates (latifundios) and tiny land plots (minifundios) . In large mea- 
sure, this was still true in the 1980s. The agrarian census of 1982 
found that 50.9 percent of the country's farmland was held in 
properties of 200 or more hectares, although farms of this size made 
up only 1 . 1 percent of the country's 2.3 million farms. At the other 
end of the scale, the census showed that 61.8 percent of Spain's 
farms had fewer than 5 hectares of land. These farms accounted 
for 5.2 percent of the country's farmland. Furthermore, just under 
25 percent of all farms consisted of less than 1 hectare of land, and 
they accounted for 0.5 percent of all farmland. Minifundios were 
particularly numerous in the north and the northwest. Latifundios 
were mainly concentrated in the south, in Castilla-La Mancha, 
Extremadura, Valencia, and Andalusia (Spanish, Andalucia). 

Crop areas were farmed in two highly diverse manners. Areas 
relying on nonirrigated cultivation (secano), which made up 85 per- 
cent of the entire crop area, depended solely on rainfall as a source 
of water. They included the humid regions of the north and the 
northwest, as well as vast arid zones that had not been irrigated. 
The much more productive regions devoted to irrigated cultiva- 
tion (regadio) accounted for 3 million hectares in 1986, and the 
government hoped that this area would eventually double, as it 
already had doubled since 1950. Particularly noteworthy was the 
development in Almeria — one of the most arid and desolate 
provinces of Spain — of winter crops of various fruits and vegeta- 
bles for export to Europe. 

Though only about 17 percent of Spain's cultivated land was 
irrigated, it was estimated to be the source of between 40 and 
45 percent of the gross value of crop production and of 50 percent 
of the value of agricultural exports. More than half of the irrigated 



157 



Spain: A Country Study 



area was planted in corn, fruit trees, and vegetables. Other agricul- 
tural products that benefited from irrigation included grapes, cot- 
ton, sugar beets, potatoes, legumes, olive trees, strawberries, 
tomatoes, and fodder grasses. Depending on the nature of the crop, 
it was possible to harvest two successive crops in the same year 
on about 10 percent of the country's irrigated land. 

Citrus fruits, vegetables, cereal grains, olive oil, and wine^ 
Spain's traditional agricultural products — continued to be impor- 
tant in the 1980s. In 1983 they represented 12 percent, 12 percent, 
8 percent, 6 percent, and 4 percent, respectively, of the country's 
agricultural production. Because of the changed diet of an increas- 
ingly affluent population, there was a notable increase in the con- 
sumption of livestock, poultry, and dairy products. Meat production 
for domestic consumption became the single most important agricul- 
tural activity, accounting for 30 percent of all farm-related produc- 
tion in 1983. Increased attention to livestock was the reason that 
Spain became a net importer of grains. Ideal growing conditions, 
combined with proximity to important north European markets, 
made citrus fruits Spain's leading export. Fresh vegetables and fruits 
produced through intensive irrigation farming also became impor- 
tant export commodities, as did sunflower seed oil that was produced 
to compete with the more expensive olive oils in oversupply through- 
out the Mediterranean countries of the EC. 

Agricultural Development 

Farming was only marginally affected by the Civil War, yet 
agricultural output during the 1940s remained below the 1933 level. 
This low agricultural productivity led to food rationing, substan- 
tially contributing to the great hardships endured by people resid- 
ing in the cities. One of the main reasons for this dilemma was 
the government preoccupation with industrial self-sufficiency, which 
resulted in neglect for the modernization of agriculture. The govern- 
ment did encourage grain cultivation with the aim of achieving 
agricultural self-sufficiency, but heavy-handed efforts to control food 
prices led to the massive channeling of agricultural products into 
the black market. 

The traditional shortcomings of Spanish agriculture — excessive 
land fragmentation (minifundismo) and extremely large land tracts 
in the hands of a few (latifundismo) — were, for all practical purposes, 
ignored. As in the past, latifundio areas with low yields and little 
irrigation were primarily devoted to the production of such tradi- 
tional commodities as olive oil, grains, and wine. They were, 
moreover, the areas where casual rural laborers (braceros) were 



158 



The Economy 



concentrated, where wage levels were lowest, and where illiteracy 
rates were highest. 

A gradual change in Spanish agriculture began in the 1950s, 
when prices rapidly increased, and the surplus labor pool began 
to shrink, as a half million rural field hands migrated to the cities 
or went abroad in search of a better life (see Migration, ch. 2). 
Nonetheless, more substantial changes did not take place prior to 
the 1960s. The Stabilization Plan of 1959 encouraged emigration 
from rural areas, and the economic boom in both Spain and 
Western Europe provided increased opportunities for employment. 
The subsequent loss of rural manpower had a far-reaching effect 
on both agricultural prices and wage levels and, as a consequence, 
on the composition of Spanish agriculture. 

Spain's economic transformation in the 1960s and in the first 
half of the 1970s caused tremendous outmigration from rural areas. 
Between 1960 and 1973, 1 .8 million people migrated to urban areas. 
Even later, between 1976 and 1985, when the economy was experi- 
encing serious difficulties, the fall in farm employment averaged 
4 percent per annum. The results of these migrations were reflected 
in the changing percentage of the population involved in farming. 
In 1960, 42 percent of the population was engaged in agricultural 
work; by 1986 only about 15 percent was so employed — a marked 
reduction, though still twice as high as the EC average. As Spain 
became more industrialized, the declining share of agriculture in 
the economy was evidenced by its declining share of the GDP. 
Agriculture accounted for 23 percent of GDP in 1960; for 15 per- 
cent, in 1970; and for 5 percent, by 1986 (see fig. 10). In addi- 
tion, the character of Spanish agriculture in the 1980s had changed. 
It had become less a way of life and more a way of making a liv- 
ing. Even subsistence agriculture, already in steady decline, had 
become increasingly market oriented. 

The magnitude of the rural exodus permitted the government 
to undertake a program of parcel consolidation, that is, to bring 
together into single plots many tiny, scattered pieces of land that 
characterized the minifundio sector. The government managed to 
surpass its goal of consolidating 1 million hectares of small land 
holdings between 1964 and 1967; by 1981 it had brought together 
a total of 5 million hectares. 

The decreased size of the rural work force affected Spanish 
agriculture because its traditionally labor-intensive practices re- 
quired a large pool of cheap labor. The workers who remained in 
the countryside saw their wages advanced by 83.8 percent between 
1960 and 1970 — a rate that roughly followed the wage increases 
in industry. At the same time, however, increased agricultural 



159 



Spain: A Country Study 



GDP FY 1988 - US$340.1 billion 



Construction 



Energy 




Industry 



Services 



Figure 10. Structure of Gross Domestic Product, 1988 

labor costs led to the end of countless minifundios. The 1982 agrarian 
census recorded the disappearance of about one-half million small 
farms between 1962 and 1982. The resulting lack of a ready labor 
supply was an incentive, particularly for large landed estates, to 
mechanize. The number of farm tractors expanded more than ten- 
fold between 1960 and 1983, from 52,000 to 593,000. The num- 
ber of combine harvester-threshers increased almost tenfold over 
the same period, from 4,600 to 44,000. The process of mechani- 
zation caused agricultural productivity to grow by 3.5 percent per 
year between 1960 and 1978, and the productivity of farm work- 
ers grew even faster. Nonetheless, Spain's output per agricultural 
worker remained low. It was about half the EC average in 1985, 
and it surpassed only those of Greece and Portugal. 

During the mid-1980s, Spanish agriculture was roughly self- 
sufficient in years when there were good harvests, and in nearly 
every year there were sizable surpluses of olive oil, citrus fruits, 
and wine that could be exported in quantities large enough to make 
it the EC's third-largest food supplier. In years of poor or average 
harvests, the country was obliged to import grains for use as animal 
fodder, but on the whole Spain was a net exporter of foodstuffs. 

Spanish agriculture varied considerably with regard to regional 
differences in output. Some regions were distinguished by a highly 



160 



The Economy 



inefficient variety of farming. Specialists estimated that areas domi- 
nated by minifundios would have to lose an estimated three-fourths 
of their farming population if they were to compete effectively with 
foreign producers. The variety of agriculture practiced along the 
Mediterranean coast or in the Rio Ebro Valley was, however, highly 
efficient and capable of keeping up with foreign competition. 

Opinion was not united as to what EC membership would even- 
tually mean for Spanish farmers. The EC's Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), which aimed at supporting most of each member 
state's farming sector, was expensive, and by the 1980s it was con- 
suming well over half of the organization's revenues. If the CAP 
were continued, it would not be likely to have a considerable effect 
on Spanish agriculture, for a system of domestic price supports had 
long protected the weaker parts of the nation's farm sector. A change 
of EC policy that encouraged a single community-wide agricul- 
tural system might allow those parts of the Spanish agricultural 
sector that outperformed their rivals in the EC to prosper, while 
backward branches would probably disappear. 

Regional Variation 

Because the interior of Spain is dominated by semiarid plateaus 
and mountains subject to temperature extremes, the most produc- 
tive agricultural areas in the late 1980s tended to be the coastal 
regions. Thus, the north and the northwest, where there is a rela- 
tively mild, humid climate, were the principal corn-producing and 
cattle-raising areas. Apples and pears were the main orchard crops 
in this area, and potatoes were another of its leading products. 

Galicia, which consists of Spain's four westernmost provinces 
directly north of Portugal, had a concentrated farm population living 
on intensely fragmented plots. Accordingly, per capita farm income 
was low, compared with that of the northern provinces lying to 
the east, where there were fewer people and higher per capita in- 
come levels because of a more diversified economy that included 
industry, mining, and tourism. 

Catalonia, on the northeast coast, also has a climate that per- 
mits diversified agriculture. At the end of the 1980s, livestock, par- 
ticularly the expanding poultry industry, was important in the area. 
Modern farming methods, including the use of tractors, were more 
advanced here than they were in the rest of the country. South of 
Catalonia, along the narrow Mediterranean coast, or Levante, was 
Spain's principal area of intensive, irrigated horticulture. Orange 
trees, orchard fruits, rice, and vegetables were produced in this 
region, and farther to the south, fig trees and nut trees were grown. 



161 



Spain: A Country Study 

Andalusia, which includes all of tillable southern Spain, was 
another major agricultural area in the late 1980s. It was also the 
target of several agricultural planning programs. Although olive 
trees grow throughout the Mediterranean coastal region, as well 
as in parts of the Meseta Central (Central Plateau), they constituted 
the most important crop in Andalusia, particularly in the province 
of Jaen. Other warm-weather crops, such as cotton, tobacco, and 
sugarcane, were also produced in Andalusia, as were wine and table 
grapes. 

The vast dry plateau region of central Spain contrasts sharply 
with the country's relatively productive areas. The production of 
agricultural commodities is particularly difficult in central Spain 
because of a lack of rainfall, a scarcity of trees and other vegeta- 
tion, extremes of temperature, and harsh, rocky soil. Neverthe- 
less, the farmers of the region grew wheat and other grains, raised 
sheep and goats, maintained vineyards, and carried on other 
agricultural activities. 

An important irrigation system lies just northwest of the north- 
ern Meseta and south of the Pyrenees in the Ebro Basin, where 
Spain's best known vineyard district is located in the autonomous 
community of La Rioja. Because of its irrigation, corn, sugar beets, 
and orchard fruits were grown in this area, and the Ebro Delta 
was one of Spain's principal rice- growing regions. 

In the Balearic Islands (Spanish, Islas Baleares), the uncertain, 
sparse rainfall and the lack of permanent fresh water streams are 
somewhat compensated for by good supplies of underground water. 
Irrigation permitted the production of a wide range of temperate 
and semitropical tree corps for export, as well as enough cereals, 
legumes, wines, and vegetables for local consumption. Sheep, goats, 
pigs, and poultry were also raised on the islands. 

Agriculture in the Canary Islands (Spanish, Canarias) was limited 
by water shortages and mountainous terrain. Nevertheless, a variety 
of vegetable and fruit crops were produced for local consumption, 
and there was a significant and exportable surplus of tomatoes and 
bananas. 

Crops 

Spain has long been Western Europe's leading producer, and 
the world's foremost exporter, of oranges and mandarins. In the 
early 1960s, the production of these commodities averaged 1 .8 mil- 
lion tons a year, and by the 1980s the annual yield averaged about 
3 million tons (see table 7, Appendix). Grapefruit, lemons, and 
limes were also grown in quantity, but Spain was second to Italy 
among West European producers of these fruits. Spain's citrus 



162 



The Economy 



groves, all under irrigation, were concentrated in Mediterranean 
coastal provinces, the Levante, primarily in a narrow coastal strip 
500 kilometers in length extending from the province of Castellon 
to the province of Almena. Some citrus fruit production also was 
found in Andalusia. 

Spain's other significant orchard crops were apples, bananas, 
pears, peaches, apricots, plums, cherries, figs, and nuts. Except 
for bananas, which were grown only in the Canary Islands, and 
figs, which were grown mosdy in the Balearic Islands, orchard crops 
were produced primarily in the Levante and in Catalonia. The 
Catalan province of Lerida was the leading producer of apples and 
pears, and it ranked second to Murcia in the production of peaches. 
Almonds, grown along the southern and the eastern coasts, emerged 
as another important Spanish cash crop. Almost half of the 1985 
crop was exported, approximately 70 to 75 percent of it to EC coun- 
tries. 

The principal vegetable crops were potatoes, tomatoes, onions, 
cabbages, peppers, and string beans. Spain was the leading pro- 
ducer of onions in Western Europe, and it was second only to Italy 
in the production of tomatoes. These crops were concentrated in 
Andalusia and in the intensively cultivated and largely irrigated 
Mediterranean coastal areas, where small garden plots known as 
huertas were common. The Canary Islands also produced a signifi- 
cant proportion of Spain's tomatoes. Potatoes were a prominent 
garden crop in the northwest. 

Spain was the world's leading producer and exporter of olives 
and olive oil, although in some years Italy showed higher produc- 
tion levels because Spanish harvests were notably vulnerable to 
insects, frost, and storm damage. Andalusia, where about one-half 
of the olive groves were found, is generally free of these hazards, 
but olives were grown in virtually every province except the humid 
north and the northwest. In the 1980s, olive production fluctuated 
wildly, ranging from 1.2 million to 3.3 million tons per year. Olive 
oil production was also volatile. Spain's olive production is affected 
by EC quotas, and past efforts to control overproduction have 
included the destruction of olive groves. 

Though Spain boasted the world's largest area of land devoted 
to vineyards, much of the wine it produced was of mediocre quality. 
Vineyards were usually located on poor land, and good wine- 
making technology was often lacking. In the past, government- 
guaranteed prices for wine tended to encourage quantity rather than 
quality and alcoholic content, but programs were instituted in the 
1980s to upgrade production, and surpluses of poor quality white 
wine were more regularly distilled into industrial alcohol. Supported 



163 



Spain: A Country Study 



by the restructuring and reconversion program initiated by the 
government in 1984 and by an EC assistance program, Spain's 
vineyard acreage continued to decline, and it was expected to fall 
to 100,000 hectares by 1990. Spain's 1986 wine production was 
estimated at 36.7 million hectoliters. 

Grains covered about 10 percent of Spain's cultivated lands, and 
about 10 percent of that area was irrigated. Wheat and barley were 
generally grown in the dry areas because corn tends to crowd such 
crops out of areas with more abundant rainfall or irrigation. 
Although most of the wheat was grown in dry upland areas, some 
of it also was grown on valuable irrigated land. Rice was depen- 
dent on plentiful water supplies and, accordingly, was produced 
in the irrigated areas of the Levante, in Andalusia, and at the mouth 
of the Rio Ebro. Spanish farmers also grew rye, oats, and sorghum. 

During the mid-1980s, the grain crop usually hit record highs 
of about 20 million tons, compared to 13 million tons in 1983. This 
meant that Spain, long a grain-importing nation, now produced 
a surplus of cereals. Barley had come to account for about one- 
half of the grain harvest and corn for about one-sixth of it, as the 
government encouraged production of these crops in order to reduce 
imports of animal feed grains. Although the wheat crop was sub- 
ject to wide fluctuations because of variable weather conditions, 
it generally provided about one-fourth of Spain's total grain produc- 
tion, which exceeded the country's needs. Rice and oats constituted 
the rest of the national total. Some rice and wheat were exported 
with the help of subsidies, and analysts expected the surplus of wheat 
and the deficit of corn to continue into the 1990s. 

To make up for the shortage of domestic feed grains, Spain 
became one of the world's largest importers of soybeans, and it 
developed a modern oilseed-crushing industry of such high produc- 
tivity that surplus soybean oil became one of Spain's most impor- 
tant agricultural export commodities. The government encouraged 
domestic production of soybeans to lessen the heavy dependence 
on soybean imports. To limit the impact of this production on the 
important, labor-intensive, olive oil industry, which provided work 
for many field hands in southern Spain, a domestic tax system was 
established that maintained a two-to-one olive oil-soybean oil price 
ratio. The revenues derived from this system subsidized large 
exports of surplus soybean oil. The United States, once the main 
source of soybean imports, lodged protests against this policy, both 
bilaterally and internationally, but with little effect as of 1988. 

As a further step in reducing Spanish dependence on imported 
soybeans, the government encouraged sunflower production. 
Especially favorable growing conditions, coupled with generous 



164 



Rice fields in Navarre 
Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain 

government support, caused sunflower seed output to expand spec- 
tacularly, and the amount of land used for its cultivation went from 
virtually nothing in 1960 to approximately 1 million hectares in 
the 1980s. Sunflower- seed meal was not the most desirable livestock 
feed, and therefore was not used in this way, but by the 1980s most 
Spanish households used the cooking oil it provided because it was 
less expensive than olive oil. 

About 8 percent of the cultivated land in Spain was devoted to 
legumes and to industrial crops. Edible legumes were grown in vir- 
tually every province; French beans and kidney beans predomi- 
nated in the wetter regions; and chick peas (garbanzos) and lentils, 
in the arid regions. However, Spain was a net importer of legumes. 
Although consumption of these crops declined as the standard of 
living improved, domestic production also fell. 

Sugar beets were Spain's most important industrial crop. Annual 
production in the mid-1980s averaged about 7 million tons. Culti- 
vation was widely scattered, but the heaviest production was found 
in the Guadalquivir Basin, in the province of Leon, and around 
Valladolid. A small amount of sugarcane was grown in the Guadal- 
quivir Basin. Sugar production, controlled to meet EC quotas, was 
usually sufficient to meet domestic needs. 

Although small quantities of tobacco, cotton, flax, and hemp were 
also cultivated, they were not adequate to fulfill Spain's needs. But 



165 



Spain: A Country Study 

esparto grass, a native Mediterranean fiber used in making paper, 
rope, and basketry, grew abundantly in the southeastern part of 
the country. 

Livestock 

Spanish meat production in 1986 totalled 2,497,000 tons. The 
country's farmers produced 137,000 tons of lamb and mutton, 
435,000 tons of beef and veal, 765,000 tons of poultry, and 
1,160,000 tons of pork. With some fluctuations, these figures were 
representative of Spain's meat production during the 1980s. Spanish 
livestock industries had experienced significant growth and modern- 
ization since the 1950s, but their output remained well behind the 
levels of efficiency and productivity of EC countries. The EC states' 
generous subsidies and their experience in the use of expensive feed 
grains gave their livestock industries a decided competitive advan- 
tage. As the Spanish livestock sector was increasingly concentrated 
in northern Spain, where minifundio agriculture predominated, 
many Spanish cattle-raising farms were too small to exploit fully 
the efficiencies of modern technology. Domestic meat production 
failed to meet demand, making Spain a net importer of farm animals 
and meat products. 

Pork was Spain's most important meat product, and the num- 
ber of pigs grew from 7.6 million in 1970 to 11.4 million in 1985. 
Pigs were raised unpenned in the central uplands, but they were 
generally pen-fed in the northern regions. At times African Swine 
Fever was a serious impediment to pork exports. 

Poultry raising had also expanded rapidly, and the number of 
chickens had doubled between 1970 and 1985, when it reached 54 
million. The emphasis was on poultry production for meat rather 
than for eggs, because poultry, previously a minor item in the Span- 
ish diet, had become much more popular. The most important areas 
for poultry raising were in the corn- growing provinces of the north 
and the northwest, but Catalonia, Valencia, and Andalusia were 
also important. 

The principal cattle areas were in the north, the northwest, and, 
to a lesser degree, in Extremadura, Andalusia, the Rio Duero Basin, 
and the Murcia- Valencia lowlands. These regions provided the 
suitable pastures that were available only in areas with humid 
climates or with irrigated land. In 1986 Spain had 5 million cattle, 
including 1.9 million dairy cows. About 25 percent of the cattle 
were raised as oxen for draft purposes, and about 2 percent were 
bred for the bullring. The ranches of Extremadura and Andalusia 
specialized in raising animals of bullring quality. 



166 



The Economy 



The dairy industry had grown rapidly. Milk production from 
cows, sheep, and goats, which had stood at 5.4 million tons in 1974, 
reached 6.4 million tons in 1986 — well over double the produc- 
tion level of the early 1960s. The bulk of milk products came from 
Galicia, Asturias, and Santander. In 1982 the government launched 
a program designed to modernize milk production, to improve its 
quality, and to concentrate it in the northern provinces. The dairy- 
industry was not seriously hurt by Spain's entry into the EC, 
although the 3 percent quota reduction for each of the years 1987 
and 1988 and the 5.5 percent voluntary cutback hampered develop- 
ment. 

Spain's sheep population remained almost unchanged at about 
17 million between 1970 and 1985. Sheep rearing predominated 
in central Spain and the Ebro Basin. Goats were kept in much the 
same area, but they were more prevalent in the higher, less grassy 
elevations because they can survive on poorer pasture. Merino 
sheep, the best known breed, were probably imported from North 
Africa, and they were well adapted to semiarid conditions. Merino 
sheep, noted for their fine wool, were widely used as stock for new 
breeds. Other prominent breeds were the Churro and the Mancha. 
Although raised primarily for wool, milk, and cheese, Spanish farm 
animals, particularly sheep, were increasingly used to satisfy the 
country's meat consumption needs. 

Forestry 

Most of the natural forests of the Iberian Peninsula had long 
since disappeared because of erosion and uncontrolled harvesting 
for firewood, timber, or the creation of pastureland. In the 1980s, 
about 7 million hectares, or 14 percent of the land in Spain, could 
be considered usable forest, although another 3.5 million hectares 
of scrub growth were often included in forestland statistics. 

A reforestation program had been under way in Spain since 1940. 
The aims of the program included meeting market demand for 
forest products, controlling erosion, and providing seasonal employ- 
ment in rural areas. Eucalyptus trees, Lombardy poplars, and a 
variety of conifers were emphasized because of their fast growth. 

Lumber output was approximately 12.3 million cubic meters in 
1986, compared with 11.8 million cubic meters in 1985. Output 
could conceivably triple if 5.8 million hectares of the best forestland, 
which accounted for 50 percent of the total woodlands area, were 
properly developed and managed. Existing forestation programs 
were inadequate, however. For example, in the 1975-84 period, 
the balance between reforestation and the loss of forestland as a 
result of fires favored the latter by about 148,000 hectares. A report 



167 



Spain: A Country Study 

issued by the Forest Progress Association reported that, by the year 
2000, Spain's wood deficit could reach between 8.5 and 16.9 mil- 
lion cubic meters. 

The value of Spain's forest products in 1985 was US$302 mil- 
lion. Pine trees grown in the north and the northwest as well as 
oak and beech trees grown in the Pyrenees accounted for most of 
the total. Commercial forestry products produced in Spain included 
cork, turpentine, and resins. 

Spain was the world's second largest producer of cork after Por- 
tugal. The best quality of cork, used for bottle stoppers, was grown 
in Catalonia. More plentiful lower grades, which went into lino- 
leum, insulating materials, and other industrial products, came 
primarily from Andalusia and Extremadura. Cork production was 
declining, after reaching a high in the 1970s of 97,000 tons per 
year; only 46,000 tons were produced in 1985, as the widening 
use of plastics and other cork substitutes reduced demand. 

Fisheries 

Spain was Western Europe's leading fishing nation, and it had 
the world's fourth largest fishing fleet. Spaniards ate more fish per 
capita than any other European people, except the Scandinavians. 
In the mid-1980s, Spain's fishing catch averaged about 1.3 mil- 
lion tons a year, and the fishing industry accounted for about 
1 percent of GDP. Sardines, mussels, cephalopods, cod, mackerel, 
and tuna, most of which came from the Atlantic Ocean, were the 
principal components of the catch (see table 8, Appendix). Fish- 
ing was particularly important in the economic life of Galicia, the 
principal fishing ports of which were Vigo and La Coruna on the 
northwest coast. Also important were Huelva, Cadiz, and Algeciras 
in the south, and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and Santa Cruz 
de Tenerife in the Canary Islands. 

In the mid-1980s, the fishing fleet numbered between 13,800 
and 17,500 vessels, most of which were old and small. Deep-sea 
vessels numbered about 2,000. Spain's 100,000 fishermen made 
up one- third of all EC manpower in the fishing sector, and a fur- 
ther 700,000 Spanish jobs depended on fishing. Prior to its admis- 
sion into the EC , the undisciplined behavior of Spanish fishermen 
was a constant problem for the government and for other Europe- 
an countries. Spanish vessels were frequently charged with fishing 
violations in the Atlantic and the North Sea. Entry into the EC 
brought access to most of its waters, but it also meant catches would 
be sharply restricted until 1995. 



168 



The Economy 



Food Processing 

Food processing had become a major industry in Spain, and by 
1985 this activity employed 450,000 workers in about 70,000 firms. 
These enterprises were dominated by about 150 large companies, 
many of which belonged to foreign multinational corporations. 
Capital expenditures by all food processing companies amounted 
to US$580 million in 1985, and the sector's productive value was 
about US$20 billion in the same year. Changes in the nation's food 
consumption patterns and increased tourism substantially contrib- 
uted to the expansion of the food processing industry. 

Industry 

Industrial Development 

Spain's rapid industrial development dates from about 1960, but 
the underlying structure that made it possible resulted from a con- 
certed effort by the government to reconstruct and to modernize 
the economy after the destruction caused by the Civil War. In the 
initial post-Civil War period of the early 1940s, the immediate need 
was for economic self- sufficiency because World War II had dis- 
rupted international trade patterns. After the war, most of the rest 
of Western Europe faced reconstruction problems, which left little 
surplus foreign capital for Spain. In addition, a political and eco- 
nomic boycott by the victorious Allies, the result of Franco's pro- 
Axis leanings, left Spain dependent on its own resources. The result 
was the slow, forced development of a diversified industrial sec- 
tor, which would not have been economically justified if Spain had 
been able to trade freely with its neighbors. The high operating 
costs, the low rate of exports, and the inflation that consequently 
befell the Spanish economy made the 1940s a difficult period for 
the country. 

In the 1950s, Spain, which had not been an original participant 
in the Marshall Plan, received considerable aid from the United 
States as part of a military basing agreement signed in 1953. 
Industrial development subsequently became more rapid, but it 
was still hampered by the country's continued isolation from the 
more quickly recovering economies of Western Europe. Inflation, 
fairly well under control in the rest of Europe, was rampant in the 
1950s, and foreign exchange reserves declined because of Spain's 
continuing inability to export its products. 

The turning point for the economy, particularly for its industrial 
sector, occurred in 1959, when a stabilization program went into 
effect. This program marked the end of Spain's economic isolation. 
Its outmoded system of multiple exchange rates was abandoned, 



169 



Spain: A Country Study 

and the peseta was devalued by 42.9 percent. Import duties and 
quotas were progressively lowered or removed, and exports were 
encouraged by subsidies, export credits, and other promotional 
efforts. The result of these initiatives was the structural transfor- 
mation of Spanish industry during the 1960s. The manufacturing 
sector grew in real terms at an annual rate of 10.3 percent between 
1958 and 1969. This growth was led by the motor vehicle and the 
chemical industries, both of which were stimulated by foreign capital 
and technology. The annual growth rates of these two key sectors 
were 24 and 14 percent, respectively. In the same period, labor 
productivity grew by nearly 8 percent per year. 

Both domestic and export demand significantly contributed to 
the industrial growth of the 1960s and the early 1970s. The export 
of manufactures rose from 43.5 billion pesetas in 1960 to 191 bil- 
lion pesetas in 1973, or from about 30 to 63 percent of the coun- 
try's total manufacturing output. 

The slowdown of the world economy caused by the increase in 
oil prices in the 1970s began to affect Spain in the second half of 
1974. Unique among Spain's major industrial sectors, mining had 
been in trouble even before the price hike. It had continually experi- 
enced the slowest rate of growth during the period of expansion, 
and it reached its high point relatively early, in 1972. Construc- 
tion was affected by the oil crises because of its relation to the boom- 
ing tourist trade, which also suffered reverses in 1974. Within the 
manufacturing sector, textiles were particularly hard hit, and both 
the automobile and the shipbuilding industries faced reduced sales 
and cancellations. Rapidly rising unemployment and continuing 
inflation also indicated that the boom in Spain's industrial growth 
had stagnated. 

The economic boom of the 1960s and the 1970s had left Spain 
with a large steel-producing capacity and had made it into one of 
the world's largest shipbuilding nations. By the mid-1970s, both 
of these industries experienced a production capacity glut as a result 
of sharply reduced global and domestic demand. Industrial retrench- 
ment, however, was postponed during the 1970s. Sheltered to some 
degree from the first oil price shock by a cut in taxes on oil 
products — and cushioned by a high inflation rate, the persistence 
of negative interest rates, and protectionist tariff barriers — steel, 
shipbuilding, and other heavy industries continued their heavy 
investment in new capacity despite the downturn in world demand 
and the increasingly competitive international environment. Excess 
capacity in these industries coincided with rapidly rising labor costs 
and, as a consequence, with reduced competitiveness and profit 
margins. 



170 



Inspecting the nets in La Coruna Province 
Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain 

One of the by-products of the country's economic difficulties was 
a sharp reduction in industrial employment. In addition, the 1980 
recession finally forced the government to permit Spanish oil prices 
to rise toward world levels, while interest rates declined. 

The first attempt at industrial restructuring was embodied in 
a 1981 law dealing with industrial reconversion. It proved difficult 
to implement, and a large part of the funds allocated for reconver- 
sion was siphoned off to cover losses among public-sector indus- 
trial companies. A more concerted attack was launched in 1983. 
The following year, a white paper on reindustrialization was issued, 
followed by a new law, the aims of which were to raise productivity 
and to restore industrial profitability by downsizing in order to 
restructure financial liabilities and to eliminate excess capacity and 
overmanning. To counterbalance these cutbacks, investment was 
directed toward new technologies for use in sectors that showed 
promise for greater growth and profit potential. 

Development and expansion were encouraged in such industries 
as food processing, consumer electronics, defense systems, and other 
"growth" sectors. The industrial reconversion program was accom- 
panied, however, by considerable worker discontent and by violent 
incidents. The initial financial costs of the program were high, but 
over time they were expected to yield considerable benefits. 

By the mid-1980s, the economy had begun to emerge from a 



171 



Spain: A Country Study 

prolonged period of stagnation and crisis. The GDP commenced 
its expansionary growth, rising by 2.3 percent in 1984 and by a 
high of 4.7 percent in 1987. Meanwhile, industrial output had suc- 
ceeded in shedding its sluggishness and had embarked on a vigorous 
cycle of growth. Industrial production grew by 0.9 percent in 1984, 
by 2.2 percent in 1985, by 3.5 percent in 1986, and by 4.7 percent 
in 1987. Observers projected that output would somewhat decrease 
in 1988 and in 1989, but that it would reach growth levels of 3.8 
and 3.7 percent, respectively, in these years. Despite a modest 
decline in the mid-1980s, Spanish economic and industrial growth 
continued to be the strongest in Western Europe. Indicating an 
expanding economy, capital goods production increased by 9 per- 
cent in 1985, despite a previous decline in 1984. In the manufac- 
turing sector, metal fabrication and the production of precision 
instruments increased from 1.8 percent in 1984 to 4.1 percent in 
1985. Nevertheless, production increases in minerals and in chemi- 
cals were a minimal 0.2 percent in 1985, compared with 3.3 per- 
cent in 1984. Auto assembly output soared, but iron and steel 
production and shipbuilding experienced sharp declines. Traditional 
export-oriented activities, such as petroleum refining, and textile, 
shoe, and leather production were suffering from reduced competi- 
tiveness. 

In what probably would turn out to be the peak of the economic 
boom, all major economic sectors posted healthy production gains 
in 1987. In the wake of renewed investment demand, construc- 
tion grew by an estimated 10 percent, and overall industrial growth 
was 4.7 percent. 

Regional Concentration 

Spanish industry has long been concentrated in a few areas. 
Traditionally, the major industrial areas were in Barcelona and 
surrounding Catalonia, the northern region of Asturias and the 
Basque provinces, Madrid, and to a lesser extent the mineral-rich 
southwest. 

Catalonia had a concentration of processing and engineering 
industries, rather than basic industries. It was the dominant area 
for food and textile industries, and it was a center for the produc- 
tion of electronics. Tarragona's industrial capacity, based on a large 
oil refinery and a petrochemical complex, was growing rapidly. 
Catalonia also had a highly developed machinery industry, includ- 
ing the country's largest automobile plant and extensive railroad 
foundries and workshops, as well as diesel, electrical engineering, 
and various industrial equipment plants. 



172 



The Economy 



The northern coast and the Basque region were centers of basic 
industry because of their coal and iron ore deposits and their port 
facilities, used for raw material imports. Spain's major iron and 
steel works were located in the northern region, as were a number 
of engineering industries, shipbuilding facilities, and chemical 
plants. 

Madrid was a major manufacturing center, producing, among 
other items, automobiles, electrical equipment, and aircraft. Its 
location in the center of both Spain and the poorly endowed Meseta 
Central would seem to make it a poor prospect for industrial devel- 
opment; however, its large population, transportation facilities, and 
governmental role stimulated its evolution as an industrial center. 
By contrast, some of the country's industrially and agriculturally 
poorer provinces lay in a vast arc separating Madrid from the north- 
ern coast and the Catalan areas. 

National Industrial Institute 

Spain's industrial sector was marked by the presence of a major 
subsector controlled by the government. Some of this subsector was 
under the control of the Directorate General for State Assets (Direc- 
cion General del Patrimonio del Estado — DGPE — see Role of 
Government, this ch.). By far the largest component of the public 
sector, however, was contained within the National Industrial Insti- 
tute (Instituto Nacional de Industria — INI), which, since 1968, had 
been under the supervision of the Ministry of Industry and Energy. 
The Franco regime adopted extremely protectionist policies early, 
and it opted for a high level of direct state intervention in the econ- 
omy. When INI was founded in 1941, it was intended to create 
or to subsidize industries in key sectors of the economy where pri- 
vate enterprise alone was insufficient to achieve self- sufficiency. 
INI, which used both direct investments and collaboration with 
sources of private capital, studiously avoided any involvement in 
the banking sector; it especially favored industries related to national 
defense. INI was granted powers to take over existing enterprises 
and to create new ones when necessary. 

Few of INI' s original purposes were realized. With the signing 
of base agreements with the United States, the armed forces, begin- 
ning in 1953, became dependent on the United States for arms 
equipment. INI's efforts to fill gaps in the economy were not very 
effective. Instead of creating efficient new industries, it tended to 
establish inefficient ones and to hamper the activities of private 
enterprise. Political favorites of the regime were permitted to unload 
badly run, deficit-producing firms on INI, and many of its top po- 
sitions were political sinecures. 



173 



Spain: A Country Study 

Efforts were periodically undertaken to bring INI more into line 
with the rest of Spanish industry, and, as a result, a more realistic 
approach toward the financing of industrial companies was 
instituted. Government subsidies were permitted to cover the deficits 
of those INI firms that were considered to have incurred losses 
unavoidably. For example, the coal-mining conglomerate, Empresa 
Nacional Hulleras del Norte (HUNOSA), which was set up by INI 
in 1967 to reorganize the coal industry, was still losing money in 
the late 1980s. In general, however, firms were expected to become 
economically viable, although many did not. 

A policy change took place in 1974, however. It was decided that 
INI, rather than remaining in the background of the industrial sec- 
tor, was to serve as the linchpin of basic industries, such as ironmak- 
ing, steelmaking, and petrochemical production, and that it was 
to become the prime promoter of development in high-technology 
areas, such as electronics and aircraft manufacture. 

By the mid-1980s, the companies directly controlled by INI 
formed the single largest industrial group in the country, responsible 
for 10 percent of Spain's GDP and for the employment of 200,000 
workers. INI directed more than 60 firms — sometimes having 100 
percent ownership in them — as well as more than 100 of their sub- 
sidiaries. INI firms produced all of the country's aluminum; most 
of its ships; much of its steel, other metals, paper and pulp, and 
transportation equipment; and many of its commercial vehicles. 
It also controlled most of the country's two largest airlines: Iberia, 
Lineas Aereas de Espafia; and Aviacion y Comercio (AVIACO). 

A restructuring and investment program was launched in 1984 
and 1985 to reduce INI's huge losses and to refocus industrial invest- 
ment and expansion. The overhaul was prompted in part by a need 
to end INI's reliance on payments from the central government, 
which would no longer be permitted when Spain completed its tran- 
sition into the EC. The program had some successes. In 1983 INI 
posted a record loss of 204 billion pesetas, but by the late 1980s 
the restructuring program had steadily reduced the shortfall. In 
its best performance since the late 1970s, the loss was cut to 45 bil- 
lion pesetas (US$421 million) in 1987. INI's improved performance 
was partly the result of the 1985 sale of the auto assembly company, 
Sociedad Espanola de Automoviles de Turismo (SEAT), which had 
lost 37 billion pesetas that year. The INI concerns that registered 
profits were the national airline, Iberia, the electric power utilities, 
food processing plants, and enterprises producing electronics, alu- 
minum, paper, and fertilizers. Among the leading contributors to 
the deficit were Construcciones Aeronauticas (CAS A), Empresa 



174 



The Economy 



National de Santa Barbara de Industrias Militares (Santa Barbara), 
and the coal company, HUNOSA. 

INI's losses had traditionally been the largest in the "rust belt" 
industries — steelmaking, shipbuilding, and mining. In each of these 
areas, the restructuring program downgraded INI's large holdings 
through personnel cutbacks and the closing down of some old, ineffi- 
cient plants, production yards, and mines. Investments were under- 
taken to upgrade industrial facilities, such as those used in a new 
continuous casting plant scheduled to begin operations by mid- 
1989. The large steel company, Empresa Nacional Siderurgica 
(ENSIDESA), was expected to reach the financial break-even point 
by the end of 1988. In addition, the shipbuilding industry gradu- 
ally was beginning to reemerge from its protracted slump. 

Although INI intended to liberate itself from much of its customary 
heavy reliance on government subsidies, massive government sup- 
port would continue to sustain the ailing shipyard and coal-mining 
industries. Government allocations in 1987 amounted to 150 billion 
pesetas (US$1.4 billion). Aid to government-supported firms was 
designed to keep them operating in order to maintain employment. 

Of particular note in INI's renovation was its partial privatiza- 
tion. In the mid-1980s, INI sold a 51 percent interest in SEAT 
to Volkswagen (SEAT lost US$231 million in 1984). Minority inter- 
ests, ranging from 25 to 45 percent, were being sold in the more 
profitable public-sector companies through public stock offerings. 
Shares in two electric power companies and a pulp-paper firm were 
offered, and observers expected that shares in Iberia and in two 
electric power companies would be offered in 1989. INI spokes- 
men, however, were quick to point out that such developments 
should not be interpreted as an ideological or policy-oriented com- 
mitment to privatization. They were conceived of as part of an effort 
to improve management of public-sector companies and to use 
private-sector resources to invest in modernization and expansion. 
The funds gained from the sale of stock in INI companies were 
to be used for strengthening them financially, for expanding exist- 
ing programs, and for embarking on new investment strategies. 

Another part of INI's restructuring strategy called for a major 
expansion of research and development. In the late 1980s, 1.6 per- 
cent of INI's revenues went to research and development, which 
was well above the overall Spanish corporate average of 0.5 percent, 
but far below that of foreign technologically oriented companies. 
The goal was to bring research and development expenditures up 
to 3 percent of INI's income by 1992. The plan also emphasized 
training and retraining for both white-collar and blue-collar workers. 



175 



Spain: A Country Study 

Manufacturing and Construction 

Iron and Steel 

Spain's steel industry was located in the north at Vizcaya, 
Cantabria, and Asturias, and in the south at Sagunto, near Valen- 
cia. Though the steel industry had had an important presence in 
Spain since the second half of the nineteenth century, it had 
expanded greatly during the boom years of the 1960s and the early 
1970s. Production had gone from 1.9 million tons in 1960 to 
11.1 million tons in 1975, making the country the fifth largest steel 
producer in Europe and the thirteenth largest in the world. By the 
late 1970s, however, a worldwide glut in steelmaking capacity and 
the domestic economic slump had led to a severe crisis in the indus- 
try. Thereafter, the Spanish steel industry experienced an exten- 
sive contraction, not only in production capacity, but also in the 
size of its labor force. 

Despite a 50 percent drop in domestic steel consumption, produc- 
tion remained at about 13 million tons per year during the early 
1980s, and it reached a high of 14 million tons in 1985. High 
production levels were maintained through extensive exports; the 
two largest steel producers, the state firm ENSIDESA, and the 
Basque company, Altos Hornos de Vizcaya, were among the 
nation's most important exporters after the large automobile com- 
panies. Both of these companies and most other steel companies 
operated with heavy losses, however. 

Membership in the EC and in the European Coal and Steel Com- 
munity (ECSC) committed Spain to cutting back its iron and steel 
output and to reducing its overall capacity. Steel output declined 
almost 16 percent in 1986, to 11.8 million tons, and it fell to a 
slightly lower level in 1987. The government's efforts at restruc- 
turing the steel industry continued during the later 1980s with the 
creation of Acenor, which consolidated the producers of special 
grades of steel and became Western Europe's sixth largest firm of 
this kind. The large blast furnaces at Sagunta were shut down, and 
the government, which already controlled ENSIDESA and Altos 
Hornos del Mediterraneo, both INI firms, took a 40 percent interest 
in Altos Hornos de Vizcaya. 

Automobile Assembly 

The greatest success story of Spain's economic expansion was 
the rise of its large motor vehicle assembly industry. Although it 
started up only in 1950, by the early 1970s it had become the coun- 
try's second most important industry in the manufacturing sector, 



176 



Steel mill at Aviles in Asturias 
Courtesy Embassy of Spain, Washington 

and in the mid-1980s it was the most important producer of exports. 
Automobile production reached 38,000 units in 1960 and increased 
sixfold between 1965 and 1976. By the 1980s, Spain manufactured 
an average of well over a million cars per year, and in 1987 it 
produced 1.4 million vehicles. A good part of this production was 
exported. In 1985, for example, about 800,000 vehicles, out of a 
total of 1.2 million, went abroad. By 1986 Spain's three largest 
exporters were Ford Espana, General Motors Espana, and SEAT. 
In addition to the manufacture of personal automobiles, Spain 
produced substantial numbers of commercial vehicles. In the 
mid-1980s, commercial vehicle production ranged from 130,000 
to 300,000 units per year, and annual tractor production levels stood 
at about 16,000 units. 

Spain's motor vehicle industry was located in many parts of the 
country. SEAT began its operations in Barcelona, while General 
Motors Espana was located in the Zaragoza and Cadiz areas, Ford 
Espana was near Valencia, and a number of companies were placed 
around Madrid. 

Subsidiaries of foreign firms dominated the automobile indus- 
try. In 1986 Fabricacion de Automoviles, SA (FAS A Renault), with 
about 20,000 employees, was Spain's largest automotive com- 
pany, as measured by revenues. SEAT — at one time a Spanish 
firm, but, since the mid-1980s, owned by Volkswagen — ranked 



177 



Spain: A Country Study 

second, followed by Ford Espana, General Motors Espana, and 
Citroen Hispania. During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, both 
Ford and General Motors became major domestic automobile 
manufacturers. Other foreign firms involved in the motor vehicle 
industry included Peugeot, Mercedes Benz, Land Rover, and 
Japanese firms such as Nissan, Suzuki, and Yamaha. 

In the late 1980s, Japanese investors sought to use Spain as a 
bridgehead to penetrate the West European market and to follow 
the example of Ford Espana and General Motors Espana, which 
exported about 75 percent of their output. Not all firms worked 
from this premise, however. Renault and Peugeot-Talbot began 
operations with the intention of catering to a highly protected Span- 
ish home market. 

The reviving economy of the second half of the 1980s was reflect- 
ed by a strong growth in domestic demand, including that for con- 
sumer durables. Sales of new cars rose from 629,000 units in 1985 
to 860,875 in 1987, an increase of about 37 percent. In accordance 
with the EC accession agreement, automobile imports were enter- 
ing Spain in increasing numbers, and they were securing a large 
share of the market. In 1987 approximately 211,000 foreign-made 
cars were sold in Spain, an increase of 101 percent over 1986; 
imported automobiles increased their market share from 16 per- 
cent in 1986 to 25 percent in 1987. 

Despite this increase in the sale of foreign cars, Spain's motor 
vehicle industry remained strong. Investments had been made in 
industrial robots in order to enhance productivity, and in the late 
1980s labor costs were highly competitive with those of foreign 
producers. In late 1988, the Economist reported that a Spanish auto 
worker earned about half as much as his West German counter- 
part. Observers regarded Spain as well positioned to emerge as 
the EC's market leader in small car production. 

Shipbuilding 

During the economic expansion of the 1960s and the early 1970s, 
Spain became one of the world's leaders in shipbuilding, ranking 
third in 1974. Its shipbuilding industry was one of the few major 
industries in the country that made no use of foreign capital. Ship- 
building, both in Spain and among other shipbuilding nations, was 
however, one of the main casualties of the post- 1974 energy crisis; 
following a sharp drop in orders in the late 1970s, the shipbuild- 
ing sector was in serious difficulty. Among Spain's leading indus- 
tries, it was one of those most affected by production cutbacks, 
closings, and reductions in personnel. The number of shipbuilding 



178 



The Economy 



yards able to build steel-hulled vessels declined from forty-three 
in 1975 to thirty, ten years later. 

In the mid-1980s, more than half Spain's shipbuilding capacity 
was located in Cadiz; other major shipyards in the south were at 
Seville (Spanish, Sevilla) and Cartagena. In the north, important 
shipyards were located at El Ferrol del Caudillo and in the province 
of Vizcaya. The shipbuilding industry was dominated by two state- 
owned firms, both belonging to the INI group, and in 1986 each 
had about 12,000 employees. One company, Empresa Nacional 
Bazan de Construcciones Navales Militares (generally referred to 
as Bazan), constructed military vessels. The other, Astilleros Espa- 
noles, SA (AESA), constructed civilian ships. The next three largest 
firms employed a total of 4,000 persons. 

After years of decline and heavy losses, in 1987 the Spanish ship- 
building industry turned the corner, showing strong gains in the 
construction of vessels from small- to medium-size. In 1987 deliv- 
eries totaled 340,000 compensated gross registered tons, 90,000 tons 
more than in 1985 or 1986. Solid increases in foreign orders were 
exceeded by domestic demand. Rigorous restructuring measures 
undertaken in the 1980s were believed to have prepared the indus- 
try for the upsurge in orders on the world market that was expected 
in the early 1990s. 

Chemical Industry 

Since the 1970s, the chemical industry had been one of Spain's 
largest, and it continued to grow in the 1980s. By the mid-1980s, 
it accounted for about 7 percent of the Spanish work force and 
8 percent of the country's total industrial production. With its share 
of exports at about 10 percent of the national total, it was the third- 
largest export industry. In 1985 chemical exports stood at US$1 .8 
billion, increasing by a further 16 percent in 1986. The Spanish 
chemical industry had received a substantial amount of foreign 
investment capital and new technology, and in 1987 about 30 per- 
cent of its output came from foreign-owned companies. Although 
many of its raw materials, including those for petrochemical produc- 
tion, had to be imported, the industry benefited from Spain's 
deposits of pyrites, potash, and mercury. The largest components 
of the chemical industry were those producing plastics, petrochemi- 
cals, pharmaceuticals, rubber manufactures, fertilizers, paints, and 
dyes. All of these areas registered substantial gains in the 1980s. 

As part of its policy of merging Spanish firms into larger entities 
better able to compete with foreign companies, the government 
prodded the country's largest chemical firm, Rio Tinto Explosives, 
to merge with the second-largest such enterprise, Cros, in 1988. 



179 



Spain: A Country Study 



By the time the merger occurred, sizable portions of both compa- 
nies were controlled by the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO), which 
managed both public and private Kuwaiti funds. The fertilizer inter- 
ests of the two companies were combined to form a new company, 
Fosforico Espanol, and Rio Tinto ceded its considerable defense 
interests. 

Textiles and Footwear 

Since the early nineteenth century, the Spanish textile industry 
has been concentrated in Catalonia. Though an established indus- 
try, it lacked the dynamism of many of the newer industries and 
had the least impressive growth rate among Spain's manufactur- 
ing industries. It was an industry that suffered from excessive frag- 
mentation, and, although, its operations were export-based, it 
depended on a protected domestic market. Spain's entry into the 
EC removed tariff barriers to textile imports, and the industry 
generally found itself in difficulty. Foreign investors showed little 
interest in the Spanish textile industry, and in the late 1980s it was 
being subjected to extensive industrial modernization for greater 
efficiency. 

The Spanish shoe-manufacturing industry was concentrated 
chiefly in the Valencia area and in the Balearic Islands. Accord- 
ing to a Spanish government study, 90 percent of the country's 
2, 100 shoe factories had fewer than 50 employees, and a large part 
of the industry operated in the underground economy. 

Construction 

The rise and fall of Spanish construction activity tended to parallel 
the ebb and flow of the general economy. During the 1960s and 
the 1970s, a genuine boom occurred in construction, but it was 
more a reflection of the strong increase in tourism than a response 
to housing needs that had been created by industrial and urban 
growth. Extensive demand for hotels, apartment buildings, vaca- 
tion housing, and amenities in tourist centers absorbed the atten- 
tion of much of the construction industry. 

During the 1974 to 1984 period, the construction industry, like 
the rest of the economy, was in the doldrums. The year 1985 was 
an especially poor one for construction, but, as the pace of economic 
activity increased in 1986, there was also a notable acceleration 
in construction. Cement consumption increased by 10.2 percent, 
compared with 1985; new private-sector housing starts increased 
by 10 percent; and construction expenditures rose by 5 percent. 
The construction boom was even stronger in 1987, when the indus- 
try registered an increase of 10 percent, the highest rate of growth 



180 



The Economy 



in all Spanish industries. In the same year, the construction sector 
came to represent 7 percent of the country's GDP. Strong indus- 
trial expansion continued throughout 1988, and much of Spain's 
new construction was concentrated on urban offices, private hous- 
ing, and tourist facilities. 

Employment has increased in all of Spain's nonagricultural sec- 
tors, but the construction industry showed the greatest relative 
increase — 11.2 percent — as a result of the 88,100 new jobs it created 
in 1986. By comparison, there had been only 7,300 new construc- 
tion jobs in 1985, and there had been a decrease of 110,400 jobs 
in 1984. In the late 1980s, overall construction employment ac- 
counted for approximately one-third of the industrial work force. 
Despite the boom, however, the sector still operated at a level con- 
siderably below its capacity in the late 1980s, and the unemploy- 
ment rate among Spanish construction workers was as high as 
30 percent. 

Mining 

Though Spain's mining sector, including the coal-mining indus- 
try, employed only 80,000 persons and was responsible for only 
about 1 percent of the country's GDP in the late 1980s, Spain was 
an important producer of minerals. It was one of the world's lead- 
ing producers of slate and strontium. It ranked second in the produc- 
tion of granite and marble; third, in pyrites and natural sodium 
sulfate; sixth, in fluorspar; seventh, in kyanite and other refractory 
minerals; eighth, in magnesite and potash; ninth, in tantalite; and 
tenth, in anthracite, asphalt, and bentonite. 

Spanish mineral production was of particular significance to the 
EC because Spain was its sole producer of mercury, natural sodium 
sulfate, and tantalite. Moreover, Spain mined approximately 9 per- 
cent of all EC copper, 86 percent of its antimony, 65 percent of 
its gold and pyrite, 47 percent of its silver, 41 percent of its lead 
and magnesite, 38 percent of its iron ore and tungsten, and 28 per- 
cent of its fluorspar and zinc. In addition to mining, Spain was 
an important processor of raw minerals, both those produced 
domestically and those imported from abroad. Although Spain was 
the most self-sufficient member of the EC with regard to minerals, 
imports were needed to meet about 30 percent of its needs. 

In the mid-1980s, Spain's mining industry suffered from the 
depressed state of the world minerals market, and the production 
of most substances had declined. The drop in the value of the dol- 
lar, the dominant currency in the mineral trade, further reduced 
the sector's profits, which had already been damaged by declining 
sales. Spanish production of copper, tin, and wolfram all declined 



181 



Spain: A Country Study 

by more than 75 percent in 1987 (see table 9, Appendix). The 
production of iron, pyrites, and fluorspar also dropped significantly 
in the same year. Zinc, potassium salts, uranium, and lead produc- 
tion remained steady during this period, however. 

Energy 

Spain is poor in energy resources, with the exception of coal. 
Rapid industrial growth has intensified the problems caused by 
insufficient oil reserves, dwindling supplies of easily accessible high- 
quality coal, and inadequate water for power generation. Until the 
early 1980s, Spain increasingly depended upon imported petroleum, 
and overall energy consumption continued to grow in the 1973-79 
period. Following adjustment to a slower rate of economic growth 
and to the changed energy market of the 1970s, Spanish energy 
consumption declined in the early 1980s. 

The National Energy Plan (Plan Energetico Nacional — PEN), 
the basic statement of official energy policy, was first formulated 
in 1978. Revised in 1983 to cover the 1984-93 period, the new 
PEN aimed at a rationalization of energy consumption and a reduc- 
tion in Spain's dependence on imported energy. It pressed, in addi- 
tion, for a reorganization of the oil industry and for a financial 
reorganization of the electricity industry. In contrast to the 1978-87 
plan, it reduced the role of nuclear energy. 

Petroleum 

Although oil continued to be Spain's major source of energy, 
it had diminished in importance significantly since 1973. Oil con- 
sumption grew steadily between 1973 and 1979, reaching 50 mil- 
lion tons in that last year, but by 1985 it had declined to 39 million 
tons. Oil accounted for two-thirds of the country's primary energy 
requirements throughout the 1970s, but by the mid-1980s the figure 
had dropped to just over half. In 1985 alone, Spanish industry saved 
40 billion pesetas (US$260 million) by replacing 500,000 tons of 
oil consumption with coal and natural gas. 

In 1985 Mexico, responsible for 19.7 percent of Spain's petroleum 
imports, was the largest single supplier of Spain's energy needs, 
and in the mid-1980s Latin American countries provided Spain 
with about one-quarter of its imported oil. Africa's share — Nigeria 
being the most important supplier — dropped from 36.5 percent in 
1985 to 29.3 percent in 1987. Middle Eastern countries provided 
27.4 percent in 1985 and 29.6 percent in 1987. Western Europe's 
share rose from 10.6 percent in 1985 to 16.5 percent in 1987. Efforts 
were under way to lessen Spain's dependence on Middle Eastern 
oil and to increase imports from Mexico. 



182 



Vandellos nuclear power plant in Tarragona Province 
Courtesy Embassy of Spain, Washington 

In the 1980s, imported petroleum entered Spain via eight ports. 
The three largest, in terms of vessel capacity, were Algeciras 
(330,000 deadweight tons), Malaga (330,000 tons), and Cartagena 
(260,000 tons). 

Spain possessed a small domestic oil production capability that 
yielded only 1.6 million tons in 1987. Despite a sizable explora- 
tion effort, only a few small fields and two medium- sized ones were 
discovered. The Casablanca oil field, discovered in 1983, yielded 
90 percent of Spain's domestic oil production in 1987, but it was 
not large enough to offset an overall decline in Spanish produc- 
tion. The fall in oil prices in the 1980s further reduced the coun- 
try's exploration efforts. 

The Spanish oil industry imported and refined foreign crude 
petroleum; it distributed petrochemical products within Spain; and, 
in the mid-1980s, it exported about 10 million tons of finished 
petroleum products per year. 

As with some other sectors of the Spanish economy, the domes- 
tic oil industry had been brought under state control. Distribution 
of petroleum products had been in the hands of the state monopoly, 
Compama Arrendataria del Monopolio de Petroleos (CAMPSA), 
since 1927, and large portions of the shipping and refining system 
were state owned. To rationalize the petroleum industry and to 
make it able to withstand foreign competition, the National Institute 



183 



Spain: A Country Study 

for Hydrocarbons (Instituto Nacional de Hidrocarburos — INH) 
was formed in 1981 in order to direct CAMPS A and those parts 
of the oil, gas, and petrochemical industry supervised by INI. By 
the mid-1980s, INH was responsible for more than 1 percent of 
the Spanish GDP, and it claimed 20,000 employees. To prepare 
for Spain's entry into the EC, after which state monopolies were 
required to be phased out, all of INH's holdings, with the excep- 
tion of the state gas company, Empresa Nacional del Gas 
(EN AG AS), were placed under a new holding company in the late 
1980s. The company, Repsol, which had a stock market listing, 
was gradually to allow a greater role for private capital in the petro- 
leum industry. By 1988 Repsol had become Western Europe's 
seventh largest petroleum company, and its management planned 
to continue to control about half of the Spanish market once that 
market was fully opened to foreign firms in 1992. EC member- 
ship rendered CAMPSA's future uncertain, for it would no longer 
be allowed its distribution monopoly. The Treaty of Accession that 
brought Spain into the EC stipulated that specific amounts of nine 
groups of petroleum products from foreign suppliers would have 
access to the Spanish market. In 1986 these products were to have 
a 5 percent share of the domestic market — a share that was to 
increase by 20 percent (of this 5 percent) each year thereafter. 

Coal 

Spain's coal reserves are found primarily in Asturias, with smaller 
deposits located near southwestern Seville (Spanish, Sevilla), 
Cordoba, and Badajoz, and in northeastern Catalonia and Aragon 
(Spanish, Aragon). Most of the country's lignite is located in 
Galicia. Domestic coal is generally of poor quality, and, because 
of the structure of Spanish deposits, it is more expensive than 
imported coal. In 1967 HUNOSA, a state holding company under 
the control of INI, was founded to direct most of Spain's coal min- 
ing, and it gradually took over the larger coal companies. 

Higher oil prices have spurred domestic coal production. Annual 
production in the early 1970s amounted to about 10 million tons 
of coal and 3 million tons of lignite. By the mid-1980s, the indus- 
try produced 15 million tons of coal and 23 million tons of lignite 
annually. This higher rate of production was insufficient to meet 
domestic needs because coal had come to supply about 25 percent 
of Spain's needed energy, compared with about 16 percent in the 
early 1970s. About 5 million tons of foreign coal were imported 
per annum. 

Over the years, there had been little change in patterns of coal 
consumption. Hard coal, used mainly for the generation of electricity, 



184 



The Economy 



accounted for 65 percent of total demand. The steel and cement 
industries were the two next-largest consumers. 

In line with the energy rationalization policies set by PEN, the 
government sought to increase the efficiency of the coal-mining 
sector by closing down high-cost mines and by providing financial 
aid for the industry's modernization. To encourage the cement and 
other industries to convert from oil to coal, the government allowed 
them to import duty-free coal. The government also made efforts 
to substitute the use of oil for coal in urban areas. 

Natural Gas 

In order to reduce Spain's dependence on imported oil, PEN 
encouraged natural gas consumption. Efforts to redirect the use 
of fuels were successful, and in the 1980s the consumption of natural 
gas increased faster than that of any other fuel. Total natural gas 
demand doubled between 1973 and 1984, and in 1987 it accounted 
for 3.85 percent of all energy consumption. Energy planners hoped 
to increase this share to 7 percent by 1992. 

Domestic production of natural gas began in 1984 with the 
development of the Serrablo field; two years later, the Gaviota field 
went into operation. In 1987 domestic production supplied about 
one-sixth of Spain's natural gas consumption, and observers antici- 
pated that its share might rise to as much as one-third by 1990. 
Domestic production shortfalls were taken up by imports from 
Algeria and Libya under long-term contracts. In 1988 it was agreed 
that Spain's gradually expanding gas pipeline network would be 
connected to the European network, and Norwegian gas was sched- 
uled to begin arriving in Spain in 1992. 

Electricity 

Although Spain's mountainous terrain would appear to be well- 
suited to hydroelectric power production, the scarcity of water 
limited such potential and was the principal reason for Spain's heavy 
dependence on thermal power. In 1986 only 27.2 percent of the 
country's electricity came from hydroelectric plants, while 50.6 per- 
cent came from conventional thermal plants, and 22.2 percent came 
from nuclear plants. The most important fuel for the production 
of electricity was coal, which generated about 40 percent of the total. 
In 1987 the production of electricity amounted to 132,000 million 
kilowatt hours — about six times the amount produced in 1960 and 
twice the production level of 1970. The total installed capacity of 
the predominantly privately owned electrical system was about 



185 



Spain: A Country Study 

40 gigawatts — an amount large enough to meet the country's needs 
and to allow some exports. In the second half of the 1980s, the 
growth of the demand for electric power was less than anticipated, 
and Spain had a supply adequate to last until the mid-1990s. The 
Spanish level of per capita electric power consumption was among 
the lowest in Western Europe, surpassing only those of Greece and 
Portugal. 

A key element in the future of Spain's electric power industry 
was the role to be assigned to nuclear power. Nuclear power was 
an important factor because of scarce petroleum reserves, the limited 
potential for hydroelectric power production, and the presence of 
significant uranium deposits. The first PEN, drawn up in 1978, 
emphasized the role that nuclear power would play in meeting the 
nation's ever- increasing need for electricity. The revised PEN of 
1984 postponed the opening of the Lemoniz Nuclear Power Plant 
for political reasons, and it continued the mothballing of three other 
nuclear plants. The government decided, nonetheless, that if the 
demand for electricity increased by more than 3 percent, work on 
one of the plants might be restarted. The new PEN also empha- 
sized the benefits of increased natural gas consumption. 

Services 
Banking 

By the late 1980s, the Spanish banking system had been under- 
going sweeping changes for some time. Its structure was largely 
a throwback to the post-Civil War period of the Franco era, when 
Spanish private banks played a leading role in financing the develop- 
ment of industry. As financial backers of the Nationalist cause, they 
had won Franco's confidence and gratitude, and they were given 
a relatively free hand during the reconstruction period. With the 
adoption of an economic policy that emphasized self-sufficiency and 
barred foreign investment capital and banking competition, their 
role was strengthened. It has been estimated that, by 1965, the 
five leading private banks controlled over 50 percent of Spain's 
capital. Their influence extended not only to the private sector, 
but also to such autonomous institutions as INI and the state rail- 
roads. Subsequently, as industry grew stronger, many of the banks' 
equity holdings were sold to the public through stock exchanges. 
The banks, however, continued to play a vital role in providing 
new funds for industry. 

Supervision of all Spanish financial institutions rested with the 
Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Commerce. Subordinate to 
this ministry, and responsible for overseeing the country's banking 



186 



The Economy 

system, was the country's central bank, the Bank of Spain. Formed 
in 1847, and granted the sole right to issue currency in 1874, the 
bank was nationalized by the Bank Reform Law of 1962. In addi- 
tion to supervising the rest of the banking system and setting reserve 
requirements, it carried out the government's monetary policy 
through open market operations, and it oversaw foreign exchange 
along with the Directorate General for Foreign Transactions. In 
1977 the Bank of Spain had helped set up the Deposit Guarantee 
Fund, which protected deposits in troubled banking institutions. 

Of the three main groups of banks in the Spanish banking 
system — private banks, savings banks, and official credit institu- 
tions — private banks were the most important. In 1962 private 
banks were divided into commercial banks and industrial banks. 
The latter had the right to invest a higher proportion of their 
resources in equity holdings than the former, and they specialized 
in industrial investments. Commercial banks, which were larger 
and more numerous, served the general public; they were the prin- 
cipal source of short-term credit for the private sector, though they 
also competed for long-term loans. By the late 1980s, the distinc- 
tion between the two kinds of banks had lost much of its meaning, 
for each had gradually been allowed to operate in the other's area 
of specialization. 

Although in the second half of the 1980s Spain had about 100 
private banks — a quarter of which were industrial banks — the field 
had long been dominated the Big Seven, seven large commercial 
institutions: Banco Espanol de Credito, or, as it was more com- 
monly known, Banesto; Banco Central; Banco de Bilbao; Banco 
Popular Espanol; Banco de Santander; Banco de Vizcaya; and 
Banco Hispano Americano. By the 1980s, these banks had direct 
or indirect control of approximately 80 percent of the country's 
banking resources. 

The leading banks controlled huge industrial portfolios, by far 
the largest in Spain. The market value of these holdings was not 
known, but analysts estimated that Banesto possessed about 
US$3 billion, and Banco Central, about US$1 billion. These large 
Spanish banks were present in virtually every area of finance. 
Beyond their industrial holdings, they also possessed extensive retail 
networks. Because Spain did not have an adequate pension fund 
system, many Spaniards invested their savings in order to provide 
for their retirement. Consequently, there were 5 million retail 
investors among Spain's 39 million people, the highest proportion 
in Europe. 

Banking can be said to be the last redoubt of Francoist economic 
autarchy. Banks had grown during the Franco period by borrowing 



187 



Spain: A Country Study 

cheaply from their customers and then selling their services at huge 
margins. During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, when a num- 
ber of banks found themselves in serious difficulties, the govern- 
ment, for the first time, permitted their purchase by foreign banks. 
When it became clear that the more sophisticated foreign banks 
were rapidly making inroads into the traditional preserves of the 
large Spanish banks, however, the government closed the door to 
their further influx. Foreign banks were no longer to be allowed 
entry into Spain before the 1992 deadline set by the EC integra- 
tion agreement, so that the Spanish banking system would have 
the maximum amount of time to modernize. 

By the second half of the 1980s, Spanish banks were still not inter- 
nationally competitive. The banks tended to be greatly overstaffed, 
and they possessed far too many branches, compared with their 
West European counterparts. Only in Belgium were there more 
branches per capita. In addition, the inadequate investments of 
Spanish banks were compensated for financially by the overpric- 
ing of services for bank clienteles. An EC report of the late 1980s 
indicated that, in order for the costs of financial services in mem- 
ber states to be harmonized, those of the Spanish banking system 
would have to be cut by 34 percent. In comparison, those of French 
banks would have to be reduced by 24 percent, and those of Brit- 
ish banks, by 13 percent. 

The pressure to revamp Spain's banking industry was, there- 
fore, very great. Mergers were undertaken with the government's 
encouragement in order to create large Spanish financial holdings 
that could adequately compete with their European rivals. Although 
an attempted merger of the Banco de Bilbao and Banesto fell 
through in 1987, in early 1988 a successful union took place between 
the Banco de Bilbao and the Banco de Vizcaya. This merger 
resulted in the creation of Western Europe's thirty-second largest 
financial institution, the Banco Bilbao- Vizcaya. In 1988 the planned 
merger of the two largest private banks, Banco Central and Banesto, 
fell through, but analysts expected that, before 1992, the Big Six 
of the Spanish banking industry might, through various mergers, 
become the Big Three or the Big Four. 

The second major group in the banking system consisted of 
savings banks, which predominated in rural areas that could not 
attract branches of the leading private banks. These banks did not 
come under the control of the Bank of Spain until 1971, having 
previously had their own official governing body, the Credit Insti- 
tute for Savings Banks. Heretofore, they had generally accounted 
for about one-quarter of total lending in the private sector. Since 
the late 1970s, savings banks have raised their share of total 



188 



The Economy 



national deposits from 34 percent to 45 percent — a feat that was 
accomplished despite severe restrictions. In the mid-1980s, these 
restrictions were gradually being relaxed. For example, barriers 
that limited their operations to specific areas or regions were lifted 
in June 1988, and by 1992 they were to be free to open up branches 
anywhere in the country. In terms of deposits, the Barcelona-based 
Caja de Pensiones para la Vejez y de Ahorros de Catalufia y 
Baleares, popularly known as La Caixa, was the country's largest 
savings bank. Another large savings bank was La Caja de Madrid. 
After the relevant restrictions were lifted, a large-scale merger 
process commenced among savings banks. This trend appeared 
likely to become a substantial factor in the country's savings banks' 
operations. 

Legally, savings banks were nonprofit institutions, but in reality 
they were quite profitable; in 1987, for example, they were more 
profitable than rival commercial banks. One reason for this was 
that savings banks were self-financed foundations without stock- 
holders. The seventy-seven savings banks operating in the late 1980s 
lent mostly to families and to small and medium-sized businesses. 

The third leg of the Spanish banking industry consisted of offi- 
cial credit institutions, each with a specialized sphere of influence. 
These credit institutions were under the control of the Directorate 
General for State Assets (Direccion General del Patrimonio del 
Estado — DGPE), and they were supervised by the Official Credit 
Institute (Instituto de Credito Oficial — ICO), which received funds 
from the state that were then lent to the credit institutions. The 
largest of these was the Industrial Credit Bank (Banco de Credito 
Industrial), which specialized in general industrial loans. The Mort- 
gage Bank of Spain (Banco Hipotecario de Espana) provided mort- 
gage loans for urban and rural properties. The Agricultural Credit 
Bank (Banco de Credito Agricola) provided credit for agriculture 
and related sectors. Provincial and municipal administrative bodies 
were served by the Local Credit Bank (Banco de Credito Local). 

Also under the ICO, but only partially so, was the Overseas 
Trade Bank (Banco Exterior de Espana), which had been founded 
in 1923 to promote exports. More than half the bank's capital was 
in private hands. In addition to its participation in foreign trade, 
it competed with domestic commercial banks and ranked just below 
the former Big Seven in terms of its size. Like the official credit 
institutes, the Overseas Trade Bank was among those bodies 
belonging to the DGPE. 

Analysts expected the increasing financial liberalization of the 
Spanish banking system to affect the status and the functions 
of the country's public banks. The freeing of funds tied up in 



189 



Spain: A Country Study 

government-required investments would eliminate the "privileged 
circuits" through which funds at low interest rates were normally 
channeled into such investments. In mid- 1988 legislation was being 
prepared that would redefine the role of publicly owned banks by 
converting them into subsidiaries of the ICO and by forcing them 
to finance themselves at market rates. To assist them in adapting 
to these new circumstances, a period of gradual adjustment last- 
ing as long as fifteen years was being considered, during which 
they could continue to depend on financing from the Ministry of 
Economy, Finance, and Commerce. 

Stock Market Exchanges 

Spain's four stock market exchanges, located in Madrid, Barce- 
lona, Bilbao, and Valencia, were also undergoing accelerated 
modernization in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, the country's nearly 
200 powerful exchange and stock market agents (agentes de cambio 
y bolsa) exercised a monopoly on all equity transactions, as they 
had for over a century and a half. These agents, who were required 
to take civil service examinations and to perform bureaucratic func- 
tions, were government employees for all practical purposes, but 
many of them earned as much as US$1 million a year. 

Under the Securities and Market Reform Act of 1988 (Ley de 
Reforma de Mercado de Valores), stock market operators were to 
be attached to brokerage houses, several dozen of which were 
established in 1987 and 1988. These houses either dealt in shares, 
and were known as sociedades de valores (SVs), or they functioned as 
brokers to third parties and were called agendas de valores (AVs). Other 
planned changes in the stock market system included eliminating 
fixed commissions, establishing a strict regulatory body, and creat- 
ing continuous trading and electronic bookkeeping systems. 

Spanish stock markets had traditionally been notoriously under- 
capitalized, and both domestic banks and foreign interests had been 
excluded from their operations. The government's intention was 
to make Spain's stock markets more competitive and to allow them 
a greater role in the country's capital market. Most major trans- 
actions had previously taken place outside the stock exchange, but 
now Spanish banks were to be granted entry to the domestic secu- 
rities market, and foreigners were to be allowed access to it on equal 
terms by 1992. In the interim, the country's stock markets were 
being given several years of breathing space in order to prepare 
for this challenge. 

Transportation and Communications 

Spain's road network covered 320,000 kilometers in 1986. Of 



190 



The Economy 



the total, 2,000 kilometers were superhighways and 20,000 kilom- 
eters were main roads (see fig. 11). Fewer than 2,000 kilometers 
of the network consisted of toll roads. In the 1980s, road transport 
was by far the most important method of moving people and goods. 
In 1983 roads accounted for 90 percent of all interurban passenger 
travel. Railroads accounted for 7 percent, and aviation, for 3 per- 
cent of the total. Internal freight traffic figures were similarly 
weighted toward road transport; the shares of mileage in this cate- 
gory were road, 73 percent; marine, 18 percent; railroad, 7 per- 
cent; and aviation, 2 percent. About 75 percent of the people 
entering or leaving Spain travelled by road, but nearly 90 percent 
of imported or exported goods were transported by sea. 

By the late 1980s, Spain's road system was in need of upgrad- 
ing. The local road network was so extensive, however, that improv- 
ing it was fraught with difficulties. The network of major roads, 
accounting for 80 percent of the country's traffic, was gradually 
being upgraded under a sucession of long-term plans, none of which 
was very successful. The 1984-91 General Highways Plan, directed 
by the Ministry of Public Works and City Planning, envisioned 
the construction of 5,000 kilometers of highways. 

Railroad construction began in the middle of the nineteenth cen- 
tury with the aid of foreign capital. In 1941 the many poorly run 
railroad companies were nationalized and then united through the 
creation of the Spanish National Railroad Network (Red Nacional 
de los Ferrocarriles Espanoles — RENFE). RENFE had its own 
statute. It was not operated by any of the state holding compa- 
nies, but instead was supervised by a board nominated by the 
minister of transportation, tourism, and communications. After 
nationalization, the system continued to experience difficulties, los- 
ing much of its freight and passenger traffic to road transporta- 
tion. An impediment to its use for international traffic was that 
the track gauge of most of the RENFE system differed from that 
of neighboring countries. Traffic in parts of the system was so light 
that in 1984 the government decided to reduce the system by 3,500 
kilometers, and in 1985 it removed 1,000 kilometers from opera- 
tion. As of the mid-1980s, the Spanish state railroad system totalled 
about 13,000 kilometers, half of which were electrified. A major 
thirteen-year renovation program was announced in 1986. 

Spain made little use of inland shipping, but nearly 90 percent 
of all transport in and out of the country was accomplished by sea 
in the early 1980s. At the end of 1987, the Spanish merchant fleet 
consisted of 957 ships of at least 100 gross tons, and it had a total 
gross tonnage of 4.6 million tons. There were, however, an exces- 
sive number of companies engaged in shipping, some of them 



191 



Spain: A Country Study 



Bay of Biscay 

in 

Santander 



Atlantic 
Ocean 



Lisbon 




H — h 



International 
boundary 
National capital 
Populated place 
Road 
Railroad 



Airport 
J, Port 

50 100 Kilometers 

1 ' l' 'l ' I 1 

50 100 



Gibraltar (Br.) 



\Ceuta 
\(Sp.) 



MOROCCO 



Isla de & 
Alboran 

(Sp.) 

Melilfa 



Figure 11. Transportation System, Mid-1980s 



192 



The Economy 




193 



Spain: A Country Study 

owning but a single vessel. In addition, many companies did not 
have the resources to upgrade their ships, and the fleet suffered 
from obsolescence. An indication of the troubles of the Spanish ship- 
ping industry was that the largest shipowner in the country, the 
Industrial Credit Bank, had to attach liens to many of its ships. 

Spain had some 200 ports in the 1980s. The ten largest ports — 
Cartagena, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Bilbao, Barcelona, Gijon, 
Aviles, Puerto de la Luz, Huelva, Valencia, and Seville — accounted 
for 75 percent of all maritime traffic. Since the 1960s, there had 
been a good deal of investment in port facilities, and Spanish ports 
were able to handle all types of shipping. 

In the mid-1980s, Spain had approximately forty airports that 
were open to civil aviation, about half of which could receive inter- 
national flights. Two airlines dominated Spanish commercial 
aviation — Iberia, Lmeas Aereas de Espana (generally known sim- 
ply as Iberia) and Aviacion y Comercio (AVIACO). In addition, 
there were four airlines that offered charter services. During the 
1980s, air transport attracted an increasing share of the traffic previ- 
ously carried by RENFE and by the country's shipping compa- 
nies. Spain's size encouraged the use of aircraft for domestic travel, 
and Iberia and AVIACO had exclusive rights in this area. Demand 
was at times too heavy to be met adequately, and fares were so 
low that domestic operations were not particularly profitable. Iberia 
had experienced grave economic difficulties in its overseas opera- 
tions in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, but business improved 
in the second half of the decade (see National Industrial Institute, 
this ch.). 

The National Telephone Company of Spain (Compama Tele- 
fonica Nacional de Espana — CTNE), popularly known as La 
Telefonica, was established in 1924 as a subsidiary of the American- 
owned International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT). 
The company was granted exclusive monopoly rights for the instal- 
lation of telephone service in 1945, when it was nationalized. 
CTNE's operations were supervised by DGPE, and as of 1984 the 
government had a 31 .5 percent interest in the company. In an effort 
to modernize its telecommunications network, CTNE entered into 
technology agreements with a number of West European, Japanese, 
and United States companies, and it also obtained stock market 
listings in Frankfurt, London, Paris, Tokyo, and New York. In 
addition, CTNE planned to invest 260 billion pesetas — a tremen- 
dous increase over earlier years — with the aim of becoming a guid- 
ing force in Spanish high technology. An indication that there was 
room for the company to grow was that Spain had a mere 369 



194 



The Economy 



telephones per 1 ,000 inhabitants in 1985, a figure that lagged well 
behind most other EC countries. 

The Postal Service, which included the national telegraph sys- 
tem, was operated by the Ministry of Transportation, Tourism, 
and Communications. Its headquarters was in the Palace of Com- 
munications in Madrid. One of the services offered by the Postal 
Service was a network of postal savings banks, which had been 
established in 1916. 

Tourism 

Although historical sites and unique cultural features had always 
made Spain attractive to foreign visitors, the tourist boom that 
began in the mid-1950s was based primarily on the recreational 
assets of the Mediterranean seashore areas. The country had fewer 
than 1 million tourists in 1950, but the number rose steadily, reach- 
ing more than 34 million in 1973 and 50.5 million in 1987 (see 
table 6, Appendix). 

The tourist boom had a significant, and not wholly beneficial, 
impact on the Spanish economy. Though it was a welcome source 
of foreign exchange and created new employment opportunities, it 
also diverted capital investment and construction efforts away from 
more stable economic activities to a sector subject to seasonal fluc- 
tuations, the whims of fashion, and worldwide economic conditions. 

Nonetheless, the importance of tourism to the Spanish economy 
was substantial. Net tourist receipts averaged about 5 percent of 
GDP in the early 1970s, but in 1987 that figure rose to almost 
10 percent, as receipts rose to US$14.7 billion — more than enough 
to cover the country's merchandise trade deficit. On a net basis, 
Spain's tourist revenues were the highest in the world. The United 
States had higher gross revenues, but its tourist expenditures ex- 
ceeded revenues by a considerable margin. 

Spain's 50.5 million foreign visitors in 1987 constituted 12 per- 
cent more than had come in 1986. Most of them came from the 
EC, with France, Portugal, Britain, and West Germany leading 
the way. American tourists accounted for less than 2 percent of 
the total, but they spent more per person than their European coun- 
terparts, making the United States the second source of tourist 
receipts after Britain. Tourism was projected to remain strong in 
1988, with a 5 percent increase in visitors. Tourist sector spokesper- 
sons were more concerned about raising tourist spending, however, 
than with increasing the number of visitors. The average expen- 
diture per foreign visitor increased only 2.4 percent in 1987. 

The most popular resort areas were the Balearic Islands and 
the Mediterranean coastal areas. The Balearic Islands generally 



195 



Spain: A Country Study 

accounted for about 34 percent of the number of nights foreign 
tourists spent in Spain; the Costa Brava and the Costa Dorada, 
stretching from the French border through Barcelona to Tarragona, 
accounted for 22 percent; and the Costa del Sol and Costa de la 
Luz, extending from Almerfa on the southern — or Mediter- 
ranean — coast to Ayamonte on the Atlantic coast at the Portuguese 
border, accounted for 12 percent. The distant Canary Islands 
attracted 13 percent of Spain's foreign guests, and land-locked 
Madrid was host to 8 percent. Cultural festivals were instituted 
in Santander and Madrid in an effort to increase the attractive- 
ness of these cities. The seaside resorts continued to dominate the 
tourist industry, however, despite considerable government effort 
to stimulate interest in visiting historical and cultural sites. 

Although areas on the northern coast facing the Bay of Biscay 
were accessible to the rest of Europe and had good weather in the 
summer, when most Europeans and Americans took their vaca- 
tions, their share of the tourist trade was only about 3 percent. San 
Sebastian was the center of the tourist industry on the Bay of Bis- 
cay, and nearby towns were also popular, but their allure was 
limited by tourist apprehensions over continuing political turbu- 
lence and violence in the Basque region. 

Tourist centers farther to the west, on the Cantabrian coast and 
in Galicia, were not so commercially developed as the better known 
Basque or Mediterranean resorts. Accordingly, their appeal to 
tourists was their traditional Spanish flavor. They also provided 
visitors with less elaborate, but also less expensive, accommodations. 

Like most nations dependent on tourist trade, Spain was con- 
cerned about the underutilization, and sometimes overutilization, 
of facilities that was caused by seasonal variation in weather. These 
variations caused marked differentials in monthly tourist revenues 
and international trade receipts. July and August were the most 
active months; February was the least active. Efforts were made 
to develop winter sports facilities in order to increase the number 
of tourists visiting Spain during the colder months; however, com- 
petition from France, Switzerland, and Austria, where snow con- 
ditions were more reliable, constituted a formidable obstacle to 
success in this area. 

Tourism was recognized, even before World War II, as an impor- 
tant economic activity worthy of government support. A chain of 
official hotels, known as tourist inns (paradores) , was initiated at 
historical sites in the 1920s during the Primo de Rivera regime, 
and it was extended during the postwar years. Tourist promotion 
was a function of the Ministry of Interior until 1951, when the 
Ministry of Information and Tourism was created. In the late 1980s, 



196 




197 



Spain: A Country Study 

the Ministry of Transportation, Tourism, and Communications 
took on this responsibility. The National Tourist Company, a state- 
owned enterprise, was engaged in the construction of hotels and 
tourist complexes. 

Tourist promotion encompassed such routine activities as adver- 
tising and distributing maps, information folders, and lists of accom- 
modations and shops. In addition, tourist offices were maintained 
in major foreign cities in order to encourage, to advise, and to assist 
people planning visits to Spain. Within the country, tourist assis- 
tance was provided by a network of more than seventy local tourist 
information offices found in all major cities and sites of interest. 

Although most tourist accommodations were privately owned 
and operated, there was considerable government supervision of 
the industry. All restaurants and hotels were inspected, classified, 
and controlled by the Ministry of Transportation, Tourism, and 
Communications. Prices for meals and accommodations were con- 
trolled, and establishments catering to tourists were required to 
maintain complaint books which were intended to help the minis- 
try's inspectors identify any shortcomings. In addition, the govern- 
ment operated a number of accommodations. These establishments 
included the above-mentioned paradores, many of which were con- 
verted castles, palaces, or other buildings of historical or cultural 
interest. Government- operated inns (albergues) were maintained on 
highways away from larger cities and towns, and many areas had 
hostels (hosterias), which were government-operated restaurants 
featuring traditional regional dishes. The ministry also maintained 
a number of mountain lodges (refugios). 

Foreign Economic Relations 

Spain has had a long legacy of tariff protectionism and economic 
isolationism, and until the 1960s it remained outside the West 
European and international economic mainstreams. Spain's effort 
in the late 1980s to accelerate its integration into the EC customs 
and economic structures resulted in a drastic accommodation to 
international and West European trading standards. 

When Spain embarked on a period of economic modernization 
in the 1960s, its foreign trade, as a percentage of overall economic 
activity, was below the average for other major West European 
countries. Exports and imports amounted to about 16.5 percent 
of the Spanish GDP in 1960. During the 1960s, Spain's foreign 
trade increased at an annual rate of about 15 percent; in the 1970s, 
it grew at an even higher rate. After the oil price increases of the 
1970s slowed the world economy, Spanish trade expanded less 
rapidly. By 1984, after a period of sluggish growth, foreign trade 



198 



The Economy 



made up about 25 percent of the country's GDP. According to the 
Economist, in 1987 Spanish imports and exports, respectively, 
accounted for 16.8 and 11.7 percent of the nation's GDP. These 
figures indicated an increasing linkage with the world economy, 
but even in the 1980s foreign trade played a smaller role in Spain's 
economy than it did in most other European countries. 

Spain has not had a positive trade balance since 1960, when 
exports of US$725 million exceeded imports by US$4 million. In 
1961 imports were about one-third larger than exports — a quan- 
titative relationship that, for the most part, has held steady ever 
since then, despite enormous increases in Spanish exports. In the 
mid-1980s, Spain's trade deficits ranged from just over US$4 bil- 
lion in 1984 and in 1985 to US$13 billion in 1987, when merchan- 
dise imports amounted to US$49.1 billion, and exports, to US$34.2 
billion. A booming economy with strong domestic demand was 
responsible for a surge of imports in 1987 — an increase of 25 per- 
cent, compared to 1986. 

Spain's chronic trade deficits were often offset by large earnings 
from the tourist industry and by remittances from Spaniards work- 
ing abroad. The revenue from these two sources often allowed 
invisible receipts to exceed the trade deficit, the result being a sur- 
plus in the nation's current account balance. In 1983 Spain's cur- 
rent account balance registered a deficit of US$2.7 billion, but this 
was followed by surpluses during the next four years. In 1985 the 
surplus amounted to US$2.8 billion, and in 1986 it was US$4.2 
billion. The surplus for 1987 was only US$184 million but, as capital 
goods made up much of that year's imports, economists were not 
alarmed. 

Although famous for its production of citrus fruits, olives, and 
wine, about three-quarters of Spain's exports consisted of manufac- 
tured products in the mid-1980s (see table 10, Appendix). In 1986 
and in 1987, manufactured goods made up 74.4 and 72.4 percent 
of the country's exports, respectively, while foodstuffs accounted 
for 16.1 and 17.6 percent, respectively. In these two years, raw 
materials made up about 4 percent of Spain's exports, and fuel 
products, about 6 percent. Merchandise imports generally exceeded 
merchandise exports by about one-third. In the 1980s, manufac- 
tured goods constituted about two-thirds of all imports, fuels as 
much as one-fifth, and other raw materials and foods about one- 
tenth each. 

Trading Partners 

Ever since steps were taken in the 1960s to liberalize Spain's econ- 
omy, its trade with West European countries had steadily expanded. 



199 



Spain: A Country Study 

In 1973 EC countries accounted for 47.8 percent of Spain's exports, 
and they provided 37 percent of its imports. In the early 1980s, 
this ratio had not changed significantly; in 1982 the respective fig- 
ures were 48.6 and 31.8 percent. After Spain's accession to the 
EC, however, the balance shifted radically; in 1987 some 63.8 per- 
cent of Spain's exports went to the EC, while the EC supplied Spain 
with 54.6 percent of its imports (see table 11, Appendix). In 1987 
France was Spain's most important trading customer, taking 18.9 
percent of its merchandise exports; West Germany was the largest 
source of imports, supplying 16.1 percent of the total. The United 
States, which was Spain's single most important trading partner 
in the 1970s, accounted for just over 8 percent of both imports and 
exports in 1987. Increased trade with the EC caused Spain's eco- 
nomic interaction with most of the rest of the world to decline on 
a relative basis. This decline was most marked with regard to the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which 
supplied Spain with 26.8 percent of its imports and received 
5.3 percent of its exports in 1982, compared with 9.5 and 6.5 per- 
cent in 1987. 

Foreign Investment 

Since the late 1950s, foreign investment has played an increas- 
ingly crucial role in Spain's economic modernization. One of the 
first and most significant steps included in the Stabilization Plan 
of 1959 was granting foreigners permission to buy Spanish securi- 
ties. In 1963 this measure was supplemented by allowing foreign- 
ers the right to secure majority interest in Spanish companies, except 
those engaged in fields deemed to have strategic importance. As 
a result of these actions, there was a large influx of foreign capital 
into Spain. 

Spain was attractive to foreign investors not merely because it 
offered opportunities for participating in a rapidly expanding domes- 
tic market, but also because it served as a base for further export 
and trade with EC countries. This was a leading factor in Ford 
Motor Company's 1974 decision to build an assembly plant near 
Valencia, and in General Motors' entry into the Spanish market. 
Japanese companies also intensified their investments and presence 
in Spain with similar goals in mind. Low-cost labor was another 
attraction for foreign investors, though not to the same extent as 
in the 1960s and the 1970s. 

In compliance with the EC accession agreement, rules govern- 
ing foreign investment in Spain were adapted to EC standards in 
1986. The new measures streamlined administrative procedures 
and reduced the number of sectors in which foreign ownership was 



200 



The Economy 



restricted. The requirement for prior authorization of investments 
was replaced by one calling merely for prior notification. Notifica- 
tion had to be given when the investment was for more than 50 per- 
cent of a Spanish enterprise, when it constituted a re-investment 
by foreigners, or when its goal was the establishment of branches 
of foreign companies on Spanish soil. 

The influx of foreign investment was extremely large during the 
1980s, almost tripling between 1982 and 1987. Some of it took the 
form of speculative investment, attracted by high Spanish interest 
rates. More than half of all new foreign investments in Spain 
represented an expansion of previously existing investments; nearly 
one-third were in the chemical industry and in the nonfuel mineral 
processing sector. EC countries became the most important source 
of investment (see table 12, Appendix). The United States, nonethe- 
less, still accounted for about 20 percent of the cumulative foreign 
investment total. It was expected that, if negotiations being con- 
ducted in 1988 for a United States-Spain treaty to avoid double 
taxation were successful, United States investment might increase. 

Spanish direct investment abroad, for which regulatory restric- 
tions were liberalized in 1986, doubled to 101 billion pesetas in 
1987. EC countries accounted for 64 percent of the total, with the 
Netherlands, West Germany, and Portugal being the largest 
recipients. Investments in the United States fell to 8 percent of the 
total. Spanish investments in Latin America, especially in Mexico 
and in Argentina, declined sharply because of heavy debt burdens 
in that region. By the late 1980s, analysts estimated that Latin 
America accounted for only 4 percent of Spain's foreign invest- 
ments. 

Spain and the European Community 

The year 1992 promised to be one of the most momentous for 
Spain in the twentieth century. The Summer Games of the XXVth 
Olympiad were to be held in Barcelona; the five hundredth anni- 
versary of the discovery of the New World was to be celebrated 
in Seville, with an ambitious international exposition known as Expo 
92; and Madrid had been designated as Europe's cultural capital 
for that year. Moreover, 1992 would mark the culmination of a 
forced march to modernize the country's economic, social, and 
financial institutions, because Spain would be fully exposed to the 
bracing winds of unfettered economic competition from the mem- 
bers of the EC. By the end of 1992, the EC's plan to eliminate 
barriers to trade, employment, and the flow of capital across the 
twelve member states' borders was to take effect. 



201 



Spain: A Country Study 



Spain's long adherence to protectionism had been a major fac- 
tor in its technological and economic backwardness. The Socialist 
government's commitment to economic modernization and to 
Spain's integration into the European economic mainstream thus 
represented a historic landmark. The end of authoritarian rule in 
1975 led Spain to embrace a system of political democracy, but 
changes in the economic sphere proved more difficult. In the 1980s, 
true economic modernization was only beginning, as the Gonzalez 
government cast Spain's national goals in terms of increasing its 
competitiveness, both within Europe and around the world. 

The Spanish economy had long functioned on a two-tiered basis. 
One part — including most notably the automobile manufacturing 
and chemical industries — was technologically advanced. An even 
larger part was accustomed to operating inefficiendy, protected from 
outside competition and highly fragmented into a host of small and 
medium- sized enterprises that accounted for as much as 90 percent 
of Spain's commerce and industry. It was in this second economic 
area that the brunt of accelerated change was being felt in the second 
half of the 1980s, as many small, inefficient concerns faced the effects 
of free market competition. 

Spain had been trying to join, or to align itself with, the EC since 
1962. The barriers to Spanish membership were primarily politi- 
cal, and they reflected varying degrees of European hostility to the 
Franco government rather than fear of economic competition. 
Among the members of the EC, only Italy and France, with simi- 
lar agricultural export commodities, had substantial economic 
motives for opposing Spain's entry into the EC. 

After long negotiations, which began in 1962, Spain and the EC 
signed a preferential trade agreement in June 1970. The agree- 
ment called for mutual tariff reductions, ranging from 25 to 60 per- 
cent, to be applied gradually over a six-year period. Quantitative 
restrictions for a number of items were eased under a special quota 
system. 

At the end of the Franco era, little attention was given to Spain's 
urgent economic problems. Spaniards and their post-Francoist 
governments tended to regard membership in the EC as a sym- 
bolic political act that obtained recognition for Spain's return to 
democracy, rather than as a portentous economic policy decision 
irretrievably linking Spain's economic future with that of Europe. 
The result was that, although Spain had applied for membership 
nearly a quarter of a century earlier, little national debate took place 
prior to the signing of the 1985 accession agreement, which was 
concluded only after arduous negotiations. 



202 



The Economy 



The accession agreement called for gradual integration to be car- 
ried out over a seven-year period, beginning on January 1, 1986. 
This adjustment transition involved a number of significant fea- 
tures. Customs duties were to be phased out as of March 1, 1988, 
and industrial tariffs on EC goods were to be phased out on a 
reciprocal basis until January 1, 1993. Additional import levies, 
most notably Spain's tax rebate on exports, were to disappear upon 
its entry into the EC. With some exceptions, import quotas were 
to be removed immediately. Quotas on color television sets and 
tractors were to be eliminated by the end of 1988, and those for 
chemicals and textiles, by the close of 1989. 

In principle, EC -based companies were free to invest in Spain. 
National assistance programs for industrial projects were subject 
to strict EC regulations, but special allowances were made for the 
steel industry, and Spain was allowed to keep its 60 percent local 
content rule for automobile manufacturing until the end of 1989. 
Spain became subject to EC antitrust rules immediately, however. 

Spain was obliged to adhere to EC product and consumer pro- 
tection standards at once. Like other EC members, Spain was 
required to levy a value-added tax (VAT — see Glossary), which 
was the EC's principal source of revenue. Spanish workers were 
to be able to circulate freely and seek employment in the EC by 
1993. 

Phased alignment with the EC's Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) was to be completed only in 1996. The Spanish widely 
regarded this as a discriminatory action taken by EC countries to 
prevent imports of Spanish tomatoes, olive oil, and wines until as 
late a date as possible. Spain's fishing industry, the largest in 
Western Europe, received the right to fish in most EC waters, but 
its catch was sharply restricted until 1995. 

Despite a favorable attitude toward the establishment of an even- 
tual EC -wide monetary union in the late 1980s, the government 
was reluctant to commit the peseta to stabilization within the Euro- 
pean Monetary System (EMS) because of its over-valued exchange 
rate. In mid- 1988 the Bank of Spain took what was regarded as a 
symbolic step toward full membership in the EMS by formally 
accepting the 1979 Basel agreement. By the terms of the agreement, 
EC central banks made 20 percent of their gold and foreign cur- 
rency reserves available to the European Monetary Cooperation 
Fund, against the equivalent in European Currency Units (ECUs — 
see Glossary). The subject of the peseta's inclusion in the ECUs, 
in all likelihood a prerequisite of Spain's full participation in the 
EMS's exchange-rate system, was to be taken up in September 1989, 
when the composition of the next ECU would be determined. 



203 



Spain: A Country Study 

The Spanish government sought special treatment for the peseta, 
the exchange rate of which was considered inflated. Such an 
arrangement would permit relatively wide margins of fluctuation 
similar to those enjoyed by the Italian lira. The International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) urged Spain's early membership 
in the EMS, and the pressure to reach a decision on this EMS ques- 
tion was bound to increase when Spain assumed the EC presidency 
during the first half of 1989. 

In the late 1980s, some of the more painful aspects of Spain's 
integration into the EC were cushioned by the country's expansion- 
ary economic boom, the continuing fall in oil prices, a sharp reduc- 
tion in the exchange value of the United States dollar, and the 
massive inflow of foreign investment, as numerous foreign multina- 
tional companies endeavored to participate in Spain's expanding 
consumer market. Observers expected that Spain's industrial enter- 
prises, especially the more inefficient and backward ones, would be 
absorbed by more modern domestic and foreign entrepreneurs or 
would cease operations. Over the long term, however, the Spanish 
economy was expected to resemble that of its more advanced EC 
counterparts much more closely by the year 2000 than it had in the 
past. 

* * * 

Although there is a growing literature in Spanish and in English 
on the Spanish economy during the Franco regime (1939-75), there 
is littie available in English on the post-Franco period, with the nota- 
ble exception of Ramon Tamames's classic and encyclopedic The 
Spanish Economy. Among the more useful books on the Franco period, 
in English, are Joseph Harrison's The Spanish Economy in the Twen- 
tieth Century and Stanley Payne's The Franco Regime, 1936-1975. For 
information and analysis of industrial, financial, and economic devel- 
opments in more recent years, readers should consult the annual 
country surveys of the OECD and the quarterly Country Report: Spain 
and the annual Country Profile: Spain, both published by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit. The annual reports of the Bank of Spain also are 
particularly useful. Current statistical data can be found in the Anuario 
Estadistica, a yearbook issued by the Spanish government's statistics 
bureau, the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. For up-to-date informa- 
tion on government and private- sector economic activities, London's 
Financial Times and the Economist provide some of the most compre- 
hensive coverage and also publish survey supplements on various 
aspects of Spanish economic and financial activities. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



204 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



^4§>.fAt»f-- ' . _____ 





Political discussion 



SPAIN'S TRANSFORMATION from a rigid, authoritarian, 
highly centralized regime into a pluralistic, liberal parliamentary 
democracy with considerable regional autonomy stands as one of 
the more remarkable political developments of the twentieth 
century. That this was accomplished without civil war or revolu- 
tionary upheaval and in the midst of unfavorable economic circum- 
stances is all the more extraordinary. Despite decades of living under 
a repressive dictatorship, most Spanish citizens adapted readily to 
the new democratic system, and they turned out in large numbers 
for referenda and elections. 

The institutions established under the new democratic regime 
were based on the principles of modernization and decentraliza- 
tion. The 1978 Constitution, which enjoyed massive popular sup- 
port, established Spain as a democratic state ruled by law. Spain's 
form of government is that of a parliamentary monarchy, with 
political power centered in the bicameral Cortes (Spanish Parlia- 
ment). 

One of the most striking features of Spain's new governmental 
system is the devolution of power and responsibility to the regions. 
Regional differences had been the source of long-standing tensions 
between the center and the periphery in Spain. The 1978 Consti- 
tution addresses these conflicts by providing for an unprecedented 
degree of regional autonomy, although not all Spaniards have been 
satisfied with the pace of the devolution process. At the same time, 
the relationships between the more powerful autonomous regions 
and the central government remain complicated by the deliberately 
ambiguous terms of the Constitution. 

The dismantling of the dictatorship of Francisco Franco y Baha- 
monde (dictator of Spain, 1939-75) and the establishment of 
democratic political institutions did not immediately permeate all 
levels of society. Reactionary elements within the army remained 
opposed to democracy, and rumors of coup plots were a persistent 
feature of the early years of democratic rule, although they subse- 
quently subsided as the government stabilized. The civil service 
also resisted transformation, remaining almost as inefficient and 
cumbersome as it was under Franco. 

Although Spanish citizens had minimal experience with politi- 
cal involvement prior to the advent of participatory democracy, 
they took to it enthusiastically, and, after a shaky beginning, a viable 
party system developed. The stability of this party system was 



207 



Spain: A Country Study 

evidenced by the declining support for extremist parties and by 
the peaceful transfer of power from a conservative coalition to the 
long-outlawed Socialists in the 1982 elections. In the late 1980s, 
the major challenge to the governing Spanish Socialist Workers' 
Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol — PSOE) came from with- 
in its own ranks, as labor leaders complained that Prime Minister 
Felipe Gonzalez Marquez had forsaken his socialist roots in favor 
of market-oriented policies. 

Spain continued to seek an independent role in the international 
arena, while maintaining a European focus through membership 
in the European Community (EC — see Glossary) and, through 
association, on its own terms, with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Other major foreign policy goals continued 
to be the re-establishment of Spanish sovereignty in Gibraltar, the 
retention of the North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, and 
an influential role for Spain in Latin America. In 1987 Spain 
expressed a latent anti- Americanism, prevalent in the country since 
the 1898 Spanish-American War, when the government delayed 
renewal of the long-standing agreement for United States use of 
military bases in Spain in exchange for military and economic 
assistance. 

One difficult problem facing the government in the 1980s was 
the ongoing menace of Basque terrorism, as militant separatists 
continued to perpetrate assassinations and bombings in spite of 
vigorous antiterrorist measures. A more far-reaching challenge lay 
in the economic realm. Workers were becoming increasingly dis- 
satisfied with their diminished earnings and with the government's 
failure to deal with the unemployment problem. 

The political changes since 1975 have been dramatic and pro- 
found. Spain has benefited from the shrewd leadership of its king 
and its prime ministers, who successfully presided over the transi- 
tion to democracy and its consolidation. Nevertheless, Spanish 
leadership confronted the challenge of sustaining social stability in 
the face of economic and regional pressures. 

Constitutional System 

The 1978 Constitution dismantled the political system of the 
Franco regime and established Spain as a democratic state ruled 
by law. The writing of the Constitution was a long and arduous 
task, involving extensive negotiations and compromise. Spain has 
a history of failed constitutions, and the framers of the 1978 Con- 
stitution endeavored to devise a document that would be accept- 
able to all the major political forces. 



208 



Government and Politics 



In July 1977, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs was 
formed, made up of thirty-six deputies from the newly elected 
Cortes. These deputies in turn appointed a seven-member subcom- 
mittee that included members of the major national parties and 
one representative, a Catalan, of the regional parties. This group 
was to produce a draft constitution, which it completed in Decem- 
ber and presented to the full committee. Vigorous debate ensued, 
and by the time the draft was returned to the subcommittee for 
final revision in January 1978, individual Cortes deputies and party 
caucuses had proposed more than 1,000 amendments. 

As the seven subcommittee members attempted to address the 
issues raised by these amendments, consensus began to break down 
over provisions concerning the Roman Catholic Church, educa- 
tion, labor lockouts, and the regional issue. The PSOE delegate 
withdrew from the subcommittee in protest on two occasions, and 
it required delicate diplomatic maneuvering on the part of Prime 
Minister Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez to surmount the stalemate in the 
constituent process. Compromise agreements were reached by the 
end of May, when the text went back to the full committee. By 
June 20, this committee had completed revisions of the draft docu- 
ment, which was presented for debate in the Congress of Deputies 
(lower chamber of the Cortes) in July, a year after the formation 
of the constitutional committee. 

The text was passed with negligible opposition, although deputies 
of the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco — PNV) 
abstained because of what they termed the inadequate provisions 
for regional autonomy (see Regional Government, this ch.). The 
draft constitution then went to the Senate (upper chamber of the 
Cortes), where it again received more than 1,000 amendments and 
was revised by another constitutional committee. At the end of Sep- 
tember, the full Senate discussed the text and approved it. Because 
there were differences between the version passed by the Senate 
and the one approved by the Congress of Deputies, another com- 
mittee, including both senators and deputies, was required to resolve 
the discrepancies. This group also added the stipulation that the 
prime minister must either call for new elections or seek a vote of 
confidence within thirty days of the promulgation of the new con- 
stitution. 

On October 31 , 1978, both chambers overwhelmingly approved 
the text of the new Constitution, which was presented to the peo- 
ple in a referendum on December 6, 1978. Of the 67.7 percent 
of eligible voters who went to the polls, 87.8 percent accepted the 
new Constitution, which was signed by the king on December 27. 



209 



Spain: A Country Study 



The Constitution that the Spaniards ratified in 1978 is long and 
complicated. In their efforts to avoid dogmatism and to gain 
widespread support, the framers had produced a document that 
was hailed as a triumph for consensus politics, but at the same time 
the new Constitution included ambiguous language and contradic- 
tory provisions, which gave rise to problems of interpretation in 
subsequent months and years. 

The 1978 Constitution 

The Constitution proclaims Spain to be a social and democratic 
state governed by law and declares liberty, justice, equality, and 
political pluralism to be the country's foremost values. National 
sovereignty resides in the people, from whom all powers of the state 
emanate. The new Constitution defines Spain as a parliamentary 
monarchy, with the king as head of state and symbol of its unity 
and permanence. It establishes a bicameral legislature, the Cortes, 
and an independent judicial system (see Government, this ch.). 

The Constitution delineates the role of political parties and 
requires that they adhere to democratic structures and procedures. 
It provides for universal suffrage at the age of eighteen and abol- 
ishes the death penalty, except under military law in time of war. 

The longest section of the Constitution sets forth the basic civil, 
political, and socioeconomic rights of citizens, all of whom are equal 
before the law, regardless of birth, race, sex, or religion. They are 
protected against unlawful arrests, searches, seizures, and other 
invasions of privacy. If accused of a crime, they are presumed inno- 
cent until proven guilty, and they have the right to a legally 
appointed judge, a solicitor, and a public trial without delay. The 
Constitution guarantees the freedoms of religion, assembly, and 
association, and it stipulates that citizens may make individual or 
collective petitions in writing to the government. 

Individual liberties are further strengthened by constitutional pro- 
visions recognizing the right to organize trade unions, to join them 
or to refrain from joining them, and to strike. The Constitution 
links the right to work with the duty to work, and it calls for suffi- 
cient remuneration to meet individual and family needs, without 
discrimination as to sex. It also guarantees adequate pensions for 
the elderly, protection of the handicapped, and decent housing, 
and it ascribes to the state a fundamental role with regard to the 
organization and protection of health care and welfare. 

The Constitution declares that the rights and the liberties 
described therein are binding on all public authorities. A provi- 
sion exists (Article 55) for the suspension of these rights and liber- 
ties, but this can be used only under strictly regulated circumstances. 



210 



Congress of Deputies, Madrid 
Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain 

The Constitution includes significant provisions pertaining to 
the armed forces and to the Roman Catholic Church, two institu- 
tions that have played dominant roles in Spain's political history. 
The framers of the new document sought to reduce the influence 
of these historically powerful institutions, and, at the same time, 
tried not to alienate them to the point that they might become 
sources of opposition. The role of each of these traditional institu- 
tions is clearly defined and is strictly limited in the new Constitu- 
tion. While assigning to the army the role of safeguarding the 
sovereignty and independence of Spain and of defending its ter- 
ritorial integrity and constitutional order, the Constitution empha- 
sizes that ultimate responsibility for Spain's defense rests with its 
popularly elected government, not with the armed forces (see Juris- 
diction Over National Defense, ch. 5). 

The role of the Roman Catholic Church also is reduced in the 
1978 Constitution, which denies Catholicism the status of state 
religion. The provisions of the new Constitution with regard to 
the church are, however, not as stridently secular as those of the 
1931 constitution, which so antagonized the conservative elements 
of Spanish society. The 1978 document guarantees complete reli- 
gious freedom and declares that there will be no state religion, but 
it also affirms that public authorities are to take into account the 
religious beliefs of Spanish society and that they are to maintain 



211 



Spain: A Country Study 



cooperative relations with the Roman Catholic Church and with 
other religions (see Religion, ch. 2). 

Religion was also a factor in the formulation of constitutional 
provisions concerning education. There was considerable con- 
troversy over the issue of providing private schools with public 
funds, because in Spain most private schools are run by the church 
or by the religious orders. The Constitution guarantees freedom 
of education and calls for the government to provide some finan- 
cial assistance to private schools. It further stipulates that children 
in state schools may receive religious teaching, if their parents so 
desire. At the same time, the Constitution gives the government 
the authority to inspect and to license the schools, thus granting 
it some control over the institutions it subsidizes. Conflicts over 
this issue of state control led to the passage in 1984 of the Organic 
Law on the Right to Education (Ley Organica del Derecho a la 
Educacion — LODE), which established three categories of schools 
and set forth conditions to be met by private institutions receiving 
financial aid from the government (see Education, ch. 2). 

Along with constitutional provisions pertaining to education and 
to the church, those dealing with regional issues were sources of 
bitter controversy. Historical tensions between the center and the 
periphery in Spain made it difficult for the framers of the Consti- 
tution to reach agreement on matters of regional autonomy. The 
compromise that they eventually reached was unsatisfactory to 
extremist elements on both sides of the issue, and the terrorist move- 
ment that grew out of this controversy continues to be the major 
threat to Spain's stability (see Political Developments, 1982-88, 
this ch.). 

The new Constitution seeks to recognize, and to respond to, deep- 
seated cultural differences among the existing nationalities by allow- 
ing for substantial regional autonomy, in contrast to the stifling 
centralism imposed by Franco. Although it affirms the indissolu- 
ble unity of the nation, it also grants a greater degree of autonomy 
to Spain's nationalities and regions, which are allowed to use their 
own languages and flags without interference (see Regional Govern- 
ment, this ch.). 

Electoral System 

The electoral system — with the exception of the Senate, which 
uses a majority system — is set forth in the electoral law of 1977, 
updated in 1985, which is based on the d'Hondt system of propor- 
tional representation. A party must obtain a minimum of 3 per- 
cent of the vote in order to qualify for parliamentary representation. 
Each province is to have a minimum of two seats in the Congress 



212 



Government and Politics 



of Deputies, plus one additional seat for every 144,500 inhabitants 
or fraction over 70,000 inhabitants. Each province is allotted four 
seats in the Senate, regardless of population. 

This system tends to overrepresent the more traditional, rural, 
and thinly populated parts of Spain and to favor the larger par- 
ties, which also benefit from the system of postelectoral subsidies. 
Under this arrangement, the state allocates funds to the party of 
each elected candidate. Parties are also given smaller sums for each 
vote received by their candidates, provided that at least one can- 
didate is elected. One of the effects of this system is that parties 
able to demonstrate probable electoral success are able to obtain 
loans to finance their campaigns based on their expected subsidies. 

The electoral law guarantees universal, free, and direct suffrage 
and stipulates that voting shall be by secret ballot. It permits postal 
balloting for those away from their areas of registration. Voting 
is done by party list. Only the names of an individual party and 
its leader appear on ballots, with the exception of those of the Senate, 
for which a multiparty list is used, and voters choose any three 
candidates. Elections are held every four years, although an early 
dissolution of the Cortes will mean early elections for this body. 
Elections in the autonomous communities — except those in the 
"historic regions" of Galicia, Catalonia (Spanish, Catalufia; Cata- 
lan, Catalunya), the Basque Country (Spanish, Pais Vasco; Basque, 
Euskadi), and Andalusia (Spanish, Andalucia), which received their 
autonomy earlier than the other thirteen communities — are held 
simultaneously. 

Government 

According to the 1978 Constitution, political power is centered 
in the bicameral Cortes, and the king exercises largely honorific 
functions as head of state (see fig. 12). Judicial power is vested in 
independent courts. The governmental system outlined in the new 
Constitution, in its emphasis on democratic principles and its pro- 
visions for decentralization, represents a radical transformation in 
the nature of the Spanish state. 

The Cortes 

The Cortes is the most powerful governmental institution of the 
state. It is made up of a lower house, the Congress of Deputies, 
and an upper chamber, the Senate. The Congress of Deputies, the 
stronger of the two bodies, may consist of between 300 and 400 
members — although electoral laws have set the norm at 350 
deputies — elected by proportional representation every four years, 
unless parliament is dissolved earlier by the head of state. The 



213 



Spain: A Country Study 





UJ -J 5 LU 




"IVNO 




SUPF 
COU 
OF Mil 
JUS 



I" 

d o 
5 o 




_J 







CO ! 






LU 
O 


















Lt Q 


I 




Q. LU t 


I— 






TU 




2 LU L 


co 






z 






o 




I CO LU I 


o 

LU 




' LL O 

Otr 


I 




Q LU 






(HEA 
COMMAND 





s 



214 



Government and Politics 



Senate is composed of 208 directly elected members and 49 regional 
representatives, also chosen every four years. 

The preponderance of legislative authority lies with the Congress 
of Deputies. Either house may initiate legislation, but the lower 
house can override a Senate veto by a vote of a simple majority 
of its members. Thus, if a political party has a solid majority in 
the Congress of Deputies, a Senate veto has little effect. The 
predominance of the lower house is also evidenced by the fact that 
the president of the Congress presides when the two chambers are 
meeting jointly. 

The Congress of Deputies also has the power to ratify or to reject 
decree laws adopted by the government, and its authorization is 
required for a declaration of a state of exception and for the exten- 
sion of a state of alarm. It is also the body that is responsible, if 
necessary, for accusing the prime minister or his ministers of trea- 
son or of crimes against the state. The prime minister must receive 
a vote of investiture from the Congress of Deputies before being 
formally sworn into office by the king. A prime minister may request 
a vote of confidence from the Congress of Deputies at any time. 
If he fails to achieve this, both houses of parliament are dissolved, 
and new elections are called. Furthermore, the Congress of Deputies 
has potentially significant power over the executive because it may 
vote the prime minister out of office by adopting a motion of cen- 
sure by absolute majority. 

The primary function of the Senate is territorial representation. 
Its only exclusive power concerns the autonomous communities. 
If a community fails to fulfill its legal and its constitutional obliga- 
tions, or acts contrary to the general interests of Spain, the govern- 
ment, with the approval of an overall majority of the Senate, may 
adopt measures to enforce the community's compliance with its 
obligations. 

Although each chamber of the Cortes carries out certain duties 
separately, many important functions are exercised by both houses, 
in which case they meet as the General Cortes (Cortes Generales). 
In this capacity, they elaborate laws proposed by the government, 
by the Congress of Deputies, by the Senate, by any autonomous 
community, or through popular initiative. They also approve, and 
they may amend, state budgets proposed by the executive. They 
furthermore may direct interpellations and questions to the govern- 
ment and to individual ministers. 

Each chamber of the Cortes meets in separate premises in 
Madrid, and each holds two regular annual sessions — from Sep- 
tember to December and from February to June. They may meet 
in extraordinary session to attend to a specific matter at the request 



215 



Spain: A Country Study 



of the government, or at the request of the absolute majority of 
the members of either chamber. 

All Spaniards "having full use of their political rights" may be 
candidates for election to the Cortes, except for the following: mem- 
bers of the Constitutional Court, high-ranking civil servants, prac- 
ticing judges and public prosecutors, the ombudsman, professional 
military personnel, members of the police and security forces who 
are in active service, and members of electoral commissions. Mem- 
bers of the Cortes may not be members of both chambers at the 
same time, nor may members of the Congress of Deputies have 
a seat in both the Congress and a regional assembly. Senators are 
not barred from occupying a seat in a regional assembly. Mem- 
bers of the Cortes are required to disclose their income and their 
assets following election. They are expected to attend plenary ses- 
sions of the chamber and of the committees on which they serve. 
Senators who consistently fail to attend such meetings are liable 
to incur a financial penalty. 

Along with these obligations, parliamentarians enjoy certain 
rights and privileges. They may not be prosecuted for verbal opin- 
ions expressed in the exercise of their duties. While in office, they 
may be arrested only if caught in the actual act of committing a 
crime. Even in this case, they cannot be charged or prosecuted 
without prior consent of the Cortes. They are guaranteed a fixed 
salary and social security payments, along with allowances for extra 
expenses incurred in the line of duty. Members of the Cortes 
exercise their functions independently, and they are not obliged 
to follow the dictates of their parties' leaderships in casting their 
votes. 

The King, the Prime Minister, and the Council of Ministers 

By defining the state as a parliamentary monarchy, the Consti- 
tution makes it clear that the king is not sovereign and that 
sovereignty resides with the people as expressed in their democrati- 
cally elected parliament. The king is a hereditary and constitutional 
monarch, who serves as head of state. 

The decision to retain the monarchy, which had been restored 
under the Franco regime, represents a historically significant com- 
promise. As the Constitution was being formulated, parties of the 
left were strongly opposed to a monarchy, which they saw as a Fran- 
coist legacy; they favored establishing a republican form of govern- 
ment. At the same time, reactionary elements wanted to preserve 
the monarchy in order to use it as a means to perpetuate Fran- 
coism. In between these two extremes were the reformers, who 



216 




The Royal Palace, Madrid 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress 

thought that the monarchy could serve as an element of stabiliza- 
tion during the transition to democracy. 

A compromise eventually was reached whereby the left-wing par- 
ties accepted the institution of a parliamentary monarchy as reflect- 
ing the will of the majority. Constitutional provisions dealing with 
the king's role were worded in such a way as to make clear the 
neutral and apolitical nature of his duties. The success of this 
arrangement has been largely attributable to King Juan Carlos de 
Borbon's willingness to relinquish the powers that Franco had con- 
ferred upon him and to rule as a constitutional monarch within 
a democratic system of government (see Transition to Democracy, 
ch. 1). 

The crown is hereditary, and the king's eldest son is first in the 
line of succession. (In the case of Juan Carlos, there is only one 
son, Prince Felipe, and there are two daughters.) Whereas Franco's 
fundamental laws forbade a female monarch, the 1978 Constitu- 
tion allows a female to inherit the throne, but only if there are no 
males of the same generation. If all hereditary lines entitled to the 
crown by law become extinct, the succession to the throne is to 
be determined by the General Cortes. 

The king sanctions and promulgates laws that have been worked 
out by the other branches of government. He formally convenes 
and dissolves the Cortes and calls for elections and for referenda. 



217 



Spain: A Country Study 

He appoints the prime minister after consultation with the Cortes 
and names the other ministers, upon the recommendation of the 
prime minister. He also signs decrees made in the Council of 
Ministers and ratifies civil and military appointments. 

Although the king does not have the power to direct foreign 
affairs, he has a vital role as the chief representative of Spain in 
international relations. The potential significance of this role has 
been demonstrated during the reign of Juan Carlos, whose many 
trips abroad and contacts with foreign leaders have enabled the 
Spanish government to establish important political and commer- 
cial ties with other nations. The king also has the duty to indicate 
the state's consent to international treaties and, with the prior 
authorization of the Cortes, to declare war and peace. 

The Constitution confers upon the king the title of supreme com- 
mander of the armed forces, although he has no actual authority 
over them. Nevertheless, Juan Carlos has maintained close rela- 
tions with the military, and he has used his considerable influence 
with them to counteract potential threats to the stability of the 
democratic regime (see Disenchantment with UCD Leadership, 
ch. 1). 

The influence of the king depends largely upon the individual 
who holds the title, because he is granted no independent execu- 
tive powers by the Constitution. Every one of his acts must be coun- 
tersigned by the prime minister or by one of his ministers. In spite 
of these restrictions, the monarchy under Juan Carlos has achieved 
a significant degree of moral authority, largely because of his coura- 
geous and steadfast adherence to democratic procedures. 

If the king has the symbolic role of representing the state, the 
prime minister has the more powerful role of chief of government. 
As the leader of the dominant political party in the Cortes, he bears 
the responsibility and the accountability for his own actions and 
for those of the government. He directs the preparation, promo- 
tion, and execution of the government's program and coordinates 
the functions of the various ministries. The prime minister nomi- 
nates candidates for the king to appoint as his ministers. He also 
has the right to name candidates for civil service positions and to 
select the civil governors in each province as well as the govern- 
ment delegates to the autonomous communities. A reform law 
approved late in 1983 placed the armed forces under the control 
of the prime minister, although the king remained supreme com- 
mander. 

The prime minister may ask for a vote of confidence from the 
Congress of Deputies with regard to his program or policies. He 
may propose the dissolution of the Congress of Deputies, the Senate, 



218 



Government and Politics 



or the Cortes, unless a motion of censure is under consideration. 
The position of his government in the event of such a motion of 
censure is strengthened significantly by the requirement that such 
a motion must contain the name of a candidate to succeed the prime 
minister if the motion is approved. This provision makes it more 
difficult to overthrow the government, because minority parties 
may find it more difficult to agree upon a candidate than to con- 
cur in their opposition to the incumbent. 

When the prime minister is appointed following elections, he 
must present his program to the Congress of Deputies and receive 
a vote of investiture by absolute majority before he can be sworn 
in by the king. If he cannot obtain a vote of confidence for investi- 
ture, a new vote is taken forty-eight hours later, requiring only 
a simple majority. If this procedure fails, the king is to propose 
other candidates until one gains a vote of confidence. Should no 
candidate succeed within two months of the first vote, the king dis- 
solves the Cortes and calls for new elections. 

The prime minister remains in office until such time as he and 
his government lose the support of the Congress of Deputies in 
a vote of confidence, or the Congress of Deputies approves a motion 
of censure. A prime minister also must resign if he and his party 
are defeated in the general elections, in which case he remains in 
office until the new prime minister has been sworn in. When a prime 
minister leaves office for whatever reason, even if it is his own 
choice, his cabinet must resign with him. They nonetheless retain 
their functions in a caretaker capacity until a new government has 
been installed. 

A deputy prime minister assumes the functions of the head of 
government if the prime minister dies, or if he is ill or out of the 
country. The deputy also plays a coordinating role, working closely 
with the prime minister, senior ministers, and high-ranking party 
members. The deputy prime minister may assume other functions, 
at the discretion of the prime minister. 

The prime minister, the deputy prime minister, and the other 
ministers together comprise the Council of Ministers, which func- 
tions as a cabinet, and which is the highest executive institution 
of the state. The Council of Ministers has both policy-making and 
administrative functions, and it is responsible for the implemen- 
tation of government policy. In addition to overseeing the adminis- 
tration of the various ministries, it controls military affairs and is 
responsible for national security and defense. In the exercise of all 
of its functions, it is ultimately accountable to the Cortes. 

Cabinet ministers are each charged with the responsibility of 
administering their individual departments. Although they may 



219 



Spain: A Country Study 

exercise a great deal of discretion and autonomy within their minis- 
tries, they are ultimately responsible to the prime minister. They 
present to the Council of Ministers draft laws that have been pre- 
pared within their departments, and they establish rules to imple- 
ment government policy. They have the power to issue ministerial 
orders without the approval of the Council of Ministers and to sign 
state contracts in matters concerning their ministries. They also 
may resolve administrative conflicts within their departments. 
Ministers are responsible to the Council of Ministers as well as to 
the prime minister for their actions, and they can be called to explain 
their policies before one or both houses of the Cortes, or before 
one of the parliamentary committees. 

The Constitution declares that government ministers may not 
hold any additional public posts not related to their governmental 
office, and it also prohibits them from engaging in professional or 
commercial activity. This provision is aimed at avoiding the cor- 
ruption that prevailed in the Franco era, when senior government 
ministers frequently occupied important positions in the business 
community and sometimes held more than one post within the pub- 
lic administration. 

Various advisory bodies serve the administration. The most 
important of these is the Council of State, which the Constitution 
refers to as the highest consultative organ of the government. It 
has no executive functions or powers and performs in a purely 
advisory capacity. The Council of Ministers appoints its president, 
who is usually an experienced jurist. The other members — 
approximately twenty-three in number — are eminent representa- 
tives of the autonomous regions, the armed forces, civil service, 
and the legal and academic communities. Permanent members are 
appointed by government decree for an indefinite period, whereas 
members termed elected are those who are also appointed by decree 
but who are chosen from among citizens who have held various 
specific jobs; the elected members serve on the council for a period 
of four years. 

The Judiciary 

The Constitution declares that justice emanates from the peo- 
ple and that it is administered in the name of the king by indepen- 
dent judges and magistrates, who are irremovable and who are 
responsible and subject only to the rule of law. The judicial sys- 
tem is headed by the Supreme Court, which is the country's highest 
tribunal except for constitutional questions. The supreme govern- 
ing and administrative body is the General Council of the Judiciary. 
Its primary functions are to appoint judges and to maintain ethical 



220 



Government and Politics 



standards within the legal profession. The 1978 Constitution pro- 
vides that twelve of this council's twenty members are to be selected 
for five-year terms by judges, lawyers, and magistrates, with the 
remaining eight to be chosen by the Cortes. A judicial reform law 
that entered into force in July 1985 called for all twenty members 
to be chosen by the Cortes; ten by the Congress of Deputies and 
ten by the Senate. The General Council of the Judiciary elects the 
president of the Supreme Court, who also serves on this council. 
In addition, there are territorial courts, regional courts, provin- 
cial courts, courts of the first instance, and municipal courts. 

Constitutional questions are to be resolved by a special Constitu- 
tional Court, outlined in the 1978 Constitution and in the Organic 
Law on the Constitutional Court that was signed into law in October 
1979. This court consists of twelve judges who serve for nine-year 
terms. Four of these are nominated by the Congress of Deputies, 
four by the Senate, two by the executive branch of the government, 
and two by the General Council of the Judiciary. They are chosen 
from among jurists of recognized standing with at least fifteen years' 
experience. Once appointed, they are prohibited by the Constitu- 
tion from engaging in other forms of political, administrative, 
professional, or commercial activity. The Organic Law on the Con- 
stitutional Court contains provisions whereby the court can expel 
its own members, a circumstance which appears to contradict the 
constitutional declaration that magistrates are irremovable. 

The Constitutional Court is authorized to rule on the constitu- 
tionality of laws, acts, or regulations set forth by the national or 
the regional parliaments. It also may rule on the constitutionality 
of international treaties before they are ratified, if requested to do 
so by the government, the Congress of Deputies, or the Senate. 
The Constitution further declares that individual citizens may 
appeal to the Constitutional Court for protection against govern- 
mental acts that violate their civil rights. Only individuals directly 
affected can make this appeal, called an amparo, and they can do 
this only after exhausting other judicial appeals. 

In addition, this court has the power to preview the constitu- 
tionality of texts delineating statutes of autonomy and to settle con- 
flicts of jurisdiction between the central and the autonomous 
community governments, or between the governments of two or 
more autonomous communities. Because many of the constitutional 
provisions pertaining to autonomy questions are ambiguous and 
sometimes contradictory, this court could play a critical role in 
Spain's political and social development. 

The Constitution prohibits special courts and limits the juris- 
diction of military courts to members of the armed services, except 



221 



Spain: A Country Study 

during a state of siege (see Military Justice, ch. 5). It provides for 
a public prosecutor as well as for a public defender, to protect both 
the rule of law and the rights of citizens. A significant innovation 
is the provision allowing for trial by jury in criminal cases. 

A major problem that continued to plague the legal system in 
the 1980s was a severe shortage of funds, which made it impossi- 
ble to keep up with an increasingly heavy case load. This resulted 
in inordinate delays, which led to corrupt practices such as the brib- 
ing of court administrators by lawyers attempting to expedite their 
clients' cases (see Criminal Justice and the Penal System, ch. 5). 

Regional Government 

The framers of the 1978 Constitution had to deal with many con- 
troversial issues arising from the advent of democracy to a nation 
that had been under dictatorial control for decades. Among these, 
the most divisive was the historically sensitive question of regional 
autonomy. The Spanish state is unusual in the extent and the depth 
of its regional differences, and the society includes ethnic groups — 
notably the Basques, Catalans, and Galicians — that are each cul- 
turally and linguistically distinct from the rest of the country (see 
Ethnicity and Language, ch. 2). The strength of regional feeling 
is such that, in many areas, Spaniards identify more closely with 
their region than they do with the nation. 

Long-standing tensions between the center and the periphery 
were repressed, but not extinguished, by Franco's rigid central- 
ism. After his death, there was considerable popular and official 
support for some degree of decentralization; a key feature of the 
democratic reforms was the devolution of increased power and 
responsibility to the regions. This applied not only to those regions 
that historically had enjoyed a degree of autonomy — Galicia, the 
Basque region, and Catalonia — but to the rest of Spain as well. 

This transformation from a unitary state into a more decentral- 
ized structure was not accomplished without bitter conflict. Reac- 
tionary elements objected to any reference to regional autonomy 
in the Constitution as a threat to national unity, while, at the other 
extreme, militant Basques demanded the right of self-determination 
for the regions. After prolonged and acrimonious debate, a com- 
promise was agreed upon by all the major parties except the Basque 
nationalists. Discontent in this region has been a major disruptive 
element in the post-Franco years (see Political Developments, 
1982-88, this ch.). 

The Constitution proclaims the indissoluble unity of the nation, 
but it recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the 
nationalities and the regions of which the state is composed. 



222 



Government and Politics 



Adjoining provinces with common historical, cultural, and eco- 
nomic characteristics, as well as the Balearic Islands (Spanish, Islas 
Baleares) and the Canary Islands (Spanish, Canarias), are granted 
the right to form autonomous communities. These communities 
are, however, expressly prohibited from forming federations. 
Castilian Spanish is declared to be the official language of Spain, 
but other languages are recognized as co-official in their respec- 
tive autonomous communities. In addition, flags and emblems of 
these communities may be displayed alongside the Spanish flag on 
their public buildings and on public occasions. 

The Constitution provides two procedures for achieving regional 
autonomy. The rapid procedure was for those regions that had 
sought autonomy in the 1930s. After approval by the Constitu- 
tional Committee of the Congress of Deputies, the proposal for 
autonomy was voted on in a regional referendum. The "historic 
nationalities" of Galicia, the Basque Country, and Catalonia 
acquired regional autonomy in this way. The slow procedure 
required initiative on the part of municipal and provincial govern- 
ments as well as final approval by the Cortes, for a degree of regional 
autonomy less than that enjoyed by the "historic nationalities." 
A compromise procedure was devised for Andalusia because, 
although it had not sought regional autonomy earlier, there was 
widespread support for such autonomy among its inhabitants. 
Although the communities employing the rapid procedure gained 
a greater degree of autonomy than the other communities for the 
time being, ultimately — although probably not until sometime in 
the 1990s — all were to have an equal degree of autonomy. 

Following the attempted coup of February 1981 , those who had 
urged a more cautious approach to regional autonomy prevailed, 
and the process was brought under stricter control by the controver- 
sial Organic Law on the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process 
(Ley Organica de Armonizacion del Proceso Autonomico — 
LOAPA), approved in July 1981. Among the law's stipulations 
was that — with the exception of Andalusia, which was already near- 
ing autonomous status — the remaining regions would have to pro- 
ceed according to the more protracted and complicated method (see 
table 13, Appendix). 

The regional reorganization of Spain into autonomous commu- 
nities was completed in May 1983, when elections were held in 
the thirteen new autonomous communities, although the actual 
process of transferring powers was far from complete. The state 
consists of seventeen autonomous communities, each of which 
includes one or more previously existing provinces (see fig. 7). These 
communities vary widely in size, in population, and in economic 



223 



Spain: A Country Study 

development; moreover, the political weight of an autonomous com- 
munity is not necessarily related to its land area or population (see 
Regional Disparities, ch. 2). 

Each regional entity is governed by its own statute of autonomy. 
It has its own capital and a political structure based on a unicameral 
Legislative Assembly, elected by universal suffrage. This assem- 
bly chooses from among its members a president who is the highest 
representative of the community. Executive and administrative 
powers are exercised by the Council of Government, headed by 
the president and responsible to the assembly. There are also 
regional supreme courts, which are somewhat less autonomous than 
the legislative and the executive organs because they are subject 
to the ultimate authority of the Supreme Court in Madrid. 

The division of powers between the autonomous regions and the 
central government is outlined in Article 148 and Article 149 of 
the Constitution. The language used to differentiate between the 
authority of the central government and that of the regions is, 
however, imprecise and ambiguous, resulting in varying, and some- 
times contradictory, interpretations. Further confusion arises from 
the constitutional provision enabling the autonomous communi- 
ties to extend their powers gradually, although it does not indicate 
specifically what these new powers are to be. 

The areas enumerated as belonging under the exclusive juris- 
diction of the national government include international affairs; 
defense; justice; criminal, commercial, and labor legislation; mer- 
chant shipping; civil aviation; foreign trade and tariffs; economic 
planning; finances; and public safety. Whereas the central govern- 
ment clearly is granted exclusive jurisdiction in these and in other 
matters, the provision that sets forth the rights of the autonomous 
communities is stated in less precise language. It declares that these 
communities may assume authority — a more equivocal mandate- 
over certain areas. These include the organization of their own 
institutions of self-government, municipal boundaries, town plan- 
ning, housing, public works, forestry, environmental protection, 
cultural affairs and organizations, tourism, sports and leisure events, 
social welfare, health and hygiene, and noncommercial ports and 
airports. In addition, the state may delegate to the communities 
part of its authority in areas reserved to its jurisdiction. Therefore, 
although the regions have very limited primary authority, the Con- 
stitution permits the extension of this authority by subsequent dele- 
gation. 

The Constitution recognizes the right of the autonomous com- 
munities to have financial autonomy "for the development and 
enforcement of their authority." These communities receive 



224 



Government and Politics 



revenue directly and indirectly from central government sources 
as well as from their own local taxes and special levies. They also 
may borrow money. The Constitution declares that the financial 
autonomy of the communities must be exercised in coordination 
with the policies of the central government, which is ultimately 
responsible for taxation and for guaranteeing equal opportunities 
for all citizens. 

The mechanism for this arrangement was established by the 1980 
Organic Law on the Financing of the Autonomous Communities, 
which provides for a Council for Fiscal and Financial Policy, to 
be composed of the finance ministers from the autonomous com- 
munities, the state fmance minister, and the minister for public 
administration. This council is to function in a consultative capacity 
in order to coordinate policies concerning public investment and 
debt, cost of services, and the distribution of resources to the regions. 

The state's ultimate responsibility for financial matters enables 
it to exercise a significant degree of control over the activities of 
the autonomous communities. A further element of control is the 
presence in each region of a central government delegate, appointed 
by the Council of Ministers at the recommendation of the prime 
minister, who monitors the activities of the regional government. 
Moreover, the state may challenge any measures adopted by the 
autonomous communities. 

The Constitutional Court makes the final decision in any ques- 
tion pertaining to the constitutionality of regional legislation. In 
1983 this court made a ruling that had the effect of increasing the 
powers of the autonomous communities. It invalidated portions 
of the controversial LOAPA and declared that this law did not har- 
monize the autonomy process. Significant provisions that were 
struck down included those stipulating that the state's legal norms 
should have automatic precedence over those of the autonomous 
regions and that regional civil servants should be seconded from 
Madrid rather than recruited locally. 

The Constitution permits the government to intervene if an 
autonomous community fails to carry out its constitutional obli- 
gations or acts against the general interests of the nation. In such 
a case, the state is to ask the president of the autonomous commu- 
nity to correct the matter; if he or she fails to do so, the govern- 
ment, with majority approval from the Senate, may adopt measures 
necessary to enforce the community's compliance. As of mid- 1988, 
this provision had never been invoked, and it remained unclear 
what such measures might entail. 

In spite of these limitations on the jurisdiction of the communi- 
ties, regions have enjoyed an unprecedented degree of autonomy 



225 



Spain: A Country Study 

since the death of Franco. Because rigid centralism was so closely 
identified with Francoism, Spaniards have come to associate democ- 
racy with greater regional independence. Although difficulties in 
the devolution process remain to be resolved, the development of 
such an extensive system of regional autonomy, by what had been 
one of the world's most centralized nations, is an indication of its 
peoples' commitment to democracy. 

Local Government 

Institutions of local government have undergone marked trans- 
formations since the Franco era, when they functioned primarily 
as instruments of the central government. The overhauling of 
administration at the local level had to wait, however, until a degree 
of political reform had been achieved at the national level. The 
first fully democratic local elections following Franco's demise were 
held in 1979, and limited reforms were introduced at the local level 
in 1981, but it was not until 1985 that the fundamental reorgani- 
zation and democratization of local administration was completed 
with the passage of the Basic Law on Local Government (Ley 
Reguladora de las Bases de Regimen Local — LRBRL). 

This law outlines the basic institutions at the municipal and the 
provincial levels, establishes guidelines for the sharing of respon- 
sibilities among the different tiers of administration, and lists the 
services that local authorities are to provide. The responsibilities 
of municipalities vary in proportion to the size of their populations. 
Municipal governments share responsibility with the regional gov- 
ernment in matters of health and education. Both the central and 
the regional governments may delegate additional powers to munici- 
palities. Because of the degree of authority that has been devolved 
to the autonomous communities from the central government, local 
institutions are politically dependent on these communities; how- 
ever, they remain to a large extent financially dependent on Madrid. 

Government at the municipal level is administered by a 
Municipal Council, the members of which are directly elected by 
universal suffrage and according to proportional representation. 
The number of council members is determined by the population 
of the municipality; a minimum of five is required by law. There 
is no limit to the number of times councillors may be re-elected. 
If they die, resign, or are dismissed, they are replaced by the next 
person on the electoral list of their political party; therefore, there 
are no by-elections. 

The council is elected every four years, and it cannot be dis- 
solved. The law requires it to meet in full session at least every 
three months; extraordinary sessions can be called by either the 



226 



Government and Politics 



mayor or one-fourth of the council membership. The council does 
not formulate major laws, but drafts regulations related to legisla- 
tion from the Cortes or the regional parliament. It oversees the 
budget, and it may raise taxes to supplement grants from the cen- 
tral and the regional governments. 

Each Municipal Council is headed by a mayor, who is elected 
following local elections, from among the council members, and 
who, in most instances, serves as the leader of the majority party 
in the council. In addition to being chairman of the council, direct- 
ing municipal administration, heading the municipal police force, 
and exercising extensive powers of appointment, the mayor plays 
a major public relations role and enjoys a great deal of prestige. 

Municipalities of more than 5,000 inhabitants have a Municipal 
Commission to assist the mayor in the exercise of his duties. 
Municipal administration in such towns is divided into departments 
and districts, the leaders of which are ultimately responsible to the 
mayor. 

Government at the provincial level has retained an element of 
its Francoist function as an outpost of the state. The Constitution 
defines the provinces as territorial divisions " designed to carry out 
the activities of the central government." The civil governor, who 
is the highest executive of the state administration at the provin- 
cial level, is appointed by the prime minister on the recommenda- 
tion of the minister of interior. Thus, the governors are usually 
political appointees, as was the case during the Franco regime, 
although they have less power than they did formerly. They con- 
tinue to be responsible for the state police and the security forces 
that operate at the provincial level (see The Police System, ch. 5). 
In addition to ensuring the implementation of state policies in the 
provinces, they function as a liaison between local authorities and 
the central government. 

Provincial government is administered by a Provincial Coun- 
cil, which consists of deputies elected by the municipal councillors 
from among themselves. They remain on the Provincial Council 
for four years and may be re-elected for as many terms as they 
remain municipal councillors. As is the case with the municipal 
councils, the Provincial Council does not have the power to draft 
major laws, but it may establish regulations based on legislation 
from the Cortes or the regional parliament. 

Each Provincial Council is headed by a president, who is elected 
by all the members of the full council. Although the civil governor 
is the highest representative of the central government in the 
province, the president of the Provincial Council has the responsi- 
bility for the government and administration of the province. The 



227 



Spain: A Country Study 

office of president of the Provincial Council was established dur- 
ing the Franco years, but it was largely overshadowed by that of 
the civil governor. Since the advent of democracy to Spain, the 
council president has acquired more prestige, and the role of the 
governor has been reduced. 

Provincial government is administered differently in the Basque 
provinces, the single-province autonomous communities, the 
Balearic Islands, and the Canary Islands. The Basque provinces 
have more extensive privileges because of their status as "historic 
territories," which makes their provincial councils more powerful 
than those of other provinces. The autonomous communities that 
are made up of a single province assume all provincial powers and 
responsibilities, thereby obviating the need for provincial institu- 
tions. Because of the geographical separation that exists within the 
island chains, government and administration have been entrusted 
to island councils, which enjoy greater powers than their provin- 
cial counterparts. The small North African enclaves of Ceuta and 
Melilla have a special status: they are organized as municipalities 
of the provinces of Cadiz and Malaga, respectively. In both towns, 
civil authority is vested in an official, called the delegado del gobierno, 
who is directly responsible to the Ministry of Interior in Madrid. 
In 1986 the enclaves received municipal autonomy under the pro- 
visions of Spain's devolution of authority to regions, but, unlike 
Spain's other regional assemblies, they were not granted legisla- 
tive powers. In March 1986, a large crowd of demonstrators in 
Ceuta protested this denial of full autonomy. 

Civil Service 

Part of the Francoist legacy to Spain was a highly inefficient and 
cumbersome civil service apparatus. Attempts to reform and to 
streamline the system of public administration have been hampered 
by the bureaucracy's traditional resistance to change. 

Under Franco, the civil service system was dominated by cuerpos, 
professional associations of engineers, lawyers, economists, etc., 
within the civil service, which also performed functions similar to 
those of trade unions and fraternal organizations. Admission to 
a cuerpo was on the basis of a competitive examination that was 
judged by the current members. The cuerpo served as a channel 
for civil servants to make their demands to the appropriate minister. 
In addition, the cuerpos were able to exercise considerable influence 
over hiring and firing of persons for key administrative positions, 
thereby enabling them to protect their own economic interests. 
Loyalty to the cuerpo came to take precedence over administrative 



228 



Government and Politics 



interests, and rivalry among these bodies added to the inefficiency 
of the system by hampering coordination among departments. 

This bloated bureaucracy extended to the provincial level, where 
it became increasingly difficult to control. As civil servants increased 
in number, administrative efficiency declined and corruption flour- 
ished. Because of the low salaries traditionally paid to civil servants, 
the practice of holding more than one job was common. This in 
turn resulted in fewer hours devoted to administrative functions 
and a further reduction in efficiency. 

In spite of intermittent efforts to reorganize this unwieldy struc- 
ture, the civil service did not undergo significant change in the 
immediate post-Franco years. The cuerpos retained their influence, 
and the bureaucracy proliferated. In 1981 the number of civil ser- 
vants had reached 1.2 million. Moreover, multiple job-holding had 
not been eliminated, despite constitutional restrictions against this 
practice. 

When the PSOE came to power in 1982, its leaders took steps 
to reduce the number of civil servants and to require that they put 
in a full workday. The government introduced more stringent legis- 
lation against multiple job-holding, and it also endeavored to reduce 
ministerial rivalry. A departmental reorganization was carried out 
in July 1986, at which time the coordination and the overall con- 
trol of the civil service became the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Public Administration. 

Nevertheless, the bureaucratic behemoth had not suffered a mor- 
tal blow, and most of the abuses were not effectively eliminated. 
An indication of the resistance to change that prevailed in the civil 
service was the continued existence of very slow service and there- 
fore of gestorias administrativas, i.e., private firms, the employees of 
which filled out forms and stood in line for customers, who consid- 
ered the time saved well worth the price charged. Meaningful reform 
of the civil service remained on the government's wish list in the 
late 1980s. 

Politics 

The politicians who had played key roles in Spain's transition 
to democracy found that consolidating and administering this 
democracy was more difficult and less exhilarating than bringing 
it into being. Suarez, who had been pivotal in the reform process, 
found his leadership undermined by internal factionalism within 
his party coalition, the Union of the Democratic Center (Union 
de Centro Democratico — UCD), as well as by his ineffectiveness 
in dealing with the country's growing economic difficulties and 
regional tensions. 



229 



Spain: A Country Study 



1977 



PNV OTHERS 
CiU 8 / 10 
11 




PSOE R^PCE 
UCD ^AP 



CiU ] I OTHERS 
PNV 



1979 



PNV OTHERS 




PSOE [S3 PCE 
UCD | | CD 



CiU I I OTHERS 
PNV 



1982 



rill PNV OTHERS 

™ 8 / 6 



1986 




PSOE [^PCE 
UCD BBpDP 



CiU I | OTHERS 
PNV 




H PSOE 

E53iu 



CP HQ PNV OTHERS 

CiU [Cy^CDS 



PARTIES 

PSOE- Spanish Socialist Workers' 



Party 



m 

Ml 

□ 



UCD - Union of the Democratic Center 

PCE - Communist Party of Spain 

IU - United Left (leftist alliance dominated by PCE) 

AP - Popular Alliance 

CD - Democratic Coalition (led by AP) 

PDP - Popular Democratic Party (allied with the AP in 1982 and 1986) 

CP - Popular Coalition (led by AP) 

CiU - Convergence and Union 

PNV - Basque Nationalist Party 

CDS - Democratic and Social Center 



Figure 13. Distribution of Seats in the Congress of Deputies Following Selected 
Elections 



230 



Government and Politics 



The Socialists had not been part of the government during the 
transition process, although they participated through pacts and 
agreements, and thus they did not share responsibility for the inevi- 
table mistakes made in the early period. When they came to power 
in 1982, however, they too were faced with the age-old problem 
of center-periphery tension (see fig. 13; table 2, Appendix). In deal- 
ing with the regional issue as well as with the economic crisis, the 
Socialists found it necessary to moderate their ideological princi- 
ples. Although compromise was essential, it resulted in the con- 
tradiction of earlier pronouncements and in the alienation of some 
elements of the political elites. Nevertheless, such pragmatism and 
moderation remained crucial to consolidating the rule of democracy 
in Spain. 

Political Developments, 1982-88 

Following its triumph at the polls in October 1982, the Spanish 
Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol — 
PSOE), under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez, formed the first 
majority one-party government since the Civil War (see Growth 
of the PSOE and the 1982 Elections, ch. 1). The increase in voter 
participation, which rose from less than 68 percent in 1979 to 80 
percent in 1982, seemed a significant indication of citizen affirma- 
tion of the democratic process. Municipal and regional elections, 
held in May 1983, confirmed the popularity of the Socialist govern- 
ment, which obtained 43 percent of the vote. 

A significant factor in the Socialist victory in 1982 was the popular 
perception that profound economic and social reforms were long 
overdue. Previous governments had not been able to deal effec- 
tively with these issues, in part because of the need to focus on politi- 
cal and constitutional questions. Whereas most Spaniards had been 
willing to defer their hopes for economic improvement and for liber- 
alized social policies in the interest of stabilizing the fledgling 
democracy, they became increasingly impatient for the reform 
process to reach their daily lives. 

The economic reform policies implemented under the POSE 
government were pragmatic rather than ideological. Although 
stressing the need for reform, the government did not call for tradi- 
tional socialist measures, such as the nationalization of industry, 
a significant redistribution of income, or massive state interven- 
tion in the economy. Instead, it pursued a program of economic 
austerity in order to lower inflation and raise productivity (see the 
Post-Franco Period, 1975-1980s, ch. 3). 

As part of an attempt to achieve greater efficiency in the indus- 
trial sector as well as in the civil service, the government eliminated 



231 



Spain: A Country Study 

many jobs. This had the short-term effect of adding to the nation's 
unemployment problem, and it met with strong opposition from 
the trade unions, although it gained support for the PSOE from 
the commercial and the financial sectors. The government's eco- 
nomic policies resulted in a moderate reduction in inflation and 
an increase in the rate of economic growth, but unemployment 
worsened, and strike activity increased 30 percent in 1984. In June 
1985, there were massive protests against the proposed reforms in 
the social security system and the reductions in pension benefits. 
Nevertheless, the idea of streamlining the economy was viewed by 
most Spaniards as a positive step toward economic recovery, in 
spite of the fact that its costs were borne largely by the working class. 

Although the Socialists' moderate approach to economic issues 
entailed a relatively slow rate of change, significant progress was 
achieved in other important areas, most notably that of military 
reorganization. In October 1983, Minister of Defense Narcis Serra 
i Serra announced plans for large-scale reductions in the size of 
the military, which was to be reoriented, toward national defense 
rather than internal security. Legislation passed in early 1984 placed 
the armed forces under the direct control of the prime minister and 
the civilian minister of defense. Increased subordination of the mili- 
tary to the civilian government was made more palatable to the 
military hierarchy by a major increase in military spending to 
modernize the army's equipment and weaponry (see The Defense 
Budget, ch. 5). 

The Socialist government also brought about significant reforms 
in the educational system. Education and Science Minister Jose 
Maria Maravall Herrero introduced legislation, passed in the spring 
of 1984, providing for increased state control over private schools 
that received government subsidies. The law also gave parents a 
greater role in the appointment of teachers and in establishing the 
curricula at these schools (see Education, ch. 2). This had a major 
impact on society, because in the late 1980s approximately one- 
third of students attended such schools, which usually had a reli- 
gious affiliation. The Roman Catholic Church joined forces with 
the right-wing Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular — AP) to mobi- 
lize a large antigovernment rally, protesting the new educational 
policies, in November 1984. 

A difficult problem facing the Socialist government was the con- 
tinuing menace of Basque terrorism. Although democratization had 
brought an unprecedented degree of autonomy to the country's 
communities, there was increasing frustration in the Basque and 
the Catalan regions with the protracted process of transferring pow- 
ers to the regional governments. The PSOE's concurrence with 



232 



Government and Politics 



the implementation of the controversial LOAPA, passed by the 
UCD government in 1981, led the Basques and the Catalans to 
consider the Socialists as proponents of centralization (see Regional 
Government, this ch.). Terrorist activity by the militant Basque 
Fatherland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna — ETA), the 
Basque separatist organization founded in 1959 by a splinter group 
of the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco — 
PNV), continued unabated in Spain in the year following the elec- 
tion that brought the PSOE to power (see Threats to Internal Secu- 
rity, ch. 5). This increased violence, in itself a destabilizing factor, 
also threatened Spain's hold on democracy by tempting right-wing 
forces to contemplate a coup in order to restore order. 

In an effort to control terrorist activity and to calm the military, 
the Socialist government introduced strong antiterrorist legislation, 
which received widespread popular support. Nevertheless, the vio- 
lence continued. Moreover, the central government received a set- 
back in its antiterrorist campaign in 1984, when the Supreme Court 
overruled a decision by the Ministry of Interior to ban the politi- 
cal party Popular Unity (Herri Batasuna — HB), with which the 
ETA Military Front (ETA Militar— ETA-M) was associated, from 
representation in either the regional or the national parliament. 

Prospects for a lessening of tension between the Basque Coun- 
try and the Socialist government appeared to brighten when a legis- 
lative pact was signed in January 1985 between the president of 
the Basque Country and the Basque affiliate of the PSOE. This 
agreement included provisions to expedite the transfer of powers 
to the autonomous institutions and called for a joint offensive against 
terrorism. In spite of vigorous antiterrorist measures taken by the 
central government, however, bombings and assassinations con- 
tinued. 

While dealing with such demanding domestic concerns as ter- 
rorism and the need for economic and social reform, the Socialist 
government was also taking steps to develop a more active inter- 
national role for Spain. The country had experienced ostracism 
under Franco because of the highly undemocratic nature of his 
regime (see Foreign Policy under Franco, ch. 1). After taking office 
in 1982, the Socialists made vigorous efforts to gain entry into the 
European Community (EC — see Glossary). The government hoped 
that membership in the EC would bring not only economic advan- 
tages but also international recognition of the country's successful 
transition to democracy. 

The question of Spain's entry into the EC met with repeated 
delays in 1983 and in 1984, largely because of the opposition of 
France. After protracted negotiations, a Treaty of Accession was 



233 



Spain: A Country Study 

signed in the summer of 1985, and Spain formally joined the EC 
on January 1, 1986 (see Spain and the European Community, this 
ch.). 

Although the PSOE government had pursued the goal of EC 
membership with single-minded zeal, it was ambivalent with regard 
to participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
The Socialists had long advocated neutralism as part of their ideol- 
ogy; moreover, latent anti-Americanism was widespread in the 
population. 

The Socialists had opposed Spain's decision to join NATO in 
May 1982, and part of their election platform in October of that 
year was the promise of a referendum on the question of remain- 
ing in the alliance. After coming to power, they soon changed their 
minds and concluded that some form of membership in NATO 
was in Spain's interest. This left Gonzalez with the ticklish task 
of campaigning for a favorable vote on an issue he had previously 
attacked. 

In order to gain approval for his new pro-NATO position, 
Gonazlez attached conditions to membership. Spain would be part 
of NATO in a political sense but without military integration; fur- 
thermore, nuclear weapons were to be banned in Spain. In an effort 
to appease the left wing of his party, the prime minister promised 
that the number of United States troops in Spain, whose presence 
reminded many Spaniards of previous United States ties with the 
Franco regime, would be reduced. The promised referendum was 
held on March 12, 1986, and in spite of public opinion polls indi- 
cating strong anti-NATO sentiment, the people voted to continue 
membership in the alliance (see Participation in NATO, ch. 5). 

Gonzalez moved to consolidate the gains his government had 
made through EC membership and the successful NATO referen- 
dum by calling for national parliamentary elections in June 1986, 
four months ahead of schedule. The PSOE benefited from the frag- 
mentation of both its right-wing opposition and the communists, 
and it retained an absolute majority in the general elections, win- 
ning 184 of the 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies — 18 fewer 
than it had obtained in the 1982 elections, but still enough to retain 
control. 

The official opposition was embodied in the conservative Popu- 
lar Coalition (Coalicion Popular — CP), which included Manuel 
Fraga Iribarne's AP, the Popular Democratic Party (Partido 
Democrata Popular — PDP), and the Liberal Party (Partido 
Liberal — PL). The CP failed in its attempt to attract the moder- 
ate vote by moving to the center. Fraga' s abrasive personality and 
Francoist past contributed to the defeat of the coalition, which began 



234 



Felipe Gonzalez Mdrquez, 
prime minister, 1982- 
Courtesy National 
Tourist Office of Spain 



to disintegrate soon after the election. Several leftist groups and 
communist splinter parties formed an electoral coalition, the United 
Left (Izquierda Unida — IU), to participate in the election, which 
obtained slightly better results than the left did in 1982. 

The surprise feature of the 1986 elections was the resurgence 
of the center vote, indicated by the tripling of the ballots cast for 
the Democratic and Social Center (Centro Democratico y Social — 
CDS). Its leader, Suarez, continued to be a popular figure on the 
Spanish political scene (see Transition to Democracy, ch. 1). Given 
the disarray at both ends of the political spectrum, the CDS had 
a chance to develop into the major opposition party (see Political 
Parties, this ch.). 

In spite of the PSOE's electoral victory in June 1986, dissatis- 
faction with the policies and the actions of the Socialist govern- 
ment had been mounting, and it increased even more as the year 
drew to a close. The early months of 1987 saw the strongest out- 
break of social unrest in Spain since the 1930s. Demonstrations 
by university and secondary school students were followed by 
increasingly violent labor strikes. Doctors and teachers joined rail- 
road workers and farm laborers in protesting the low wages and 
the high unemployment that had come in the wake of the govern- 
ment's economic austerity policies. Contributing to the growing 
unrest was an escalation in Basque terrorism and popular revul- 
sion over a bomb that caused the deaths of many innocent civilians. 



235 



Spain: A Country Study 

Polls indicated a decline in confidence in Gonzalez, whose immense 
popularity had heretofore been unaffected by such vicissitudes. 

Elections held in June 1987 at the municipal and the regional 
levels, as well as those for the European Parliament, confirmed the 
declining support for the Socialist government. Although the PSOE 
remained the largest single party, it obtained only 37 percent of 
the municipal vote, down from 43 percent in 1983. The June elec- 
tions resulted in a further erosion of the AP, which was under the 
new leadership of Antonio Hernandez Mancha. The CDS emerged, 
strengthened, as the fulcrum of the center, although it was not yet 
in a position to present a challenge to Socialist dominance. 

Dissatisfaction with the PSOE government was also evidenced 
within the Socialist party itself. In October 1987, Nicolas Redondo, 
leader of the Socialist-controlled General Union of Workers (Union 
General de Trabaj adores — UGT), resigned his seat in parliament 
in protest against the government's 1988 budget. He criticized the 
government for favoring employers' interests over those of the work- 
ing class. 

Most businessmen approved of the market-oriented economic 
policies of Gonzalez, which had succeeded in reducing the annual 
inflation rate, from 15 percent in 1982 to below 5 percent in 1987, 
and in raising annual economic growth rate to 4.5 percent. The 
price paid for these accomplishments, however, was an unemploy- 
ment rate of 21 percent, the highest in Europe, and an increasingly 
alienated labor force. The UGT joined with its communist counter- 
part, the Workers' Commissions (Comisiones Obreras — CCOO), 
in staging joint protests in October and in November 1987 and 
a general strike in December 1988 (see Political Interest Groups, 
this ch.). 

At the Socialist party congress held in January 1988, Redondo 
and other left-wing socialists accused Gonzalez of betraying the 
workers and of forsaking the socialist cause. They urged a relaxa- 
tion of anti-inflation measures in order to allow for an increase in 
wages and in pensions. They also called for greater investment in 
public works and for a concerted effort to deal with the unemploy- 
ment problem. 

In contrast to the growing dissatisfaction with the government's 
economic policies, there was widespread approval when Gonzalez 
decided to demand a reduction of the United States military 
presence in Spain, in keeping with the pledge he had made at the 
time of the NATO referendum. In December 1987, the govern- 
ment notified the United States that it would have to remove its 
seventy-two F-16 fighter bombers from Spain by mid- 1991. The 
two countries reached agreement in principle in January 1988 on 



236 



Government and Politics 



a new, more limited base agreement to last eight years (see Spain 
and the United States, this ch.; Military Cooperation with the 
United States, ch. 5). 

Spanish popular opinion also responded favorably to indications 
that there might be hope for an end to the terrorist violence that 
had claimed more than 750 lives in a 20-year period. In Novem- 
ber 1987, the major political parties signed an antiterrorist pact 
in which they pledged to work peacefully for the resolution of con- 
flicts in the Basque Country, they condemned all forms of violence, 
and they called on the ETA to lay down its arms and to work 
through democratic channels. In February 1988, the government 
accepted an ETA proposal for a sixty-day truce and for the open- 
ing of formal peace negotiations. A major factor in bringing the 
ETA to hold talks was French cooperation, beginning in mid- 1986, 
in hunting down the movement's leaders and in extraditing those 
who had sought asylum in France. The negotiators faced formid- 
able obstacles, most notably the conflict between Basque demands 
for self-determination and constitutional provisions for the armed 
forces to uphold Spain's territorial integrity. Nevertheless, by 
mid- 1988 prospects for an end to violence were brighter than they 
had been in many years. 

After five and one-half years in office, the PSOE could take credit 
for significant accomplishments, in spite of rumblings on the left. 
Observers generally conceded that the austerity measures carried 
out by the government, while far removed from socialist concepts, 
were necessary in order to revive the economy, and they hoped 
that a healthier economy would ultimately resolve the unemploy- 
ment problem. More in line with socialist policies were the govern- 
ment's measures to lessen the Roman Catholic Church's control 
of Spain's schools, to ease censorship laws, and to legalize divorce 
(see Social Values and Attitudes, ch. 2). The PSOE's foreign policy 
initiatives, gaining EC membership and reducing dependence on 
the United States, also received popular approval. The democratic 
process appeared to have taken root. 

Political Parties 

Prior to the arrival of participatory democracy in Spain in the 
late 1970s, Spanish citizens had scant experience with political 
involvement. Suffrage was extremely limited, electoral mechanisms 
were controlled and corrupt, and political parties were elitist. Under 
the Francoist regime, Spanish society was depoliticized; the only 
political formation officially sanctioned was the National Movement. 
Remnants of the socialist and the communist parties functioned 



237 



Spain: A Country Study 

underground, and they were subject to severely repressive measures 
(see The Franco Years, ch. 1). 

After forty years without parliamentary elections, political par- 
ties were revived, and they proliferated in the months following 
Franco's death. Leftist parties that had been exiled or had func- 
tioned clandestinely, such as the communists and the Socialists, 
had existing organizations and ideological traditions to form the 
bases of renewed political activity. The center and the right, 
however, had no such structures in place, and they lacked experi- 
ence in political involvement. The coalition party that was victori- 
ous in the first elections of the new democratic regime in June 1977, 
the center-right UCD, failed to develop a coherent political vision. 
Its brief period of success was due largely to the charisma of its 
leader, Suarez, and the party ultimately succumbed to its internal 
conflicts. 

With the victory of the PSOE in 1982, Spain's political system 
moved from a moderate right-left division to a predominance of 
the center-left. Support for the PSOE had become less class-based 
and more widespread as Spain underwent economic transforma- 
tion and as the party became less dogmatic. In general, the tendency 
of Spain's party politics has been toward the center, and support 
for extremist parties has declined markedly, which bodes well for 
the country's future stability. 

Spanish Socialist Workers' Party 

The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero 
Espanol — PSOE) is the oldest political party in Spain. Founded 
by Pablo Iglesias in 1879 as a Marxist proletarian party, it evolved 
alongside the trade union UGT, which was the basis of its sup- 
port. The goal of both organizations was to obtain a voice for the 
working class in the political arena. As the party began to win 
parliamentary seats in the 1920s and the early 1930s, its member- 
ship began to broaden to include intellectuals, writers, and teachers. 
The PSOE's first experience as a governing party was during the 
turbulent Second Republic, but its time of leadership was short- 
lived. The party experienced severe repression under Franco, and 
its leaders went into exile, primarily in France. 

In the early years of the Franco dictatorship, the PSOE within 
Spain was almost obliterated. In succeeding years, the party's 
leadership in exile gradually lost touch with what was evolving inside 
the country. In the mid-1950s, socialist groups began to organize 
within Spain; and, in the 1960s a small group of activists, led by 
two young labor lawyers from Seville (Spanish, Sevilla), Alfonso 



238 



Government and Politics 



Guerra and Felipe Gonzalez, revived the PSOE and began to agitate 
for changes within the party. 

The leaders in exile had fought in the Civil War, and they had 
strong feelings against compromising the ideological purity of their 
cause by collaborating with other forces opposing Franco. Con- 
versely, the younger activists, with no personal memories of the 
Civil War, were willing to work with other anti-Franco groups to 
the left as well as to the right of the PSOE. These young Socialists, 
who had been strongly influenced by Social Democrats in the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany (West Germany), also favored a more 
moderate ideology than the rigid Marxism of the old guard. By 
1972 the struggle for power between these two groups had been 
won by the younger generation, and Gonzalez was elected secre- 
tary general of the PSOE at its Twelfth Congress in 1974. 

During the transition to democracy, the PSOE essentially cooper- 
ated with the reform plans set forth by Suarez, as did the other 
major leftist groups. When the country's first free elections since 
the Civil War were held in June 1977, the PSOE became Spain's 
leading opposition party. While growing in popularity, however, 
the party was beset from within by profound ideological tensions. 
Although the Socialists had gained support by presenting an image 
of moderation to the electorate, this stance was vehemently attacked 
by the more radical members of the party, who criticized Gonzalez 
and his supporters for placing more emphasis on gaining votes than 
they did on advancing the interests of the workers. 

This rift came to a head at the party's Twenty-Eighth Congress 
in May 1979. When Gonzalez failed in his effort to remove the 
term Marxist from the party's constitution, he resigned. Gonzalez 
was successful in his gamble that most PSOE members considered 
his leadership invaluable, and at an extraordinary congress held 
in September 1979, he was re-elected on his own terms. The party 
no longer defined itself as Marxist, and policies of moderation and 
pragmatism prevailed, thereby enabling the PSOE to appeal to a 
wider spectrum of society. This broader electoral base was a key 
factor in the Socialists' victory in 1982, when they increased their 
popular vote from 5.5 million in 1979 to 10 million. 

Nevertheless, Gonzalez continued to emphasize economic moder- 
nization rather than traditional socialist policies, which resulted in 
increasingly vociferous opposition from his historical base of sup- 
port, the labor unions (see Political Developments, 1982-88, this 
ch.). A poll taken at the end of 1987 revealed a steady, albeit not 
dramatic, decrease in popular support for the Socialists. Even so, 
in mid- 1988 the PSOE, as governing party, had no serious rival. 



239 



Spain: A Country Study 

Communist Party of Spain 

The Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de Espana — 
PCE) had its beginnings in Spain during the revolutionary upsurge 
that followed World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution in Rus- 
sia. The Spanish communists did not become as strong a force as 
their counterparts in other European countries, however, largely 
because of the existence in Spain of strong socialist and anarchist 
movements that already occupied the left end of the political spec- 
trum. PCE membership, never very large in the party's early years 
of activity, declined dramatically under the repression carried out 
by the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera in the 1920s (see 
The Africa War and the Authoritarian Regime of Miguel Primo 
de Rivera, ch. 1). Communist influence on the left increased when 
the PCE ceased attacking the Socialists and other leftist organiza- 
tions and shifted toward a popular front strategy in 1934. 

During the Civil War, the leftist forces were again divided. The 
communists were intent on finishing the war against the fascist forces 
before beginning their social and political revolution, whereas other 
leftist organizations were not willing to postpone the restructuring 
of Spanish society. The communists were brutal in their suppres- 
sion of competing leftist organizations, which led to the party's 
ostracism by the other anti-Franco forces in the post-Civil War 
period. 

In the mid-1950s, the PCE began vigorous efforts to break out 
of its isolation and adapted policies designed to bring together a 
broad coalition of parties, under PCE leadership, to oppose the 
Franco dictatorship. Ironically, it was the Franco regime itself, by 
focusing its attacks on the PCE, that enabled the party to become 
a rallying point for dissident students and workers. The party built 
a political base around the trade union movement known as the 
CCOO, and by the end of the Franco era the PCE, under the 
leadership of Santiago Carrillo, was the most effective political 
organization in Spain. 

The PCE failed to take the initiative as this authoritarian regime 
drew to a close, however, and expectations of a hegemonic role 
for the PCE on the Spanish left were not realized. Although PCE 
membership multiplied following the party's legalization in 1977, 
the PCE received only 9 percent of the popular vote in the elec- 
tions held that year; dominance on the left went to the rival PSOE 
(see Transition to Democracy, ch. 1). After the PCE's share of 
the vote fell to 3.8 percent in the 1982 elections, internal tensions 
within the party reached crisis proportions, and Carrillo 's leader- 
ship began to be questioned. 



240 



Government and Politics 



As had been the case for the PSOE, the PCE found that the bur- 
den of dogmatic Marxism reduced its appeal for the electorate. Car- 
rillo had succeeded in eliminating the word "Leninism" from the 
PCE statutes at a party congress in 1978, over substantial opposi- 
tion. He continued to be criticized by the pro-Soviet militants within 
the party, who urged him to take a more revolutionary approach. 
At the same time, a more European-oriented group, known as the 
renovators, agitated for modernization and for more internal debate 
within the party. 

In addition to ideologically based dissension, there was also gen- 
eral dissatisfaction with Carrillo's increasingly inflexible leadership. 
His repeated purges of those members who opposed him further 
decimated and demoralized the party. Following the PCE's deci- 
sive defeat in the October 1982 elections, Carrillo resigned as secre- 
tary general of the party; he was replaced by Gerardo Iglesias. 

In succeeding months, splinter groups broke away from the PCE, 
further depleting its support to form pro-Soviet or Marxist- Leninist 
parties. Among these were the pro-Soviet Communist Party of the 
Peoples of Spain (Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de Espaha — 
PCPE) and the Communist Party of Spain — Marxist-Leninist 
(Partido Comunista de Espana — Marxista-Leninista — PCE-ML). 
Within the PCE, Carrillo strongly opposed Iglesias' s policies. He 
was particularly critical of the latter' s proposal to form a coalition 
of all progressive forces that were to the left of the PSOE. This 
conflict led to Carrillo's expulsion from the central committee of 
the party, in April 1985. He subsequently organized and led the 
Committee for Communist Unity (Mesa para Unidad de los Com- 
unistas — MUC), which in December 1986 formed a new pro-Soviet 
party named the Spanish Workers' Party-Communist Unity (Par- 
tido de los Trabajadores de Espana-Unidad Comunista — PTE- 
UC). By the end of 1987, there were indications of efforts on the 
part of the PCE, PCPE, and the PTE-UC to unify the three com- 
munist parties in time for the next general elections. The PCE and 
the PCPE, together with several other small leftist parties, formed 
an electoral coalition, the IU, to contest the national elections in 
1986 as well as the regional and municipal elections in 1987. 

The PCE convened its Twelfth Party Congress in February 1988 
amid mounting agitation for a major revitalization of the party, 
which was plagued by financial problems and by a lack of unity. 
Although Iglesias had initiated the policy of a united left and had 
ended the decimating party purges, critics felt that stronger mea- 
sures as well as more effective leadership were necessary to mobi- 
lize the left and to improve the PCE's showing at the polls. At the 
party congress, Julio Anguita was chosen to succeed Iglesias. Party 



241 



Spain: A Country Study 

members reaffirmed their commitment to workers' interests, and 
they adopted policies aimed at attracting environmentalists and 
pacifists to their ranks. 

Popular Alliance 

The Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular — AP) was a conserva- 
tive right-wing party founded in 1976 by former Franco ministers 
under the leadership of Fraga, who had helped to prepare the way 
for reform during the Franco era and who had expected to play 
a key role in post-Franco governments. He underestimated the 
popular desire for change and distaste for Francoism, and he advo- 
cated an extremely gradual transition to democracy. Although Fraga 
had originally intended to convey a reformist image, his party was 
perceived by the electorate as both reactionary and authoritarian. 
Fraga' s own outbursts of temper and the close ties of many of the 
AP candidates to the previous regime contributed to this percep- 
tion. When elections were held in June 1977, the AP garnered only 
8.3 percent of the vote. 

In the months following the 1977 elections, dissension erupted 
within the AP over constitutional issues that arose as the draft docu- 
ment was being formulated. The more reactionary members voted 
against the draft constitution, and they advocated a shift to the right. 
Fraga, however, wanted to move the AP toward the political center 
in order to form a larger center-right party. Most of the disen- 
chanted reactionaries left the AP, and Fraga and the remaining 
AP members joined other more moderately conservative party lead- 
ers to form the Democratic Coalition (Coalicion Democratica — 
CD). It was hoped that this new coalition would capture the sup- 
port of those who had voted for the UCD in 1977, but who had 
become disenchanted with the Suarez government. When elections 
were held in March 1979, however, the CD received only 6. 1 per- 
cent of the vote. Deeply disappointed, Fraga resigned as head of 
his party. 

By the time of the AP's Third Party Congress in December 1979, 
party leaders were reassessing their involvement in the CD. Many 
felt that the creation of the coalition had merely confused the voters, 
and they sought to emphasize the AP's independent identity. Fraga 
resumed control of the party, and the political resolutions adopted 
by the party congress reaffirmed the conservative orientation of 
the AP. 

In the early 1980s, Fraga succeeded in rallying the various com- 
ponents of the right around his leadership. He was aided in his 
efforts to revive the AP by the increasing disintegration of the UCD. 
In the general elections held in October 1982, the AP gained votes 



242 



Government and Politics 



both from previous UCD supporters and from the far right, and 
it became the major opposition party, securing 25.4 percent of the 
popular vote. Whereas the AP's parliamentary representation had 
dropped to 9 seats in 1979, the party allied itself with the small 
right-wing PDP and won 106 seats in 1982. The increased strength 
of the AP was further evidenced in the municipal and regional elec- 
tions held in May 1983, when the party drew 26 percent of the 
vote. A significant portion of the electorate appeared to support 
the AP's emphasis on law and order as well as its probusiness 
policies. 

Subsequent political developments belied the party's aspirations 
to continue increasing its base of support. Prior to the June 1986 
elections, the AP once again joined forces with the PDP, and along 
with the PL, formed the CP, in another attempt to expand its con- 
stituency to include the center of the political spectrum. The coa- 
lition called for stronger measures against terrorism, for more 
privatization, and for a reduction in spending and in taxes. The 
CP failed to increase its share of the vote in the 1986 elections, 
however, and it soon began to disintegrate. 

When regional elections in late 1986 resulted in further losses 
for the coalition, Fraga resigned as AP president, although he 
retained his parliamentary seat. At the party congress in Febru- 
ary 1987, Hernandez was chosen to head the AP, declaring that 
under his leadership the AP would become a "modern right-wing 
European party." But Hernandez lacked political experience at 
the national level, and the party continued to decline. When sup- 
port for the AP plummeted in the municipal and regional elections 
held in June 1987, there was increased likelihood that it would be 
overtaken as major opposition party by Suarez' s CDS. 

Democratic and Social Center 

The Democratic and Social Center (Centro Democratico y 
Social — CDS) was organized shortly before the October 1982 elec- 
tions by Suarez, who had been the principal architect of the tran- 
sition to a democratic system after the death of Franco. After he 
resigned as both prime minister of Spain and president of the UCD 
in January 1981, Suarez continued to struggle for control of the 
party machine. When he failed in his bid to regain party leader- 
ship in July 1982, he abandoned the party he had created and 
formed the CDS. The new centrist party fared poorly in the October 
general elections, gaining only two parliamentary seats. 

By 1986 the party's fortunes had improved dramatically under 
the leadership of the former prime minister. In the June elec- 
tions, the CDS more than tripled its share of the vote, which was 



243 



Spain: A Country Study 



9.2 percent in 1986, compared with 2.9 percent in 1982, indicat- 
ing that many who had previously voted for the UCD had trans- 
ferred their support to the CDS. In the electoral campaign, Suarez 
had focused on his own experience as head of the government; he 
had criticized the PSOE for not fulfilling its 1982 election promises, 
had advocated a more independent foreign policy, and had called 
for economic measures that would improve the lot of the poor. This 
strategy enabled him to draw some votes from those who had 
become disillusioned with the PSOE. 

In the municipal and the regional elections held in June 1987, 
the largest gains were made by the CDS. A poll taken at the end 
of 1987 revealed even stronger support for the party, and it gave 
Suarez a popularity rating equal to that of Gonzalez. Suarez 's call 
for less dependence on the United States appealed to the latent anti- 
Americanism in the populace, and his advocacy of a greater role 
for the state in providing social services and in ensuring a more 
equitable distribution of income struck a responsive chord among 
the workers, who were growing increasingly impatient with Gon- 
zalez's conservative economic policies. Nevertheless, it remained 
to be seen how far Suarez 's populist rhetoric would take him in 
his quest to challenge the PSOE. 

Other National Parties 

Smaller parties emerged during the 1970s and the 1980s, and 
they frequently became part of various coalitions. The PDP had 
been a component of the UCD, but it re-established its separate 
identity in 1982, joining with the AP for the October 1982 electoral 
campaign and forming part of the CP during the June 1986 elec- 
tions. The PL, founded in 1977, also allied with the CP in 1986. 
The centrist Democratic Reformist Party (Partido Reformista 
Democratico — PRD), established in 1984, stressed decentraliza- 
tion and greater independence for local party leaders. A new radi- 
cal right-wing party also emerged in 1984, the Spanish Integration 
Committees (Juntas Espanolas de Integration). Founded by former 
Franco ministers, the party presented an updated version of the 
Falangism of the Franco regime. Another extreme right-wing party, 
the National Front (Frente Nacional — FN), was formed in October 
1986. On the left, the radical Progressive Federation (Federation 
Progresista — FP) called for greater decentralization and for a neu- 
tralist foreign policy. 

Special interest groups also established political organizations. 
The Spanish Green Party (Partido Verde Espanol — PVE) convened 
its first party congress in February 1985. The group focused on 
wide-ranging environmentalist concerns, and it opposed NATO 



244 



Government and Politics 



membership for Spain. There was also a Feminist Party (Partido 
Feminista — PF) that focused primarily on education. 

Regional Parties 

Spain's system of political parties was complicated by the exis- 
tence of regional parties that were active both at the regional level, 
and, when they had seats in the Cortes, at the national level (see 
table 14, Appendix). In most autonomous communities, politics 
was dominated by regional affiliates of one of the two national par- 
ties, the PSOE and the AP, with the PSOE controlling the greater 
number of regions. In some of the autonomous communities, 
however, these regional offshoots had to form coalitions with truly 
local parties if they wished to govern. Only the Basque Country 
and Catalonia had regional parties that were strong enough to set 
the political agenda; the most important were the PNV and the 
Catalan electoral coalition, Convergence and Union (Convergencia 
i Unio — CiU). These two moderately right-wing parties routinely 
won seats in the Cortes, and the CiU did well enough in regional 
elections to govern Catalonia, if it chose, without the aid of coali- 
tion partners. It was also the only regional party that had a deci- 
sive role in politics on the national level. This foremost exponent 
of Catalan nationalism occasionally supplied important parliamen- 
tary support to the UCD in the late 1970s. By far the second most 
important party in Catalonia was the regional offshoot of the PSOE, 
the Socialists' Party of Catalonia (Partit dels Socialistes de Cata- 
lunya— PSC). 

The Catalan party system in general was characterized by prag- 
matism and by moderation. By contrast, the Basque national par- 
ties were beset by polarization, fragmentation, and political 
violence. In 1986 a group of PNV dissidents, unhappy with both 
the party's economic conservatism and its willingness to cooper- 
ate with the PSOE's stern antiterrorist measures, split from the 
party to form the more radical organization named Basque Soli- 
darity (Eusko Alkartasuna — EA). In addition, there were two more 
extreme Basque nationalist groups, the Basque Left (Euskadiko 
Ezkerra — EE) and the HB. The more radical of these was the HB, 
which included Marxist- Leninist revolutionary and ultranationalist 
groups and which was closely linked to the ETA-M. The party 
emphasized social revolution and armed struggle for Basque inde- 
pendence. The EE party was believed to be tied to the less violent 
ETA Political-Military Front (ETA Politico-Militar— ETA-PM) 
(see Threats to Internal Security, ch. 5). These nationalist parties 
almost invariably won seats in the Cortes. 



245 



Spain: A Country Study 

Political Interest Groups 

The revitalized pluralism that accompanied liberalization in Spain 
after Franco gave rise to new forms of popular participation in the 
country's political process. At the same time, it redefined the exist- 
ing political forces, such as the army and the Roman Catholic 
Church (see Constitutional System, this ch.). Article 9 of the 1978 
Constitution calls on public authorities to facilitate the participa- 
tion of all citizens in the political, the economic, the cultural, and 
the social life of the country. After forty years of depoliticization, 
Spanish citizens began to play an increasingly active role in the 
nation's development, through involvement in the various interest 
groups that were established or reactivated along with the political 
parties. 

Labor 

The labor movement, which had been a major component of 
support for the Republican forces in the Civil War, was brutally 
suppressed after the Nationalists came to power. Vertical syndi- 
cates replaced trade unions, and strikes were outlawed (see The 
Franco Years, ch. 1). Nevertheless, mounting strike activity in the 
1960s and the 1970s, which persisted in spite of severe reprisals, 
testified to the strength of the labor movement, which was a key 
factor in propelling Spain toward a democratic form of government. 

The political changes that swept through Spain in the wake of 
liberalization were not accompanied by commensurate changes in 
social and economic conditions. One of the reasons for this was 
the labor movement's reluctance to voice strong criticisms of the 
governing UCD for fear of provoking a military coup. Because of 
the army's apparent ambivalence toward the nascent democratic 
system, the parties on the left and the labor movement, which 
normally would have been expected to agitate for a significant 
restructuring of the economy and of society, adopted an attitude 
of cooperation and consensus with the government (see Transition 
to Democracy, ch. 1). Although this stance contributed to the suc- 
cess of the transition process, it nevertheless had the effect of post- 
poning necessary societal reforms. The consequences of this delay 
were a salient factor in the labor unrest that reached crisis propor- 
tions in the late 1980s. 

Decree laws in March and in April 1977 legalized trade unions 
and introduced the rights to strike and to engage in collective bar- 
gaining. The 1978 Constitution delineates the rights of unions to 
defend their interests. It grants to all citizens, except members of 
the armed forces and the judiciary, the right to join a union. It 



246 



The Benedictine Monastery of Montserrat, 
located to the northwest of Barcelona, is a bastion of Catalan culture. 

Courtesy James Scofield 

also guarantees them the right not to join one. The first major labor 
legislation enacted under the 1978 Constitution, the Workers' 
Statute that came into force in 1980, further elaborated the rights 
of workers. It included guarantees pertaining to a minimum wage 
and to social security, and it stipulated that labor relations were 
to be worked out between unions and management, with no direct 
government involvement. The statute outlined the format for col- 
lective bargaining, recognizing the right of the elected representa- 
tives of the workers to negotiate on their behalf. 

The basic freedoms and rights of unions were given more detailed 
treatment in the Organic Law on Trade Union Freedom, which 
went into effect in August 1985. This law spelled out the negotiat- 
ing role to which larger unions were entitled, and it prohibited any 
form of discrimination on the part of employers. An earlier govern- 
ment labor statute called for syndical elections to be held every two 
years, and these provided an indication of the national strength 
of the labor unions. 

The two principal unions were the UGT and the CCOO. The 
UGT, which was founded in 1888 and which had a long tradition 
of close ties with the PSOE, was a composite of autonomous local 
unions, each of which consisted of workers engaged in the same 
type of activity, who were organized on a provincial or regional 



247 



Spain: A Country Study 

basis. The UGT favored the idea of increased power at the local 
level, and allowed local unions to call work stoppages independendy. 
In the 1982 union elections, the UGT gained a greater share of 
the vote than the CCOO, which had dominated previous syndical 
elections. 

The CCOO has a shorter history than the UGT, having devel- 
oped out of locally organized groups of workers that functioned 
both legally and clandestinely during the Franco dictatorship. 
Reforms enacted in the late 1950s allowed for the election of factory 
committees that rapidly evolved into permanent bodies represent- 
ing the interests of the workers. Although the founding members 
of this new labor movement were independent socialists and leftist 
Roman Catholics as well as communists, it was the PCE that 
emerged as the dominant force within the movement; the majority 
of leadership positions were held by PCE members. 

As these workers' organizations, called commissions, grew in 
strength and began to proliferate, the Francoist authorities cracked 
down, outlawing them in 1967. This did not stop their activities. 
By the time of Franco's death, the CCOO was the dominant force 
in the labor movement. It subsequently declined in strength, in 
part because of the PCE's decreased electoral support and the con- 
comitant ascendancy of the PSOE. 

Like the UGT, the CCOO was organized into federations of 
workers, based on the type of work they performed. These groups 
were in turn linked together as confederations in territorial con- 
gresses. A national congress met every other year. The structure 
of the CCOO was more centralized than that of the UGT; deci- 
sions made at the top were expected to be carried out throughout 
the lower echelons of the union. 

The CCOO claimed to be politically independent, but the union 
had strong historical links with the PCE, and its important lead- 
ers were also prominent communists. Communist ideology pre- 
vailed, although the union began assuming a tactical distance from 
the PCE in the 1980s, as the party became weakened by internal 
divisions and lost support at the polls. 

The UGT made no effort to de-emphasize its links with the 
PSOE. Both union and party frequently reiterated their common 
aspirations, although there were disagreements between them as 
well as within their respective organizations. The political ties of 
both the UGT and the CCOO were salient factors in the rivalry 
that existed between the two unions. 

In addition to these two major unions, other labor organizations 
remained active and influential in Spaih in the late 1980s. The 
Workers' Syndical Union (Union Sindical Obrera — USO) was 



248 



Government and Politics 



among those that developed in opposition to the Franco regime. 
Many of its founding members had been involved in the Catholic 
workers' organizations, and they were strongly anticommunist. At 
the same time, they sought to replace capitalism with control of 
production by the workers. Militant in its early days, the USO had 
evolved into the most politically conservative of the major federa- 
tions by the 1980s. 

A more radical trade union, the anarcho-syndicalist National 
Confederation of Labor (Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo — 
CNT), was the second oldest labor organization in Spain; it had 
been a major political force during the Second Republic. Failing 
to re-establish its working-class base after the Franco period, it found 
its principal support among white-collar workers. It boycotted syn- 
dical elections as elements of bourgeois democracy and preferred 
direct action strategies. 

Two smaller unions that developed as splinter groups from the 
CCOO were the extreme left Confederation of United Workers' 
Unions (Confederacion de Sindicatos Unitarios de Trabajadores — 
CSUT) and the United Syndicate (Sindicato Unitario — SU). Both 
were linked to Maoist political parties; their aim was to present 
a distinctly radical alternative to the moderation of the major fed- 
erations. Although they gained some support in the 1978 union 
elections, their influence has steadily declined. 

In addition, there were regional unions, two of which gained 
sufficient support to qualify for a formal place in negotiating 
procedures. These were the Basque Workers' Solidarity (Eusko 
Langilleen Alkartasuna-Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos — 
ELA-STV), which was closely linked to the PNV, and the National 
Galician Workers' Union (Intersindical Nacional de Trabajadores 
Gallegos— INTG). 

Although trade unions were highly visible and influential in the 
political process, they all, with the exception of the ELA-STV, 
suffered from small memberships. While studies indicated that less 
than 20 percent of the wage-earning population was affiliated with 
a union, even fewer of these workers maintained their dues pay- 
ments, leaving the trade unions in a financially weak position (see 
Labor Relations in the Post-Franco Period, ch. 3). 

Nevertheless, labor unions continued to maintain a high profile 
in the political arena. Throughout 1987 and 1988, periodic strikes 
plagued the PSOE government and disrupted the day-to-day func- 
tioning of the country. These strikes had the backing of the UGT. 
Discontent within the labor movement was dramatized when the 
UGT leader, Redondo, formerly close to Gonzalez, resigned his 
seat in parliament in protest against government policies. He gave 



249 



Spain: A Country Study 

voice to the widespread feeling that the PSOE's economic policies 
were benefiting business at the expense of the working class. In 
October 1987, the UGT and the CCOO agreed to stage joint 
demonstrations against the government's pay and pension policies, 
and in December 1988 they staged a general strike (see Political 
Developments, 1982-88, this ch.). 

Business 

Throughout the Franco years, a relatively small financial elite 
of businessmen and bankers exercised a considerable amount of 
power through personal influence and connections rather than 
through support from organized interest groups. Moreover, the 
interests of the business community were generally compatible with 
those of the Franco dictatorship: both wanted stability and eco- 
nomic prosperity. In the later years of the regime, business lead- 
ers, influenced by their contacts with Western Europe, came to 
favor more economically liberal policies; many of these leaders 
became vigorous proponents of economic and political moderni- 
zation. 

Many members of the financial elite under Franco continued 
to hold positions of authority after his death. Constitutional and 
statutory provisions enacted under the new democratic regime 
provided more formalized structures to represent their interests and 
those of the wider business community. In the early days of 
democratic government, a large number of employers' organiza- 
tions came into being. Some of these were based on regions; a larger 
number were organized according to the type of business activity 
involved. In 1977 these diverse organizations were brought together 
in the Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organizations (Con- 
federation Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales — CEOE). 
This group subsequently became one of the strongest supporters 
of the AP. A separate confederation, the Spanish Confederation 
of Small and Medium-Sized Firms (Confederacion Espanola de 
Pequenas y Medianas Empresas — CEPYME), was incorporated 
into the CEOE in 1980. It maintained a special status within the 
larger confederation, and when agreements were reached with the 
government and the unions, the CEPYME was a separate sig- 
natory. 

The CEOE was a highly consolidated organization, represent- 
ing almost all of Spain's companies, other than those that were 
owned or controlled by the government. Two other national associa- 
tions endeavored, with little success, to become the representatives 
of smaller-scale businesses: the General Confederation of Small and 
Medium-Sized Firms of Spain (Confederacion General de las 



250 



Government and Politics 



Pequenas y Medianas Empresas del Estado Espanol — COPYME) 
and the Union of Small and Medium-Sized Firms (Union de la 
Pequefia y Mediana Empresa — UNIPYME). 

In addition to employers' organizations, chambers of commerce 
endeavored to further the economic interests of their members by 
providing a variety of services to the firms and the individuals they 
represented. They had an international role as well, and they 
assisted in export promotion and trade missions. 

The greatest degree of political influence within Spain's busi- 
ness community was exercised by the country's large private banks. 
During the Franco regime, the banking sector provided crucial 
financial support for Franco, and he in turn enacted measures that 
were to its benefit. For example, he prohibited the founding of new 
banks from 1936 to 1962, thereby further concentrating the power 
of the larger banks. These banks controlled large sectors of indus- 
try, directly and indirectly, and they collaborated with government 
institutions in directing Spain's economic expansion (see Banking, 
ch. 3). 

The traditionally powerful position of the banks was eroded some- 
what during the economic recession of the 1970s and by increased 
government intervention in banking under the democratic regime. 
The inability of the leaders of the largest banks to transcend their 
mutual rivalries also attenuated the influence of this potentially for- 
midable interest group. Nevertheless, they remained the single larg- 
est grouping of economic and financial interests in Spain, with close 
links to the government. Banks gained additional leverage by 
providing financial assistance to the frequentiy short-funded politi- 
cal parties. 

Roman Catholic Church 

Church and state have been closely linked in Spain for centu- 
ries. With the reinstitution of the Inquisition in Spain in the fifteenth 
century, the state employed draconian measures to enforce reli- 
gious unity in an effort to ensure political unity. Strong measures 
to separate church and state were enacted under the short-lived 
Second Republic, but they were nullified by the victorious Nation- 
alists. In the early years of the Franco regime, church and state 
had a close and mutually beneficial association. The loyalty of the 
Roman Catholic Church to the Francoist state lent legitimacy to 
the dictatorship, which in turn restored and enhanced the church's 
traditional privileges (see The Franco Years, ch. 1). 

After the Second Vatican Council in 1965 set forth the church's 
stand on human rights, the church in Spain moved from a posi- 
tion of unswerving support for Franco's rule to one of guarded 



251 



Spain: A Country Study 

criticism. During the final years of the dictatorship, the church with- 
drew its support from the regime and became one of its harshest 
critics. This evolution in the church's position divided Spanish 
Catholics. Within the institution, right-wing sentiment, opposed 
to any form of democratic change, was typified by the Brother- 
hood of Spanish Priests, the members of which published vitriolic 
attacks on church reformers. Opposition took a more violent form 
in such groups as the rightist Catholic terrorist organization known 
as the Warriors of Christ the King, which assaulted progressive 
priests and their churches. 

Whereas this reactionary faction was vociferous in its resistance 
to any change within the church, other Spanish Catholics were frus- 
trated at the slow pace of reform in the church and in society, and 
they became involved in various leftist organizations. In between 
these extreme positions, a small, but influential, group of Catho- 
lics — who had been involved in lay Catholic organizations such as 
Catholic Action — favored liberalization in both the church and the 
regime, but they did not enter the opposition forces. They formed 
a study group called Tacito, which urged a gradual transition to 
a democratic monarchy. The group's members published articles 
advocating a Christian democratic Spain. 

The church continued to be in opposition to the Franco regime 
throughout the dictatorship's final years. The Joint Assembly of 
Bishops and Priests held in 1971 marked a significant phase in the 
distancing of the church from the Spanish state. This group affirmed 
the progressive spirit of the Second Vatican Council and adopted 
a resolution asking the pardon of the Spanish people for the hier- 
archy's partisanship in the Civil War. 

At the Episcopal Conference convened in 1973, the bishops 
demanded the separation of church and state, and they called for 
a revision of the 1953 Concordat. Subsequent negotiations for such 
a revision broke down because Franco refused to relinquish the power 
to veto Vatican appointments. Until his death, Franco never under- 
stood the opposition of the church. No other Spanish ruler had 
enacted measures so favorable to the church as Franco, and he com- 
plained bitterly about what he considered to be its ingratitude. 

Because the church had already begun its transformation into 
a modern institution a decade before the advent of democracy to 
Spain, it was able to assume an influential role during the transi- 
tion period that followed Franco's death. Furthermore, although 
disagreements over church-state relations and over political issues 
of particular interest to the Roman Catholic Church remained, these 
questions could be dealt with in a less adversarial manner under 
the more liberal atmosphere of the constitutional monarchy. 



252 



Government and Politics 



A revision of the Concordat was approved in July 1976 by the 
newly formed Suarez government. Negotiations soon followed that 
resulted in bilateral agreements, delineating the relationship between 
the Vatican and the new democratic state (see Religion, ch. 2). 
The 1978 Constitution confirms the separation of church and state 
while recognizing the role of the Roman Catholic faith in Spanish 
society (see The 1978 Constitution, this ch.). 

Within this basic framework for the new relationship between 
the church and the government, divisive issues remained to be 
resolved in the late 1980s. The church traditionally had exercised 
considerable influence in the area of education, and it joined con- 
servative opposition parties in mounting a vigorous protest against 
the education reforms that impinged on its control of the schools 
(see Political Developments, 1982-88, this ch.). Even more acri- 
monious debate ensued over the emotionally charged issues of 
divorce and abortion. The church mobilized its considerable influ- 
ence in support of a powerful lobbying effort against proposed legis- 
lation that was contrary to Roman Catholic doctrine governing these 
subjects. The passage of a law in 1981 legalizing civil divorce struck 
a telling blow against the influence of the church in Spanish society. 
A law legalizing abortion under certain circumstances was passed 
in August 1985 and further liberalized in November 1986, over 
the fierce opposition of the church. 

Another manifestation of the redefined role of the church was 
contained in measures aimed at reducing, and ultimately eliminat- 
ing, direct government subsidies to the church. As part of the agree- 
ments reached in 1979, the church concurred with plans for its 
financial independence, to be achieved during a rather lengthy tran- 
sitional period. At the end of 1987, the government announced 
that, after a three-year trial period, the church would receive no 
further direct state aid but would be dependent on what citizens 
chose to provide, either through donations or by designating a por- 
tion of their income tax for the church. Although the church's tax- 
exempt status constituted an indirect subsidy, the effect of this new 
financial status on the church's ability to wield political influence 
remained to be seen. 

Although church-state relations involved potentially polarizing 
issues, the church played a basically cooperative and supportive 
role in the emergence of plural democracy in Spain. Although it 
no longer had a privileged position in society, its very indepen- 
dence from politics and its visibility made it an influential force. 

Opus Dei 

The most influential Catholic lay group during the Franco period 



253 



Spain: A Country Study 

was the controversial Opus Dei (Work of God). This group did 
not fit conveniently into any political category. Although it denied 
any political aims, its members played pivotal roles in the moderni- 
zation of the economy under Franco and in the subsequent liberali- 
zation of politics and government. At the same time, they were 
theologically conservative, and their desire for modernization was 
far from radical. They believed that economic reforms would 
improve society to the extent that thoroughgoing political reforms 
would be unnecessary. 

Opus Dei was founded in 1928 by an Aragonese priest, Jose 
Maria Escriva de Balaguer y Albas, and it was subsequently recog- 
nized by the Roman Catholic Church as its first secular religious 
institution. Although attention has been drawn primarily to its 
activities in Spain, it is an international body with members and 
associates throughout the world. Members take a vow to dedicate 
their professional talents to the service of God and to seek to win 
converts through their missionary zeal. The organization in Spain 
has emphasized professional excellence, and it has expected its mem- 
bers to serve in important government positions. 

During the late 1950s and the 1960s, Opus Dei members came 
to control the economic ministries, and they occupied other impor- 
tant cabinet posts as well. This was in keeping with the organiza- 
tion's aim of influencing the development of society indirecdy. Opus 
Dei recruited its members from among the brightest students, which 
encouraged a sense of elitism and clannishness. Because of this clan- 
nishness and the secrecy that surrounded the organization, some 
critics termed it the "Holy Mafia." 

The Opus Dei technocrats were largely responsible for devising, 
introducing, and later administering the economic stabilization pro- 
gram that formed the basis of Spain's economic development. They 
encouraged competition as a means of achieving rapid economic 
growth, and they favored economic integration with Europe. 
Although these policies implied eventual political as well as eco- 
nomic liberalization, this was not Opus Dei's avowed goal; the 
group remained socially conservative, stressing personal piety and 
orthodox theology. 

With the advent of democracy, Opus Dei lost much of its influ- 
ence, and it was condemned by the more progressive forces in both 
the Catholic hierarchy and Spanish society for having propped up 
a repressive regime. Its stature was somewhat restored under Pope 
John Paul II, who viewed the orthodox Catholicism of the organi- 
zation with favor. Opus Dei remained influential in the area of 
education as well as in certain sectors of the financial community. 



254 



Government and Politics 



Military 

Military intervention in politics has been a recurring theme in 
Spain since the end of the Napoleonic wars. From 1814 to 1936, 
Spain experienced no fewer than fifty-four attempts by the army 
or by groups of officers to intervene against the civilian authority. 
Twelve of these succeeded in overthrowing the existing regime or 
in abrogating its constitution. The form each of these interventions 
took was that of a pronunciamiento (pi., pronunciamientos) , whereby 
a group of rebelling officers would "pronounce" what it wanted 
the civilian leaders to do (see Rule by Pronunciamiento, ch. 1; 
Historical Role of the Armed Forces, ch. 5). 

The support of the armed forces was an essential factor in main- 
taining Franco's forty-year dictatorship. Franco was always aware 
of the importance of this support, and he managed to foster the 
belief that the army's interests would be served best by the con- 
tinuation of his rule. Franco restored to the army its role of guaran- 
tor of the nation's values. At the same time, Franco was aware 
of the dangers of a politicized army. He retained firm control of 
the military establishment and prevented any individual officer from 
gaining a power base. If a military leader became too popular or 
began to question Franco's policies, he was quickly removed from 
any position of influence. 

Following the death of Franco, King Juan Carlos and Prime 
Minister Suarez were able to achieve a peaceful transition to 
democracy by proceeding with extreme caution and consulting with 
the military leadership throughout the process. Thus, the military 
leaders retained the belief that they had the right to be consulted 
on matters of national importance. The democratic leftists were 
also aware of the ever-present possibility that reformist measures 
could alienate the military and could provoke a coup attempt, which 
led them to accept many compromises throughout the transition 
period. 

The role of King Juan Carlos was vital in gaining the army's 
acceptance of the new democratic regime. He had been trained 
in military academies, and he understood the viewpoint of the officer 
corps. He made a point of establishing close ties with the armed 
forces after Franco's death in order to gain their loyalty to him 
as Franco's chosen successor. At the same time, he was able to keep 
the government informed as to how far it could go in the reform 
process without provoking a military reaction. 

Although many officers did not care for the political reform pro- 
gram set forth by Suarez, the military leaders did not express open 
opposition to the democratization process until the legalization of 



255 



Spain: A Country Study 

the PCE in the spring of 1977 (see Transition to Democracy, ch. 1). 
They felt betrayed by Suarez, who had promised not to take such 
a step, and although there was no coup, they protested vehemently. 

The independence with which the army leaders had expressed 
their revulsion at the government's decision highlighted the possi- 
bility that a powerful military organization could limit popular 
sovereignty. Subsequently, measures were taken to affirm the 
supremacy of civilian control. At the same time, the government 
took steps to assuage military opinion by allocating funds for the 
modernization of military equipment and for raising military 
salaries. Efforts also were made to rationalize the military career 
structure and to eliminate bottlenecks in the promotion process. 

In succeeding months, the armed forces and the civilian govern- 
ment coexisted uneasily. Intermittent rumblings were heard from 
reactionary army leaders, who retained an antidemocratic men- 
tality and who could not come to terms with their new position 
in society. The armed forces seethed with plots for military take- 
overs, and the government's leniency toward conspirators, rather 
than mollifying the military leaders, encouraged the plotters to more 
daring acts. This unstable situation was exacerbated by the esca- 
lation of terrorist violence. Army dissidents perceived the govern- 
ment as allowing the country to descend into anarchy, and military 
unrest culminated in the dramatic coup attempt of February 23, 
1981 . This attempted takeover was thwarted by the decisive inter- 
vention of King Juan Carlos, but conspiracies continued to be 
uncovered. 

When the Socialists came to power in 1982, the deterrent power 
of the armed forces was still a factor to be considered. The PSOE 
government continued to be cautious in dealing with issues affect- 
ing the military, although it took a firmer stance than did its 
predecessors. As rumors of impending coups quieted, and as 
extreme right-wing parties failed to gain popular support, the 
government undertook stronger legal measures to bring the armed 
forces under the political control of the prime minister as well as 
to modernize and to streamline the military organization (see The 
Military in National Life and Jurisdiction Over National Defense, 
ch. 5). 

A significant aspect of the military reorganization was the empha- 
sis on the armed forces' role in defending the state from external, 
not internal, enemies. This was reinforced by Spain's entrance into 
NATO (see Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
this ch.). This new outward focus, combined with the general sta- 
bility and conservatism of the government, helped to make mili- 
tary intervention in the political realm both impractical and unlikely. 



256 



King Juan Carlos 
and Queen Sofia 
Courtesy National 
Tourist Office of Spain 




Mass Communications 

Newspapers and Periodicals 

Under the rigorous censorship that prevailed during the Franco 
regime, only news favorable to the government could appear in 
the press, and there was little concern for the veracity of such 
reports. With no reliable coverage of political events, reportage 
diminished to a few items pertaining to society news, sports, or 
business. 

A new press law, approved in 1966, provided a degree of liberali- 
zation for publications and eliminated prior censorship, although 
newspapers were expected to exercise self-censorship. The 1966 law 
did not usher in freedom of the press, but it did expand the scope 
of news that could be published; newspapers even began debating 
what forms of government might evolve after Franco's death. 

Although the 1978 Constitution guarantees the right to dis- 
seminate information, as of mid-1988 the 1966 press law had not 
been replaced, and regulations dating from the Franco years had 
been used in attempts to control journalists who published articles 
offensive to the government. In addition, some observers believed 
that government subsidies to the press, beginning in 1979, threat- 
ened to compromise true freedom of the press. 

The early post-Franco years witnessed a proliferation of news- 
papers and magazines, although many of these were short lived. 



257 



Spain: A Country Study 

The enthusiasm for publishing was not matched by a commensurate 
eagerness for reading on the part of the populace. In part because 
of the prolonged repression of the dictatorship, Spaniards had lost 
the habit of reading newspapers. Whereas about 2,000 newspapers 
had appeared daily during the Second Republic, in the 1980s there 
were only 130 (see table 15, Appendix). This drastically reduced 
figure was an indication of the population's distrust of the press, 
although the growth of radio and television newscasts was also a 
factor. Spain's per capita newspaper circulation was far below that 
of most West European countries, and in the late 1980s less than 
10 percent of the population regularly bought a daily newspaper. 

By all accounts, the most influential newspaper was El Pais, 
founded in 1976. It played a critical role in guiding the formation 
of opinion in the early days of Spanish democracy. The paper main- 
tained a liberal, factually objective viewpoint, and it appealed 
primarily to well-educated citizens. In the mid-1980s, it was the 
country's largest daily newspaper, with a circulation of 350,000 
daily and 590,000 on Sundays. 

The much older ABC was a conservative-monarchist newspaper. 
Founded in 1905, it enjoyed wide popularity during the Franco 
years, but its circulation declined after 1975. El Alcazar represented 
ultra-right wing opposition to democratic policies. Many of its arti- 
cles pertained to the armed forces, because it appealed to a sector 
of society still nostalgic for Francoism. The oldest continuously pub- 
lished newspaper in Spain was La Vanguardia, founded in 1881 and 
published in Barcelona. Until the early 1980s, this conservative 
paper had the largest circulation in the country. 

Other major daily newspapers included the Catholic rightist Ya, 
which strongly defended the church's position on such issues as 
divorce and abortion, and Diario 16, which began publication in 
1975 as a spinoff of the respected weekly, Cambio 16. Marca was 
a popular daily newspaper, devoted exclusively to sports news. 
Founded in the early days of the Franco regime, it enjoyed immense 
popularity between 1940 and 1970, primarily because sports cover- 
age was the only uncensored news permitted by the government. 
There were also a number of important regional newspapers in 
Catalonia (Avui) and in the Basque Country (Deia in Bilbao and 
Egin in San Sebastian) that published, at least partly, in the respec- 
tive regional language; the circulation of each usually ran between 
40,000 and 50,000 daily. 

One large news agency, EFE, dominated the distribution of news. 
This national agency, which the government owned and subsi- 
dized, was controlled by the Ministry of Transportation, Tourism, 
and Communications. The government frequently exercised its 



258 



Government and Politics 



prerogative of appointing EFE directors. At the same time, finan- 
cial aid from the state contributed to the significant growth of the 
agency. Observers questioned the appropriateness of newspapers' 
receiving their information from an agency so closely linked with 
the government. 

In addition to newspapers, Spain had a large number of weekly 
and monthly periodicals that filled in the gaps in newspaper 
coverage. Two leading weeklies specialized in political reporting: 
Cambio 16, founded in 1972; and its more recent, somewhat sen- 
sationalist rival, Tiempo. Other periodicals for the most part con- 
centrated on entertainment, social events, sports, and television. 
One of the most popular magazines in Spain, Interviu, combined 
unrestrained political reporting with equally uninhibited photo- 
graphy. This blending of political and sexual liberation proved 
highly attractive to Spanish readers, after Franco's repressive poli- 
cies in both these areas. The best- selling magazine in Spain was 
the weekly television review Tele-Indiscreta, the large circulation of 
which indicated the immense popularity of television throughout 
the country. 

Radio and Television 

Spain was served by four major radio networks in the late 1980s: 
Radio Nacional Espanola (RNE), controlled by the government; 
Radio Cadena Espanola (RCE), which consisted of stations for- 
merly owned by Francoist groups; Cadena de Ondas Populares 
Espanolas (COPE), a network supported by the Roman Catholic 
Church; and Sociedad Espanola de Radiodifiision (SER), the larg- 
est and most popular of the commercial networks. 

The 1975 Geneva Conference restricted the number of networks 
that might operate on the medium wave in each country. In Spain, 
the four major networks plus one Catalan station broadcast on the 
medium wave as well as on frequency modulation (FM). A num- 
ber of new stations and networks began broadcasting on FM after 
the government redistributed the franchises in 1982. The quality 
and the popularity of this FM programming had increased to such 
an extent, that in the mid-1980s, more Spaniards were listening 
to FM than to medium wave. In 1986 there were approximately 
10.8 million radio receivers in the country. 

Radio broadcasting was regulated by the General Bureau for 
Radio Broadcasting and Television (Direccion General de Radio- 
difusion y Television). In October 1977, the government relin- 
quished its monopoly on radio news dissemination and declared 
that it would no longer require the country's nonstate radio sta- 
tions to broadcast government news bulletins. News coverage 



259 



Spain: A Country Study 

became both faster and better after the end of RNE's monopoly, 
as was evidenced dramatically during the February 1981 coup 
attempt, when radio correspondents provided vivid and timely 
descriptions of the night's events to a worried population, in a man- 
ner that neither the slower print media nor state-run television could 
match. 

Of the various forms of communications media, television occu- 
pied a unique position in the shaping of Spanish social values and 
institutions. Spaniards received a relatively small proportion of their 
news and information from the print media, and they spent more 
time watching television than the people of any other country in 
Western Europe except Britain. Even most of the poorest homes 
had television sets, which numbered approximately 10 million in 
1986. 

Television was controlled by a state monopoly, Radio-Television 
Espafiola (RTVE), the responsibility for which was shuffled from 
one ministry to another in the 1970s and the 1980s. Television as 
well as radio continued to be subject to intense government scrutiny 
and censorship through the early years of the post-Franco era, and 
the Francoist notion of television as an arm of government did not 
end with Franco's death. As part of agreements stemming from 
the Moncloa Pacts, a governing body was established to guaran- 
tee RTVE's objectivity (see Transition to Democracy, ch. 1). This 
body, called the Administrative Council, was to consist of six mem- 
bers elected by the Congress of Deputies in order to ensure that 
it would reflect the political composition of the Cortes. This coun- 
cil was less than vigilant in its watchdog role, however, and dur- 
ing the late 1970s and the 1980s there were many cases of political 
and financial corruption as well as mismanagement on the part 
of RTVE. 

Spain had two national television programs: one ultrahigh fre- 
quency (UHF) and the other, very high frequency (VHF). They 
operated under the country's only television network, Television 
Espanola (TVE), which in turn was under the jurisdiction of the 
RTVE. In the 1980s, several autonomous governments obtained 
permission to build television transmission facilities for broadcast- 
ing in their regional languages. 

The most noteworthy development regarding television in the 
late 1980s was the passage of a bill in April 1986, which, when 
carried out, will end the state monopoly on television by allowing 
three new private television networks to operate under the super- 
vision of an independent broadcasting authority. The bill included 
restrictions to prevent private investors from gaining a monopoly 
control of a station, and it also established requirements about 



260 



Government and Politics 



programming. The bill became law on April 4, 1987, and observers 
noted that the introduction of commercial television might lead to 
an improvement in the rather erratic programming of Spanish tele- 
vision. 

Foreign Relations 

Spain's remote position on the southwest periphery of Western 
Europe has affected much of its history, even when it belonged to 
the Roman, the Habsburg, and the Napoleonic empires. The 
Pyrenees have presented a formidable land barrier against both 
invasions and influences from the north. At the same time, Spain's 
location at the western entrance of the Mediterranean has impelled 
the country to play the role of an important maritime power and 
has enabled it to act as a bridge among Europe, Africa, and the 
Americas. 

In the nineteenth century, Spain, beset by political instability 
deriving from the cataclysm of the French Revolution as well as 
from its own later failure to participate in the Industrial Revolu- 
tion, withdrew behind its borders. After suffering a humiliating 
defeat by the United States in the Spanish-American War and los- 
ing its last colonies in the Philippines and the New World, Spain's 
focus turned even further inward. Neutral in both world wars, Spain 
found that its isolation deepened during the Franco years, intensi- 
fied by the ostracism the country experienced because of its associ- 
ations with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. 

After the Nationalist victory in the Civil War, the Franco regime 
devoted itself primarily to domestic affairs, relegating foreign con- 
siderations to a secondary position. The primary concerns were 
to establish political stability and to ensure economic reconstruc- 
tion and development. Spanish diplomacy was an instrument with 
which the government tried to obtain political legitimacy and to 
gain Spain's acceptance by the international community. Franco 
played the leading role in pursuing these foreign policy goals, as 
he did in every other aspect of his government. 

Spain's pariah status following World War II strengthened 
Franco's internal position, solidifying the support of the Spanish 
people behind their beleaguered leader. Nevertheless, as Spain 
began to benefit from mounting Cold War tensions, from signing 
an agreement with the United States, and from achieving United 
Nations (UN) membership, the siege mentality of the Spanish peo- 
ple lessened (see Foreign Policy under Franco, ch. 1). 

Spain and the European Community 

As Spain began to emerge from its postwar isolation, successive 



261 



Spain: A Country Study 

Franco cabinets sought to establish closer ties with Europe. After 
Franco's death, this became Spain's major diplomatic goal. The 
desire to be recognized as a member of the West European 
democratic societies was a primary motivating factor in Spain's 
attempts to gain membership in the European Community (EC). 

Spain had become an associate member of the Organisation for 
European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in 1958 and a full mem- 
ber of that organization's successor, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD — see Glossary), in 1959. 
It also had gained membership in the World Bank (see Glossary). 
The EC, however, was much more reluctant to have Spain join 
its ranks. Agreement for a preferential commercial trade pact was 
reached in March 1970, after six years of negotiations, but it was 
a strictiy economic accord. The continued existence of undemocratic 
governmental institutions in Spain was strongly resented by member 
countries of the EC, and it continued to be a barrier to Spanish 
accession. 

Shortly after Spain's first democratically elected government in 
more than forty years came to power in June 1977, Prime Minister 
Suarez dispatched his foreign minister to Brussels to present Spain's 
formal application to join the EC. The major political parties in 
Spain, divided over other issues, all firmly supported this attempt 
to advance Spain's modernization as well as its international legiti- 
mation. Prospects for the approval of this application were enhanced 
by the implementation of democratic policies by the post-Franco 
governments. European attitudes toward Spain began to improve, 
and Spain was admitted to membership in the Council of Europe 
(see Glossary), in November 1977. The Spanish government's 
determination to continue moving in the direction of closer rela- 
tions with Europe was manifested in the creation in February 1978 
of a new cabinet-level position, that of minister in charge of rela- 
tions with Europe. 

Nevertheless, negotiations for Spain's accession to the EC were 
complicated and protracted. After Spain had acquired the neces- 
sary democratic credentials, the economic implications of the pro- 
spective Spanish accession caused misgivings among EC members. 
Spain's level of economic development was significantiy lower than 
that of other member nations, and its industrial sector was in need 
of profound structural reform. There were also difficulties concern- 
ing Spain's fishing fleets. It was in the area of agriculture, however, 
that the potential consequences of Spanish membership created the 
greatest concern among EC members, particularly France. These 
and other factors would necessitate substantial increases in budget 



262 



Government and Politics 



expenditures on the part of the EC , which was already experienc- 
ing a financial crisis (see Spain and the European Community, 
ch. 3). 

After lengthy bargaining, agreements were reached on these 
issues, and a Treaty of Accession was signed in the summer of 1985. 
On January 1 , 1986, Spain finally entered the EC, along with Por- 
tugal. The terms of the Treaty of Accession were less than favor- 
able to Spain, making the country a net contributor to the EC 
budget for several years, but there was no popular or governmen- 
tal protest. A major nonpartisan foreign policy objective had been 
achieved, and most Spaniards savored the long-awaited feeling of 
formal inclusion in the West European society of nations. 

Their enthusiasm was tempered in subsequent months, as issues, 
such as the barring of Spanish fishermen from Moroccan waters 
because of an EC dispute with Morocco, made clear that not all 
aspects of EC membership would be beneficial to Spain. A poll 
taken in the spring of 1987 revealed that a large majority of 
Spaniards believed that entry into the EC had not helped Spain. 
Farmers were particularly dissatisfied with the consequences of the 
EC's Common Agricultural Policy. Nevertheless, the same poll 
indicated that a majority of Spaniards favored EC membership and 
that their sense of being "citizens of Europe" was increasing. 

Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Even though popular and official opinion had been virtually 
unanimous in favoring Spain's accession to the EC, considerable 
doubts were expressed with regard to Spanish membership in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Spain's significant 
geographical position, astride some of the world's major sea, air, 
and land communication routes, made it a valuable potential part- 
ner for the alliance. Spanish proponents of NATO membership 
argued that these same geopolitical considerations made such mem- 
bership equally advantageous to Spain, because the country's stra- 
tegic location could make it an obvious target in any major conflict 
unless it had allied support. They also maintained that integra- 
tion into NATO would ensure sorely needed modernization of 
Spain's armed services in addition to the securing of adequate 
national defense. A corollary hope was that NATO membership 
would reorient the focus of army leaders away from reactionary 
preoccupations and toward defense of the West. 

Many political forces in Spain, particularly the socialists and the 
communists, did not agree that full membership would benefit the 
country's defense and foreign policy aims. On the contrary, they 
felt it would raise the level of tension between the rival power blocs 



263 



Spain: A Country Study 

and would make Spain a more likely target in any future conflict 
with the Soviet Union. Moreover, opponents of NATO member- 
ship pointed out that NATO would be of no assistance in an area 
of primary concern to Spain: the two Spanish enclaves of Ceuta 
and Melilla, which are located in Morocco and which are outside 
the geographic zone of application of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
They also maintained that NATO would be of no benefit to Spain 
in the country's long-standing effort to recover Gibraltar, because 
it could be assumed that other NATO members would support 
Britain on this issue (see Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla, this ch.). 
Resentment of the United States as the principal supporter of the 
Franco regime was another factor influencing those who opposed 
Spain's entry into NATO. 

Although Suarez had announced Spain's intention of applying 
for NATO membership, his Union of the Democratic Center 
(Union de Centro Democratico — UCD) government remained 
somewhat divided over the question. After Suarez resigned in 1981 , 
his successor, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, gave high priority to this 
issue, arguing that Spain's entry into NATO would expedite negoti- 
ations for integration into the EC. In December 1981, the Cortes 
approved membership in NATO by majority vote, over the vigor- 
ous opposition of a large leftist minority. Spain officially joined 
NATO in May 1982. 

Leaders on the left protested bitterly that NATO membership 
had been pushed through parliament in violation of the consensus 
that had been the basis of all major political decisions since 1977. 
The Socialists organized a protest campaign, and the PSOE leader, 
Gonzalez, made the NATO issue a major feature of his electoral 
platform in 1982, promising a popular referendum on withdrawal 
from NATO in the event of a Socialist victory. 

No immediate steps were taken to fulfill this promise, following 
the overwhelming Socialist victory in October 1982, although the 
PSOE confirmed in June 1983 that it would campaign in favor 
of withdrawal when the referendum was held. Many Socialists took 
part in a large anti-NATO demonstration organized by the PCE 
in June 1984, but Gonzalez was having second thoughts, and he 
found reasons to delay the referendum. Although neutralist opinion 
remained strong in Spain, the government evolved toward a posi- 
tion favoring continued membership in NATO, which it perceived 
as the principal guarantor of European security. A significant fac- 
tor in this change of position was the fear that withdrawal from 
NATO might become an insuperable obstacle to entry into the EC . 

When the referendum eventually was set for March 2, 1986, 
Gonzalez engaged in a vigorous campaign for continued, but limited, 



264 



Government and Politics 



NATO membership. The government presented NATO member- 
ship as a corollary to EC membership, and it warned of the seri- 
ous economic consequences of a vote to withdraw. In spite of 
opinion polls indicating the probability of a negative outcome, the 
government secured a clear margin of victory for its position. With 
almost 60 percent of the electorate participating, 52.6 percent of 
the voters supported Spain's continued membership in NATO, 
while 39.8 percent opposed it. Spain remained the sixteenth member 
of NATO (see Participation in NATO, ch. 5). 

The following year, in a move seen as emphasizing the European 
aspect of the defense system, Gonzalez made a bid for Spanish mem- 
bership in the Western European Union (WEU), a seven-nation 
European defense grouping, originally formed in 1948, that experi- 
enced revitalization in the 1980s. On April 19, 1988, Spain and 
Portugal were formally invited to join the organization. 

Spain and the United States 

The anti- American sentiment that figured significantly in Spain's 
relations with NATO had its roots in the historical rivalry between 
the two countries for control of the territories of the New World. 
The Spanish- American War ended this rivalry, stripping Spain of 
its remaining colonies and leaving a residue of bitterness toward 
the United States. 

In the years following the Spanish-American War, economic 
issues dominated relations between Spain and the United States, 
as Spain sought to enhance its trading position by developing closer 
commercial ties with the United States as well as with Latin 
America. A series of trade agreements signed between Spain and 
the United States in 1902, 1906, and 1910 led to an increased 
exchange of manufactured goods and agricultural products that 
benefited Spain's domestic economy. Cultural contacts and tourism 
also increased. 

The emotions of the American public were stirred profoundly 
by the outbreak of the Civil War in Spain, and approximately 3,000 
United States citizens volunteered to serve in the Spanish Repub- 
lican Army, although the United States government remained 
adamantly neutral. Following the Nationalist victory, much of pub- 
lic opinion in the United States condemned Franco's regime as a 
fascist dictatorship, but the United States government participated 
in various Allied agreements with Spain, aimed at ensuring that 
Franco would not permit the Iberian Peninsula to be used by Adolf 
Hider against Allied forces (see Foreign Policy under Franco, ch. 1). 

The 1953 Pact of Madrid between Spain and the United States 
provided for mutual defense as well as for United States military 



265 



Spain: A Country Study 

aid, and it brought to an end Spain's postwar isolation. It did not 
end anti- Americanism in Spain, however. Francoist leaders resented 
having to accept what they considered to be insufficient military 
supplies in return for basing rights. They also chafed at United 
States restrictions against the use of American equipment in defend- 
ing Spain's North African territories in 1957. This anti- American 
sentiment was bipartisan in Spain. Whereas Francoists resented 
the United States for its democratic form of government, the opposi- 
tion parties in Spain perceived the United States as the primary 
supporter of the Franco regime and therefore as a major obstacle 
to the democratization of Spain. 

Following the death of Franco in 1975, the United States wel- 
comed the liberalization of the Spanish regime under King Juan 
Carlos and sought to bring Spain further into Western military 
arrangements. In 1976 the bilateral agreement between Spain and 
the United States was transformed into a Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation. In addition to renewing United States basing rights 
in return for United States military and economic aid, this treaty 
provided for a United States-Spanish Council intended to serve 
as a bridge to eventual Spanish membership in NATO. 

During the early years of democratic rule, the government's focus 
was on consolidating the parliamentary system, and foreign policy 
issues received less attention. However, a point of contention per- 
sisted between the governing UCD and the Socialist opposition over 
Spain's relations with NATO and with the United States (see Spain 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, this ch.). 

When Calvo Sotelo replaced Suarez as prime minister in 1981, 
he made vigorous efforts to gain approval for Spanish member- 
ship in NATO, and shortly after this was accomplished a new execu- 
tive agreement on the use of bases in Spain was signed with the 
United States in July 1982. This agreement was one of a series 
of renewals of the basic 1953 arrangement, providing for United 
States use of strategic naval and air bases on Spanish soil in ex- 
change for United States military and economic assistance (see Mili- 
tary Cooperation with the United States, ch. 5). 

Many Spaniards resented the presence of these bases in Spain, 
recalling the widely publicized photograph of United States presi- 
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower, throwing his arms around Franco 
when the first agreement on bases was signed. There were occa- 
sional popular protests against these reminders of United States 
support for the dictatorship, including a demonstration during 
United States president Ronald Reagan's 1985 visit to Spain. 

The Socialists had consistently advocated a more neutralist, inde- 
pendent stance for Spain, and when they came to power in 



266 



Government and Politics 



October 1982, Gonzalez pledged a close examination of the defense 
and cooperation agreements with the United States. A reduction 
in the United States military presence in Spain was one of the stipu- 
lations contained in the referendum, held in 1986, on continued 
NATO membership. In keeping with this, the prime minister 
announced in December 1987 that the United States would have 
to remove its seventy-two F-16 fighter-bombers from Spanish bases 
by mid- 1991 . Spain also had informed the United States in Novem- 
ber that the bilateral defense agreement, which opinion polls indi- 
cated was rejected overwhelmingly by the Spanish population, 
would not be renewed. Nevertheless, in January 1988 Spain and 
the United States did reach agreement in principle on a new base 
agreement to last eight years. The new military arrangements called 
for a marked reduction of the United States presence in Spain and 
terminated the United States military and economic aid that had 
been tied to the defense treaty. 

Spain and Latin America 

One of Spain's major foreign policy objectives since the advent 
of democracy has been to increase its influence in Latin America. 
Spain has a special interest in this area because of historical ties 
and a common linguistic, cultural, and religious heritage. In the 
post-Franco years, economic investments and diplomatic initiatives 
were added to the more nostalgic links between Spain and its former 
colonies. 

Relations between Spain and Latin America have undergone 
profound transformation since Spain's imperial days. Resentment 
of Spain as the imperial power continued long after the colonial 
period, because many Latin Americans blamed Spain for their lack 
of progress and for their problems with democratization. In the 
early years of independence, the attitude of most Latin Americans 
was one of disdain for Spain. This changed, following the Spanish- 
American War in 1898. The devastating defeat inflicted upon Spain 
by the United States combined with increased United States inter- 
ference in Latin America led the two Hispanic areas to draw closer 
together in the face of a common enemy. Both Spain and Latin 
America began to re-emphasize their common ties of culture, lan- 
guage, and religion, although trade, diplomatic, and political rela- 
tions between the two areas remained minimal. 

During the 1950s, modernized methods of communications and 
transportation facilitated closer contacts between Spain and Latin 
America. Trade increased, and Spain's rapid economic growth in 
the 1960s and the 1970s enabled the country to approach its rela- 
tions with Latin America from a position of greater economic 



267 



Spain: A Country Study 



strength. A paradoxical foreign policy phenomenon during this 
period was the refusal of the fiercely anticommunist Franco to break 
off relations with Fidel Castro Ruz's Marxist Cuba. In this instance, 
historical ties appeared to take precedence over ideology. 

After Franco's death, Spain's transition to a democratic form 
of government was paralleled by the establishment of various forms 
of democratic rule in some Latin American countries. The timing 
of these governmental changes was largely coincidental, although 
Spain offered its transition process as an example for Latin America 
to follow. 

The democratization process in Spain caused a reorientation of 
Spanish foreign policy. Under Suarez, Spain pursued a more 
aggressive foreign policy, which included giving increased atten- 
tion to Latin America. Both Suarez and King Juan Carlos made 
official visits to most of the Latin American countries, and Span- 
ish investment in the area increased markedly. When war broke 
out between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas) in the spring of 1982, Spain supported Argentina's claim 
to the islands, even though the Spanish government opposed the 
military junta that ruled Argentina at the time. 

When the Socialists came to power in 1982, Foreign Minister 
Fernando Moran asserted that the amount of influence Spain could 
exert in Europe and on the United States would depend on Spain's 
maintaining special relationships outside these areas, particularly 
with Latin America. In keeping with this policy, the Socialist 
government created a special assistance program for Latin America 
that had a budget of tens of millions of dollars in 1985. 

A particular area of concern for Gonzalez was the intensifying 
conflict in Central America. Under his leadership, Spain took an 
active part in the Contadora Group, an association of Latin Ameri- 
can republics seeking peaceful solutions to the bloody struggles in 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. 

Before becoming prime minister, Gonzalez had been involved 
in the articulation of the Socialist International's policies toward 
Latin America and had served as the president of that organiza- 
tion's committee for the support of the Nicaraguan Revolution, 
which was formed in 1980. Although Gonzalez was sympathetic 
to the early goals of the Sandinistas, who had seized power in 1979, 
he later became highly critical of their radical Marxist policies. He 
favored the more pragmatic approach of Latin America's social 
democrats. 

It became increasingly apparent that the prime minister's moder- 
ate views were in marked contrast to the Marxist orientation of 
his foreign minister. Gonzalez was also less stridentiy anti- American 



268 



Government and Politics 



than Moran. Although critical of United States actions in both 
Nicaragua and El Salvador, the prime minister recognized that the 
United States had legitimate interests in the area and that it could 
not be excluded from the negotiating process. These increasingly 
divergent views between Gonzalez and his foreign minister led to 
the latter' s removal in the summer of 1985. 

Moran 's successor, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, followed a 
more restrained approach — calling for Spain to be the Iberian- 
American conscience of Europe — in furthering Spain's active role 
in Latin America. Spain continued to support efforts for a peace- 
ful resolution to the strife in Central America. In January 1988, 
Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega requested that Spain take part 
in the verification of the peace process in Central America. Gonzalez 
accepted the proposal, provided that the other Central American 
governments were in agreement and that a cease-fire were in effect. 
The prime minister reiterated his support of the Contadora Group 
and emphasized that the countries involved had the ultimate respon- 
sibility for finding a solution to the conflict. He also called for an 
end to United States aid for the armed forces fighting against the 
Sandinista government (Contras) so that the peace plan could be 
implemented. 

Although Spain had again become a significant presence in Latin 
America in the 1980s, there was no indication that it was on the 
way to supplanting the United States in the region, or, indeed, 
that it wanted to assume that role. At the same time, a vital sense 
of Hispanic commonality between Spain and Latin America 
appeared likely to continue. 

Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla 

The return of Gibraltar to Spain has remained a foreign policy 
goal for all Spanish rulers since the area was lost to Britain under 
the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 (see War of the Spanish 
Succession; Foreign Policy under Franco, ch. 1). Franco's fierce 
determination to regain Gibraltar culminated in his closing the 
frontier between Spain and Gibraltar in 1969. Governments that 
came to power after the regime was democratized engaged in calmer 
but equally persistent negotiations with the British and with the 
residents of Gibraltar over the future of the area. These discus- 
sions ultimately resulted in the April 1980 Lisbon Agreement, which 
was more symbolic than substantive, but which served as a frame- 
work for subsequent Anglo-Spanish negotiations. 

The Spanish government had intended to reopen the frontier 
between Spain and Gibraltar shortly after the signing of the Lisbon 
Agreement, but it postponed this step in anger at a series of British 



269 



Spain: A Country Study 

actions, including the use of Gibraltar as a military depot and refuel- 
ing base during the Falklands War in 1982. The frontier was finally 
reopened in the early days of the Socialist government that was 
elected later in the year. 

Spain's entry into NATO added new complications to the Gibral- 
tar question, including Spain's insistence that Gibraltar was a 
NATO naval base as well as a British one, a contention that the 
British government denied. The Spanish navy refused to partici- 
pate in joint military exercises with the British while Britain main- 
tained a military base on Gibraltar. At the same time, Spanish 
membership in NATO provided a vehicle for negotiations on the 
Gibraltar question in a less competitive atmosphere. It also put 
Spain in a better bargaining position. 

The ultimate issue underlying the various twists and turns of 
the Gibraltar problem was sovereignty. The approximately 30,000 
residents of Gibraltar remained adamantly opposed to becoming 
Spanish citizens, although the UN continued to pass resolutions 
condemning British rule in Gibraltar as a colonial situation. As 
a more flexible and democratic government took root in Spain, 
however, and as the country achieved greater integration into 
Europe through its EC and NATO memberships, the possibility 
of a resolution of the sovereignty issue became less remote. The 
Socialist government, unlike its predecessors, emphasized that any 
solution to this problem must be in keeping with the interests of 
Gibraltar's inhabitants. This led observers to conjecture that — 
through some type of regional autonomy structure, provided for 
in the 1978 Constitution — a long-term plan for a form of autono- 
mous government for Gibraltar acceptable to all concerned, might 
be possible. 

In much the same way that Spain laid claim to Gibraltar as part 
of its territory, Morocco maintained that the Spanish enclaves of 
Ceuta and Melilla were integral parts of Morocco's sovereign ter- 
ritory. The two North African towns and their tiny offshore islands, 
the last vestiges of Spain's far-flung empire, had belonged to the 
Spanish crown for centuries. Both were administered as integral 
parts of Spain and had predominantly Spanish populations; Spain 
insisted that they remain Spanish. 

Ceuta, which had become a Spanish possession following the 
union with Portugal in 1580, was historically a focal point for trade 
between Europe and Africa. Located only thirty kilometers from 
metropolitan Spain, it could reasonably be regarded as a natural 
prolongation of the Iberian Peninsula. Although Ceuta was used 
for military purposes, it also functioned as a fishing port, and it 
had close economic links with Andalusia. 



270 




View of Ceuta 
Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain 

There were almost no direct links between Ceuta and the other 
Spanish enclave of Melilla, which had come under Spanish rule 
in the late fifteenth century. Melilla was situated more than 500 
kilometers away from the Iberian Peninsula, and it did not benefit 
from the lively tourist traffic that Ceuta enjoyed. Because of its 
geographical location, Melilla also was subject to greater influence 
from its Moroccan hinterland than was Ceuta. In addition, more 
Moroccans actually lived in Melilla than in Ceuta, where the 
atmosphere was far more European. 

There were protests on the part of the Muslim communities in 
both enclaves over the passage, in July 1985, of an aliens law, which 
required all foreigners in Spain to register with the authorities or 
be expelled. Tensions were especially high in Melilla, where less 
than one-third of the Muslim community held Spanish nationality. 
Promises from Madrid to assist in integrating the Muslims of both 
enclaves into Spanish society angered portions of the local Span- 
ish communities, who in turn demonstrated in support of the aliens 
law. 

The outlook for continued Spanish sovereignty in the two enclaves 
appeared uncertain. When Spain joined the EC in 1986, Ceuta 
and Melilla were considered Spanish cities and European territory. 
They joined the EC as part of Spain, and they hoped to receive 
financial assistance from the EC's Regional Development Fund. 



271 



Spain: A Country Study 

Spain also hoped that membership in NATO, while providing no 
security guarantee to Ceuta and Melilla, might make Morocco's 
King Hassan II less likely to move against territory belonging to 
a NATO member; however, Spanish demands for the return of 
Gibraltar could fuel Moroccan claims to the North African enclaves. 

Mounting tensions between the Spanish and the Muslim popu- 
lations in Ceuta and in Melilla added to the precariousness of the 
Spanish position. In addition, a few leaders in both the socialist 
and the communist parties expressed sympathy for Morocco's 
claim, contributing to a growing fear of abandonment on the part 
of the enclaves' inhabitants. A resolution of this tenuous situation 
did not appear imminent in mid- 1988. 

Spain and the Middle East 

In spite of tensions with Morocco over control of Ceuta and 
Melilla, Spain continued to consider itself as a bridge between the 
Arab world and Western Europe. In an effort to maintain good 
relations with Islamic states, the Spanish government adopted a 
pro- Arab stance in most Middle East conflicts. For years, Spain 
was the only West European country that did not recognize Israel. 
The Spanish government finally established diplomatic relations 
with the Israeli state in January 1986. When that step resulted in 
widespread criticism from the Arab states, Spain hastened to com- 
pensate by according diplomatic status to the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) mission in Madrid in August 1986. More 
generalized efforts to increase Spain's role throughout the Middle 
East and Africa in the 1980s included expanded trade and cultural 
relations. 

Spain and the Soviet Union 

Diplomatic relations between Spain and the Soviet Union were 
not formally reestablished until February 1977, although there had 
been extensive trade and cultural contacts between the two nations 
for decades, and Spain had already established diplomatic relations 
with the other Warsaw Pact states. This long delay was due in part 
to Franco's strong anticommunist feelings, but more particularly 
to his bitterness toward the Soviet Union for its support of the 
Republican forces during the Spanish Civil War. Anti-Soviet senti- 
ment was not limited to the Francoists in the years following that 
devastating upheaval. Because of the attempts of the Soviet dicta- 
tor, Joseph Stalin, to destroy leftist elements within Spain that were 
independent of Moscow, anti-Francoists as well as Franco's sup- 
porters were deeply distrustful of Moscow (see The Spanish Civil 
War, ch. 1). 



272 



Government and Politics 



Spain's relations with the Soviet Union were also significantly 
affected by its relations with the United States. From the point of 
view of the Soviet Union, it was vital to maintain a strong posi- 
tion in the Mediterranean in order to guard the gateway to the 
Black Sea and to assure access to the Atlantic Ocean through the 
Strait of Gibraltar. At the same time, the United States, wary of 
Soviet expansionist aims, had sought to protect this vital region 
by the establishment of United States bases on Spanish soil. The 
opposition that subsequently developed within Spain to the con- 
tinued presence of United States forces there received encourage- 
ment from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, when Moscow delivered 
a warning to Madrid, referring to the "negative consequences" 
that could ensue if Spain joined NATO, Spain's foreign minister 
curtly remonstrated with the Soviet Union for attempting to inter- 
fere in Spain's internal affairs. 

Spanish public opinion has generally not shared United States 
fears of a serious Soviet military threat. Spaniards have favored 
increasing trade with the Soviet Union, and they have welcomed 
Moscow's support of Spain's demand for the "decolonization" of 
Gibraltar. In the late 1970s and the 1980s, however, Spain moved 
toward an increasingly independent stance, and this applied to its 
relations with the Soviet Union as well as with the United States. 
Such independence also was reflected in the efforts of the PCE to 
reduce its ties to Moscow (see Political Parties, this ch.). In the 
mid-1980s, Spain's major difficulty with regard to the Soviet Union 
concerned the extensive espionage activities that had been mounted 
from the large Soviet embassy installed after Franco's death and 
that had led to the expulsion of several Soviet diplomats. 

Spain and France 

While the Soviet Union appeared to most Spaniards to be too 
far away to pose any immediate threat, Spain's most difficult rela- 
tions in the postwar years were with its European neighbor to the 
north, France. Spain's relations with France had been troublesome 
since 1945, when France called for an Allied invasion of Spain to 
remove the last fascist dictator. When the United States and Britain 
refused to agree to such a course of action, France permitted anti- 
Franco forces to use France as a base for organizing raids into Spain. 
When some of these infiltrators were apprehended and executed 
in Spain in 1946, the Allies declared that Spain would be forbidden 
to join the UN while under the control of Franco. France was also 
the major obstacle to Spain's entry into the EC. Responding to 
the pressures of a strong agricultural lobby, the French government 



273 



Spain: A Country Study 

succeeded in delaying Spanish membership in the EC (see Spain 
and the European Community, this ch.). 

French policies also exacerbated Spain's most volatile domestic 
political problem, that of Basque terrorism. For years, France main- 
tained a policy of providing sanctuary to terrorists, who were seen 
as "resistance fighters." This policy became less tenable, however, 
after the democratization of Spain. Following the appearance of 
terrorist activity within France itself, the policy of sanctuary was 
markedly restricted, and by 1986 France was cooperating with Spain 
in efforts to combat terrorist activity (see Threats to Internal Secu- 
rity, ch. 5). 

Two highly readable works dealing with political and social 
developments in the new democratic Spain are John Hooper's The 
Spaniards: A Portrait of the New Spain and Robert Graham's Spain: 
A Nation Comes of Age. A selection of papers delivered at a confer- 
ence conducted by the West European Program of the Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars deals with the dominant 
issues facing Spain as the country consolidates its democratic system. 
Titled Spain in the 1980s (edited by Robert P. Clark and Michael 
H. Haltzel), it includes insightful articles by leading Spanish politi- 
cal figures as well as papers prepared by American and British 
experts on Spain. 

A thorough and lucidly written examination of the provisions 
contained in the Spanish Constitution can be found in the Hast- 
ings Constitutional Law Quarterly in an article by George E. Glos. 
Updates and elaborations of laws pertaining to the Spanish govern- 
mental system are available in Spain: A Guide to Political and Eco- 
nomic Institutions, by Peter J. Donaghy and Michael T. Newton. 
This book provides the most comprehensive treatment of Spain's 
major political and economic institutions and the first in-depth study 
of local and regional institutions to be published in English. 

The rapid evolution of Spanish politics after Franco is depicted 
in Democratic Politics in Spain, edited by David S. Bell. Richard Gun- 
ther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad provide a comprehensive 
description of the development of political parties and the political 
orientations of the electorate in Spain After Franco: The Making of 
a Competitive Party System. How these parties fared is the topic of 
the insightful Spain at the Polls, 1977, 1979, and 1982: A Study of 
the National Elections , edited by Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio 
M. Mujal-Leon. Group political participation, as manifested in 
the interest groups that influenced Spain's political development, 



274 



Government and Politics 



is emphasized in Politics and Change in Spain, edited by Thomas D . 
Lancaster and Gary Prevost. 

An excellent background for the study of Spanish foreign rela- 
tions may be found in James W. Cortada's Spain in the Twentieth- 
Century World. Although somewhat dated, it covers the major thrust 
of Spain's foreign policy both before and after Franco. Spain: Studies 
in Political Security, edited by Joyce Lasky Shub and Raymond Carr, 
also provides a useful analysis of Spain's foreign policy goals. For 
a study of Spain's relations with the Latin American countries, see 
Howard J. Wiarda's The Iberian- Latin American Connection: Implica- 
tions for U.S. Foreign Policy. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



275 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Spanish soldiers 



DURING THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY, when Spain was the 
most powerful nation in Europe, the Spanish armed forces enjoyed 
a formidable reputation. The military decline that set in during 
the Thirty Years' War (1618-48) brought an end to Spain's ascen- 
dancy. During the nineteenth century, the ineffectiveness of the 
Spanish armed forces was demonstrated repeatedly by humiliat- 
ing defeats abroad. A decadent monarchy and the weak and corrupt 
civil governments of the time cemented the military's involvement 
in domestic politics; interventions by an inflated and underemployed 
officer corps became a recurrent feature of Spanish political life. 

At the conclusion of the 1936-39 Civil War, the victorious 
Nationalist army of General Francisco Franco y Bahamonde (dic- 
tator of Spain, 1939-75) was a large and hardened fighting force. 
Franco maintained direct command over the army, which he em- 
ployed as an instrument for suppressing opposition to his regime. 
The country, however, exhausted economically after the Civil War, 
could not afford a large military establishment. Its size was steadily 
reduced, and it lacked the means to fight a modern conflict. Begin- 
ning in 1953, military assistance furnished by the United States 
in conjunction with the base agreement between the two countries 
helped to reverse the deterioration of the armed forces. 

The constitutional monarchy that emerged on Franco's death 
in 1975 was threatened by the rebelliousness of many senior officers 
who had failed to come to terms with the new democratic climate. 
Nevertheless, under the 1978 Constitution and subsequent enact- 
ments, the mission and the structure of the armed forces were gradu- 
ally transformed. Funds were allotted for new equipment and for 
improved training. The career system was rationalized, and pay 
increases were granted. The three individual service ministries were 
replaced by a single Ministry of Defense with a civilian at its head. 
The Chief of the Defense Staff (Jefe del Estado Mayor de la 
Defensa — JEMAD), the highest military officer, acted in a sup- 
portive role to the minister of defense in carrying out military 
policies. 

Further reforms were introduced by the Socialist government 
of Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, who came to power in 1982. The 
army was reconstituted as five divisions comprising eleven brigades, 
plus four independent brigades. The distinction between forces, 
earmarked to protect against external threats, and regional defense 



279 



Spain: A Country Study 

units, organized to maintain internal order, was abandoned. From 
a manpower strength of 280,000, when the Socialists took office, 
the army was scheduled to be reduced by nearly one-third to 195,000 
effectives by 1991. 

The navy and the air force, less burdened by personnel costs, 
were farther along in their modernization programs than the army. 
In 1987 the navy had a personnel strength of about 47,300, includ- 
ing 11,500 marines; its fleet of warships in 1988 included a new 
aircraft carrier. The air force, with a manpower level of 33,000, 
had an aging inventory of 1 8 squadrons of interceptor and ground 
attack aircraft. More advanced F-18 Hornets, seventy-two of them 
purchased from the United States, were scheduled for delivery in 
the 1986 to 1990 period. 

Spain's long-established policy of neutrality ended with its con- 
ditional accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in 1982. Spain's membership, subject to conditions that 
circumscribed the Spanish role, remained in doubt, however, until 
it was ratified by a public referendum in 1986. Spain abstained 
from participating in the NATO integrated command structure, 
continued to ban nuclear weapons from Spanish soil, and excluded 
the use of Spanish forces outside its own territory. The Spanish 
government also insisted on the removal of a wing of United States 
fighter planes based near Madrid, which had formed a part of 
NATO's South European defenses. 

In spite of the modernization program, the Spanish armed forces, 
especially the army, were still deficient in relation to other NATO 
nations. Defense spending remained well below the average for the 
alliance. Nevertheless, Spain was potentially capable of making a 
significant contribution to NATO's defenses. Moreover, its acces- 
sion to the treaty was expected to invigorate the Spanish military 
establishment and to contribute to its emergence as a modern force 
with a well-defined mission as part of Europe's collective security. 

The Military in National Life 

Since the early nineteenth century, the Spanish armed forces had 
been burdened by an inflated officer corps and had had infrequent 
military challenges. The professional military was preoccupied with 
its status and its privileges. Promotions were slow, and they were 
based on seniority rather than on merit. Fighting units were starved 
of modern equipment because of heavy personnel costs. The mili- 
tary had established a tradition of frequent interventions to alter 
the course of internal politics in what it perceived to be the higher 
interests of the nation. Nevertheless, until the authoritarian regime 
of Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923-30), the military was more 



280 



National Security 



inclined to induce changes in civilian governments than it was to 
impose direct rule (see The African War and the Authoritarian 
Regime of Miguel Primo de Rivera, ch. 1). 

Although left with a large and powerful army at the close of the 
Civil War in 1939, Franco allowed the armed forces to deteriorate. 
The majority of his officers were identified with the most reaction- 
ary elements in the government and with the repressive aspects 
of the regime. They were thrust into an uneasy relationship with 
the civilian politicians of the democratic government installed after 
Franco's death in 1975. Aggrieved over the course of events, a small 
group of army and Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) officers attempted 
a coup on February 23, 1981, by holding the entire government 
hostage in the Cortes (Spanish Parliament). The coup failed because 
of the lack of support and the intervention of the king on the side 
of democratic rule (see Disenchantment with UCD Leadership, 
ch. 1). 

The Socialist government that assumed office in 1982 introduced 
a radical program to reform the status of the armed forces. It set 
out to improve the material conditions of military life, but it also 
imposed layers of civilian control and a sharp cutback in the size 
of the army and the number of active-duty officers. Smaller, but 
more rationally configured and embarked on a modernization pro- 
gram, the armed forces were faced with the task of coordinating 
Spain's fighting strength with the overall NATO defense effort. 
Although the officer corps continued to be treated cautiously as 
a potentially intrusive factor if the civilian government faltered, 
its traditional political role seemed increasingly anachronistic. 

Historical Role of the Armed Forces 

Permanently organized armed forces were first created during 
the reign of Ferdinand of Aragon (Spanish, Aragon) and Isabella 
of Castile (Spanish, Castilla) in the fifteenth century (see Ferdi- 
nand and Isabella, ch. 1). Throughout the sixteenth and the seven- 
teenth centuries, the army was well organized and disciplined, 
employing the most technologically advanced weapons of all the 
forces in Europe; in that period it suffered no decisive defeat. The 
army was colorful, feared, and respected. Military careers had sta- 
tus, and they were sought by the aristocracy and by the most ambi- 
tious of the commoners. 

The navy was also formidable throughout much of the same 
period. The humiliation of the Armada, as the navy is known in 
Spain, in its battle against England in 1588 was a result of inade- 
quate strategy and tactics, complicated by weather, not inferior 
fleet size. Its defeat did not end Spain's days as a sea power, but 



281 



Spain: A Country Study 

Spain was never again mistress of the seas. The appeal of military 
careers gradually declined, and the lower ranks became a haven 
for social misfits. Foreign mercenaries outnumbered Spaniards in 
twenty- six of the thirty-one brigades formed during the reign of 
Philip III (1598-1621). The Thirty Years' War began the eclipse 
of Spain's international prestige as a military power. The occupa- 
tion of Spain by Napoleon Bonaparte in the first decade of the 
nineteenth century was the last occasion on which Spanish forces 
participated in a major conflict with those of other European pow- 
ers (see The Napoleonic Era, ch. 1). 

The War of Independence (1808-14) marked the armed forces' 
departure from unquestioning obedience to the government. 
Although the government had acquiesced in the French occupa- 
tion, and many of the army's leaders had concurred in this, a num- 
ber of regular army units rebelled against the occupation and 
responded to the patriotic cause. After the defeat by the French, 
guerrilla units continued to resist. Composed largely of former army 
personnel, these units were, in effect, fighting a people's war in 
opposition to the so-called legal government. 

When the War of Independence ended, officers from the old army 
were joined by those of the resistance groups. Most retained their 
military status rather than resign or retire, because there were few 
employment opportunities in the sluggish civilian economy of the 
time. The glut of officers persisted, and it was one of the factors 
contributing to the military's continued dabbling in the political 
arena. 

The Carlist civil wars that occurred intermittently between 1833 
and 1876, the decadent monarchy, and the weak governments of 
the nineteenth century cemented the military's involvement in 
politics (see Rule by Pronunciamiento; Liberal Rule, ch. 1). Civilian 
politicians were rarely willing to turn over power, but they often 
encouraged actions by the military when conditions under the group 
in control could no longer be tolerated. Although not all its mem- 
bers shared a common ideology, the military was generally among 
the more liberal forces in society. 

The armed forces were either the instigators of, or the major 
participants in, most of the governmental changes between 1814 
and the Civil War of the 1930s. There were so many military inter- 
ventions that the procedure followed a stylized scenario, known 
as the pronunciamiento (pi., pronunciamiento s) . A group of officers — 
usually led by a general — would, after exploring the ' 1 will of the 
people," seek a commitment to rebellion from other officers, who 
would pledge their troops and agree to act upon a proper signal. 
Convinced of adequate support, the leader would then issue a 



282 



National Security 



pronunciamiento, which typically would consist of an address to the 
troops or to a street gathering, taking the form of direct or oblique 
threats against the government. Both the military leaders and the 
government would then watch the public reaction to determine 
whether there had been an impressive rallying to the rebel cause, 
in which case the government would resign. If the pronunciamiento 
were not greeted with revolutionary enthusiasm and if those who 
had agreed to stage simultaneous demonstrations failed to do so, 
the effort was quickly abandoned. 

Pronunciamientos were made almost annually between 1814 and 
1868, and occasionally thereafter until the 1930s. The last successful 
one brought Primo de Rivera to power in 1923. 

Depite the position of the armed forces as a highly important 
factor in Spanish politics, they demonstrated deplorable incompe- 
tence in batde. Spain's Latin American colonies successfully broke 
away early in the nineteenth century. Spain's last colonies, Puerto 
Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines, were lost during the Spanish- 
American War of 1898. The navy shared the army's disgrace; its 
crushing losses during the Spanish- American War left it with only 
two major combat vessels. Spain emerged successfully from a frus- 
trating campaign against Morocco (1907-27) only after painful and 
humiliating defeats. Symptomatic of the defense establishment's 
failure to adapt to modern needs was the existence of nearly 150 
admirals in the navy of the time. 

The Civil War and Its Aftermath 

After the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, a majority of 
the officers remained to fight in the Republican forces, as much 
from a sense of obligation to the legitimate government as on ideo- 
logical grounds. Their units usually stayed intact and followed them. 
Many remained with the forces controlling the areas in which they 
found themselves. More conservative officers tended to join the 
Nationalist forces of the rebellion. 

The Republican forces controlled the larger share of the land, 
including the cities of Madrid and Barcelona, at the beginning of 
the war. Their troops often fought superbly; however, their lead- 
ers were less effective than those of the Nationalist army, which 
also had the better disciplined of the army's fighting units (those 
that were based in Morocco) and better organized international 
support, primarily from Germany and Italy. Moreover, in Franco 
they had by far the most gifted combat leader (see The Spanish 
Civil War, ch. 1). 

At the outset of the war, the Nationalists controlled most of the 
highlands of the north, much of the western part of the country, 



283 



Spain: A Country Study 

and a part of Andalusia (Spanish, Andalucfa) in the south (see 
fig. 4). The Republicans controlled the northern coast and most 
of the country east of Madrid, including all of Catalonia (Span- 
ish, Cataluna; Catalan, Catalunya). It became apparent that the 
war was to be a long struggle, when Franco's forces from Andalu- 
sia advanced to the Madrid area in the early months of the war 
but failed to take the city. 

In subsequent campaigns, the Nationalist forces expanded the 
areas they held to include most of the northern, the southern, and 
the western portions of the country. During the last year, they drove 
a wedge between the Republican forces in Madrid and Catalonia, 
decisively defeated those in Catalonia, and seized Barcelona. Forces 
in Madrid could no longer be supplied. The city and the Republi- 
can cause were surrendered in March 1939. 

Franco's victorious troops had by then been molded into a power- 
ful and well-equipped army, organized into sixty-one divisions. Its 
strength compared favorably with other European armies on the 
eve of World War II. The country's energies, however, were spent. 
It soon became apparent that a force of that size was not needed 
to maintain order and that it could not be supported under the 
prevailing economic conditions. By 1941 demobilization had 
brought the army down to twenty-four divisions in peninsular 
Spain. Its offensive capability was already depleted; with only one 
motorized division, it was rapidly becoming out of date. 

Franco avoided being drawn into World War II, although a 
volunteer Spanish unit known as the Blue Division served with Ger- 
man forces on the Soviet front between August 1941 and October 
1943. Fully outfitted and financed by Germany, it fought almost 
entirely in the Leningrad sector. The 40,000 volunteers who served 
in the Blue Division swore allegiance to the German dictator, Adolf 
Hitler, rather than to Franco or to Spain (see Foreign Policy under 
Franco, ch. 1). 

Although the economy had recovered to pre-Civil War levels by 
1951 , the army was ill-trained and poorly equipped, lacking modern 
armaments and transport. Substantial United States assistance after 
the signing of the Pact of Madrid in 1953 helped to reverse the 
deterioration and contributed to a slow improvement in quality. 
World War II-vintage tanks and artillery were introduced into the 
army, new and refurbished ships were supplied to the navy, and 
the air force was equipped with modern jet aircraft (see Military 
Cooperation with the United States, this ch.). 

An important reorganization of the army in 1965 grouped it into 
two distinct categories: an intervention force organized to protect 
against external threats, and a territorial defense army divided into 



284 



National Security 



nine regional garrisons. Both forces were deployed in such a way 
that they were available to protect against internal disorder rather 
than to defend the country's borders. The strongest units of the 
intervention force were concentrated around Madrid, in the center 
of the country; others were assigned to the nine military regions 
under captains general into which the country was divided, in such 
a manner as to maximize security against regional dissidents. 

The Military in Political Life 

The armed forces have constituted a highly important and often 
decisive factor in Spanish politics throughout the modern history 
of the country as a constitutional monarchy and republic. During 
most of the nineteenth century, the military was considered to be 
a liberal influence, intervening to enforce necessary correctives 
against the failings of weak civilian governments, but not seeking 
to replace civilian institutions permanently. After about 1875, the 
army was less involved politically, and it often found itself on the 
side of maintaining public order against popular movements of 
peasants and the industrial working class. Although their outlook 
was little changed, the officers then occupied what had become the 
right side of the political spectrum in a period of rapidly evolving 
political ideas. 

Until the Spanish Civil War, the range of acceptable political 
beliefs among army officers remained quite broad. One result of 
the conflict was that the most conservative officers tended to join 
the Nationalist forces. More than 10,000 Nationalist officers who 
had survived the war, or who had been commissioned during its 
course, decided to stay on as regulars. The officer corps was com- 
pletely purged of those who had fought on the losing side. The army 
leadership during the next three decades thus was drawn from the 
group that had been the most conservative and the most closely 
identified with Franco's political ideology. 

High-ranking soldiers were appointed by Franco to important 
state bodies and served in the Cortes. (Under the 1978 Constitu- 
tion, officers are required to resign their commissions to run for 
parliamentary office.) Over one-third of the ministers in post- 1939 
cabinets had backgrounds as career officers. The ministers of the 
army, the navy, and the air force were invariably professional mili- 
tary, as was the minister of interior, who was responsible for inter- 
nal security. Many officers also served in civilian ministries and 
in other agencies, in companies owned by the government, and 
on the boards of directors of leading private companies. Neverthe- 
less, as modernization of the economy proceeded, the main func- 
tions of government fell increasingly under the control of civilian 



285 



Spain: A Country Study 

technocrats. The influence of the military in the final stages of the 
Franco regime was limited primarily to the prime minister and to 
the armed forces ministerial portfolios. In spite of its prominent 
representation in the ministries and in the industries connected with 
defense, the military establishment had little success in persuad- 
ing Franco to earmark for it the resources needed to overcome the 
obsolescence of the armed forces. 

The more senior officers remained extremely conservative, vio- 
lently opposed to the left, and suspicious of any broadening of politi- 
cal expression. Certain military reforms were advanced by Diego 
Alegna, the army commander who took office in 1970. He aimed 
at more selective enlistments, at rationalization of troop deploy- 
ments, and at promotion by merit rather than by seniority. Alegna' s 
program was undermined, however, by right-wing commanders, 
who secured his removal in 1974. 

In 1972 a secret society of younger army officers, the Democratic 
Military Union (Union Militar Democratica — UMD) grew quickly, 
numbering 300 in 1975 when many of its members were arrested 
and court-martialed. Most of the reforms they proposed — the unifi- 
cation of the three service ministries, a restriction in the scope of 
the military justice system, reductions in the length of obligatory 
military service, curbs on the military intelligence system, and a 
less prominent role for the captains general of the nine military 
regions — were adopted after Franco's death. 

During the transition period after Franco's death, the civil 
government adopted a deferential attitude toward the military 
leadership, which, as the national institution most loyal to the former 
regime and most able to intervene decisively, presented the greatest 
danger to the program of the new democratic leaders. The civilian 
authorities prudently consulted the military before adopting new 
proposals, seeking their implied consent. Many members of the 
officer corps willingly accepted the new constitutional order, but 
others — mainly in the army — who still identified with the Franco 
era, regarded it as a betrayal of the Civil War victory in 1939. 

In spite of objections by the most vocal elements, the senior mili- 
tary acquiesced in the important changes to the military command 
structure needed to bring it unambiguously under civilian direc- 
tion (see Jurisdiction over National Defense, this ch.). The mili- 
tary was dangerously antagonized by other actions, however, 
particularly by the legalization of the Communist Party of Spain 
(Partido Comunista de Espafia — PCE) in 1977 after the military 
had received what it had interpreted as a firm pledge against such 
a step. 



286 



National Security 



The accumulating discontent of certain officers was made evi- 
dent by a number of provocative incidents. The first of a series 
of plots against the government was uncovered in November 1978. 
The extremely light sentences imposed on the officers involved may 
have encouraged conspiracies. In late 1980 and early 1981, at least 
three further schemes appeared to be afoot. The conspiracy that 
came closest to success was the invasion of the Congress of Deputies 
(lower house of the Cortes) on February 23, 1981 , by Civil Guards- 
men and soldiers who took as hostages the entire body as well as 
the cabinet, which was present for a debate on a new government. 
The three principal plotters were Lieutenant Colonel Antonio 
Tejero Molina, an officer of the Civil Guard; Lieutenant General 
Jaime Milans del Bosch, captain general of Valencia; and Lieutenant 
General Alfonso Armada Comyn, a confidant of the king. Milans 
del Bosch had previously been commander of the elite Brunete 
Armored Division near Madrid, but he had been transferred, as 
a result of his well-known antipathy to the new political order, under 
suspicion of earlier plotting. Armada had been forced from a post 
in the royal household because of his political activities. The failure 
of other units to join the mutineers, the vacillation of a number 
of officers who had been counted on to join the revolt, and, most 
particularly, the denunciation of the attempt by King Juan Carlos 
de Borbon, who appeared in uniform on national television, brought 
the release of the civilian politicians, after twenty- two hours, and 
the surrender of the forces under the control of the conspirators. 

At least one further plot was foiled when a group of colonels was 
discovered planning to seize power on the eve of the October 1982 
general election. The subsequent accommodation of the military 
to the Socialist government of Gonzalez and the military's grudg- 
ing acceptance of the major reforms of the armed forces, introduced 
in 1983, and of Spain's membership in NATO and in the European 
Community (EC — see Glossary) appeared to have moderated the 
danger of new attempts by right-wing officers to challenge civilian 
authority. 

In spite of the government's success in establishing unequivo- 
cal authority over the principal issues of national security, certain 
matters continued to be sensitive for the military. Attacks by Basque 
terrorists on high-ranking officers and security personnel have been 
a source of bitterness. Government plans to devolve greater auton- 
omy on regional governments were delayed; and, these plans were 
less extensive than originally foreseen, in deference to military 
objections to the decentralization process, especially as it applied 
to the Basque region. The inflexibly nationalistic stance of the mili- 
tary commanders was the primary factor determining government 



287 



Spain: A Country Study 

policy regarding the status of the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla 
on the North African coast as well as on negotiations with Britain 
over the status of Gibraltar (see Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla, 
ch. 4). 

By 1986 the authority of the defense minister was great enough 
to enable him to replace the JEMAD and the three service chiefs 
of staff, reportedly because they had failed to support the military 
reform program. Nevertheless, the military leaders continued to 
be treated with prudence. The government made a considerable 
effort to demonstrate sympathy and respect for the military in 
ceremonies and in official statements. The king, who had received 
training in the three military academies, had carefully forged links 
with the military. As supreme commander, he could in theory 
supersede the political authority of the country. His public addresses 
recognized the contribution of the military and were sensitive to 
the need to sustain its morale in the face of the fundamental changes 
that it had been obliged to accept. At the same time, the king 
stressed that, in a democracy, the armed forces must comport them- 
selves with discipline and restraint (see Political Interest Groups, 
ch. 4). 

The Military in Society 

Officers of the Spanish armed forces have tended to regard them- 
selves as highly patriotic, self-denying, and devoted to service. They 
attach importance to the symbols of Spanish unity and historical 
continuity. Sensitive to criticism and extremely conscious of per- 
ceived slights to honor, they have constantly sought reassurance 
that their role was appreciated by the government and by the public. 

The military careerists' sense of forming a community set at a 
distance from civilian society has been heightened by their style 
of living. They usually have been housed on military compounds; 
they have shopped in military outlets, have obtained free educa- 
tion for their children at military schools, have used military hospi- 
tals, and have taken holidays at special facilities made available 
only to the armed forces. This isolated life has not been entirely 
a matter of choice, but has been necessitated by low wage scales. 
Until 1978 the majority of officers could maintain themselves only 
by holding second jobs, after finishing their military duties at 
midday. 

Rates of intermarriage within the armed services community have 
always been high, as has been the ratio of sons of military person- 
nel choosing military careers. As of 1979, about 67 percent of 
those entering the army military academy were following their 
fathers into the service. The corresponding ratio for the navy was 



288 



King Juan Carlos in military uniform 
Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain 



289 



Spain: A Country Study 

81 percent, and for the air force it was 54 percent. The future of 
the officers' group, as a distinctive social class, appeared to be in 
jeopardy by the mid-1980s. Uncompetitive salaries, greater career 
opportunities in the modern civilian economy, and reduced pros- 
pects in an officer corps that was faced with dramatic staff reduc- 
tions presented a discouraging prospect to the sons of officers. A 
newer source of entrants to the military academies was developing 
among the sons of noncommissioned officers (NCOs), however, 
for whom the free education and the potential for social advance- 
ment were important inducements. 

In terms of its status as a profession, military service has tradi- 
tionally ranked high, below that of doctors and of engineers, but 
higher than that of lawyers, of deputies of the Cortes, and of mem- 
bers of the priesthood. In an opinion poll taken in late 1986, con- 
cerning the prestige of nineteen of the leading institutions of the 
nation, the armed services ranked seventh, below that of the monar- 
chy, the Roman Catholic Church, the press, and the internal secu- 
rity forces, but above the Cortes, the central government, the courts, 
unions, universities, and the business community. 

External Security Perceptions and Policies 

Not having faced any serious threat to its territorial integrity for 
more than 150 years, Spain has tended to regard itself as safely 
removed from conflicts that could arise on the continent of Europe. 
Spain's remoteness and the physical barriers to mounting a suc- 
cessful attack on its soil appear to justify this view. To the north, 
the Cordillera Cantabrica and the Pyrenees form natural defenses 
against invasion (see fig. 5). Attacks from the sea, whether from 
the Atlantic or the Mediterranean coasts, also would confront 
rugged terrain. Only by invading from the west, through Portu- 
gal, could a hostile army find relatively level terrain, permitting 
maneuver. The distance between central Spain and the nearest 
Warsaw Pact airfields is nearly 2,000 kilometers. Hostile aircraft 
with the necessary range would need to survive NATO air defenses 
over Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) 
in order to attack Spanish targets. 

Spain's success in maintaining a status of nonbelligerency in both 
World War I and World War II has helped to contribute to its 
sense of invulnerability. In spite of the strongly anticommunist and 
anti-Soviet attitude among the Spanish military, there has been 
little sense of an immediate security threat from the Soviet Union. 
The reinforcement of the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterra- 
nean Sea, with an aircraft carrier in 1979, and the increased num- 
ber of Soviet submarines passing through the Strait of Gibraltar 



290 



National Security 



have modified this perception to some degree, however, in the late 
1980s. Spanish naval planners have been obliged to take account 
of this new potential risk to the strait and to the Spanish Mediterra- 
nean islands and coast. 

The conclusion of the 1953 Pact of Madrid with the United States 
altered Spain's traditional neutrality, making its territory a factor 
in the defense of the West. The Spanish military leadership began 
to recognize that Spain had acquired strategic importance as a result 
of the presence of United States bases and that it had become a 
potential target in the event of conflict between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. If the West suffered a military setback, particularly 
on NATO's vulnerable southern flank, Spain's security and ter- 
ritorial integrity would be directly threatened. 

Spain's adherence to NATO in 1982 necessitated the recasting 
of Spain's traditional strategic doctrine to accept the concept of 
collective security in partnership with other nations of the West. 
The public's endorsement of Spanish membership in NATO, in 
a 1986 referendum, demonstrated recognition that, under the con- 
ditions of modern warfare, a threat to Central Europe represented 
a threat to Spain as well. Nevertheless, in the debate over the advan- 
tages of Spanish membership, opponents pointed out that Spain 
would face a higher level of risk, including exposure to bombard- 
ment from the air and nuclear attack. 

Prior to accepting NATO commitments, much of Spain's stra- 
tegic planning had been dominated by the potential threat from 
North Africa. The immediate objects of any belligerency had been 
expected to be the port enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Surrounded 
on the landward side by Moroccan territory and claimed by 
Morocco, these remnants of Spain's once- vast empire were vul- 
nerable both economically and militarily. Both were fortified towns 
defended by relatively strong garrisons. Since the fifteenth century, 
they had formed a line of defense against the Islamic threat to the 
Iberian Peninsula. In modern times, however, their strategic impor- 
tance was that, together with Gibraltar, they ensured that control 
of the strait linking the western Mediterranean with the Atlantic 
was in Western hands. 

If it had chosen to do so, Morocco probably could have imposed 
a damaging economic blockade on the two cities. Observers 
regarded the likelihood of such an action as small, however, because 
of the losses that would be inflicted on people living in adjacent 
Moroccan areas dependent on sales of their products and on smug- 
gling operations in the enclaves. Militarily, Morocco probably 
would not have been strong enough to drive the Spanish out, and 
it had generally avoided actions that would inflame the issue. The 



291 



Spain: A Country Study 

success of the Spanish military in cultivating their Moroccan coun- 
terparts had also helped to keep tensions at a minimum. Neverthe- 
less, for a time the short-lived 1984 treaty of union between Libya 
and Morocco created anxiety in Spain because the military poten- 
tial of the two countries combined with the belligerency of the 
Libyan ruler, Muammar al Qadhafi, accentuated its sense of vul- 
nerability. 

A number of Spanish observers criticized the failure of the Span- 
ish government to secure recognition from NATO of Ceuta and 
Melilla as falling within the geographical sphere of the treaty, there- 
by requiring a response from the alliance if they were attacked. 
Others concluded that Spain's NATO ties would, at a minimum, 
act as a brake against action by Morocco because Spain could avail 
itself of the consultative provisions of the treaty if it regarded its 
territorial integrity, political independence, or security as coming 
under threat. Realistically, however, other NATO countries viewed 
the enclaves as remnants of the European colonial past in Africa, 
and they could not be counted on for assistance. 

Jurisdiction over National Defense 

In Francoist Spain, the head of state occupied the position of 
commander in chief of the armed forces. He was, in an active sense, 
at the top of the military hierarchy, linked directly to the three ser- 
vices. The ministers of the army, the air force, and the navy — 
customarily officers of three-star rank — directed the operations, the 
training, and the administration of their respective services to the 
extent of the authority delegated to them by Franco as commander 
in chief. Under Franco the National Defense Council and the 
Supreme Staff had planning and coordinating functions without 
real authority over the three services. 

After Adolpho Suarez Gonzalez took office in 1976, replacing 
Franco's last prime minister, he set into motion a series of mea- 
sures to convert the command structure into one resembling that 
of other democratic Western nations and to place the armed forces 
unequivocally under the authority of the elected civilian govern- 
ment. The chairman of the Supreme Staff, Lieutenant General 
Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, was entrusted with this task, for which 
he was appointed deputy prime minister responsible for defense. 
Gutierrez Mellado acted vigorously to introduce a host of reforms, 
the first of which was to replace the chairman of the Supreme Staff 
by transferring his powers to a newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor— JUJEM), comprising of the three 
service chiefs and a chairman. By a royal decree in June 1977, the 
three service ministries were replaced by a single Ministry of 



292 



National Security 



Defense. Gutierrez Mellado became the first minister of defense; 
when he retired two years later, a civilian assumed the portfolio. 

The new ministry was given the task of preparing organizational 
alternatives for the government to consider in the areas of national 
defense and the execution of military policy. A further stage in the 
transition was reached with the promulgation of the new 1978 Con- 
stitution, which, in Article 8, states that: 

1. "The Armed Forces, consisting of the army, the navy, and 
the air force, have as their mission the guarantee of the sovereignty 
and independence of Spain, the defense of its territorial integrity, 
and the constitutional order. 

2. "An organic law will regulate the bases of the military organi- 
zation, in conformity with the principles of the present Constitution." 

Article 97 establishes that "The government directs domestic 
and external policy, the civil and military administration, and the 
defense of the state. Exercise of the executive function and juris- 
diction will be by regulation in accordance with the Constitution 
and the laws." 

The language of the new Constitution affirms that responsibility 
for defense and for military policy is to be under the authority of 
the civilian government. The new definition of the armed forces 
clearly distinguishes them from the forces of public order, i.e., the 
Civil Guard and the police, which had been treated as part of the 
armed forces under the applicable organic law of the previous 
regime. Allocation to the armed forces of the responsibility to defend 
the constitutional order was intended to reassert the role of the mili- 
tary in internal security and to underscore the illegality of actions 
contrary to the democratic system. 

In conformity with Article 8.2 of the Constitution, Organic Law 6 
was promulgated on July 1 , 1980. It allocates authority in matters 
concerning national defense and the military establishment, declar- 
ing that the king is the supreme commander of the armed forces 
and the presiding officer of the National Defense Council at ses- 
sions that he attends, and that the government, headed by the prime 
minister, is to determine defense policy. It names the National 
Defense Council, to include both civilian and military officials, as 
the senior advisory and consultative body of the government, with 
the task of formulating and proposing military policy. The JUJEM 
would continue to serve as the senior joint military advisory board 
(see fig. 14). 

The division of responsibilities set out in the 1980 law failed to 
resolve all of the issues involved in the distribution of functions; 
notably, it failed to assure that the planning of military require- 
ments took full account of available resources. In addition, the 



293 



Spain: A Country Study 



CO CC 
Z LU 



Q o 

tr lli 

LU o 

x z 

O in 
x<2 



LU £ 

z < 

LLI Li_ 

O LL 

LU < 

h- O 

< □ 

tr cd 

O 3 

I- CL 



LX CO 
LU LU 

Q £ 
Z DC 

< O 

— O 2 

LU LU 
LX X 
CL •- 
3 LL 
CO o 



7 



T 
I 

" / 
I / 

1/ r- 

it 



o 
z 

—J 3 

< o 



Z LU 



z £ 



< 

O CO 

o 



> LU 

> o 

< DC 

Z O 



< Q 
LL Z 

o < 



— > 
5 < 

Z Q 

•O uj« 

S J . 

Hi O 
0- Z 

z 
< 

CC 



LU 
CC 

I- 
< 

9uT 

S DC 

it! £ 

CO 

< 

CC 



< ° 



< Z O H -J 

<=> Z z W < 

O CC < 2 Z 

LU LU LX Q LU 

H- CL I- < O 



£ Z CO ^ 

< LU DC -t LU 

O £ < co o 

CC CC ^ z CC 

< o ^ 111 

lu o z < < 

en Luoif 

O I o I i 



CO 



UJ < 



10 

uf a. 



< 2 
CCLU 

P UJ 



cc O 

Q 



JO 

<3 

§2 
Si 



LU 

CO 

Zco 

LU — - 

u_ O 

UJ < 

Q 2 

UJ LU 

X 3 



o < 

co 



a p 

|— CO 

z 

o 



Q 
LL 3 

O I- 

LX W 



z z 

LU LU 
O LL 
nr LU 
DC O 
LU 

II 

x o 



E 



2 - ■ 
o E oj 
"2 ° 

[Ox-. 



1 s 



2qQ 



t- C\J CO 



294 



National Security 



powers of the prime minister and the minister of defense to super- 
vise the conduct of military operations were not clearly defined. 
Some politicians felt that the military still dominated the chain of 
command. 

To deal with these problems, Organic Law 1 of January 5, 1984, 
introduced certain modifications. It specifically assigns to the prime 
minister the responsibility for defining the outlines of strategic and 
military policy, and it authorizes him to order, to coordinate, and 
to direct the implementation of military policy by the armed forces. 
It establishes that the minister of defense could exercise various 
of these functions as delegated to him by the prime minister. It mod- 
ifies the role of the JUJEM, confining it to that of a military advi- 
sory body to both the prime minister and the minister of defense. 
An important innovation is the creation of the post of Chief of the 
Defense Staff (Jefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa— JEMAD). 
As the highest figure in the military hierarchy, the JEMAD is in- 
structed to act as principal collaborator to the minister of defense 
in the planning and the execution of the operational aspects of mili- 
tary policy. In wartime, the JEMAD would be commander in chief 
of the armed forces, directly responsible for conducting military 
operations. 

As explained by the government, the 1984 law formalizes the 
procedure whereby the prime minister and the minister of defense 
are given a preponderant role in carrying out defense policy and 
in integrating the contributions of the individual branches of the 
armed forces. All three service chiefs of staff must exercise their 
commands under the authority of the civilian leaders; the law allows 
for no separate military command whereby the armed forces could 
operate autonomously. 

Military Commands and Organization 

As a result of the organizational reforms since 1977, culminat- 
ing in the 1984 law that reaffirmed civil authority over the mili- 
tary establishment, command responsibility for the three armed 
services, was vested in the JEMAD, who reported directly to the 
minister of defense. The post was held by a senior officer of each 
of the three services on an alternating basis, with no specified term. 
The JEMAD was responsible for proposing major strategic objec- 
tives that formed the basis for the Joint Strategic Plan, prepared 
by the Ministry of Defense for the prime minister's approval. The 
JEMAD also prepared operational directives and plans derived from 
the Joint Strategic Plan, determined requirements for the conduct 
of military operations in case of war, coordinated logistics among 
the three services, and supervised the training and effectiveness 



295 



Spain: A Country Study 

of the services. To carry out these functions, the JEMAD had at 
his disposal a staff of five sections: plans and organization, intelli- 
gence, strategy, logistics, and telecommunications and electronic 
warfare. 

At a senior level in the Ministry of Defense, the office of the 
secretary of state for defense was responsible for material and eco- 
nomic resources. The office was divided into three directorates 
general, concerned, respectively, with economic affairs, armaments 
and materiel, and infrastructure. At a parallel level, the under secre- 
tary of defense and his staff supervised technical services, person- 
nel training, administrative services, and the general counsel. 

The first JEMAD was Admiral Angel Liberal Lucini. In October 
1986, Lucini was succeeded by Lieutenant General Gonzalo Puig- 
server Roma, an air force officer; the chiefs of staff of the three 
service branches were replaced at the same time. The wholesale 
removal of the top military leadership reportedly was carried out 
by Minister of Defense Narcis Serra i Serra in reaction to their 
opposition to several of the Socialist government's reform measures, 
including the reduction of compulsory military service to twelve 
months and changes in the military justice system that expanded 
the rights of individual soldiers (see Sources and Quality of Man- 
power; Military Justice, this ch.). 

Army 

The army (Ejercito de Tierra) has existed continuously since the 
reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. The oldest and largest of the three 
services, its mission was the defense of peninsular Spain, the Balearic 
Islands (Spanish, Islas Baleares), the Canary Islands (Spanish, 
Canarias), Melilla, Ceuta, and the smaller islands and rocks off 
the northern coast of Africa. The army was, as of 1988, complet- 
ing a major reorganization that had been initiated in 1982. It had 
previously been organized into nine regional operational com- 
mands. These were reduced to six commands in conjunction with 
a revised deployment of forces: Central Command, Southern Com- 
mand, Levante Command, Eastern Pyrenees Command, North- 
western Command, and Western Pyrenees Command. In addition, 
there were the two military zones of the Canary Islands and the 
Balearic Islands. Ceuta and Melilla fell within the Southern Com- 
mand (see fig. 15). At the head of each regional and zonal com- 
mand was an officer of two-star rank. Although his authority had 
been reduced, the regional commander, who held the title of cap- 
tain general, was still among the most senior officers of the army. 

Under its earlier organization, the army was grouped into 
two basic categories: the Immediate Intervention Forces and the 



296 



National Security 



Territorial Operational Defense Forces. In theory, the former, con- 
sisting of three divisions and ten brigades, had the missions of 
defending the Pyrenean and the Gibraltar frontiers and of fulfill- 
ing Spain's security commitments abroad. The latter force, con- 
sisting of two mountain divisions and fourteen brigades, had the 
missions of maintaining security in the regional commands and 
of reinforcing the Civil Guard and the police against subversion 
and terrorism. In reality, most of the Immediate Intervention Forces 
were not positioned to carry out their ostensible mission of pro- 
tecting the nation's borders. Many units were stationed near major 
cities — as a matter of convenience for officers who held part-time 
jobs — from which they also could be called upon to curb distur- 
bances or unrest. 

In a gradual process that had not been fully completed as of 
mid- 1988, the division of the army into the Immediate Interven- 
tion Forces and the Territorial Operational Defense Forces was 
being abolished. The brigade had become the fundamental tacti- 
cal unit. The total number of brigades had been reduced from 
twenty-four to fifteen by the dismantling of nine territorial defense 
brigades. Eleven of the brigades had been organized within the 
existing five divisions; three brigades were to be independent, and 
one was to be in general reserve. 

The best equipped of the five was the First Division, the Brunete 
Armored Division, with its armored brigade in the Madrid area 
and its mechanized brigade farther to the southwest near Badajoz. 
The motorized Second Division, Guzman el Bueno Division, which 
had acquired a third brigade as a result of the reorganization, was 
the major defensive force in the south, with full capability for rapid 
maneuver. The mechanized Third Division, the Maestrazgo Divi- 
sion, under the Levante Command, consisted of two brigades con- 
sidered to have a medium degree of mobility. The two mountain 
divisions, the Fourth Division — or Urgel Division and the Fifth 
Division — or Navarra Division, each consisting of two mountain 
brigades, remained in the Pyrenean border area of the north. Two 
of the four independent brigades were armored cavalry, one was 
an airborne brigade, and one was a paratroop brigade (in general 
reserve). 

Numerous other changes were introduced as well, including the 
reorganization of artillery forces not included in the major combat 
units. This involved the creation of a field artillery command that 
consisted of a restructured and consolidated former artillery brigade, 
the creation of a single straits coastal artillery command that 
replaced two former coastal artillery regiments, and the introduction 



297 



Spain: A Country Study 



_,£2C3L layoff 




Strait 

SO 100 Kilometers 

100 Miles / MOROCCO 



CANARY 
ISLANDS $ 

(jLasPalmasde 
Gran Canaria 



— ■ ■ — International boundary 




Air base 


Military regional boundary 




Naval base 


® National capital 




Regional Army headquarters 


• Populated place 




United States Installation 



Figure 15. Major Military Installations, 1988 



of an antiaircraft artillery command that was expected to benefit 
from significant modernizing of its weapons inventory. 

The personnel strength of the army, which previously had been 
maintained at about 280,000, including 170,000 conscripts, had 
been trimmed to 240,000 by 1987. This was achieved through lower 
intakes of conscripts and volunteers and through cuts in the table 
of organization for officers and NCOs. The government's goal was 
a smaller but more capable army of 195,000 effectives by 1991. 
Outside peninsular Spain, about 19,000 troops were stationed in 
Ceuta and Melilla. These included, in addition to the Spanish 
Legion and other specialized units, four Regulares regiments of 
North Africans. An additional 5,800 troops were assigned to the 
Balearic Islands, and 10,000 were in the Canary Islands. 



298 



National Security 



Spanish Legion 

The Spanish Legion, founded in Morocco in 1920, has always 
been under the direct command of the chief of the army staff. It 
has had a reputation as the toughest combat unit in the service. 
Although modeled after the French Foreign Legion, it never 
acquired the international flavor of its French counterpart. Reduced 
in size to 8,500 in 1987, as a result of successive reorganizations, 
the legion was scheduled to undergo further cuts to an overall 
strength of 6,500. It had a higher number of career soldiers than 
other units, but it was manned mosdy by conscripts who had volun- 
teered for the legion. Recruitment of non-Spanish personnel, who 
had never exceeded 10 percent of the group's manpower, ended 
in 1986. Foreign legionnaires already in the service were not 
affected. 

As of 1987, the Spanish Legion was grouped into four tercios 
(sing., tercio), a unit intermediate between a regiment and a brigade, 
each commanded by a colonel. The first and the second tercios con- 
stituted the core of the military garrisons at Melilla and Ceuta. 
Each had been reduced by a motorized battalion, leaving it with 
a single motorized battalion, a mechanized battalion, an antitank 
company, and a headquarters company. They were equipped with 
BMR armored personnel carriers. The third tercio, stationed in the 
Canary Islands, consisted of two motorized battalions and a head- 
quarters company. The fourth tercio was being converted from a 
support role to a combat unit at the legion headquarters in Ronda 
near Malaga. 

In 1987 the Ministry of Defense was planning the creation of 
a rapid deployment force composed entirely of volunteers. This 
force, which would include the Spanish Legion, the paratroop 
brigade, the airborne brigade, and Marine units, would be avail- 
able for use in trouble spots on twelve hours' notice. Lack of ade- 
quate air and naval transport would, however, be a limiting factor. 

Equipment 

In spite of new procurement programs, introduced in the mid- 
1980s, arms and equipment were not in sufficient supply, and they 
were not up to the standards of other NATO armies. The inven- 
tory of medium tanks was made up of nearly 700 United States 
models dating back to the Korean War, as well as about 300 
AMX-30s of French design but manufactured mostly in Spain 
between 1974 and 1983. Although the military felt that it was 
essential to adopt a new main battle tank for the 1990s, economic 
considerations led to a postponement of the decision and the 



299 



Spain: A Country Study 

upgrading of the AMX-30s with new West German-designed diesel 
engines and transmissions, reactive armor panels, and laser fire- 
control systems. 

Armored troop carriers included about 1,200 American-made 
M-l 13s as well as AML-60s and AML-90s of French design. The 
Spanish army was in the process of being equipped with more than 
1,200 BMRs, a six- wheeled armored vehicle manufactured in Spain 
under French license. A variety of towed and self-propelled artillery 
was available, ranging from 105mm to 203mm guns and howit- 
zers. The main antitank weapons were recoilless rifles; 88.9mm 
rocket launchers; Milan, Cobra, and Dragon missiles; and a small 
number of TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) 
and HOT (high subsonic, optically guided, tube-launched) anti- 
tank missile systems. A considerable quantity of additional anti- 
tank missiles and rocket launchers was on order. The army aircraft 
inventory included about 180 helicopters, about 40 of which were 
armed with 20mm guns or HOT antitank missiles (see table 16, 
Appendix). 

The air defense of ground forces depended largely on outdated 
Bofors guns and on aging Hawk and Nike missiles. As of 1987, 
a start had been made on overcoming deficiencies in this area by 
acquiring French Roland missiles, to be mounted on AMX-30 
chassis, and Italian Aspide missiles for fixed defense. 

Navy 

The Spanish navy (Armada) was relatively large, ranking second 
in total tonnage, after the British navy, among European NATO 
nations. Its ship inventory, although aging, was being upgraded 
through a construction and modernization program. As part of its 
personnel reorganization, its strength had been reduced by 10,000 
to 47,300 personnel, including marines, as of 1987. Of this num- 
ber, about 34,000 were conscripts. 

Subordinate to the commander in chief of the fleet, with his head- 
quarters in Madrid, were four zonal commands: the Cantabrian 
Maritime Zone with its headquarters at El Ferrol del Caudillo 
(Ferrol) on the Atlantic coast; the Straits Maritime Zone with its 
headquarters at San Fernando near Cadiz; the Mediterranean 
Maritime Zone with its headquarters at Cartagena; and the Canary 
Islands Maritime Zone with its headquarters at Las Palmas de Gran 
Canada. 

Operational naval units were classified by mission, and they were 
assigned to the combat forces, the protective forces, or the auxil- 
iary forces. The combat forces were given the tasks of conducting 
offensive and defensive operations against potential enemies and 



300 



National Security 



of assuring maritime communications. Their principal vessels 
included a carrier group, naval aircraft, transports and landing ves- 
sels, submarines, and missile-armed fast attack craft. The protec- 
tive forces had the mission of protecting maritime communications 
over both ocean and coastal routes and the approaches to ports and 
to maritime terminals. Their principal components were destroy- 
ers or frigates, corvettes, and minesweepers as well as marine units 
for the defense of naval installations. The auxiliary forces, respon- 
sible for transport and for provisioning at sea, also had such diverse 
tasks as coast guard operations, scientific work, and maintenance 
of training vessels. In addition to supply ships and a tanker, the 
force included older destroyers and a considerable number of patrol 
craft. 

The largest vessel of the navy was the 15,000-ton aircraft carrier, 
Principe de Asturias, which had entered service in 1988 after com- 
pleting sea trials. Built in Spain with extensive United States 
engineering assistance and financing, it was designed with a "ski- 
jump" takeoff deck. Its complement would be six to eight Harrier 
vertical (or short) takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft and as 
many as sixteen helicopters designed for antisubmarine warfare 
and support of marine landings. 

The new carrier was to have as its escort group four frigates of 
the United States FFG-7 class, built in Spain and armed with 
Harpoon and Standard missiles. The first three were commissioned 
between 1986 and 1988; construction on the fourth was begun in 
1987. Also in the inventory were five frigates, commissioned 
between 1973 and 1976 and built in Spain with United States assis- 
tance. Six slightly smaller vessels of Portuguese design, classified 
as corvettes, were constructed in Spain between 1978 and 1982 (see 
table 17, Appendix). 

The fleet of eight submarines was built, based on French designs, 
with extensive French assistance. Four submarines of the Agosta 
class were constructed in Spain between 1983 and 1985. They were 
equipped with the submarine-launched version of the Exocet anti- 
ship missile. Four submarines of the Daphne class had been com- 
pleted between 1973 and 1975. A number of United States 
destroyers of the Gearing and the Fletcher classes, constructed at 
the close of World War II, were also in the 1988 inventory, although 
the three remaining Fletcher class vessels were scheduled to be 
retired by 1990. 

The marines, numbering 11,500 troops, were divided into base 
defense forces and landing forces. One of the three base defense bat- 
talions was stationed at each of the headquarters at Ferrol, Cartagena, 
and San Fernando. "Groups" (midway between battalions and 



301 



Spain: A Country Study 

regiments) were stationed at Madrid and at Las Palmas de Gran 
Canaria. The fleet tercio (equal to a regiment), available for immedi- 
ate embarkation, was based at San Fernando. Its principal arms 
included light tanks, armored personnel vehicles, self-propelled artil- 
lery, and TOW and Dragon antitank missiles. 

Air Force 

The air force (Ejercito del Aire), with a personnel strength of 
33,000 as of 1987, of whom about 18,000 were conscripts, was orga- 
nized into four operational commands — combat, tactical, trans- 
port, and Canary Islands. The Combat Air Command (Mando 
Aereo de Combate — MACOM) had as its mission control over 
national airspace through the use of offensive and defensive inter- 
ceptor operations. As of 1987, MACOM consisted of seven squad- 
rons equipped with F-18 Hornets, F-4 Phantoms, Mirage F-ls, 
and Mirage Ills (see table 18, Appendix). 

The F-18s, introducted in 1986, were among the world's most 
up-to-date multipurpose fighter aircraft, with advanced navigational 
and target acquisition systems. Associated weaponry included Spar- 
row and Sidewinder antiaircraft missiles, HARM antiradar mis- 
siles, and Harpoon antiship missiles. The F-18s would permit 
replacement of the F-4 Phantoms, high-performance fighters of 
the 1960s generation. The version of Mirage III in the Spanish 
inventory, first introduced in 1964, was designed as a long-range 
fighter-bomber intruder. A more recent Mirage model, the F-l, 
was purchased in the 1974-75 period by the air force. The Mirage 
Ills were scheduled to have new electronic attack and navigation 
systems installed, so that they could be kept in service through the 
1990s. 

The Tactical Air Command (Mando Aereo Tactico — MAT AC) 
had as its mission the support of ground forces. It was equipped 
with ten squadrons of SF-5 aircraft, one squadron of six Orion 
P-3A maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and one squadron of 
DO-27 type liaison aircraft. The SF-5s, modeled after the North- 
rop-designed American F-5, were assembled in Spain in three ver- 
sions: attack- fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and two- seat trainers. 
Modifications being carried out in 1987, involving installation of 
new communications, a plane identification system, and updated 
navigation and landing aids, were intended to keep the SF-5 opera- 
tional until a replacement was available in the late 1990s. This was 
expected to be either one designed and manufactured in Spain or 
a more advanced model available through Spain's participation in 
the European fighter program (see Defense Production, this ch.). 



302 



Spanish-made CASA aircraft 
Courtesy Embassy of Spain, Washington 

The Air Transport Command (Mando Aereo de Transporte — 
MATRA) provided airlift capacity for the three services, as well 
as air evacuation, disaster relief, and paratroop carriers. The com- 
mand possessed sixty aircraft, and it could conduct heavy logisti- 
cal operations, using five C-130 Hercules transports and six 
KC-130s (for aerial refueling). The Spanish-built CASA C-212 
Aviocar was the mainstay of the light transport fleet. 

The Canary Islands Air Command (Mando Aereo de Canar- 
ias — MACAN) was a mixed unit equipped to carry out multiple 
missions — interceptor, ground attack, transport, surveillance, and 
antisubmarine — at a distance of 1,500 kilometers from the main- 
land. Its air fleet included a squadron of Mirage F-ls armed for 
both interceptor and ground attack operations, a unit of ten CASA 
C-212 Aviocar light transports, and a squadron equipped for anti- 
submarine warfare with Fokker F-27 patrol aircraft and Aero- 
spatiale AS-332B Super Puma helicopters. 

The modernization efforts of the air force centered on the acquisi- 
tion of seventy-two F-18s, produced by McDonnell Douglas in the 
United States. The first such planes — known as the EF-18A in 
Spain — arrived in 1986, and the final deliveries were scheduled 
for 1990. The cost of this program, which amounted to US$1.8 
billion for the aircraft alone, was to be offset in full by expendi- 
tures in Spain. These were to include support and overhaul for 



303 



Spain: A Country Study 

CF-18s of the Canadian Air Force in Europe and for F-18s of the 
United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. 

The principal MACOM bases were at Zaragoza, at Torrejon 
near Madrid, at Albacete, and at Manises near Valencia. The initial 
F-18 deliveries were assigned to two operational MACOM squad- 
rons based at Zaragoza. Subsequent deliveries would replace the 
F-4s of two squadrons at Torrejon and two Mirage III squadrons 
at Manises. The SF-5s of MATAC were based at Moron de la 
Frontera (Moron), and the Orion P-3As were at Jerez de la Fron- 
tera near Cadiz. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

Service uniforms for officers of all military services consisted of 
a blouse, shirt, tie, pants, black socks, and black shoes. Service 
uniforms for army and air force officers were similar in style, in 
that both were single-breasted and had four patch pockets, but 
different in color — olive green for the army and blue for the air 
force. The navy had a white and navy blue service uniform. Uni- 
forms for enlisted personnel were more simply tailored, and they 
were made from heavier, longer wearing fabric. The army's enlisted 
personnel uniform jacket was similar to that worn by officers, but 
it lacked the lower patch pockets. Air force enlisted personnel wore 
waist-length jackets similar to those worn by officers. Navy enlisted 
personnel wore the conventional blues and whites. The military's 
field uniform consisted of an olive green fatigue jacket, a shirt, trou- 
sers, a belt with vertical shoulder suspenders, a field cap and/or 
a helmet, and combat boots. Additional field uniforms for special 
forces included winter and summer camouflage uniforms. 

Ranks in all three military services generally corresponded to 
those in the armed forces of the United States. Each of the three 
services had ten officer ranks, ranging from the equivalent of second 
lieutenant in the army and the air force and ensign in the navy 
to general of the army, general of the air force, and fleet admiral. 
The only difference between the two countries' officer rank struc- 
tures was that Spain had only four, rather than five, general officer 
ranks. The highest actual rank held by a general officer was that 
of three stars. Only the king, as supreme commander, held the four- 
star rank of captain general. Spain had eight enlisted grades for 
the army and the air force (as opposed to nine in the United States), 
ranging from basic private and airman basic to command sergeant 
major and chief master sergeant, respectively. Spain lacked an 
equivalent for the United States army grade of sergeant first 
class/master sergeant or its air force grade of master sergeant. The 
Spanish navy had only seven enlisted grades, ranging from seaman 



304 



National Security 



apprentice to master chief petty officer. It lacked an equivalent for 
the United States grades of seaman recruit and chief petty officer. 

Insignia of rank for Spanish military personnel were displayed 
on sleeves or shoulder boards and, in some cases, on headgear. 
Officer rank insignia were the same for the army and air force (a 
varying number and type of symbols in gold). Naval officer ranks 
were usually distinguishable by gold stripes worn on sleeves or shoul- 
der boards (see fig. 16). Enlisted personnel ranks were designated 
by stripes: red for army private and private first class as well as 
for navy seaman and seaman apprentice; green (on shoulder boards) 
for air force airman first class; and gold for all other enlisted ranks 
including warrant officers, but on different colored backgrounds 
depending on the service (red background for army, blue for navy, 
and green for air force). In addition, army and air force warrant 
officers wore a single five-pointed star on service background; the 
naval warrant officer was identified by a single short horizontal 
stripe (see fig. 17). 

Sources and Quality of Manpower 

Beginning in 1982, major changes in the military personnel sys- 
tem were introduced in an effort to deal with the chronic problem 
of overstaffing, to modernize recruitment procedures, and to 
improve the quality of education and training. The existing officer 
complement was far in excess of the number required by the new 
tables of organization adopted in the extensive reorganization of 
the army. A total of 41,328 soldiers were in the ranks of sergeant 
through lieutenant general in 1986; these were scheduled to be 
reduced to 35,213 by 1991. In 1986 a further 4,200 officers were 
in the active reserves, and 2,000 were in a special status called tran- 
sitional active reserve, a voluntary category that had been created 
to induce officers to forego their final two years of active duty while 
retaining full pay. 

The total number of trained reserves was reported to be 
1,085,000, as of 1987. These personnel, who were considered 
reservists until the age of thirty-eight, theoretically would be avail- 
able to form brigades needed to fill out incomplete divisions in an 
emergency. Reservists did not, however, attend periodic refresher 
courses or undergo retraining. 

The mandatory retirement age for general officers, which had been 
between sixty- six and seventy prior to 1981, had been reduced to 
sixty-five — after conversion to active reserve status on full pay at 
age sixty-two to sixty- four — as of 1986. Active duty for majors, lieu- 
tenant colonels, colonels, and their naval equivalents was to end about 
five years earlier than it had previously, at age fifty- seven to sixty. 



305 



Spain: A Country Study 




306 



Spain: A Country Study 

In spite of these changes, it was evident that the number of army 
generals still would be excessive (143 in 1991) in relation to the 
small number of units at the level of division and brigade. 

Military promotions historically had been based almost exclu- 
sively on seniority; with few exceptions, years in grade and age 
were the determining factors. Military officers knew with consider- 
able certainty when they would advance in rank and whether or 
not vacancies existed for them at the new grade. Reforms in the 
promotion system, giving far greater weight to professional merit, 
to previous assignments, and to special training, were proposed 
as early as 1984, but only in 1987 was specific legislation introduced 
to modify the procedure. 

Reforms of the salary system also were introduced to raise and 
to simplify military wage scales, making them consistent with the 
civil service wage structure. When the new system was introduced 
in 1985, it resulted in pay increases of between 15 percent (for ser- 
geants) and 33 percent (for lieutenant generals). Total pay and 
allowances at the rate of exchange prevailing in 1 988 would be the 
equivalent of US$19,300 annually for a colonel, US$14,800 for 
a captain, and US$10,000 for a sergeant. No changes were pro- 
posed in the policy of paying conscripts only nominal wages, which 
amounted to only US$5 a month in 1988. 

Also included in the reform legislation of 1984 were a number 
of important changes affecting recruitment and conscription. For 
the first time, conscientious objectors were recognized officially and 
offered the possibility of alternate social service of eighteen to twenty- 
four months. Obligatory military service, previously set at fifteen 
months for the army and the air force, and at eighteen months for 
the navy, was to be reduced over a three-year period to twelve 
months for all services. A gradual shift in the call-up age, from 
twenty-one years to nineteen years, also was initiated. Voluntary 
recruits to all services would in the future serve for sixteen months 
rather than eighteen months (twenty-four months for the navy). 
In categories requiring specialized training, enlistments of two to 
three years would be required. The reason for these changes was 
the attempt to achieve an annual intake of 200,000 conscripts and 
36,600 enlistees in 1986. The total number of young men quali- 
fied for military service would exceed these totals combined by an 
estimated 71 ,000. The conscripts would be concentrated in the army 
and the navy. Only 4,700 would be assigned to the air force, which 
expected to attract 16,000 volunteers each year. 

The military conscription system was relatively unpopular; but 
the government vowed that it would be maintained. In a 1987 public 
opinion poll, 76 percent of those queried believed that some form 



308 



National Security 



of service should be rendered to the state; however, only 17 per- 
cent felt that the service should be in the armed forces. The govern- 
ment's position was believed to be influenced by the high rate of 
unemployment among young men and the added cost of depend- 
ing on voluntary enlistments. Moreover, the government was appre- 
hensive that an all-professional army might be less accountable to 
civil authority. 

Although the 1978 Constitution gives each citizen the right to 
serve in the armed forces, regardless of sex, the full integration 
of women had been met by strong resistance. About 8,000 women 
were included in a uniformed army auxiliary health corps, but they 
retained civilian status. A small number of women auxiliaries in 
the air force and the navy served in certain administrative jobs. 
As of early 1988, this situation was on the brink of change as the 
result of a royal decree providing for the progressive incorpora- 
tion of women under equal conditions with males. Initially, women 
were to be permitted to apply for enlistment in the legal, the 
auditing, the engineering, the health, and the veterinary corps of 
the three services. Access to additional corps would be allowed as 
necessary organizational adaptations were completed. No action 
had been taken to open the service academies to women, although 
individual legal suits had been instituted by women seeking 
admission. 

Training and Education 

Three service academies prepared young men as career officers. 
The General Military Academy at Zaragoza provided a four-year 
program leading to a commisssion as lieutenant in the army. The 
first two years and the fourth year consisted of joint studies at the 
academy; the third year was devoted to training specific to the 
branch of service selected. The five-year curriculum of the Naval 
Military School at Marin on the Atlantic coast included years one, 
two, and four based at the academy, a six-month to eight-month 
cruise on a school sailing ship during the third year, and a fifth 
year spent primarily aboard fleet units. At the General Air Academy 
at San Javier, the first three years consisted of basic studies and 
introductory flight training. The fourth year was devoted to the 
specialization chosen. Beginning with the entering class of 1987, 
a fifth year was to be added with further concentration on a speciali- 
zation. 

As part of the reforms announced in 1985, all of the academies 
were expected to provide similar levels of the general education 
needed to undertake future advanced studies; in particular, they 
were to strengthen the areas of the humanities and the social 



309 



Spain: A Country Study 

sciences, including the courses on the constitutional and the justice 
systems. The curricula were to devote 20 percent of courses to the 
humanities and the social sciences, 20 percent to scientific and tech- 
nical subjects, 10 percent to physical education and recreation, and 
50 percent to military and professional training. 

Competition for entry into the academies was keen. In 1986 only 
194 out of 3,000 candidates were selected for the army academy, 
only 60 of 800 applicants were chosen for the naval academy, and 
only 78 out of 2,500 were accepted for the air academy. The entering 
classes were decidedly smaller than they had been in the past, in 
order to conform to the new tables of organization. In 1980, for 
example, 275 cadets had entered the army academy, 72 had been 
accepted in the naval academy, and 126, in the air academy. 

Army noncommissioned officer (NCO) training was conducted 
at the Basic General Academy of Noncommissioned Officers 
(Academia General Basica de Suboficiales — AGBS), in an inten- 
sive three-year program. The first year consisted of basic military 
studies, the second year was spent in study in a technical training 
institute, and the third year consisted of further specialized tech- 
nical training or additional leadership training at AGBS. Soldiers 
completing the course were promoted to the rank of sergeant. In 
spite of a large number of applicants — more than 10,000 in 1985 — 
the number of candidates accepted was reduced from more than 
1,100 in 1980 to 610 in 1986. 

Each branch of the armed forces had a range of technical schools 
and preparatory courses for successive levels of command. The 
Ministry of Defense directly administered schools in such special- 
ties as military justice, accounting, administration, and intelligence. 
Army colonels and lieutenant colonels with demonstrated aptitudes 
and qualifications could be assigned to the Higher Army School 
for command and staff studies. The Naval Warfare School pre- 
pared naval captains and marine colonels for higher commands. 
The Higher Air School provided corresponding command train- 
ing to those air force officers demonstrating qualities expected to 
lead to general officer rank. 

Training for ground force conscripts consisted of an initial four- 
month period of basic instruction and tactical exercises at the squad 
and the platoon levels. This was followed by two four-month train- 
ing cycles providing collective larger-unit instruction and tactical 
exercises. Spanish observers asserted that insufficient time was 
devoted to training and that its quality was lax. Recruits complained 
that they were often inefficiently occupied, doing minor chores, 
sitting around barracks, or assigned to duties in commissaries and 
clubs. In addition to efforts to introduce more meaningful training 



310 



National Security 



and to increase the amount of time devoted to training, the govern- 
ment hoped to meet other objections to the conscription system 
by instituting a new regionalization policy. To the extent permit- 
ted by national defense needs, servicemen were to be assigned to 
posts near their homes. The previous policy, introduced under 
Franco when the principal mission of the armed forces was inter- 
nal security, was to send soldiers to regions where they had no per- 
sonal ties. 

The army continued to rely, to a considerable extent, on univer- 
sity students, who were fulfilling their twelve-month service obli- 
gation as second lieutenants, to serve as platoon commanders or 
as sergeants after only six months of basic training. Observers ques- 
tioned the continued dependence on this recruiting source, which 
affected the caliber of training provided to conscripts and reduced 
the professional prospects of career NCOs. One reason for its reten- 
tion was that limiting the number of career officers left the avenues 
for advancement to higher rank less cluttered. 

Military Justice 

During the Franco regime, military courts were competent to 
try a wide array of political crimes by civilians, including terrorist 
acts and offenses against military honor by the press. Martial law 
was invoked frequently, enabling military courts to prosecute 
civilians charged with participating in strikes, demonstrations, and 
subversive meetings. In accordance with the requirements of the 
new 1978 Constitution, an organic law passed in 1980 abolished 
the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians. In addition, com- 
mon crimes committed by military personnel were to be tried in 
civil courts, and sentences imposed by military courts were sub- 
ject to review by the Supreme Council of Military Justice and by 
the civil Supreme Court as the final court of appeal. 

A completely new Military Penal Code was adopted in late 1985. 
The new code introduced safeguards comparable to those of the 
civil criminal system, including the appointment of defense coun- 
sel and a ban against degrading punishment. It distinguished 
between conduct of a criminal character that was subject to crimi- 
nal justice and disciplinary infractions that were to be handled by 
the military commands. The new code reduced the jurisdiction of 
military courts in the area of political crimes, such as rebellion, 
and it placed limits on the defense of obedience to legal authority 
in connection with illegal or unconstitutional acts. The death penalty 
was abolished for all but certain crimes committed in wartime, and 
even in such cases the death penalty was not to be mandatory. 



311 



Spain: A Country Study 

The Defense Budget 

The defense budget for 1988 was set at 762 billion pesetas (for 
value of the peseta — see Glossary), or US$6.74 billion based on 
1988 rates of exchange. It was apportioned on the basis of 37 per- 
cent to the army, 24 percent to the navy, 19 percent to the air force, 
and 20 percent to centralized functions (the Ministry of Defense). 
The army budget, which had constituted 46 percent of the total 
in 1982, had begun to diminish as a result of reductions in army 
force levels. The shift also reflected major weapons acquisitions pro- 
grams by the navy and the air force. The cost of centralized func- 
tions had risen as a result of the development of the new command 
structure, the consolidation of many operations that had previously 
been administered by individual services, and the decision of the 
minister of defense to control major equipment acquisitions more 
directly. 

The 1988 defense budget was somewhat higher than the 
corresponding figures for 1987 (703 billion pesetas) and for 1986 
(630 billion pesetas). In real terms, however, the rise in defense 
allocations had been lower than the annual rate of 4.432 percent 
planned for the eight-year period 1982-90. Moreover, the mili- 
tary budget had declined as a percentage of the total government 
budget, from 13.2 percent in 1978 to 8.81 percent in 1986. Mili- 
tary expenditures also declined slightly, during the same period, 
as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary), 
from 2.06 percent to 1.97 percent. 

Although personnel costs remained high in proportion to total 
defense expenditures, a distinct reduction was recorded between 
1982 and 1986, from 49.9 percent to 44.5 percent. Expenditures 
for construction and materiel expanded from 34.8 percent of the 
total in 1982 to 42.3 percent in 1986. Operating costs (of 15.3 per- 
cent in 1982 and 13.2 percent in 1986) were proportionately some- 
what lower. Although the army was gradually bringing its personnel 
outlays under control, they continued to be much higher than those 
in the other services — 58.8 percent of its total expenditures in 1988, 
compared with 31.3 percent in the navy and 33.5 percent in the 
air force. Moreover, because of their earlier starts on moderniza- 
tion programs, much higher shares of the navy and the air force 
budgets (over 50 percent for each in 1986) were being invested in 
equipment and in construction than was true in the army (22 per- 
cent in 1986). 

According to a study prepared by the United States Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency, Spain ranked thirteenth among 
NATO's sixteen nations in military expenditures per capita, 



312 



National Security 



calculated on the basis of 1985 defense budgets. With the excep- 
tion of Luxembourg and Iceland, it ranked last in military expen- 
ditures as a percentage of GDP. Spain's defense outlays were well 
below the average of 3.4 percent of GDP attained by other Euro- 
pean NATO countries. 

Defense Production 

Spanish industry manufactured a significant share of the material 
requirements of the armed forces, notably light arms, vehicles, 
ships, and light transport aircraft. As a member of NATO, Spain 
had joined in the planning of several coproduction projects with 
other West European countries. Nearly 150 firms were engaged 
principally in defense production, and about 4,000 Spanish firms 
were linked in some way with the industry. Four large munitions 
manufacturers were directly controlled by the Ministry of Defense. 
A number of other major firms were part of the state holding com- 
pany, the National Industrial Institute (Instituto Nacional de Indus- 
tria — INI). A large group of purely private companies formed a 
third category. The ultimate intention of the Ministry of Defense 
was to transfer the four arms factories to the INI. 

According to a 1986 survey of firms doing business with the 
Ministry of Defense, the manufacture of electronics accounted for 
about 20 percent of Spanish defense production; military vehicles 
for about 14 percent, supply of arms for approximately 13 percent, 
naval construction for about 8 percent, and aircraft construction 
for approximately 6 percent. Production of components and ancil- 
lary equipment made up the remaining approximately 39 percent. 

Among the leading producers of army equipment was Empresa 
Nacional de Autocamiones S.A. (EN AS A), generally known by 
the trade name of Pegaso, which manufactured a range of trucks 
and armored vehicles. Its basic BLR four-wheeled armored car was 
used primarily by the Spanish army; the six- wheeled BMR also 
was exported to Saudi Arabia and to Egypt. Most of the army's 
ordnance was produced by Empresa Nacional de Santa Barbara 
de Industrias Militares (Santa Barbara), including the CETME 
5.56mm rifle, in general use by the Spanish army, and the 
AMX-30E tank, based on French technology. Santa Barbara also 
manufactured the truck-mounted 140mm Teruel multiple rocket 
launcher. Larger naval vessels, including Spain's new aircraft car- 
rier, French-designed submarines of the Daphne and the Agosta 
classes, and FFG-7 frigates of United States design, were con- 
structed by Empresa Nacional Bazan de Construcciones Navales 
Militares (Bazan) at San Fernando near Cadiz. 



313 



Spain: A Country Study 

The predominant aircraft manufacturer, Construcciones Aero- 
nauticas S.A. (CASA), was best known for the C-212, a short 
takeoff and landing utility plane with a three- ton payload. The com- 
pany also produced the C-101, a trainer and light fighter, with 
assistance from West German and American aircraft companies 
that owned minority interests in CASA. The CN-235 turboprop, 
a forty- seat airliner with a military version, was being built in 
cooperation with an Indonesian firm. CASA also was reported in 
1987 to be at the design stage of a plane — the Avion Experimental 
(AX) — that might be selected to replace the F-5 tactical fighters 
obtained from the United States. This would be an advanced ver- 
sion of the C-101, with an engine of much greater horsepower. 
CASA also assembled French-supplied kits for Aerospatiale Super 
Puma helicopters. It was the principal Spanish firm involved with 
British, West German, and Italian firms in the Eurofighter con- 
sortium planning an entirely new fighter aircraft for the latter half 
of the 1990s that was expected to replace the Mirages in the exist- 
ing Spanish inventory. 

Among other more advanced systems either being produced or 
in the planning phase were the French-designed Roland and the 
Italian Aspide air defense missile systems and the European attack 
helicopter AB-129. The latter was being developed in collabora- 
tion with Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands, with production fore- 
seen for the 1990s. 

The relatively small scale of Spain's own military orders spurred 
the Spanish armaments industry to develop its export potential and 
to increase its share of the international arms market. By 1987 it 
had risen to eighth rank as a world exporter, with a number of 
clients in the Middle East and in Latin America. In an analysis 
of 1985 results by an industry group, the Spanish Arms Manufac- 
turers Association, export sales by member firms (125 billion 
pesetas) exceeded sales to the Ministry of Defense (90 billion 
pesetas). 

As of 1988, Spain enforced sales embargoes against countries 
accused of human rights violations (e.g., South Africa, Chile, and 
Paraguay), Warsaw Pact and other communist countries, and active 
belligerents (e.g., Iran and Iraq). The Spanish press has, however, 
reported widespread violations of these controls, especially in the 
form of munitions shipments to Iran and to Iraq. Spain also had 
joined with other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
countries and Japan in controlling the export of militarily sensi- 
tive goods to communist destinations through the Paris-based Co- 
ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). 



314 



Spanish-made military equipment on display during 
annual Spanish Armed Forces Day parade, Valladolid, May 29, 1984 
Courtesy United States Department of Defense 



315 



Spain: A Country Study 

Participation in NATO 

Membership in NATO had not been a practical alternative dur- 
ing Franco's lifetime because of the opprobrium with which the 
dictatorship was viewed by other West European states. Moreover, 
Franco displayed little interest in a Spanish contribution to West 
European security, regarding the Spanish military primarily as an 
instrument to protect the internal stability of the country. Only 
after his death was Spain able to contemplate the possibility of par- 
ticipation in the alliance. With the support of the political parties 
of the right and of the then-dominant Union of the Democratic 
Center (Union de Centro Democratico — UCD), membership terms 
were successfully negotiated and approved by the Cortes in Octo- 
ber 1981, in spite of opposition by the Spanish Socialist Workers' 
Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol — PSOE) and the Com- 
munist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de Espana — PCE). 
Although most European members were less enthusiastic over 
Spain's membership than was the United States, the agreement 
was quickly ratified, and Spain's formal entry as the sixteenth 
member — the first new member since West Germany, twenty-seven 
years earlier — took place in May 1982. 

Spanish participation was to be accomplished in stages: first by 
membership in the political committees and eventually by integra- 
tion into alliance military activities. A few months after entry, 
however, in October 1982, a new PSOE government took office 
under Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, who had cam- 
paigned against Spanish adherence to the pact. Gonzalez suspended 
further Spanish involvement in NATO military operations, pending 
a national referendum on Spain's continued membership. A strong 
anti-NATO movement had been growing among the Spanish peo- 
ple. In the eyes of many, NATO membership was linked to the 
issue of United States bases and to the likelihood of an increased 
military budget. Spanish opposition became part of the movement 
then gaining ground elsewhere in Europe to resist the deployment 
of intermediate-range nuclear missiles on the continent. Neverthe- 
less, a delay in calling the referendum until March 1986 was accom- 
panied by a reevaluation in the PSOE attitude. By this time, 
Gonzalez was openly supporting Spain's continued adherence, 
arguing that if Spain wished to benefit from membership in the 
European Community (EC), it would have to accept the responsi- 
bilities of membership in NATO as well (see Spain and the European 
Community; Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
ch. 4). 

The referendum took the form of asking the electorate to agree 



316 



National Security 



that it was in the national interest for Spain to remain in the alli- 
ance subject to three principles affirmed by the Gonzalez govern- 
ment: that Spain would not be incorporated into the integrated 
military structure; that the ban on the installation, the storage, and 
the introduction of nuclear weapons on Spanish territory would 
be maintained; and that there would be an effort toward a progres- 
sive reduction in the United States military presence in Spain. Con- 
trary to opinion polls predicting continued heavy opposition to 
Spanish membership, the government's proposal was approved by 
52.6 percent to 39.8 percent. 

The actual conditions of Spain's participation — as subsequently 
negotiated — were that Spain would remain a full member of the 
North Adantic Council and its subordinate organs, that Spain would 
be present as an observer on the Nuclear Planning Group, that 
it would continue to be a member of the Defense Planning Com- 
mittee and the Military Committee, and that it would appoint mili- 
tary representatives for liaison with the NATO military commands. 
Spain would continue to participate in logistical coordination, 
development of common equipment and materiel, and civil pro- 
tection measures, reserving its position on participation in the inte- 
grated communication system. Spain would be permitted to 
nominate candidates for the NATO Secretariat and the Interna- 
tional Military Staff. Observers later reported that Spain had offered 
to coordinate its national military missions with those of NATO, 
especially control of the sea between the Balearic Islands and the 
Canaries. Spanish forces were to be commanded only by Spanish 
officers, however, and no troops were to be deployed outside of 
Spain on a sustained basis. The Spanish air defense system, which 
was compatible with the NATO system, was to be linked also to 
the French and the Italian air defense systems. 

In spite of the formal limitations on Spain's participation in 
NATO, the coordinated strategic planning envisaged by Spain was 
intended to make it possible for Spanish forces to operate in con- 
junction with NATO in an emergency. NATO planners viewed 
Spain's relatively secure landmass as a potentially major strategic 
asset, forming a marshaling area and a redoubt from which air and 
sea attacks could be launched against Warsaw Pact forces. In a 
crisis, it would be highly valuable as a transit center and a supply 
depot for reinforcement from the United States. The Spanish navy 
and air force, operating from bases located in the Balearic Islands 
and southern Spain, afforded NATO a stronger position in the 
western Mediterranean. The Canary Islands bases would be impor- 
tant for safeguarding shipping lanes, particularly for oil tankers 
bound for the North Atlantic and the North Sea. Moreover, the 



317 



Spain: A Country Study 



addition of a new and important West European country imparted 
a useful psychological boost to NATO, helping to demonstrate the 
restored vitality of the alliance. 

Politically, the United States and other NATO countries believed 
that, by establishing a closer association through NATO, Spain's 
new democratic course would be strengthened. They hoped that 
membership would offer the Spanish armed services a well-defined 
military mission and would distract them from involvement in 
domestic politics. A greater professionalism of the Spanish mili- 
tary was expected to result, as well as efforts to modernize and to 
improve the armed forces through collaboration with NATO, 
perhaps at a lower cost than would otherwise be the case. 

The conditions limiting Spain's membership restricted the par- 
ticipation of Spanish ground forces in NATO exercises, although 
Spain conducted exercises with other NATO countries on a bilateral 
basis. In 1987 Spanish ships engaged in NATO air-naval maneu- 
vers between the Bay of Biscay and the Canary Islands, an area 
of the Atlantic Ocean that Spain regarded as of strategic impor- 
tance. Spanish officers were not eligible to hold allied command 
and staff positions, thereby denying them valuable broadening 
experience and exposure to modern doctrinal and tactical concepts. 
NATO funds were not available for infrastructure projects in Spain. 
Particularly in light of the deficiencies and the obsolescence of much 
of the army's equipment, Spain needed to increase its military 
budget considerably to bring its forces within reach of minimum 
NATO standards. Some Spanish critics argued that Spain had 
gained little advantage from its membership because it had failed 
to secure any commitment regarding the eventual cession of Gibral- 
tar, and it had failed to obtain security guarantees covering Ceuta 
and Melilla, which remained outside NATO's area of collective 
defense. 

Prime Minister Gonzalez justified in part Spain's failure to accept 
the integrated military structure by pointing out that Spain had 
joined the alliance many years after its formation, when the com- 
mand structure was already well established. A complex readjust- 
ment of existing commands would have been necessary, said 
Gonzalez, which would have created conflict with other members. 
For example, Spain's maritime role in the Atlantic would appro- 
priately fall under the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic 
(SAC L ANT). Under the system prevailing when Spain entered 
NATO, a command subordinate to SAC L ANT, the Iberian Atian- 
tic Command (IBERLANT), headquartered at Lisbon under a Por- 
tuguese admiral, was responsible for surveillance and control of 
large ocean areas west of Portugal and south to the Tropic of 



318 




Armored vehicles at military garrison near Seville 
Courtesy United States Department of Defense 



319 



Spain: A Country Study 

Cancer. Spain would appropriately have an important role in 
IBERLANT, but Portugal made it plain that it would be unwill- 
ing to cede command responsibilities to Spain, even on an alter- 
nating basis. Similarly, for fully effective defense of the strait, 
Spanish cooperation with British forces on Gibraltar would be indis- 
pensable. Spanish sensitivities on this issue, however, made it hardly 
imaginable for Spanish officers to be part of a combined NATO 
command, or to engage in area cooperation with British officers 
on Gibraltar, so long as Britain refused to negotiate seriously on 
the future of the stronghold. 

In 1987 Spain changed its status from observer to full member 
on NATO's Nuclear Planning Group. It continued, however, to 
adhere to the policy, approved virtually unanimously during the 
parliamentary debate on NATO, that it would remain a nonnuclear 
power and that it would not agree to stockpile or to install nuclear 
weapons of NATO forces on its territory. In this respect, its posi- 
tion was similar to two other NATO members, Norway and Den- 
mark. Spain had initially rejected adherence to the 1968 Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), asserting that 
the treaty was unbalanced in favor of the nuclear signatories. But 
in 1987, after finding that its nonadherence was complicating its 
nuclear fuel supply relationships in the EC and with other coun- 
tries as well, Spain reversed its position and acceded to the treaty. 

The issue of nuclear weapons had been politically charged since 
three thermonuclear bombs were spilled over Spanish territory and 
one dropped into Spanish coastal waters in 1966, following an air 
collision between a United States B-52 bomber and a KC-135 
refueling plane. Although all the bombs eventually were recovered, 
subsequent agreements expressly committed the United States to 
refrain from storing nuclear devices or components on Spanish soil. 
The last American units with nuclear armaments were submarines 
equipped with Poseidon missiles that were based at the Rota naval 
complex until they were shifted to Holy Loch, Scotland. 

Military Cooperation with the United States 

The Pact of Madrid, signed in 1953 by Spain and the United 
States, ended a period of virtual isolation for Spain, although the 
other victorious allies of World War II and much of the rest of the 
world remained hostile to what they regarded as a fascist regime 
sympathetic to the Nazi cause and established with Axis assistance. 
The 1953 accord took the form of three separate executive agree- 
ments that pledged the United States to furnish economic and mili- 
tary aid to Spain. The United States, in turn, was to be permitted 
to construct and to utilize air and naval bases on Spanish territory. 



320 



National Security 



Although not a full-fledged military alliance, the pact did result 
in a substantial United States contribution to the improvement of 
Spain's defense capabilities. During the initial United States fis- 
cal year (FY — see Glossary) 1954 to FY 1961 phase, military aid 
amounted to US$500 million, in grant form. Between FY 1962 and 
FY1982, a further US$1,238 billion of aid in the form of loans 
(US$727 million) and grants (US$511 million) was provided. Dur- 
ing the period FY 1983 to FY 1986, United States military aid, 
entirely in the form of sales under concessional credit terms, aver- 
aged US$400 million annually, but it declined to slightiy more than 
US$100 million annually in FY1987 and in FY1988. The military 
credits were scheduled to be phased out in FY 1989, in keeping with 
Spain's growing self-sufficiency in national defense. More than 200 
Spanish officers and NCOs received specialized training in the 
United States each year under a parallel program. 

Although Spain had purchased some military equipment from 
countries other than the United States, and although some officers 
had received training in other countries, the only major foreign 
influence on the Spanish military between the end of World War 
II and Franco's death in 1975 had been the United States. After 
the democratic regime was installed in 1976, the United States con- 
tinued to be Spain's predominant partner in military cooperation, 
in spite of that country's growing involvement with France and 
with other West European countries. Between 1982 and 1986, the 
value of arms shipments to Spain from the United States totaled 
US$725 million. France was the second ranking supplier (US$310 
million), and West Germany was third (US$50 million). 

As of 1988, there were 12,000 United States military personnel 
in Spain, at four major bases and at several smaller communica- 
tions and navigation facilities. The legal status of the American 
military personnel and their dependents was governed by status 
of forces accords that were similar to the standard NATO status 
of forces agreements. One of the major bases was the naval com- 
plex at Rota near Cadiz, northwest of the Strait of Gibraltar, which 
provided fuel and ammunition storage facilities for American forces. 
It was also a naval air base supporting antisubmarine warfare and 
ocean surveillance operations. Rota was the site of a United States 
Defense Communications System (DCS) terminal tied to a num- 
ber of radar and microwave stations throughout Spain, with fur- 
ther linkage to DCS sites elsewhere in the Mediterranean, that 
remained in continuous contact with the United States Sixth Fleet. 

The United States shared with Spain the use of three airbases: 
Torrejon, just east of Madrid; Zaragoza, in northeast Spain; and 
Moron, near Seville (Spanish, Sevilla) in southwest Spain. Torrejon 



321 



Spain: A Country Study 

was the headquarters of the Sixteenth Air Force of United States 
Air Forces, Europe (USAFE). A tactical fighter wing of seventy- 
two F-16 aircraft at Torrejon was rotated to other USAFE airbases 
at Aviano, Italy, and at Incirlik, Turkey. Torrejon was, in addi- 
tion, a staging, reinforcement, and logistical airlift base. 

Zaragoza was the base for a detachment of five United States 
aerial refueling aircraft, and it also was used by USAFE as a tacti- 
cal fighter training base. It was located near Spain's Bardenas 
Reales firing range, where gunnery and bombing techniques could 
be practiced. Moron served as a support base for units of USAFE, 
including a detachment of fifteen aerial refueling aircraft. 

Torrejon, Zaragoza, and Moron were built initially as bases for 
Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-47 bombers, which had a rela- 
tively limited range. After the B-47s were phased out, SAC no 
longer needed the bases, but they continued to serve useful func- 
tions for airlift, communications, resupply, rear basing, and fighter 
training in conjunction with the NATO obligations of the United 
States. 

As the time approached in 1987 for the renegotiation of the 
existing base agreement, which had entered into force in 1983 for 
a five-year period, pressures mounted for a reduction of the United 
States military presence in Spain. Communist political groups and 
elements of the PSOE had campaigned against the bases. Moreover, 
the base agreement had become a symbol of United States coopera- 
tion with the former Franco regime. It was important to many 
Spaniards to eliminate vestiges of this history by converting Spain's 
long-standing bilateral relations with the United States into a mul- 
tilateral undertaking through NATO. According to a poll taken 
in early 1987, 53 percent of Spanish citizens regarded the bases 
as prejudicial to the security and the defense of Spain, and 47 per- 
cent thought they should be removed. 

The outcome of the 1986 referendum on membership in NATO 
committed Gonzalez to negotiate the reduction of the United States 
military presence in Spain. Gonzalez insisted that the wing of 
seventy-two F-16 aircraft be removed from Torrejon as a condi- 
tion for renewal of the base agreement, and he threatened to expel 
all United States forces in Spain if this demand were not accepted. 
His stand was considered unduly inflexible by the United States 
and inconsistent with an earlier Spanish commitment that the level 
of security would be left intact. The United States felt that Spain, 
the military contribution of which was minimal, was permitting 
domestic factors to dictate a weakening of NATO defenses. Even 
though Italy subsequently agreed to station the F-16 wing on its 



322 



National Security 



territory, the cost of transfer would be high, and the unit would 
be in a more exposed position. 

In January 1988, Spain and the United States announced jointly 
that agreement had been reached in principle on a new base agree- 
ment with an initial term of eight years, essentially meeting the 
conditions demanded by Spain. The F-16 fighter wing was to be 
removed from Torrejon within three years, by mid- 1991. It was 
expected that this step would reduce the number of United States 
personnel in Spain by nearly one-half. 

Use by the United States of the bases in Spain for non-NATO 
purposes was a matter requiring Spanish approval, which was not 
likely to be forthcoming unless the mission had Spain's endorse- 
ment. In keeping with its policy of avoiding involvement in the 
Arab-Israeli dispute, Spain withheld diplomatic clearance for the 
United States to use the bases to resupply Israel during the Octo- 
ber 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Gonzalez reportedly was approached 
indirectly regarding the possible use of the Spanish bases and over- 
flights of Spain in connection with the United States raid on Libya 
in April 1986. His negative response necessitated a long detour 
over international waters by the aircraft flying from British bases. 
One of the American fighter-bombers was forced to make an emer- 
gency landing at Rota, however. Gonzalez defended the landing 
as consistent with the provisions of the base agreement, in spite 
of the criticism that it evoked in Spain. 

Public Order and Internal Security 

The transition from Franco's dictatorship to a system of parlia- 
mentary democracy was accompanied by a major effort to bring 
the forces of law and order and the justice system into harmony 
with the new political era. The police were stripped of most of their 
military characteristics. The Civil Guard, which maintained order 
in rural areas and in smaller communities, retained many of its 
military features, but both the Civil Guard and the police were 
placed under civilian leadership. Once dedicated to repressing all 
evidence of opposition to the Franco regime, the police and the 
Civil Guard were expected to tolerate forms of conduct previously 
banned and to protect individual rights conferred by the 1978 Con- 
stitution and by subsequent legislation. Members of the Civil Guard 
continued to be implicated in cases of mistreatment and brutality 
in the campaign against Basque terrorism. The authorities had, 
however, prosecuted many guardsmen for such infractions, with 
the result that by 1988 fewer violations of legal norms were being 
recorded. 



323 



Spain: A Country Study 

Reforms of the judicial system included appointments of judges 
by a body insulated from political pressures and increased bud- 
gets to enable courts to deal with a chronic backlog of criminal hear- 
ings. The penal code was being modernized to bring it into 
conformity with the new Constitution. Some progress had been 
made in ensuring that defendants had effective legal representa- 
tion and that they received speedier trials. Nevertheless, antiquated 
procedures and the escalation of crime continued to generate huge 
delays in the administration of justice, with the result that as much 
as half of the prison population in 1986 consisted of accused per- 
sons still awaiting trial. 

The Police System 

The principal forces of public order and security as of 1988 were 
the Civil Guard and the National Police Corps (Cuerpo Nacional 
de Policia). The Civil Guard, fortified by nearly a century and a 
half of tradition, was a highly disciplined paramilitary body with 
close links to the army. As it evolved, it served mainly as a rural 
police to protect property and order and to reinforce the authority 
of the central government. Under Franco, a tripartite system of 
police was formalized: the Civil Guard in rural areas; the Armed 
and Traffic Police (renamed the National Police in 1979), which 
fulfilled normal police functions in communities with a population 
of more than 20,000; and the Higher Police Corps of plainclothes 
police with responsibility for investigating crimes and political 
offenses. Separate municipal police forces under the control of local 
mayors were concerned mainly with traffic control and with en- 
forcement of local ordinances. 

During the Franco era, the police had been regarded as a reac- 
tionary element, associated in the public mind with internal sur- 
veillance and political repression. The Civil Guard and the Armed 
and Traffic Police were legally part of the armed forces, and their 
senior officers were drawn from the army. The 1978 Constitution 
effects the separation of the police from the military, and it empha- 
sizes that one of the functions of the police is to safeguard personal 
liberties. Article 104 of the 1978 Constitution states that, ' 'The 
Security Corps and Forces, responsible to the Government, shall 
have as their mission the protection of the free exercise of rights 
and liberties and the guaranteeing of the safety of citizens." 
Although considerably delayed, a subsequent statute, the Organic 
Law on the Security Corps and Forces, was enacted in March 1986 
to incorporate the mandate of the Constitution to redefine the func- 
tions and the operating principles of the police forces. With its pas- 
sage, the final legal steps had been taken to make the police system 



324 



National Security 



conform to the requirements of the democratic regime, although 
most observers concluded that it would be years before the reforms 
were fully in effect. 

The new organic law provided a common ethical code for police 
practices, affirmed trade union rights, recast the role of the judi- 
cial police serving under the courts and the public prosecutors, com- 
bined the uniformed and the nonuniformed police into the single 
National Police Corps, and redefined the missions and the chains 
of command of the various police elements. The Civil Guard 
remained a separate paramilitary force, although in operational 
matters it was under the direction of the Ministry of Interior rather 
than the Ministry of Defense. In time of war or emergency, it would 
revert to the authority of the minister of defense. In 1986 a new 
post of secretary of state for security was created in the Ministry 
of Interior to coordinate the activities of the National Police Corps 
and the Civil Guard. The National Police Corps functioned under 
the directives of the director general of the National Police Corps, 
but local supervision was exercised by civil governors of the 
provinces where police forces served (see fig. 18). 

The Civil Guard 

Patterned after the French rural gendarmerie when it was formed 
in 1844, the Civil Guard has long maintained its own traditions 
and style of operation. Until the first civilian director general of 
the Civil Guard was installed in 1986, its head had been an army 
lieutenant general. The total complement of the Civil Guard as 
of 1986 was 65,000; in addition, about 9,000 auxiliary guardsmen 
performed their military service obligation in the Civil Guard. 

The Civil Guard was grouped into six zones, matching the six 
army regions, each commanded by an army brigadier general. 
These were divided, in turn, into commands coinciding with provin- 
cial boundaries and further subdivided into about 300 companies, 
800 lines {lineas) corresponding to platoons, and about 3,200 posts. 
A post typically consisted of six to ten guardsmen, headed by a 
corporal or a sergeant. Posts were responsible for organizing two- 
member patrols to police their areas, generally by automobile. To 
deploy forces more flexibly, this traditional system had been aug- 
mented by radio-controlled mobile patrols of three or more mem- 
bers. A separate traffic group patrolled the main roads to assist 
in cases of breakdown or accident. A Rural Antiterrorist Group 
of four companies, stationed in the Basque Country (Spanish, Pais 
Vasco; Basque, Euskadi) and Navarre (Spanish, Navarra), con- 
centrated its efforts against Basque extremists. This force could be 
supplemented by a helicopter unit and by a Special Intervention 



325 



Spain: A Country Study 



MINISTER OF 
INTERIOR 



SECRETARY OF 
STATE FOR SECURIP 



DIRECTOR GENERAL 
OF THE NATIONAL 
POLICE CORPS 



INTELLIGE 



CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION 



r 



PERS( 



DOCUMENTS 1 



FINANCIAL MAN- 
AGEMENT AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE 



RECRUITMENT 
AND TRAINING 



CIVIL SECURI 



SPECIAL OPER- 
ATIONS GROUP 
(GEO)* 



REGIONAL 
HEADQUARTERS (13) 



PROVINCIAL 
HEADQUARTERS (50) 



MUNICIPAL 
HEADQUARTERS (190) 



DISTRICT 
HEADQUARTER! 



IUNICI 
POLI' 



PROMOTIONS, 
ASSIGNMENTS, 

Mil ITARY 



MINISTER 
OF DEFENSE 



DIRECTOR GENERAL 
OF THE CIVIL GUARD 



DEPUTY 
DIRECTOR 
GENERAL 
(ADMINIS- 
TRATION, 
PERSONNEL, 
SOCIAL 
ACTION) 



DIRECTOR, 
TRAINING 



DIRECTOR, 
LOGISTICS 



CHIEF OF 
STAFF 



DIRECTOR, 
CIVIL PROTECTION 



RURAL ANTI- 
TERRORIST 
GROUP 



TRAFFIC 
GROUP 



FISCAL 
SERVICE 



MARITIME 
SERVICE 



SPECIAL 
INTERVENTION 
UNIT 



HELICOPTER 
UNIT 



MOUNTAIN 
UNITS 



SECURITY 
POLICY 
COUNCIL 



ZONES (6) 
1 



IEGIONAI 
POLICE 



COMMANDS (50) 
\ 



*GEO 



LINES OF COMMAND 
LINES OF COORDINATION 
GRUPO ESPECIAL 
OPERACIONES 



COMPANIES (300) 
I 



LINES (800) 



POSTS (3,200) 
I . 



Source: Based on information from Ian R. MacDonald, "The Police System of Spain," 
in Police and Public Order in Europe, John Roach and Juergen Thomaneck (eds.), 
London, 1985, 215-54. 



Figure 18. Organization of Police Services, 1988 



326 



National Security 



Unit as needed. Mountain Units guarded the Pyrenees frontier 
against terrorists and smugglers, in addition to providing general 
police and rescue services. 

The Civil Guard generally enjoyed greater popularity than other 
police elements, in part because of its reputation for courtesy and 
helpfulness to motorists. Nevertheless, it had not completely shed 
its earlier reputation as the primary instrument of the Franco 
regime's efforts to root out and crush any evidence of opposition. 
Numerous cases of torture and ill treatment were attributed to mem- 
bers of the Civil Guard, especially in the handling of suspected 
Basque dissidents (see Criminal Justice and the Penal System, this 
ch.). The persistence of reactionary tendencies was underscored 
by the participation of a senior officer of the Civil Guard, Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina, in the dramatic coup 
attempt of 1981, backed by nearly 300 guardsmen who made 
prisoners of cabinet ministers and deputies of the Cortes (see The 
Military in Political Life, this ch.). 

Most members of the Civil Guard were housed with their fami- 
lies on compounds that formed part of the stations from which they 
operated. A high proportion of recruits were the sons of guards- 
men. Entrance was at the age of sixteen years or seventeen years, 
when recruits began a two-year course at one of two "colleges" 
or, alternatively, at ages nineteen to twenty-four at the other col- 
lege where the course was of eleven months duration. Promotion 
to officer rank was possible after fourteen years of service. A 
minority of officers gained direct commissions by attending the 
General Military Academy at Zaragoza for two years, where they 
followed the regular military cadet curriculum. After an additional 
three years at the Special Academy of the Civil Guard at Aranjuez, 
these cadets entered the service as lieutenants. 

Under the 1986 organic law, the Ministry of Interior was assigned 
responsibility for operational matters, pay, assignments, accom- 
modations, and equipment. The Ministry of Defense was respon- 
sible for promotions, military missions, and wartime mobilization. 
Recruitment, training, weapons, deployment, and conduct of the 
system whereby compulsory service could be performed in the Civil 
Guard were matters of joint responsibility. The regulations intro- 
duced in early 1988 enabling women to serve in certain categories 
of the armed forces also cleared the way for eventual recruitment 
of women into the Civil Guard. 

The 1986 law set out a new functional division of responsibili- 
ties between the Civil Guard and the National Police Corps. In 
addition to its rural police functions, the Civil Guard was to be 
responsible for firearms and explosives control; traffic policing on 



327 



Spain: A Country Study 

interurban roads; protection of communication routes, coasts, fron- 
tiers, ports, and airports; enforcement of environmental and con- 
servation laws, including those governing hunting and fishing; and 
interurban transport of prisoners. 

The National Police Corps 

The 1986 organic law unifying the separate uniformed and plain- 
clothes branches of the national police was a major reform that 
required a considerable period of time to be brought into full effect. 
The former plainclothes service, known as the Higher Police Corps, 
but often referred to as the ' ' secret police," consisted of some 9,000 
officers. Prior to 1986, it had a supervisory and coordinating role 
in police operations, conducted domestic surveillance, collected 
intelligence, investigated major crimes, issued identity documents, 
and carried out liaison with foreign police forces. 

The uniformed service was a completely separate organization 
with a complement of about 50,000 officers, including a small num- 
ber of female recruits who were first accepted for training in 1984. 
The Director General of the National Police Corps, a senior offi- 
cial of the Ministry of Interior, commanded 13 regional headquar- 
ters, 50 provincial offices, and about 190 municipal police stations. 
In the nine largest cities, several district police stations served 
separate sections of the city. The chief of police of each station was 
in command of both the uniformed and the plainclothes officers 
attached to the station. A centrally controlled Special Operations 
Group (Grupo Especial de Operaciones — GEO) was an elite fight- 
ing unit trained to deal with terrorist and hostage situations. 

The principal weapons regularly used by the uniformed police 
were 9mm pistols, 9mm submachine guns, CETME and NATO 
7.62mm rifles, and various forms of riot equipment. The uniform 
consisted of light brown trousers and dark brown jackets. 

The initial training phase for recruits to the National Police Corps 
was nine months, followed by a year of practical training. Promo- 
tions to corporal, sergeant, and sergeant major were based on 
seniority, additional training, and performance. In the Franco era, 
most police officers were seconded from the army. Under a 1978 
law, future police officers were to receive separate training, and army 
officers detailed to the police were to be permanently transferred. 
By 1986 only 170 army officers remained in the National Police 
Corps. Under the 1986 organic law, military-type training for police 
was to be terminated , and all candidate officers were to attend the 
Higher Police School at Avila, which previously had served as the 
three-year training center for the Higher Police Corps. The ranks 
of the plainclothes corps — commissioners, subcommissioners, and 



328 



National Security 



inspectors of first, second, and third class — were to be assimilated 
into the ranking system of the uniformed police — colonel, lieutenant 
colonel, major, captain, and lieutenant. Two lower categories — 
subinspection and basic — would include all nonofficer uniformed 
personnel. The newly unified National Police Corps was to be 
responsible for issuing identity cards and passports, as well as for 
immigration and deportation controls, refugees, extradition, depor- 
tation, gambling controls, drugs, and supervision of private secu- 
rity forces. 

Franco's Armed and Traffic Police had once been dreaded as 
one of the most familiar symbols of the regime's oppressiveness. 
During the 1980s, however, the police effected an internal trans- 
formation, adopting wholeheartedly the new democratic spirit of 
the times. The police unwaveringly supported the legally constituted 
government during the 1981 coup attempt. Led by the new police 
trade union, the police demonstrated in 1985 against right-wing 
militants in their ranks and cooperated in efforts to punish mis- 
conduct and abuses of civil rights by individual officers. 

Other Police Forces 

Although their powers were, in most cases, quite limited, the 
local police services of individual towns and cities supplemented 
the work of the National Police Corps, dealing with such matters 
as traffic, parking, monitoring public demonstrations, guarding 
municipal buildings, and enforcing local ordinances. They also col- 
laborated with the National Police Corps by providing personnel 
to assist in crowd control. Numbering about 37,000 individuals 
in 1986, the local police were generally armed only with pistols. 

Under the Statutes of Autonomy of 1979, the Basque Country 
and Catalonia were granted authority to form their own regional 
police forces. Subsequently, ten of the seventeen autonomous 
regions were extended the right to create their own forces, but, 
as of 1988, only three areas — the Basque Country, Catalonia, and 
Navarre — had developed regional police units. The 1986 organic 
law defined the limits of competence for regional police forces, 
although the restrictions imposed did not apply to the existing forces 
in the Basque Country and Navarre and applied only in part to 
those in Catalonia. Under the law, regional police could enforce 
regional legislation, protect regional offices, and, in cooperation 
with national forces, could police public places, control demonstra- 
tions and crowds, and perform duties in support of the judiciary. 
A Security Policy Council was established at the national level to 
ensure proper coordination with the new regional forces, which, 
as of 1986, numbered about 4,500 officers. 



329 



Spain: A Country Study 

Intelligence Services 

The principal intelligence agency was the Higher Defense Intel- 
ligence Center (Centro Superior de Informacion de la Defensa — 
CESID), created in 1977 to replace the intelligence organizations 
of the Francoist period. These included the Political- Social 
Brigade — a special branch of the plainclothes corps — and th£ Intel- 
ligence Service of the Civil Guard. With their files on every part 
of the rural and urban population, these bodies carried on close 
surveillance and political intimidation on behalf of the Franco 
regime. 

By a royal decree of January 1984, CESID was defined legally 
as the intelligence agency of the prime minister. Nevertheless, it 
was fundamentally military in nature, and its head in 1988 was 
an army lieutenant general, Emilio Alanso Manglano. Observers 
speculated, however, that Manglano, who had held the post since 
1981, eventually would be succeeded by a civilian. 

Employing about 2,000 individuals as of 1988, CESID was staffed 
primarily by the military, supplemented by 500 members of the 
Civil Guard and by 80 plainclothes police. About 30 percent of 
the members of the staff were civilians, said to be selected usually 
from among close relatives of military officers. Women had been 
confined largely to administrative tasks, but they were increasingly 
being entrusted with operational assignments. 

The principal operating units were domestic intelligence; for- 
eign intelligence; counterintelligence; economics and technology 
(primarily industrial espionage); and operational support (princi- 
pally application of devices for surveillance and eavesdropping). 
Considerable emphasis in external intelligence was allotted to North 
Africa and to the security of Ceuta and Melilla. Liaison was main- 
tained with a number of intelligence services of North African and 
Middle Eastern nations, as well as with the Israeli agency, Mossad. 
Interception of ship transmissions in the strait area was another 
focus of activity. Domestic intelligence centered on exposure of plots 
against the government, monitoring activities of unrecognized politi- 
cal parties, and counterterrorism. 

Although CESID was the senior agency, it did not have a firmly 
established coordinating function over other intelligence bodies, 
which included the General Headquarters of Information of the 
Ministry of Defense; the second sections of the army, the air force, 
and the navy staffs; and the Civil Guard Information Service, dedi- 
cated to criminal and terrorist intelligence. In addition, the National 
Police Corps had a General Commissariat of Intelligence, with an 
antiterrorist mission that included a Foreign Intelligence Brigade 



330 



National Security 



to investigate international terrorism aimed against Spain. Con- 
siderable rivalry and overlapping of missions characterized the entire 
intelligence system. CESID, in particular, was reported to be seek- 
ing to gain exclusive jurisdiction over police foreign intelligence 
activities. 

Criminal Justice and the Penal System 

Spain's criminal justice system, which is based on Roman law, 
extends customary procedural safeguards to accused persons. Arti- 
cle 17 of the 1978 Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and impris- 
onment. It also provides that there be a maximum period of 
preventive detention (set by law at seventy-two hours), and that 
the arrested person be informed of his or her rights, including the 
right to an attorney, the right to an explanation of the reason for 
the arrest, and the right to be present at the trial. The Constitu- 
tion abolishes the death penalty, except for certain military crimes 
in wartime. Under the Socialist government that took office in 1982, 
laws were passed providing for a limited right of habeas corpus 
for suspects to appeal against illegal detention or mistreatment. 
Defendants unable to afford counsel were assured of free legal assis- 
tance. A Public Defender's Office was formed that had authority 
to look into complaints by citizens and to initiate investigations. 
Trial by jury, which had been abolished by Franco, was part of 
the Socialist electoral program, but its introduction was delayed 
by differences with the judiciary as to the precise role the jury would 
play. 

A full-scale revision of the Penal Code was being prepared in 
the late 1980s, but a number of significant changes had already 
taken effect. The principle of suspended sentences was introduced. 
Pollution of the environment was made a crime, and distinctions 
were introduced between hard and soft narcotics in sentencing illicit 
producers and dealers. Earlier provisions of law that had legalized 
the possession of small quantities of soft drugs were reaffirmed. 

After the Civil War, crimes involving the security of the state 
were handled outside the regular court system. From 1941 until 
1963, military courts had sole charge of all crimes against national 
security, in many cases through summary courts martial. Offenses 
ranging from treason and sabotage to the fostering of strikes and 
membership in illegal associations came under the jurisdiction of 
military courts. In 1963 Franco created the three-judge civilian 
Court for Public Order to deal with all nonterrorist internal secu- 
rity offenses, such as belonging to illegal parties and distributing 
antigovernment propaganda. In 1968, however, and again in 1975, 
after intensified terrorist action, various crimes were added to the 



331 



Spain: A Country Study 

state security category, restoring them to military jurisdiction. In 
1980 the charging or the trying of civilians by military courts was 
prohibited. 

Antiterrorist laws adopted in 1980 and in 1981, in response to 
a wave of killings by Basque terrorists, had the effect of suspend- 
ing certain constitutional guarantees. Anyone charged with sup- 
porting terrorism could be held virtually incommunicado for up 
to ten days (later reduced to three days). A suspect's home could 
be searched, his mail opened, and his telephone tapped. A detainee 
in a terrorism case had the right to an appointed attorney who could 
formally advise him of his rights, and who might be present dur- 
ing his interrogation, but who could not consult with the detainee 
until the interrogation was completed. 

The international human rights group, Amnesty International, 
Spanish civil rights organizations, and the Spanish press have drawn 
attention to abuses of these exceptional powers given to police under 
the antiterrorism laws. In several of its annual reports, Amnesty 
International has said that detainees were not accorded access to 
counsel while in custody, that few were actually charged with crimes, 
that habeas corpus rights were not respected, and that insufficient 
judicial and medical supervision was exercised. The organization's 
claims of widespread mistreatment and torture, mainly of alleged 
members of Basque terrorist organizations, were supported by the 
annual reports on human rights of the United States Department 
of State. The Spanish government asserted, for its part, that 
detainees under the antiterrorist laws routinely lodged complaints 
of police brutality or torture, whether or not there was cause. 
Nevertheless, in 1986 the courts sentenced thirty-nine members 
of security forces for mistreatment of prisoners, and an estimated 
150 additional cases were pending. 

One of the most persistent problems of the judicial system was 
the delay in bringing cases to trial. As of 1986, these delays aver- 
aged eighteen months for minor offenses and between two and four 
years for serious crimes. In 1980, in an effort to curb the growing 
incidence of crime, bail was made available only for those accused 
of crimes for which the penalty was six months or less. By 1983 
the large number of prisoners awaiting trial obliged the govern- 
ment to introduce a law raising to two years the maximum time 
that an accused could be held pending trial on a minor charge and 
to four years, on a serious charge. 

Spanish statistics reflected increases of 5 to 10 percent annually 
in the incidence of crime during the late 1970s and the 1980s. For- 
eign tourists in particular were frequent victims of armed and vio- 
lent robberies. The rise was attributed largely to the economic and 



332 



National Security 



social problems of urban areas where recent high-school and col- 
lege graduates faced unemployment rates often in excess of 20 per- 
cent (see The Unemployment Problem, ch. 3). The growing 
problem of drug addiction also contributed to the number of rob- 
beries in cities and in resort areas. 

Over 90 percent of all crimes reported in 1986 were offenses 
against property. The next most significant crimes — against per- 
sons and internal security as well as the abandonment of family 
and personal injury — each contributed only between 1 and 2 per- 
cent to the total. Despite liberal laws in this area, the number of 
persons arrested on narcotics charges rose from about 9,000 in 1980 
to nearly 22,000 in 1987. Nevertheless, in Spain as a whole, the 
official crime rate continued to be lower than it was in most other 
countries of Western Europe. 

The prison population as of 1987 consisted of 17,643 individu- 
als, of whom 1,486 were women. Of the total, about 7,700 were 
serving sentences, and nearly 9,000 were detained pending trial. 
An additional 7,200 were inmates of other correctional institutions 
and halfway houses. Many complaints of overcrowding and inade- 
quate medical attention had in the past been leveled against prison 
conditions. A series of riots between 1976 and 1978 had been pro- 
voked in major part by the crowding and by delays in sentencing. 
Under the Franco government, periodic amnesties had helped to 
reduce pressures from the expanding prison population. The ban 
in the 1978 Constitution against such amnesties had led to a buildup 
that necessitated an ambitious construction and renovation pro- 
gram. As a result, by 1984, one- third of existing prisons had been 
built in the previous five years, and many others had been modern- 
ized. Prisons, which numbered forty-seven in 1987, were located 
in most of the main population centers. The largest prisons by far 
were in Madrid and in Barcelona, each of which had inmate popu- 
lations of more than 2,000. None of the others housed more than 
800 prisoners. 

Although in a 1978 report a committee of the Spanish Senate 
(upper chamber of the Cortes) had severely criticized the treatment 
of inmates, subsequent evidence indicated considerable improve- 
ment. The International Red Cross was permitted to inspect prison 
conditions whenever it desired. It reported that facilities were satis- 
factory in the majority of cases, and it described Yeserias Women's 
Prison in Madrid, where female militants of the Basque movement 
were held, as a model for the rest of the world. There were several 
open prisons from which inmates were allowed to return to the 
community for specified periods. Conjugal visits were allowed 



333 



Spain: A Country Study 

on a limited basis. Rehabilitation facilities were said to be almost 
nonexistent, however. 

Threats to Internal Security 

During the Franco regime, a wide spectrum of opposition groups 
carried on antigovernment and, in some cases, terrorist activities. 
Nevertheless, these movements were successfully contained by the 
authorities, who were determined to crush all forms of indepen- 
dent political expression. Most of the dissident activity abated with 
the introduction of a democratic system that extended legal recog- 
nition to hitherto banned political groups, including the Communist 
Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de Espafia — PCE). The legiti- 
macy of separatist movements was recognized by granting partial 
regional autonomy, which included legislatures with powers of taxa- 
tion, policing, and education (see Regional Government, ch. 4). 

As a consequence of these policies, political opposition groups 
presented no imminent threat to Spain's stability as of 1988, 
although the activities of Basque extremists continued to present 
a danger to the forces of internal security. The Basque terrorist 
movement did not, however, enjoy the active support of the majority 
of the Basque population, and it appeared to be in decline as a 
result of an increasingly effective police campaign. 

The radical movement of Basque separatists was organized in 
1959 when the group known as Basque Fatherland and Freedom 
(Euskadi Ta Askatasuna — ETA) broke away from the much larger 
Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco — PNV). The 
ETA adopted a policy of armed struggle in 1968; in practice, much 
of the violence was attributed to an extremist faction, the ETA Mili- 
tary Front (ETA Militar— ETA-M). A less violent faction, the ETA 
Political-Military Front (ETA Politico-Militar — ETA-PM) , pur- 
sued a strategy of mixing political activities with terrorist actions. 
The ETA-M was largely responsible for the mounting savagery 
of the attacks during the 1970s, which included the assassination 
of the prime minister, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, in 1973. 

The election of a democratic national parliament in 1977 and 
a Basque parliament in 1980 brought little relief from ETA vio- 
lence. Although avowedly socialist in orientation, ETA continued 
to justify its terrorist policies after the Socialist government came 
to power in 1982. It insisted that the PSOE was only a pawn of 
the capitalist and clerical forces that dominated Spain and that it 
had failed to offer real autonomy to the Basque people. 

The ETA-M was considered to be the militant wing of Popular 
Unity (Herri Batasuna — HB), the most radical of three Basque 



334 



National Security 



parties represented in the Cortes (see Political Parties, ch. 4). 
Although the HB increased its representation in the Cortes to five 
seats in 1986, it still received only 17 percent of the Basque vote. 
The party's platform included the compulsory teaching of the 
Basque language, Euskera, in the schools; the withdrawal of Spanish 
security forces from Basque territory; measures to restrict private 
capital; and the addition of Navarre to the three provinces of the 
north that constituted the existing autonomous community of the 
Basque Country. As its ultimate objective, the party favored com- 
plete independence from Spain. 

ETA-M's strategy had been to carry out a series of carefully 
selected assassinations and bombings, each having important psy- 
chological or symbolic impact. The terrorists thus hoped to inspire 
a spiral of violence and counterviolence that would arouse feeling 
against "repression" by the security forces and that would perhaps 
provoke a right-wing coup by the armed services. A total of more 
than 700 deaths had been attributed to the movement by the close 
of 1987. The violence had reached its peak in 1980 when the death 
toll was eighty-five. Nearly two-thirds of those killed were mem- 
bers of the Civil Guard or the National Police Corps. Most of the 
remainder were civilians killed in bombings or caught in crossfire. 
The military represented only 7 percent of the deaths, but those 
selected for assassination were often senior officers holding promi- 
nent positions. 

The activists of ETA-M, believed to number no more than 200 
to 500 in 1986, were organized into cells of as few as 5 individuals. 
Most members were under thirty years of age, and they had served 
for an average of three years in this sideline to their ordinary jobs. 
Perhaps no more than 100 were actual gunmen, the others acting 
as messengers, transporting weapons and explosives, and provid- 
ing support. A number of young women also served in ETA-M; 
they were said to be among the most uncompromising militants, 
willing to take risks that young men increasingly shunned. 

By the mid-1980s, ETA-M appeared to be under growing pres- 
sure from the security forces, with the result that the incidence of 
terrorist acts had tapered off. Better use of informants, ambushes, 
raids, and tighter control of the border with France contributed 
to the success of the police efforts. In 1984 the Spanish govern- 
ment had announced a policy of "social integration," a form of 
amnesty offered to ETA members in exile or in Spanish jails if they 
renounced future acts of terrorism. Improved international coopera- 
tion was also important. In 1986 about 200 active terrorists were 
believed to be living among the large Basque population in the adja- 
cent provinces of France, using French territory as sanctuary and 



335 



Spain: A Country Study 

as a base for terrorist missions. Two years later, their numbers had 
been reduced to a few dozen as a result of intensified cooperation 
between Spanish and French security authorities. Until 1983 
France, citing its tradition of granting political asylum, had been 
unwilling to extradite ETA members to Spain, France shifted to 
a more accommodating policy, after the new Socialist government 
took office in Spain, and permited the extradition of a few ETA 
members, accused of specific crimes of violence, while resettling 
others in northern France or deporting them. In late 1987, the police 
claimed a crippling blow had been administered to the terrorists 
by the arrest of many senior members of ETA-M in both Spain 
and France and the discovery of caches of arms and explosives. 

Sympathy among Basques for the extremists, which was already 
limited, diminished further following the bombing in 1987 of a 
supermarket garage in Barcelona, in which twenty-four innocent 
people were killed. Later in the same year, there was popular revul- 
sion over the deaths of five children among eleven people killed 
in a bombing of family quarters of the Civil Guard at Zaragoza. 

Beginning in late 1983, a right-wing force, the Antiterrorist 
Liberation Group (Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberacion — GAL), 
began a campaign of revenge killings and bombings among sus- 
pected ETA terrorists, chiefly in France, where GAL was widely 
believed to be linked to the Civil Guard. At the same time, an off- 
shoot of ETA-M, Spain Commando, targeted members of the Civil 
Guard and the armed forces in Madrid, where such attacks, which 
gained maximum publicity for the movement, had been on the rise. 

ETA-M was at one time well financed by kidnappings, robber- 
ies, and the so-called " revolutionary tax" on Basque businessmen. 
Reportedly, however, after the reverses suffered by the terrorists 
in 1987, receipts from the tax had declined almost to zero. 

The regional Basque police force, Ertzaintza, formed in 1981, 
originally was assigned to traffic and other nonsecurity duties, but 
in late 1986 it conducted its first engagement against ETA-M. A 
plan had been adopted for Ertzaintza gradually to take a larger 
role, but it was reported that Civil Guard officers were reluctant 
to turn over intelligence out of conviction that the autonomous police 
were infiltrated by ETA activists. 

Other regional opposition groups — in the Canary Islands, 
Galicia, and Catalonia — did not present a threat to internal secu- 
rity forces that was comparable to ETA. The Catalan separatist 
organization Terra Lliure (Free Land), formed in 1980, was respon- 
sible for a series of bomb explosions, some of which had resulted 
in fatalities. In late 1987, a United States servicemen's club in 
Barcelona was attacked with grenades, and the United States 



336 



National Security 



consulate was bombed. Terra Lliure and a newer group, the Cata- 
lan Red Liberation Army, both claimed responsibility. During the 
first part of 1987, a group dedicated to a separate Galician nation, 
the Free Galician Guerrilla People's Army, carried out bomb attacks 
against banks in a number of towns in Galicia. 

* * * 

An official Spanish publication, Ministerio de Defensa: Memoria 
Legislatura, 1982-86, provides an authoritative explanation of the 
sweeping changes undertaken during the 1980s in the structure of 
national defense, defense policy, organization of the armed ser- 
vices, personnel and training policies, and modernization of equip- 
ment. The role of the armed forces under Franco, the strained 
relations between military and civil authorities during the transi- 
tion to democracy, and the government's successful efforts to intro- 
duce its reform measures are reviewed in a study by Carolyn P. 
Boyd and James M. Boyden included in Politics and Change in Spain, 
edited by Thomas D. Lancaster and Gary Prevost. Briefer accounts 
covering the same topics can be found in John Hooper's The 
Spaniards: A Portrait of the New Spain and Robert Graham's Spain: 
A Nation Comes of Age. Analyses by several scholars of Spanish secu- 
rity concerns, relating to the North African enclaves, Gibraltar, 
and the implications of Spain's membership in NATO, can be 
found in Spain: Studies in Political Security edited by Joyce Lasky Shub 
and Raymond Carr. An article by Victor Alba also addresses the 
domestic political and military factors bearing on Spanish entry 
into NATO. Strategic considerations of Spanish participation in 
the defense of Europe are weighed in a study by Stewart Menaul, 
The Geostrategic Importance of the Iberian Peninsula. The uncertainties 
arising from the special conditions of Spain's adherence to NATO 
are emphasized in "Spain in NATO: An Unusual Kind of Par- 
ticipation," by Carlos Robles Piquer. The changes in the charac- 
ter of the Spanish police services and the Civil Guard are detailed 
in two articles by Ian R. MacDonald. In Spain and the ETA: The 
Bid for Basque Autonomy, Edward Moxon-Browne provides back- 
ground on an internal security problem that has troubled Spain 
for many years. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



337 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Selected Election Results for the Congress of Deputies, 1977-86 

3 Total Population and Annual Growth Rates, Census Years, 

1860-1981 

4 Area, Population, and Density of the Autonomous Commu- 

nities and Provinces in the Mid-decennial Census of April 1 , 
1986 

5 Population of Principal Cities in the Mid-decennial Census 

of April 1, 1986 

6 Number of Foreign Tourists and Earnings from Tourism, 

Selected Years, 1960-87 

7 Selected Crops, 1985-87 

8 Fishing Industry Catches, 1984-86 

9 Selected Mineral Production, 1986-87 

10 Composition of Foreign Trade, 1981 and 1987 

1 1 Total Spanish Foreign Trade and Trade with Selected Part- 

ners, 1982-86 

12 Foreign Investment in Spain by Country, 1982-87 

13 Autonomous Communities and Dates of Approval of Statutes 

of Autonomy 

14 Selected Regional Parties 

15 The Thirty Daily Newspapers with the Largest Circulations 

in 1987 

16 Major Army Equipment, 1987 

17 Major Naval Equipment, 1988 

18 Major Air Force Equipment, 1987 



339 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters > 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



341 



Spain: A Country Study 



Table 2. Selected Election Results for the Congress of Deputies, 1977-86 





1977 






1979 




Party 


Valid Votes 


Percentage 


Party 


Valid Votes 


Percentage 


UCD 


. 6,337,288 


34.61 


UCD 


6,292,102 


35.02 


PSOE 


. 5,358,781 


29.27 


PSOE 


5,477,037 


30.49 


PCE 


. 1,718,026 


9.38 


PCE 


. . . 1,940,236 


10.80 


AP 


. 1,525,028 


8.33 


CD 


. . . 1,070,721 


5.96 


CiU 


514,647 


2.81 


CiU 


483,446 


2.69 


PNV 


314,409 


1.72 


PNV 


. . . 275,292 


1.53 


EE 


60,312 


0.33 


HB 


172,110 


0.96 








EE 


85,677 


0.48 














Party 


\ 7_i: J \ 

Valla Votes 


Percentage 


Party 


Valla Votes 


Percentage 


PSOE .... 


. 10, 127, 392 


48.4 


roUr- . . . 


O OOT 1 A K 

. . . O,oo/,J40 


44.3 


AP 


5,409,229 


25.9 


CP 


. . . 3, 245,396 


26.2 


UCD 


1,425,248 


6.8 


CDS 


... 1,862,856 


9.3 


AP/UCD * 


139,148 


0.6 


CiU 


... 1,012,054 


5.0 


PCE 


846,440 


4.0 


IU 


. . . 930,223 


4.6 


CiU 


772,726 


3.7 


PNV 


. . . 308,991 


1.5 


CDS 


604,293 


2.9 


HB 


... 231,558 


1.2 


PNV 


395,656 


1.9 


EE 


106,937 


0.5 


HB 


210,601 


1.0 








EE 


100,326 


0.5 









AP — Popular Alliance. 

CD — Democratic Coalition (led by AP). 

CDS — Democratic and Social Center. 

CiU — Convergence and Union Party. 

CP— Popular Coalition (led by AP). 

EE— Basque Left. 

HB— Popular Unity. 

IU— United Left (leftist alliance dominated by PCE). 
PCE — Communist Party of Spain. 
PNV — Basque Nationalist Party. 
PSOE— Spanish Socialist Workers' Party. 
UCD — Union of the Democratic Center. 

* These parties formed an alliance in three Basque provinces for the 1982 elections. 

Table 3. Total Population and Annual Growth Rates, 
Census Years, 1860-1981 



Annual Annual 
Census Growth Census Growth 

Year Population Rate Year Population Rate 



1860 15,655.467 0.34 1950 27,976,755 0.81 

1910 19,927,150 0.72 1960 30,903,137 0.88 

1920 21,303,162 0.69 1970 33,823,918 0.94 

1930 23,563,867 1.06 1981 37,746,260 1.15 

1940 25,877,971 0.98 



Source: Based on information from John Paxton (ed.), The Statesman's Year-Book, 1989-1990, 
New York, 1989, 1114. 



342 



Appendix 



Table 4. Area, Population, and Density of the Autonomous 
Communities and Provinces in the Mid-decennial 
Census of April 1, 1986 

Autonomous Area Inhabitants 

Community (in square Per Square 

Province kilometers) Population Kilometer 



Andalusia 87,268 6,875,628 79 

Almeria 8,774 448,592 51 

Cadiz 7,385 1,054,503 143 

Cordoba 13,718 745,175 54 

Granada 12,531 796,857 64 

Huelva 10,085 430,918 43 

Jaen 13,498 633,612 47 

Malaga 7,276 1,215,479 167 

Seville 14,001 1,550,492 111 

Aragon 47,669 1,214,729 25 

Huesca 15,671 220,824 14 

Teruel 14,804 148,073 10 

Zaragoza 17,194 845,832 49 

Asturias 10,565 1,114,115 105 

Balearic Islands 5,014 754,777 151 

Basque Country 7,261 2,133,002 294 

Alava 3,047 275,703 90 

Guipuzcoa 1,997 688,894 345 

Vizcaya 2,217 1,168,405 527 

Canary Islands 7,273 1,614,882 222 

Las Palmas 4,065 855,494 210 

Santa Cruz de Tenerife 3,208 759,388 237 

Cantabria 5,289 524,670 99 

Castilla La Mancha 79,226 1,665,029 21 

Albacete 14,858 342,278 23 

Ciudad Real 19,749 477,967 24 

Cuenca 17,061 210,932 12 

Guadalajara 12,190 146,008 12 

Toledo 15,368 487,844 32 

Castilla y Leon 94,147 2,600,330 28 

Avila 8,048 179,207 22 

Burgos 14,269 363,530 25 

Leon 15,468 528,502 34 

Palencia 8,029 188,472 23 

Salamanca 12,336 366,668 30 

Segovia 6,949 151,520 22 

Soria 10,287 97,565 9 

Valladolid 8,202 503,306 61 

Zamora 10,559 221,560 21 

Catalonia 31,970 5,977,008 187 

Barcelona 7,773 4,598,249 592 

Gerona 5,886 490,667 83 

Lerida , . 12,028 356,811 30 

Tarragona 6,283 531,281 85 

Extremadura 41,602 1,088,543 26 

Badajoz 21,657 664,516 31 

Caceres 19,945 424,027 21 

Galicia 29,434 2,785,394 95 

LaCorufia 7,876 1,102,376 140 



343 



Spain: A Country Study 
Table 4. — Continued 



Autonomous Area Inhabitants 

Community (in square Per Square 

Province kilometers) Population Kilometer 



Lugo 9,803 399,232 41 

Orense 7,278 399,378 55 

Pontevedra 4,477 884,408 198 

Madrid 7,995 4,854,616 607 

Murcia 11,317 1,014,285 90 

Navarre 10,421 512,676 49 

La Rioja 5,034 262,611 52 

Valencia 23,305 3,772,002 162 

Alicante 5,863 1,254,920 214 

Castellon 6,679 437,320 65 

Valencia 10,763 2,079,762 193 



Source: Based on information from John Paxton (ed.), The Statesman 's Year-Book, 1989-1990, 
New York, 1989, 1114-1115. 



344 



Appendix 



Table 5. Population of Principal Cities in the 
Mid- decennial Census of April 1, 1986 



City 



Population 



City 



Population 



Albacete 127,169 

Alicante 265,543 

Almeria 156,838 

Badajoz 126,340 

Barcelona 1,694,064 

Bilbao 378,221 

Burgos 163,910 

Caceres 79,342 

Cadiz 154,051 

Cartagena 168,809 

Castellon 129,813 

Cordoba 304,826 

La Coruna 241,808 

Gerona 67,578 

Granada 280,592 

Huelva 135,427 

Jerez de la Frontera 180,444 

Jaen 102,826 

Leon 137,414 

Lerida 111,507 

Logrono 118,770 

Lugo 77,728 

Madrid 3,123,713 

Malaga 595,264 

Murcia 309,504 



Orense 102,455 

Oviedo 190,651 

Palencia 76,707 

Palma de Mallorca 321,112 

Las Palmas de Gran 

Canaria 372,270 

Pamplona 183,703 

Salamanca 166,615 



San Sebastian 

Santa Cruz de Tenerife 

Santander 

Santiago de Compostela 

Seville 

Tarragona 

Valencia 

Vailadolid 

Vitoria 



180,043 
211,389 
188,539 
104,045 
668,356 
109,557 
738,575 
341,194 
207,501 

Zaragoza 596,080 



Source: Based on information from John Paxton (ed.), The Statesman's Year-Book, 1989-1990, 
New York, 1989, 1115-1116. 



Table 6. Number of Foreign Tourists and Earnings 
from Tourism, Selected Years, 1960-87 



Earnings 

Number of Tourists (in millions of 



Year (in millions) United States dollars) 



1960 6.1 350 

1965 . 14.3 1,105 

1970 24.1 1,681 

1975 30.1 3,404 

1980 38.0 6,968 

1982 42.0 7,126 

1984 43.0 7,717 

1986 47.4 12,058 

1987 50.5 14,760 



Source: Based on information from Spain, Ministerio del Portavoz del Gobierno, Spain, 
1989, Madrid, 1989, 141. 



345 



Spain: A Country Study 



Table 7. Selected Crops, 1985-87 
(in thousands of tons) 



Crop 1985 1986 1987 



Almonds 287 221 250 

Bananas 402 471 410 

Barley 10,698 7,431 9,602 

Cabbages 546 465 421 

Corn 3,414 3,423 3,555 

Grapes 5,450 5,788 6,181 

Lemons 482 619 584 

Mandarins 1,051 1,164 1,133 

Oats 680 433 503 

Olive oil 429 533 710 

Onions 1,249 1,166 1,104 

Oranges 1,968 2,135 2,359 

Potatoes 5,927 5,125 5,379 

Rice 463 496 490 

Rye 273 220 320 

Sugar beets 6,619 7,746 7,908 

Tomatoes 2,429 2,400 2,347 

Wheat 5,329 4,392 5,768 



Source: Based on information from Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2, London, 1989, 2336. 



Table 8. Fishing Industry Catches, 1984-86 
(in thousands of tons) 



Type of Catch 


1984 


1985 


1986 




116.8 


103.3 


118.3 


Cephalopods 










54.1 


51.5 


45.9 




26.1 


23.6 


66.6 


Cod varieties 










35.5 


38.3 


54.6 


Cape hake . , 


119.0 


136.4 


147.9 


European hake 


55.1 


46.3 


42.3 


Blue whiting 


25.2 


26.6 


35.7 


Mackerel varieties 








Atlantic horse mackerel 


34.0 


34.1 


44.7 




19.4 


16.1 


23.4 




20.9 


'19.4 


15.8 




257.1 


229.0 


173.2 


Tuna varieties 










17.5 


21.4 


22.1 




57.2 


58.5 


65.5 




57.9 


83.3 


79.6 


TOTAL (incl. others) 


1,337.7 


1,337.7 


1,303.5 


* Estimates of the Food and Agriculture Organization. 

Source: Based on information from Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2, 


London, 1989, 2337. 



346 



Appendix 



Table 9. Selected Mineral Production, 1986-87 
(in thousands of tons, net metal content) 





1986 


1987 




4.7 


1 1 
1 1 




278 


196 




2,778 


2,042 




80 


78 




1,491 


1,612 




1,195 


992 


Tin * 


281 


71 




373 


380 


Wolfram * 


564 


64 




223 


225 



* in tons. 



Source: Based on information from John Paxton, (ed.), Statesman's Year-Book, 1989-1990, 
New York, 1989, 1120. 



Table 10. Composition of Foreign Trade, 1981 and 1987 
(in billions of pesetas) 

Trade Items 1981 1987 
Imports 

Capital goods 419.0 1,432.8 

Consumer goods 278.1 1,193.6 

Food 258.1 606.5 

Fuels 1,259.6 986.5 

Raw materials 334.2 508.8 

Semi-finished products 421 .5 1,301.6 

Total imports 2,970.5 6,029.8 

Exports 

Capital goods 296.3 617.3 

Consumer goods 476.4 1,324.0 

Food 347.0 739.8 

Fuels 99.1 260.7 

Raw materials 61.9 156.1 

Semi-finished products 607.6 1,097.8 

Total exports 1,888.3 4,195.7 

Source: Based on information from Spain, Ministerio del Portavoz del Gobierno, Spain, 
1989, Madrid, 1989, 150. 



347 



Spain: A Country Study 



5» 



V 



« Co 

1 si 

8 S 



e5 



e5 





to 


CO 




cd 


tO 




o 


to 




to 


c 


CM 


■* 


CO 




O 






CM 


to 




n3 


in 


°l 






°l 




to 




m 


CD 


Q. 

a 


o" 


of 




CM 


o" 




<o" 




CO* 




>—> 




en 










o 


s 


o 


m 












Of 




CM 






CO 



CO ^ t-i CO 

CO LO CO tJh cm 
tO tD CM CO CD 



CD m -<f co 
(O co N l£) 
m r— to to m 

<d" r>T oo" t-T t-T 
cm ^ cm m 
cd o t-i o m 



»-H CO CM CD 

to cd t>. 

CM t-h tO CM 



CM 


to 


m 


to 






to 






CM 






co 






o" 




to" 


o" 


m" 




CD 




o 




CO 


CO 


CO 


co 


CM 



to O CO CM 

o co T-< 
M m m Oi 

CO m CT) CM CM 
N O) iO CO 

10 m 



n ffi m co co 

CO O O CO CM 
CO CM CO ^ CM 



m m to m <d 

in CM 

cm co m 



m 


o 




CM 


co 




to 


to 


CO 


O 


CM 


to 


co 


co 


CO 




CO 


CD 






CM 


o 






CD 


O 








m 


Co" 


to" 


co" 




to" 


m 


o 




CM 


m 


CM 


to 


m 


CO 


CO 


CO 


>o 


to 


en 




CO 


CO 




m 






CM 


CO 


co 





to 




CT) 




m 








t^. 


CM 




co 




cd 


CM 




CO 


r>» 




o 


CO 


co^ 


CO 


CD 




CO 




m 


co 


a l 


m" 




co" 






of 


co" 


to" 


m" 


cm" 






CTl 






to 




to 


CO 


CO 


CM 


CO 


co 




m 


CO 




m 


to 


to 



CD ■■— i CO ■>— i CM 
N N CO CM n 
CO^ tD_ O to to 

o to --" of t>" 

N if] CO (N t^- 
t-< CM CM CO CO 



m to 
n » co m a 
* * m * o 
o" co" co" co" co" 
o n co to m 
*-h co m co 



ffl O ^ CO N 

co c?) co to 

m CT) cm 

m" to" co" co" o" 

to t cm CT) 
^hioom 

co ^ in ^ 

h : : : : : 

& 

o 

Ph in co ^ m to 

H CO CO CO CO CO 

^ CT) CT) CT) CT) CD 



O N IN * tO 

co CT> r-~ 
to CO O CM CO 



o CD co ~h m 
to —i ^ m co 
t-h cm co co co 



CM CD CO CO CO 

to m m d o 

» to^ co co 

co co cm m" 

CD CM CD 

O * O) IN 



to i-i co co 

O O CM ^ CO 

O tO h CO 

co" co" ■>*" t-T 

in co co o O 

CM CO CO 

cm' cm" cn co" 

h : : : : : 

06 

o 

0-t cm co m to 

yl CO CO CO CO CO 

Q CD CD CD D CD 



348 



Appendix 



Table 12. Foreign Investment in Spain by Country, 1982-87 
(in billions of pesetas) 



Percentage of 
Total Foreign 
Investment, 



Country 


1982 


1984 


1986 


1987 


1982-87 




1.0 


3.4 


11.5 


33.5 


3 




10.3 


20.7 


28.0 


45.4 


8 




8.0 


15.6 


25.1 


50.1 


10 


Italy 


2.0 


4.3 


25.3 


67.1 


7 


Japan 


3.5 


15.6 


9.9 


33.3 


5 




16.3 


18.4 


30.5 


122.5 


13 


Switzerland 


35.4 


22.5 


21.1 


61.0 


11 


United States 


42.3 


35.0 


32.1 


40.1 


14 


West Germany 


18.9 


26.9 


104.5 


26.8 


14 


Others 


24.7 


75.4 


52.0 


60.5 


17 


TOTAL 


162.4 


237.8 


340.0 


540.3 


100 * 



* Figure does not add to total because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Mark Hudson and Stan Rudcenko, Spain to 1992: Joining 
Europe's Mainstream, Special Report No. 118, Economist Intelligence Unit, Lon- 
don, 1988, 112. 



Table 13. Autonomous Communities and Date of Approval of 
Statutes of Autonomy 

Autonomous Community Approval Date 

Basque Country December 18, 1979 

Catalonia December 18, 1979 

Galicia April 6, 1981 

Andalusia December 30, 1981 

Asturias December 30, 1981 

Cantabria December 30, 1981 

La Rioja June 9, 1982 

Murcia June 9, 1982 

Valencia July 1, 1982 

Aragon August 10, 1982 

Castilla La Mancha August 10, 1982 

Canary Islands August 10, 1982 

Navarre August 10, 1982 

Extremadura February 25, 1983 

Balearic Islands February 25, 1983 

Madrid February 25, 1983 

Castilla y Leon February 25, 1983 



349 



Spain: A Country Study 



Table 14. Selected Regional Parties 



Name of Party 


Ideology 


Year Founded 


Basque Left (Euskadiko Ezkerra — EE) 


leftist 


1976 


Basque Nationalist Party (Partido 






Nacionalista Vasco — PNV) 


center-right 


1894 


Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna — EA) . . 


radical independentist 


1986 


Canary Independence Association (Agrupacion 






Independiente Canaria — AIC) 


independentist 


1986 


Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra 








moderate left 


1931 


Convergence and Union (Convergencia i 






Unio— CiU) 


center-right 


1979 


Galician Coalition (Coalicion Galega — CG) . . 


reformist 


1985 




leftist 


1978 


Regionalist Aragonese Party (Partido Aragones 






Regionalista— PAR) 


center- right 


1977 


Union of the Navarrese People (Union del 






Pueblo Navarro— UPN) 


social Christian 


1979 



350 



Appendix 



Table 15. The Thirty Daily Newspapers with the 
Largest Circulations in 1987 



Newspaper 


Place of Publication 


Average Circulation 
in 1987 


El Pais 


. . Madrid and Barcelona 


373,000 


ABC 


. . Madrid and Seville 


247,000 




. Barcelona 


201,000 


As 


. . Madrid 


157,000 


El Periodico 


. Barcelona 


154,000 


Marca 


. Madrid and Seville 


144,000 


Diario 16 


. Madrid and Seville 


136,000 


El Correo Espanol-El Pueblo Vasco 


. . Bilbao 


123,000 


La Voz de Galicia 


. La Corufia 


82,000 


El Diario Vasco 


. San Sebastian 


81,000 


Ya 


. Madrid 


75,000 




. Valencia 


56,000 


El Mundo Deportivo 


. Barcelona 


55,000 


Sport 


. Barcelona 


50,000 


Deia 


. Bilbao 


50,000 


Heraldo de Aragon 


. Zaragoza 


49,000 


Diario de Navarra 


. Pamplona 


43,000 




. Hernani 


41,000 




. Murcia 


40,000 


Avui 


. Barcelona 


39,000 


La Nueva Espana 


. Oviedo 


36,000 


El Faro de Vigo 


• Vigo 


32,000 


Sur 


. Malaga 


32,000 


La Provincia - 


. Las Palmas de Gran Canaria 


32,000 




. Alicante 


31,000 




. Cadiz 


28,000 




. Valencia 


27,000 




. Palma de Mallorca 


26,000 


El Diario Montanes 


. Santander 


26,000 


Ideal 


. Granada 


26,000 



Source: Based on information from Ramon Tamames (ed.), El Pais Anuario, 1989, Madrid, 
1989, 200. 



351 



Spain: A Country Study 

Table 16. Major Army Equipment, 1987 

Country of Number in 

Type and Description Manufacture Inventory 
Tanks 

AMX-30E France/Spain 300 

M-47E United States 380 

M-48A5E -do- 164 

M-41 -do- 127 

Armored vehicles 

M-113 armored personnel carriers -do- 1,196 

BMR-600 six-v/heeled infantry combat vehicles Spain 510 

AML-60 reconnaissance vehicles France 60 

AML-90 light armored cars -do- 80 

Self-propelled guns and howitzers 

105mm M-108 howitzers United States 48 

155mm M-109A howitzers -do- 96 

175mm M-107 -do- 12 

203mm M-55 howitzers -do- 4 

Towed Artillery 

105mm M-26 and M-56 pack United States 810 

122mm 122/46 Spain 188 

155mm M-114 United States 84 

155mm M-44 -do- 12 

203mm M- 115 -do- 24 

Multiple Rocket Launchers 

Teruel 140mm Spain 12 

L-21 216mm -do- 16 

Mortars: 81mm, 107mm, 120mm various 1,200 

Antitank weapons 

106mm recoilless rifles United States 500 

M-65 88.9mm rocket launchers -do- 42 

Milan, Cobra, Dragon, HOT, and TOW missiles .... France and 

United States 130 

Air defense weapons 

20mm, 35mm, 40mm, and 90mm guns various 364 

Nike, Hercules missiles United States 9 

Improved Hawk -do- 24 

Roland France n.a. 

Aspide Italy n.a. 

Helicopters 

Bell UH-1 B/H (utility) United States 69 

CASA-MBB HA- 15 (attack; reconnaissance) Spain/West 

Germany 70 

AB-206A; AB-212 (training; utility) Italy 9 

OH-58B (transport) United States 12 

CH-47 Chinook (transport) -do- 18 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The 
Military Balance, 1987-88, London, 1987, 75. 



352 



Table 17. Major Naval Equipment, 1988 



Appendix 



Type and Description 



Origin 



Number 



Date 
Commissioned 



Aircraft carriers 

Dedalo (eight Harriers; eight helicopters) . United States 1 1967 (to be 

Principe de Asturias (six-eight Harriers retired) 

(V/STOL); eight helicopters) Spain 1 1988 

Submarines 

Agosta class Spain/France 4 1983-86 

Daphne class v -do- 4 1973-75 

Destroyers 

Gearing class United States 5 1945 

Fletcher class -do- 3 1943-44 

Roger de Lauria Spain 1 1959 

Frigates 

FFG-7 class -do- 3 1986-88 

F-70 Baleares -do- 5 1973-76 

Corvettes 

Atrevida class -do- 4 1954-60 

Descubierta class -do- 6 1978-82 

Fast attack craft, missile armed -do- 12 1975-78 

Patrol craft, various types -do- 79 various 

Minesweepers 

Aggressive class (ocean) United States 4 1953-54 

Adjutant class (coastal) -do- 8 1956-59 

Amphibious 

Paul Revere class LP A 1 -do- 2 1958-61 

Cabildo class LSD 2 -do- 1 1945 

Landing craft, various types Spain and 

United States 35 various 

Helicopters 

AB-212 (command; reconnaissance) .... Italy 12 n.a. 

Sea King (antisubmarine) United States 13 n.a. 

Hughes 500M (antisubmarine) -do- 11 n.a. 

n.a. — not available. 

1 Amphibious Personnel Transport. 

2 Landing Ship, Dock. 

Source: Based on information from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The 
Military Balance, 1987-88, London, 1987, 76; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1987-88, 
London, 1987, 461-75. 



353 



Spain: A Country Study 



Table 18. Major Air Force Equipment, 1987 



Country of Number in 

Type and Description Origin Inventory 

Fighter-bomber-interceptors 

F-4C and RF-4C Phantoms United States 36 

Mirage HIE and HID (trainer) France 30 

Mirage Fl -do- 63 

F-18 Hornets United States 24 

(on order) 48 

Ground attack 

SF-5 Spain (assembly) 52 

Maritime reconnaissance 

Orion P-3A United States 6 

Fokker F-27 Netherlands 3 

Transport 

C-130 Hercules United States 5 

KC-130 (aerial refueling) -do- 6 

CASA C-212 Aviocar Spain 82 

DHC-4 Caribou United States 12 

Utility 

Do-27 West Germany 49 

Training 

Beech T-34A Mentor United States 24 

Beech F-33A Bonanza -do- 8 

CASA C-101 Spain 40 

Helicopters 

Aerospatiale SA-319A Alouette III France 6 

Aerospatiale SA-330 Puma -do- 6 

Aerospatiale AS-332B Super Puma Spain (assembly) 12 

Agusta/Bell 205, 206 Italy 17 

Hughes 269A United States 17 

Bell CH-47 Chinook -do- 25 

Source: Based on information from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The 

Military Balance, 1987-88, London, 1987, 76-77. 



354 



Bibliography 



Chapter 1 

Allan, Tony. Spain. Alexandria, Virginia: Time- Life Books, 1987. 

Arango, E. Ramon. Spain: From Repression to Renewal. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1985. 

Blinkhorn, Martin. Carlism and Crisis in Spain, 1931-1939. Cam- 
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 

Boyd, Carolyn. Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain. Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1979. 

Braudel, Fernand. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in 
the Age of Philip II. (2 Vols.) New York: Harper and Row, 1975. 

Brenan, Gerald. The Spanish Labyrinth. New York: Macmillan, 1943. 

Carr, Edward Hallett. The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War. New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1984. 

Carr, Raymond. Modern Spain, 1875-1980. Oxford: Oxford Univer- 
sity Press, 1980. 

Spain, 1808-1975. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. 

The Spanish Civil War. New York: Norton, 1986. 

Carr, Raymond (ed.). The Republic and the Civil War in Spain. Lon- 
don: Macmillan, 1971. 

Carr, Raymond, and Juan Pablo Fusi. Spain: Dictatorship to Demo- 
cracy. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979. 

Castro, Americo. The Structure of Spanish History . Princeton: Prince- 
ton University Press, 1954. 

Clark, Robert P. The Basque Insurgents. Madison, Wisconsin: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1984. 

The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond. Reno, Nevada: 

University of Nevada Press, 1979. 

Clark, Robert P., and Michael H. Haltzel (eds.). Spain in the 1980s. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing, 1987. 

Clissold, Stephen. Spain. London: Thames and Hudson, 1969. 

Collins, Roger. The Basques. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986. 

Cortada, James W. (ed.). Spain in the Twentieth- Century World: Essays 
on Diplomacy, 1898-1978. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, 1980. 

Coverdale, John F. The Political Transformation of Spain after Franco. 

New York: Praeger, 1979. 
Crow, John Armstrong. Spain: The Root and the Flower. (3d ed.) 

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 
Crozier, Brian. Franco. Boston: Little Brown, 1967. 



355 



Spain: A Country Study 



Davies, R. Trevor. The Golden Century of Spain, 1501-1621. Lon- 
don: Macmillan, 1937. Reprint. Westport, Connecticut: Green- 
wood Press, 1984. 

Spain in Decline, 1621-1700. London: Macmillan, 1957. 

Douglass, William A. (ed.). Basque Politics: A Case Study in Ethnic 
Nationalism. (Basque Studies Program, Occasional Papers Series, 
No. 2.) Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 1985. 

Elliott, J. H. Imperial Spain, 1469-1716. New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1963. 

"Espagne: Le second souffle," L' Express [Paris], September 4, 
1987, 5-16. 

Fischer, Richard S. "The Spanish Left: Resurgence After Four 
Decades of Franco." (Western Societies Program, Occasional 
Papers, No. 11.) Ithaca: Western Societies Program, Cornell 
University, December 1978. 

Fraser, Ronald. Blood of Spain. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, United 
Kingdom: Penguin, 1981. 

Fusi, Juan Pablo. Franco. (Felipe Fernandez- Armesto, trans.) New 
York: Harper and Row, 1987. 

Gallo, Max. Spain Under Franco. (Jean Stewart, trans.) New York: 
E.P. Dutton, 1974. 

Gilmour, David. The Transformation of Spain: From Franco to the Con- 
stitutional Monarchy. London: Quartet Books, 1985. 

Glick, Thomas F. Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. 

Graham, Robert. Spain: A Nation Comes of Age. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1984. 

Gunther, Richard. Public Policy in a No-Party State: Spanish Planning 
and Budgeting in the Twilight of the Franquist Era. Berkeley: Univer- 
sity of California Press, 1980. 

Gunther, Richard, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad. Spain After 
Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System. Berkeley: Univer- 
sity of California Press, 1986. 

Halstead, Charles R. "Spanish Foreign Policy, 1936-1978." Pages 
41-94 in James W. Cortada (ed.), Spain in the Twentieth-Century 
World. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980. 

Harbron, John D. "Spanish Foreign Policy Since Franco," Be- 
hind the Headlines [Toronto], 41, No. 4, 1984, 1-15. 

Harvey, Robert. "Spain's Democracy: A Remarkable First Year," 
The World Today [London], 36, March 1980, 102-07. 

Hayes, Carleton J.H. The United States and Spain: An Interpretation. 
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970. 

Herr, Richard. The Eighteenth- Century Revolution in Spain. Prince- 
ton: Princeton University Press, 1958. 



356 



Bibliography 



Historical Essay on Modern Spain. Berkeley: University of 

California Press, 1971. 

Hillgarth, J.N. The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250-1516. (2 Vols.) Lon- 
don: Oxford University Press, 1976. 

Hooper, John. The Spaniards: A Portrait of the New Spain. New York: 
Penguin Books, 1987. 

Hottinger, Arnold. "Spain in Transition, I: Franco's Regime." 
(Washington Papers, No. 18, Center for Strategic and Interna- 
tional Studies, Washington.) Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 
1974. 

"Spain in Transition, II: Prospects and Policies." (Wash- 
ington Papers, No. 19, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Washington.) Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974. 

Jackson, Gabriel. The Making of Medieval Spain. New York: Har- 
court Brace Jovanovich, 1972. 

The Spanish Republic and the Civil War. Princeton: Prince- 
ton University Press, 1965. 

Kamen, Henry. A Concise History of Spain. New York: Charles Scrib- 
ner's Sons, 1973. 

Inquisition and Society in Spain in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 

Centuries. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1985. 

Spain, 1469-1714. London and New York: Longman, 

1983. 

Lancaster, Thomas D., and Gary Prevost (eds.). Politics and Change 
in Spain. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

Linz,JuanJ. "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain." Pages 160-207 
in Stanley Payne (ed.), Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain. 
New York: Franklin Watts, 1976. 

Lomax, Derek W. The Reconquest of Spain. London: Longman, 1978. 

Lopez-Pintor, Rafael. "The October 1982 General Election and 
the Evolution of the Spanish Party System." Pages 293-313 in 
Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio Mujal-Leon (eds.), Spain at 
the Polls, 1977, 1979, and 1982: A Study of the National Elections. 
Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press for the Ameri- 
can Enterprise Institute, 1985. 

Lynch, John. Spain under the Habsburgs. Oxford: Oxford Univer- 
sity Press, 1964. 

McDonough, Peter, Samuel Barnes, and Antonio Lopez Pina. 
"The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain," American 
Political Science Review, 80, No. 3, September 1986, 735-60. 

MacKay, Angus. Spain in the Middle Ages: From Frontier to Empire, 
1000-1500. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. 

Maravall, Jose Maria. "Political Cleavages in Spain and the 1979 



357 



Spain: A Country Study 

General Election," Government and Opposition, 14, Summer 1979, 
299-317. 

The Transition to Democracy in Spain. London: Croom Helm, 

1982. 

Marcus, Jonathan. "The Triumph of Spanish Socialism: The 1982 
Election," West European Politics [London], 6, No. 3, July 1983, 
281-86. 

Mattingly, Garrett. Defeat of the Spanish Armada. Boston: Hough- 
ton Mifflin, 1984. 

Maxwell, Kenneth. "The Emergence of Democracy in Spain and 
Portugal," Orbis, 27, No. 1, Spring 1983, 151-84. 

Meaker, Gerald H. The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914-1923. Stan- 
ford: Stanford University Press, 1974. 

Medhurst, Kenneth. "Spain's Evolutionary Pathway from Dic- 
tatorship to Democracy," West European Politics [London], 7, 
No. 2, April 1984, 30-50. 

Moss, Robert. "Spain After Franco," The World Today [London], 
29, No. 8, August 1973, 324-36. 

Mujal-Leon, Eusebio. Communism and Political Change in Spain. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983. 

"The Crisis of Spanish Democracy," Washington Quarterly, 

5, Spring 1982, 101-07. 

. "Madrid: The March Elections," Washington Quarterly, 2, 
Spring 1979, 105-13. 

"Rei(g)ning in Spain," Foreign Policy, 51, Summer 1983, 

101-17. 

Orwell, George. Homage to Catalonia. New York: Harcourt Brace, 
1952. 

Parry, J. H. The Age of Reconnaissance. New York: The New Ameri- 
can Library, 1964. 

The Spanish Seaborne Empire. New York: Knopf, 1966. 

Payne, Stanley G. The Franco Regime, 1936-1975. Madison: Univer- 
sity of Wisconsin Press, 1987. 

Franco's Spain. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967. 

A History of Spain and Portugal. (2 Vols.) Madison: Univer- 
sity of Wisconsin Press, 1973. 

Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain. New York: 

Franklin Watts, 1976. 

Payne, Stanley G. (ed.). Falange: A History of Spanish Facism. Madi- 
son: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980. 

Penniman, Howard R., and Mujal-Leon, Eusebio. Spain at the Polls, 
1977, 1979, and 1982: A Study of the National Elections. Durham 
North Carolina: Duke University Press for the American Enter- 
prise Institute, 1985. 



358 



Bibliography 



Preston, Paul. The Coming of the Spanish Civil War. London: Mac- 
millan, 1978. 

. Spain in Crisis. New York: Harper and Row, 1976. 

The Triumph of Democracy in Spain. New York: Methuen, 

1986. 

Preston, Paul (ed.). Revolution and War in Spain, 1931-1939. New 

York: Methuen, 1984. 
Preston, Paul, and Denis Smyth. Spain, the EEC, and NATO. 

(Chatham House Papers, 22.) London: Routledge and Kegan 

Paul, 1984. 

Roskin, Michael. "Spain Tries Democracy Again," Political Science 
Quarterly, 93, No. 4, Winter 1978, 629-46. 

Salisbury, William T., and James D. Theberge (eds.). Spain in the 
1970s. New York: Praeger, 1976. 

Sanchez, Jose M. The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy. Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987. 

Semprun, Jorge. "La Democratic, sans plus," Le Debat [Paris], 
No. 42, November-December 1986, 3-15. 

Serfaty, Meir. "Spanish Democracy: The End of the Transition," 
Current History, 80, May 1981, 213-17, 227-28. 

Serra Rexach, D. Eduardo. "Spain: Politics and Change," 
Washington Quarterly, 10, No. 1, Winter 1987, 23-27. 

Share, Donald. "Democratization of Spain," The Center Magazine, 
19, May-June 1986, 54-59. 

. The Making of Spanish Democracy. New York: Praeger, 1986. 

Smith, Rhea Marsh. Spain: A Modern History. Ann Arbor, Michi- 
gan: University of Michigan Press, 1965. 

Stradling, R.A. Europe and the Decline of Spain: A Study of the Span- 
ish System, 1580-1720. London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1981. 

Thomas, Hugh. The Spanish Civil War. New York: Harper and 
Row, 1961. 

Trythall, J.W.D. El Caudillo. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970. 
Vicens Vives, Jaime. Approaches to the History of Spain. Berkeley: 

University of California Press, 1970. 
Vidal-Naquet, Pierre (ed.). The Harper Atlas of World History. New 

York: Harper and Row, 1987. 
Vilar, Pierre. Spain: A Brief History. (Brian Tate, trans.) Oxford: 

Pergamon Press, 1967. 
Wiarda, HowardJ. "Spain and Portugal." Pages 298-328 in Peter 

Merkl (ed.), Western European Party Systems. New York: Free Press, 

1980. 

Wyden, Peter. The Passionate War: The Narrative History of the Span- 
ish Civil War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. 



359 



Spain: A Country Study 



Chapter 2 

Aceves, Joseph. Social Change in a Spanish Village. Cambridge, Massa- 
chusetts: Schenkman, 1971. 

Aceves, Joseph, and William Douglass (eds.). The Changing Faces 
of Rural Spain. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman, 1976. 

Aguilera, Francisco. Santa Eulalia's People: Ritual Structure and Process 
in an Andalusian Multicommunity. St. Paul, Minnesota: West, 1978. 

Anllo- Vazquez, Juan. Estructuray problemas del campo espanol. Madrid: 
Editorial Cuadernos para el Dialogo, 1966. 

Arija Rivares, Emilio. Geografia de Espana. Barcelona: Editores De 
Gasso Hermanos, 1972-84. 

Azaola, Jose Miguel. Vasconiay Su Destino. (2 Vols.) Madrid: Revista 
de Occidente, 1972. 

Barrett, Richard. Benabarre: The Modernization of a Spanish Village. 
New York: Wiley, 1974. 

"Social Hierarchy and Intimacy in a Spanish Town," 

Ethnology, 11, No. 4, October 1972, 386-98. 

Boetsch, Laurent. "The Church in Spanish Politics." Pages 144-67 
in Thomas Lancaster and Gary Prevost (eds.), Politics and Change 
in Spain. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

Brandes, Stanley. Migration, Kinship, and Community: Tradition and 
Transition in a Spanish Village. New York: Academic Press, 1975. 

Brassloff, Audrey. "The Church and Post-Franco Society." Pages 
59-77 in Christopher Abel and Nissa Torrents (eds.), Spain: Con- 
ditional Democracy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 

Carter, Michael S. "Ethnic Minority Groups and Self-Determination: 
The Case of the Basques," Columbia Journal of Law and Social 
Problems, 20, No. 1, 1986, 55-87. 

Cazorla Perez, Jose, and J. Mentabes Pereira. "The Social Struc- 
ture of Spain." Pages 180-97 in David Bell (ed.), Democratic 
Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics after Franco. London: Frances 
Pinter, 1983. 

Clark, Robert P. The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond. Reno: 
University of Nevada Press, 1979. 

"Dimensions of Basque Political Culture in Post-Franco 

Spain." Pages 212-64 in William A. Douglass (ed.), Basque 
Politics: A Case Study in Ethnic Nationalism. (Basque Studies Pro- 
gram Occasional Papers Series, No. 2.) Reno: University of 
Nevada Press, 1985. 

"The Ethnic Nation, the State and European Integration: 

Basque Autonomy and Spanish Membership in the EEC." 
(Paper presented to the Conference of Europeanists, Washing- 
ton, October 1987.) 



360 



Bibliography 



"Euzkadi: Basque Nationalism in Spain since the Civil 

War." Pages 75-100 in Charles Foster (ed.), Nations Without a 
State: Ethnic Minorities in Western Europe. New York: Praeger, 1980. 

"Madrid and the Ethnic Homelands: Is Consociational 

Democracy Possible in Post-Franco Spain?" Pages 64-93 in 
Thomas Lancaster and Gary Prevost (eds.), Politics and Change 
in Spain. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

"Public Policies to Protect a Minority Language: The 

Basque Case." (Paper presented to the International Political 
Science Association, Washington, August 28-September 1, 
1988.) 

"The Question of Regional Autonomy in Spain's 

Democratic Transition." Pages 139-56 in Robert P. Clark and 
Michael H. Haltzel (eds.), Spain in the 1980s. Cambridge, Massa- 
chusetts: Ballinger Publishing, 1987. 

"Spain's Autonomous Communities: A Case Study in 

Ethnic Power Sharing, " European Studies Journal, 2, No. 1, 1985, 
1-16. 

Cobb, Christopher. "Basque Language Teaching: From Clandes- 
tinity to Official Policy, "Journal of Area Studies, No. 11, Spring 
1985, 7-11. 

Collins, Roger. The Basques. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. 

Connell, Tim. "Language and Legislation: The Case of Catalo- 
nia," Journal of A rea Studies, No. 11, Spring 1985, 12-16. 

Corbin, J.R., and M.P. Corbin. Compromising Relations: Kith, Kin 
and Class in Andalusia. Brookfield, Vermont: Gower Publishing, 
1984. 

Urbane Thought: Culture and Class in an Andalusian City. 

Brookfield, Vermont: Gower Publishing, 1987. 

Crow, John Armstrong. Spain: The Root and the Flower. (3d ed.) 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 

Davies, Catherine. "The Early Formation of a Galician Nation- 
alist Ideology: The Vital Role of the Yoet" Journal of Area Studies, 
No. 11, Spring 1985, 17-21. 

del Campo, Salustiano, and Manuel Navarro. Nuevo andlisis de la 
poblacion espahola. Barcelona: Ariel, 1987. 

del Campo, Salustiano, Manuel Navarro, and J. Felix Tezanos. 
La cuestion regional esparto la. Madrid: EDICUSA, 1977. 

Diaz Lopez, Cesar E. "The Politicization of Galician Cleavages." 
Pages 389-454 in Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin (eds.), The 
Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism. Lon- 
don: Sage, 1982. 

Di Giacomo, Susan. "The Catalan Language Today: Demogra- 
phy and Use." (Paper presented to the American Association 



361 



Spain: A Country Study 

of Teachers of Spanish and Portuguese, Boston, 1983.) 

"Images of Class and Ethnicity in Catalan Politics, 

1977-1980." Pages 72-92 in Gary McDonogh (ed.), Conflict in 
Catalonia: Images of an Urban Society. (University of Florida Mono- 
graphs, Social Sciences, No. 71.) Gainesville, Florida: Univer- 
sity of Florida, 1986. 

Donaghy, Peter J., and Michael T. Newton. Spain: A Guide to Po- 
litical and Economic Institutions . Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- 
sity Press, 1987. 

Douglass, William A. Death in Murelaga: Funerary Ritual in a Spanish 
Basque Village. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969. 

Echalar and Murelaga: Opportunity and Rural Exodus in Two 

Spanish Basque Villages. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975. 

"Rural Exodus in Two Spanish Basque Villages: A Cul- 
tural Explanation," American Anthropologist, 73, No. 5, October 
1971, 1100-1114. 

Douglass, William A, and Milton da Silva. "Basque Nationalism." 
Pages 147-86 in Oriol Pi-Sunyer (ed.), The Limits of Integra- 
tion: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Modern Europe. (Department of 
Anthropology, University of Massachusetts, Research Reports, 
No 9.) Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts, 
1971. 

Duplaa, Cristina, and Gwendolyn Barnes. Las nacionalidades delestado 
espahol: una problemdtica cultural. Minneapolis: Institute for the 
Study of Ideologies and Literature, University of Minnesota, 
1986. 

"Envejecer en Espafia," Carta de Espana [Madrid], No. 334, July 

15-30, 1986, 8-11. 
Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2. London: Europa Publications, 

1989. 

Europa Year Book: A World Survey, 1988, 2. London: Europa Publi- 
cations, 1988. 

Fisher, William Bayne, and Howard Bowen-Jones. Spain: An Intro- 
ductory Geography. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. 

Freeman, Susan. Neighbors: The Social Contract in a Castilian Hamlet. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. 

The Pasiegos: Spaniards in No Man } s Land. Chicago: Univer- 
sity of Chicago Press, 1979. 

"Religious Aspects of the Social Organization of a 

Castilian Village," American A nthropologist, 70, No. 1, February 
1968, 34-49. 

Garcia Venero, Maximiano. Historia del nacionalismo vasco. (3d ed.) 

Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1969. 
Garmendfa, Jose Antonio, Francisco Parra Luna, and Alfonso 



362 



Bibliography 



Perez- Agote. Abertzalesy vascos: identification vasquistay nacionalista 
en el Pais Vasco. Madrid: Akal, 1982. 

Gilmore, David. Aggression and Community: Paradoxes of Andalusian 
Culture. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. 

"Andalusian Anti-clericalism: An Eroticized Rural Pro- 
test," Anthropology, 8, No. 1, May 1984, 31-44. 

The People of the Plain: Class and Community in Lower Andalu- 
sia. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 

Giner, Salvador. "Ethnic Nationalism, Centre, and Periphery in 
Spain." Pages 78-99 in Christopher Abel and Nissa Torrents 
(eds.), Spain: Conditional Democracy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1984. 

Glos, George E. "The Spanish Divorce Law of 1981," International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly [London], 32, No. 3, July 1983, 
667-88. 

Gomez-Ibanez, Daniel. The Western Pyrenees: Differential Evolution 
of the French and Spanish Borderland. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975. 

Graham, Robert. Spain: A Nation Comes of Age. New York: St. Mar- 
tin's Press, 1984. 

Greenwood, Davydd. "Continuity in Change: Spanish Basque Eth- 
nicity as a Historical Process." Pages 81-102 in Milton Esman 
(ed.), Ethnic Conflict in the Western World. Ithaca: Cornell Univer- 
sity Press, 1977. 

Gregory, David. "Rural Exodus and the Perpetuation of Andalu- 
cia." Pages 69-76 in Joseph Aceves, Edward Hansen, and Gloria 
Levitas (eds.), Economic Transformation and Steady-State Values. 
Flushing, New York: Queens College Press, 1976. 

Gunther, Richard. "A Comparative Study of Regionalisms in 
Spain." (Paper presented to the Society for Spanish and Por- 
tuguese Historical Studies, Toronto, Canada, April 24-25, 
1981.) 

Politics and Culture in Spain. Ann Arbor: Center for Politi- 
cal Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michi- 
gan, 1988. 

Gunther, Richard, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad. "Party 
Strategies and Mass Cleavages in the 1979 Spanish Election." 
(Paper presented to the American Political Science Association, 
Washington, August 28-31, 1980.) 

Heiberg, Marianne. "Inside the Moral Community: Politics in 
a Basque Village." Pages 285-308 in William A. Douglass (ed.), 
Basque Politics: A Case Study in Ethnic Nationalism. (Basque Studies 
Program, Occasional Papers Series, No. 2.) Reno: University 
of Nevada Press, 1985. 



363 



Spain: A Country Study 

"Urban Politics and Rural Culture: Basque Nationalism." 

Pages 355-88 in Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin (eds.), The Poli- 
tics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism. London: 
Sage, 1982. 

Hernandez, Francesc, and Francesc Mercade (eds.). Estructuras 
socialesy cuestion nacional en Espaha. (Ariel Sociolgia series.) Barce- 
lona: Ariel, 1986. 

Hooper, John. The Spaniards: A Portrait of the New Spain. New York: 
Penguin Books, 1987. 

Kenny, Michael. A Spanish Tapestry: Town and Country in Castile. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962. 

Kendrick, Donald. The Destiny of Europe's Gypsies. New York: Basic 
Books, 1972. 

Kohler, Beate. Political Forces in Spain, Greece, and Portugal. London: 
Butterworth Scientific, 1982. 

Krejci, Jaroslav, and Vitezslav Velimsky. Ethnic and Political Na- 
tions in Europe. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 

Laitin, David. "Political Linguistics in Catalonia after Franco." 
(Paper presented to the American Political Science Association, 
New Orleans, August 21 -September 1, 1985.) 

Lancaster, Thomas D. "Spanish Energy Policy under the Socialists: 
A Break with the Past?" (Paper presented to the Conference of 
Europeanists, Washington, October 18-20, 1985.) 

"Spain's Plan Energetico Nacional: Energy Policy in Two 

Political Regimes." (Paper presented to the Conference of 
Europeanists, Washington, April 29-May 1, 1982.) 

Linz, Juan J. "The Basques in Spain: Nationalism and Political 
Conflict in a New Democracy." Pages 1 1-52 in W. Phillips Davi- 
son and Leon Gordenker (eds.), Resolving Nationality Conflicts: The 
Role of Public Opinion Research. New York: Praeger, 1980. 

"From Primordialism to Nationalism." Pages 203-53 in 

Edward Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski (eds.), New National- 
isms of the Developed West. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985. 

Linz, Juan J., and Amando de Miguel. "Within-Nation Differ- 
ences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains." Pages 267-319 in 
Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Comparing Nations: 
The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1966. 

Maraval, Jose Maria. "Education for Democracy." Pages 67-77 
in Robert P. Clark and Michael H. Haltzel (eds.), Spain in the 
1980s. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1987. 

Martinez- Alier, Juan. Labourers and Landowners in Southern Spain. 
London: Allen and Unwin, 1971. 



364 



Bibliography 



Maxwell, Kenneth (ed.). The Press and the Rebirth of Iberian Democracy. 

Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983. 
Medhurst, Kenneth. The Basques. London: Minority Rights Group, 

1975. 

. "Basques and Basque Nationalism." Pages 235-61 in 

Colin Williams (ed.), National Separatism. Vancouver: Univer- 
sity of British Columbia Press, 1982. 

. The Basques and Catalans. London: Minority Rights Group, 

1977. 

McDonogh, Gary. "Urban Models and Urban Conflicts." Pages 
1-16 in Gary McDonogh (ed.), Conflict in Catalonia: Images of an 
Urban Society. (University of Florida Monographs, Social Sciences, 
No. 71.) Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida, 1986. 

McDonough, Peter, Samuel Barnes, and Antonio Lopez Pina. 
"Economic Policy and Public Opinion in Spain." Unpublished 
manuscript, 1985. 

. "Political Identity in Spain." (Paper presented to the Con- 
ference of Europeanists, Washington, October 18-20, 1985.) 

' 'The Spanish Public and the Transition to Democracy. ' ' 

Paper presented to the American Political Science Association, 
Washington, August 31 -September 3, 1979. 

Miguel, Amando de. Manual de estructura social de Espana. Madrid: 
Tecnos, 1974. 

Recursos humanos, closes, y regiones en Espana. Madrid: EDIC- 

USA, 1977. 

Moliner Ruiz, Matilde. Geografta de Espana. Madrid: Compama 

Bibliografica Espanola, 1955. 
Naylon, John. Andalusia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. 
Nunez, Luis C. Closes sociales en Euskadi. San Sebastian, Spain: Txer- 

toa, 1977. 

. Euskadi sur electoral. San Sebastian: Txertoa, 1980. 

Perez Diaz, Victor. Estructura social del campo y exodo rural: estudio 

de un pueblo de Castilla. Madrid: Tecnos, 1966. 
Pescatello, Ann M. Power and Pawn: The Female in Iberian Familes, 

Societies, and Cultures. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 

1976. 

Pi-Sunyer, Oriol. "Catalan Nationalism: Some Theoretical and 
Historical Considerations." Pages 253-76 in Edward Tiryakian 
and Ronald Rogowski (eds.), New Nationalisms of the Developed 
West. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985. 

. "Dimensions of Catalan Nationalism." Pages 101-15 in 

Charles Foster (ed.), Nations without a State: Ethnic Minorities in 
Western Europe. New York: Praeger, 1980. 



365 



Spain: A Country Study 



' 'The Maintenance of Ethnic Identity in Catalonia. ' ' Pages 

1 1 1-46 in Oriol Pi-Sunyer (ed.), The Limits of Integration: Ethnic- 
ity and Nationalism in Modern Europe. (Department of Anthropol- 
ogy, University of Massachusetts, Research Reports, No. 9.) 
Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts, 1971. 

Nationalism and Societal Integration: A Focus on Catalonia. Am- 
herst, Massachusetts: International Area Studies Programs, 
University of Massachusetts, 1983. 

Ruiz Olabuenaga, Jose Ignacio. Atlas linguistico vasco. Vitoria, Spain: 
Basque Government, 1984. 

Sanchez-Gijon, Antonio. "The Spanish Press in the Transition 
Period." Pages 123-37 in Robert P. Clark and Michael H. 
Haltzel (eds.), Spain in the 1980s. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Ballinger, 1987. 

Shabad, Goldie, and Richard Gunther. "Language, Nationalism, 
and Political Conflict in Spain." (Paper presented to the Con- 
ference of Europeanists. Washington, October 23-25, 1980.) 

"Language, Nationalism and Political Conflict in Spain," 

Comparative Politics, 14, July 1982, 443-77. 

Siguan, M. "Lenguas y Educacion en Espana." (Paper presented 
to the Conference on Minority Languages and Education, 
Universidad de Barcelona, 1985.) 

Spain. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. Anuario estadistica de Espana 
Madrid: 1986. 

Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. Boletin de estadistica 

[Madrid], No. 462, November-December 1986. 

Ministerio del Portavoz del Gobierno. Spain, 1989. 

Madrid, 1989. 

Statesman's Year-Book, 1988-89. (Ed. John Paxton.) New York: St. 

Martin's Press, 1988. 
Statesman's Year-Book, 1989-1990. (Ed. John Paxton.) New York: 

St. Martin's Press, 1989. 
Teran, Manuel de, L. Sole Sabaris, and J. Vila Valenti. Geografia 

regional de Espana. (5th ed.) Barcelona: Ariel, 1987. 
Threlfell, Monica. "Women and Political Participation." Pages 

136-60 in Christopher Abel and Nissa Torrents (eds.), Spain: 

Conditional Democracy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 
Torrents, Nissa. "Cinema and the Media after the Death of 

Franco. " Pages 100-14 in Christopher Abel and Nissa Torrents 

(eds.), Spain: Conditional Democracy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 

1984. 

Woolard, Kathryn. "The 'Crisis in the Concept of Identity' in 
Contemporary Catalonia, 1976-82." Pages 54-71 in Gary 
McDonogh (ed.), Conflict in Catalonia: Images of an Urban Society. 



366 



Bibliography 



(University of Florida Monographs, Social Sciences, No. 71.) 
Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida, 1986. 

. "A Formal Measure of Language Attitudes in Barcelona," 

International Journal of the Sociology of Language [The Hague], No. 47, 
1984, 63-71. 

. The Politics of Language and Ethnicity in Barcelona. Stanford: 

Stanford University Press, 1987. 
Yoors, Jan. The Gypsies of Spain. New York: Macmillan, 1974. 



Chapter 3 

Acena, Pablo Martin, and Leandro Prados de la Escosura (eds.). 

La nueva historia economica en Espaha. Madrid: Tecnos, 1985. 
Albarracin, Jesus. La onda larga del capitalismo espahol. Madrid: 

Economistas Libros, 1987. 
. Las tendencias bdsicas de la poblacion, el empleo, y el paro en el 

periodo 1964 a 1980. Madrid: Banco de Espafia, 1982. 
Arango, Joaquin, et al. La economia espanola en el siglo XX: una per- 

spectiva historica. (Ariel Historia: Seccion Historia Economica.) 

Barcelona: Ariel, 1987. 
Balfour, Sebastian. Dictatorship, Workers, and the City: Labour in Greater 

Barcelona since 1939. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
Bank of Spain. Informe Anual 1987. Madrid, 1988. 
Burns, Robert Ignatius. Medieval Colonialism: Postcrusade Exploita- 
tion of Islamic Valencia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

1975. 

Capdevila Batilles, Jose. Agricultura e industria espanola f rente a la CEE: 
aspectos juridicos, economicos y politicos. Barcelona: Aedos, 1985. 

Castells, Manuel, et al. Nuevas technologias: economia y sociedad en 
Espaha,. (2 Vols.) Madrid: Alianza, 1986. 

Cuervo Garcia, Alvaro, Luis Rodriguez Saiz, and Jose Alberto 
Parejo. Manual de sistema financiero: instituciones, mercados y medios 
en Espaha. Barcelona: Ariel, 1987. 

Diaz Gonzalez, Enrique. Rumasa. (Coleccion documento series.) 
Madrid: Planeta, 1983. 

Donaghy, Peter J., and Michael T. Newton. Spain: A Guide to Po- 
litical and Economic Institutions . Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- 
sity Press, 1987. 

Donges, Juergen B. La industria espanola en la transicion. Barcelona: 
Orbis, 1985. 

"La insuficiencia de productividad en la economia espa- 
nola: Causas y remedios." Pages 97-124 in Juan J. Linz et al. 
(eds.), Espaha: un presente para elfuturo, 1. Madrid: Instituto de 
Estudios Economicos, 1984. 



367 



Spain: A Country Study 

Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Spain, 1987-88. Lon- 
don: 1987. 

. Country Profile: Spain, 1988-89. London: 1988. 

Quarterly Economic Review of Spain, Annual Supplement, 

1984-1988. London: 1984-88. 

Ekaizer, Ernesto. Jose Maria Ruiz Mateos, el ultimo magnate. Barce- 
lona: Plaza y Janes, 1985. 

El Pais Anuario, 1989. (Ed. Ramon Tamames.) Madrid: El Pais, 
1989. 

Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2. London: Europa Publications, 
1989. 

Europa Year Booh, 1988: A World Survey, 2. London: Europa Publi- 
cations, 1988. 

Eussner, Ansgar. "Industrial Policy and Southward Enlargement 

of the European Community: The Case of Shipbuilding and 

Repairs," Journal of Common Market Studies [Oxford], 22, No. 2, 

December 1983, 147-72. 
Fanjul, Oscar, and Fernando Maravall. La eficiencia del sistema ban- 

cario espanol. Madrid: Alianza, 1985. 
French, Martin. "Madrid Awaits El Grande Bang," Euromoney 

[London], April 1988, 147, 149, 151-52. 
Gamir, Luis. Contra el paroy la crisis en Espana. (Coleccion documento 

series.) Barcelona: Planeta, 1985. 
Gonzalez, Manuel Jesus. La economia politica del Franquismo, 

1940-1970: dirigismo, mercado y planificacion. Madrid: Tecnos, 

1979. 

Gonzales- Arias, Orlando A. "Spain Liberalizes Its Exchange Con- 
trol Laws," International Lawyer, 21, No. 4, Fall 1987, 1199-1204. 

Graham, Robert. Spain: A Nation Comes of Age. New York: St. Mar- 
tin's Press, 1984. 

Gwyn, Richard. "The Spark for a New Mediterranean Miracle: 
The European Free Market Moves South," World Press Review, 
36, No. 3, March 1989, 22-25. 

Harrison, Joseph. "Spain: The End of the Miracle." Pages 195-213 
in Andrew Cox (ed.), Politics, Policy and the European Recession. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. 

. The Spanish Economy in the Twentieth Century. New York: 

St. Martin's Press, 1985. 

Hendel, Clifford. "An Introduction to Spain's Foreign Investment 
Law," Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 10, No. 1, Winter 
1984, 1-24. 

Hudson, Mark, and Stan Rudcenko. Spain to 1992: Joining Europe's 
Mainstream. (Special Report No. 1138.) London: Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 1988. 



368 



Bibliography 

Lieberman, Siam. The Contemporary Spanish Economy. London: Allen 

and Unwin, 1982. 
Linz, Juan J., et al. Espana: un presente para elfuturo. (2 Vols.) (Colec- 

cion tablero series.) Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Economicos, 

1984. 

Maravall, Fernando. Economia y politica industrial en Espana. Madrid: 
Piramide, 1987. 

Martin, T.R. "A Study of Business and Society in Another Coun- 
try: Spain," Columbia Journal of World Business , 23, No. 3, Fall 
1988, 77-84. 

Martinez Serrano, J. A. Economia espanola, 1960-1980: crecimiento 
y cambio structural. Madrid: Hermann Blume, 1982. 

Merigo, Eduardo. * 'Spain." Pages 554-80 in Andrea Bolitho (ed.), 
The European Economy: Growth and Crisis. Oxford: Oxford Univer- 
sity Press, 1982. 

Navarro, Francisco Jose (ed.). Los trabajadores ante la concertacion social. 
Madrid: Fundacion Friedrich Ebert, 1986. 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Spain: 
OECD Economic Surveys. Paris: 1980-88. 

Payne, Stanley. The Franco Regime, 1936-1975. Madison: Univer- 
sity of Wisconsin Press, 1987. 

Perez Diaz, Victor. "Polfticas, economicas y pautas sociales en 
la Espana de la transicion: La doble cara del neocorporatismo. ' ' 
Pages 21-55 in Juan J. Linz, et al. (eds.). Espana: un presente para 
el futuro, 1. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Economicos, 1984. 

Ringrose, David R. Madrid and the Spanish Economy, 1560-1850. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. 

Saez, Armando. Poblacion y actividad economica en Espana. Mexico 
City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1975. 

Sagardoy, Juan A., and David Leon Blanco. El poder sindical en 
Espana. Barcelona: Planeta, 1982. 

Salisbury, William T., and James D. Theberge (eds.). Spain in the 
1970s: Economics, Social Structure, Foreign Policy. (International Rela- 
tions Series of the Institute of International Studies.) New York: 
Praeger, 1975. 

Sanchez- Alvornoz, Nicolas (ed.). The Economic Modernization of Spain, 
1830-1930. (Karen Powers and Manuel Sanudo, trans.) New 
York: New York University Press, 1987. 

Santamana, Javier. El petroleo en Espana: del monopolio a la libertad. 
Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1988. 

Sloop, Christine. "Spain's Growth and Modernization Create U.S. 
Export Opportunities," Business America, 10, No. 25, Decem- 
ber 7, 1987, 6-11. 



369 



Spain: A Country Study 



Spain. Ministerio de Industria y Energia. Secretaria General 
Tecnica. Informe Anual sobre la Industria Espanola 1985. Madrid: 
1985. 

. Ministerio del Portavoz del Gobierno. Spain, 1989. 

Madrid: 1989. 

Statesman's Year-Book, 1988-89. (Ed. John Paxton.) New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1988. 

Statesman's Year-Book, 1989-90. (Ed. John Paxton.) New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1989. 

Straubhaar, Thomas. "The Accession of Spain and Portugal to 
the EC from the Aspect of the Free Movement of Labour in an 
Enlarged Common Labour Market," International Migration [Lon- 
don], 22, No. 3, 1984, 228-38. 

Swinbank, Alan, and Christopher Ritson. "The Common Agricul- 
tural Policy, Customs Unions, and the Mediterranean Basin," 
Journal of Common Market Studies [Oxford], 27, No. 2, December 
1988, 97-112. 

Tamames, Ramon. Introduccion a la economia espanola. Madrid: 
Alianza, 1987. 

La oligarquia financiera en Espaha. (Espejo de Espana.) Barce- 
lona: Planeta, 1977. 

. The Spanish Economy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 

Trujillo del Valle, Jose A., and Carlos Cuervo-Arango. El sistema 
financiero espanol: flujos, mercados e intermediarios financieros. Barce- 
lona: Ariel, 1985. 

Vassberg, David E. Land and Society in Golden Age Castile. (Cam- 
bridge Iberian and Latin American Studies.) Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1984. 

Vicens Vives, Jaime, with Jorge Nadal Oiler. An Economic History 
of Spain. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 

Villa, Luis Enrique de la. Panorama de las relaciones laborales en Espana. 
Madrid: Tecnos, 1983. 

Wright, Alison. The Spanish Economy, 1959-1976. New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1977. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Economist [London], January 
1980-September 1988; Financial Times [London], January 
1980-September 1988; New York Times, January 1980-September 
1988; Papeles de Economia Espanola [Madrid]; Washington Post, January 
1980-September 1988.) 

Chapter 4 

Aguilar, Miguel Angel. "The Spanish Military: Force for Stability 



370 



Bibliography 



or Insecurity?" Pages 49-58 in Joyce Lasky Shub and Raymond 
Carr (eds.), Spain: Studies in Political Security. New York: Prae- 
ger, 1985. 

Allin, George R. "Spain's NATO Dilemma," Military Review, 65, 
No. 1, January 1985, 61-73. 

Arango, E. Ramon. The Spanish Political System: Franco's Legacy. 
(Westview Special Studies in West European Politics and Soci- 
ety.) Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978. 

Aurrecoechea, Ignacio. "Some Problems Concerning the Constitu- 
tional Basis for Spain's Accession to the European Community," 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 36, January 1987, 14-31. 

Barrio, Antonio Marquina. "NATO, the EEC, Gibraltar, North 
Africa: Overlapping Issues for Spain," International Spectator 
[Rome], 21, January-March 1986, 43-46. 

"Spain and Its North African Enclaves." Pages 114-19 

in Joyce Lasky Shub and Raymond Carr (eds.), Spain: Studies 
in Political Security. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

Bell, David S. "The Spanish Communist Party in the Transition." 
Pages 63-77 in David S. Bell (ed.), Democratic Politics in Spain: 
Spanish Politics After Franco. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 

Bermeo, Nancy. "Redemocratization and Transition Elections: 
A Comparison of Spain and Portugal," Comparative Politics, 19, 
January 1987, 213-51. 

Bleifuss, Joel. "Spain: Democracy with Difficulties," Dissent, Spring 
1987, 162-67. 

Boetsch, Laurent. "The Church in Spanish Politics." Pages 144-67 
in Thomas D. Lancaster and Gary Prevost (eds.), Politics and 
Change in Spain. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

Bollag, Daniel. "A Breath of Feminism in Macho Spain," Swiss 
Review of World Affairs [Zurich], 32, July 1982, 21-23. 

Bonime, Andrea R. "The Spanish State Structure: Constitution 
Making and the Creation of the New State." Pages 11-34 in 
Thomas D. Lancaster and Gary Prevost (eds.), Politics and Change 
in Spain. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

Boyd, Carolyn P., and James M. Boyden. "The Armed Forces 
and the Transition to Democracy in Spain." Pages 94-124 in 
Thomas D. Lancaster and Gary Prevost (eds.), Politics and Change 
in Spain. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

Carr, Raymond. "The Spanish Transition to Democracy in Histor- 
ical Perspective." Pages 1-14 in Robert P. Clark and Michael 
H. Haltzel (eds.), Spain in the 1980s. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Ballinger Publishing, 1987. 

Carr, Raymond, and Juan Pablo Fusi. Spain: Dictatorship to Demo- 
cracy. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981. 



371 



Spain: A Country Study 



Cebrian, Juan Luis. "The Press and National Security in 
Democratic Spain." Pages 87-91 in Joyce Lasky Shub and Ray- 
mond Carr (eds.), Spain: Studies in Political Security. New York: 
Praeger, 1985. 

Chislett, William. "The Spanish Media since Franco," Index on 
Censorship, 8, March- April, 1979, 3-7. 

Clark, Robert P. The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980. Madi- 
son, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984. 

"Madrid and the Ethnic Homelands: Is Consociational 

Democracy Possible in Post-Franco Spain?" Pages 64-93 in 
Thomas D. Lancaster and Gary Prevost (eds.), Politics and Change 
in Spain. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

"The Question of Regional Autonomy in Spain's 

Democratic Transition." Pages 139-56 in Robert P. Clark and 
Michael H. Haltzel (eds.), Spain in the 1980s. Cambridge, Massa- 
chusetts: Ballinger Publishing, 1987. 

Clark, Robert P. , and Michael H. Haltzel (eds.). Spain in the 1980s. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing, 1987. 

Cortada, James W. "The United States." Pages 235-60 in James 
W. Cortada (ed.), Spain in the Twentieth-Century World: Essays on 
Spanish Diplomacy, 1898-1978. Westport, Connecticut: Green- 
wood Press, 1980. 

Coverdale, John F. The Political Transformation of Spain After Franco. 
New York: Praeger, 1979. 

Crow, John Armstrong. Spain: The Root and the Flower (3d ed.) Berke- 
ley: University of California Press, 1985. 

Diaz Lopez, Cesar Enrique. "The State of the Autonomic Process 
in Spain," Publius, 11, Summer, 1981, 193-216. 

Donaghy, Peter J., and Michael T. Newton. Spain: A Guide to Po- 
litical and Economic Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- 
sity Press, 1987. 

Dorman, Gerald A., and Peter J. Duigan (eds.). Politics in Western 
Europe. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1988. 

Druckman, Daniel. "Stages, Turning Points, and Crises: Negotiat- 
ing Military Base Rights, Spain and the United States," Jour- 
nal of Conflict Resolution, 30, No. 2. June 1986, 327-60. " 

El Pais Anuario, 1989. (Ed. Ramon Tamomes.) Madrid: El Pais, 
1989. 

Ferrando, Xavier Selles. "Das demokratische Spanien als Staat 
der autonomen regionalen Gemeinschaften," Europaeische Rund- 
schau [Vienna], 15, No. 2, Summer 1987, 89-102. 

Fishman, Robert. "The Labor Movement in Spain," Comparative 
Politics, 14, April 1982, 281-305. 



372 



Bibliography 



Fleming, Shannon. "North Africa and the Middle East." Pages 
121-54 in James W. Cortada (ed.), Spain in the Twentieth- Century 
World: Essays on Spanish Diplomacy, 1898-1978. Westport, Con- 
necticut: Greenwood Press, 1980. 

Ford, Robert E. "The Spain-NATO-United States Triangle: Who 
Controls the Negotiations?" Fletcher Forum, 12, No. 2, Summer 
1988, 321-39. 

Fouquet, David. "Southern European Socialism: NATO Ques- 
tions in Greece and Spain," Editorial Research Report, 2, No. 1 1 , 
September 21, 1984, 708-16. 

Foweraker, Joseph W. "Corporatist Strategies and the Transition 
to Democracy in Spain," Comparative Politics, 20, No. 1, October 
1987, 57-72. 

"The Role of Labor Organizations in the Transition to 

Democracy in Spain." Pages 97-122 in Robert P. Clark and 
Michael H. Haltzel (eds.), Spain in the 1980s. Cambridge, Massa- 
chusetts: Ballinger Publishing, 1987. 

Fusi, Juan Pablo. "The Basque Problem." Pages 120-26 in Joyce 
Lasky Shub and Raymond Carr (eds.), Spain: Studies in Political 
Security. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

Gallagher, Charles F. "The Medium and the Message: RTVE 
and Democracy in Spain." {American Universities Field Staff Reports, 
15.) Hanover, New Hampshire: 1979. 

Gillespie, Richard. "Spain's Referendum on NATO," West Euro- 
pean Politics [London], 9, No. 4, October 1986, 238-44. 

. The Spanish Socialist Party: A History of Factionalism. Oxford: 

Oxford University Press, 1989. 

Gilmour, David. The Transformation of Spain: From Franco to the Con- 
stitutional Monarchy. New York: Quartet Books, 1985. 

Glos, George E. "Danger Signals for Spain," The World Today 
[London], 38, January 1982, 26-32. 

. "The New Spanish Constitution: Comments and Full 

Text," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 7, Fall 1979, 47-128. 

Gonzalez, Felipe. "A New International Role for a Modernizing 
Spain." Pages 179-90 in Robert P. Clark and Michael H. 
Haltzel (eds.), Spain in the 1980s. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Ballinger Publishing, 1987. 

Gonzalo Perez, Angel Luis. "Telecommunications in Spain," 
Telecommunication Journal [Geneva], 49, December 1982, 819-922. 

Graham, Robert. Spain: A Nation Comes of Age. New York: St. Mar- 
tin's Press, 1984. 

Grugel, Jean. "Spain's Socialist Government and Central Ameri- 
can Dilemmas," International Affairs [London], 63, Fall 1987, 
603-15. 



373 



Spain: A Country Study 



Gunther, Richard. "Democratization and Party Building: The Role 
of Party Elites in the Spanish Transition." Pages 35-66 in 
Robert P. Clark and Michael H. Haltzel (eds.), Spain in the 1980s. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing, 1987. 

Public Policy in a No-Party State: Spanish Planning and Bud- 
geting in the Twilight of the Franquist Era. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980. 

. "Spain and Portugal." Pages 186-236 in Gerald A. 

Dorman and Peter J. Duignan (eds.), Politics in Western Europe. 
Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1988. 

Gunther, Richard, and Roger A. Blough. "Religious Conflict and 
Consensus in Spain: A Tale of Two Constitutions," World Affairs, 
143, Spring 1981, 336-412. 

Gunther, Richard, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad (eds.). Spain 
After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986. 

Harbron, John D. "Spanish Foreign Policy Since Franco," Be- 
hind the Headlines [Toronto], 41, No. 4, March 1984, 1-15. 

Heiberg, William L. The Sixteenth Nation: Spain's Role in NATO. 
(National Security Affairs Monograph Series, 83-1). Washing- 
ton: National Defense University Press, 1983. 

Heywood, Paul. "Mirror- images: The PCE and PSOE in the Tran- 
sition to Democracy in Spain, ' ' West European Politics [London] , 
10, No. 2, April 1987, 193-210. 

Holmes, Peter. "Spain and the EEC." Pages 165-79 in David S. 
Bell (ed.), Democratic Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics After Franco. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 

Hooper, John. The Spaniards: A Portrait of the New Spain. New York: 
Penguin Books, 1987. 

Hughey, J.D. "Church, State, and Religious Liberty in Spain," 
Journal of Church and State, 23, Fall 1981, 485-95. 

Kolinsky, Eva (ed.). Opposition in Western Europe. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1987. 

Kolodziej, Edward A. "The Southern Flank: NATO's Neglected 
Front," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, 6, No. 2, Summer 
1986, 45-57. 

Kroner, Dieter H. "Spain's Last African Outposts," Swiss Review 
of World Affairs [Zurich], 35, October 1985, 8-11. 

Kurlansky, Mark J. "Convalescent Spain: Socialists Without a Pro- 
gram, Politics Without a Left," Progressive, 47, October 1983, 
30-32. 

Lancaster, Thomas D. "Spanish Public Policy and Financial Power. ' ' 
Pages 168-201 in Thomas D. Lancaster and Gary Prevost (eds.), 
Politics and Change in Spain. New York: Praeger, 1985. 



374 



Bibliography 



Lancaster, Thomas D., and James L. Taulbee. "Britain, Spain, 
and the Gibraltar Question, "Journal of Commonwealth and Com- 
parative Politics [London], 23, November 1985, 251-66. 

Lange, Peter, and Maurizio Vannicelli (eds.). The Communist Par- 
ties of Italy, France, and Spain: Postwar Change and Continuity. (Case- 
book Series on European Politics and Society.) Harvard 
University: George Allen and Unwin, 1981. 

Maravall, Jose Maria. "Spain: Eurocommunism and Socialism," 
Political Studies [London], 27, No. 2, June 1979, 218-35. 

. The Transition to Democracy in Spain. New York: St. Mar- 
tin's Press, 1982. 

Marcus, Jonathan. "The Triumph of Spanish Socialism: The 1982 
Election," West European Politics [London], 6, No. 3, July 1983, 
281-86. 

Martin, Benjamin. "Carrillo's Collapse," New Republic, 187, 

July 12, 1982, 19-21. 
"Spanish Socialists in Power," Dissent, 31, Winter 1984, 

116-20. 

Maxwell, Kenneth. "The Emergence of Democracy in Spain and 
Portugal," Orbis, 27, No. 1, Spring 1983, 151-84. 

McDonough, Peter, Samuel H. Barnes, and Antonio Lopez Pina. 
"Authority and Association: Spanish Democracy in Compara- 
tive Perspective, "Journal of Politics, 46, August 1984, 652-88. 

' 'The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain, ' ' Ameri- 
can Political Science Review , 80, No. 3, September 1986, 735-60. 

"Social Identity and Mass Politics in Spain," Compara- 
tive Political Studies, 21, No. 2, July 1988, 200-30. 

"The Spanish Public in Political Transition," British Jour- 
nal of Political Science [London], 11, June 1981, 49-79. 

McGee, Henry W., Jr. "Counsel for the Accused: Metamorpho- 
sis in Spanish Constitutional Rights," Columbia Journal of Trans- 
national Law, 25, No. 2, Summer 1987, 253-99. 

Medhurst, Kenneth N. "The Military and the Prospects for Span- 
ish Democracy," West European Politics [London], 1, No. 1, 
February 1978, 42-59. 

_. "Spain's Socialist Government," Contemporary Review 

[London], 242, No. 1409, June 1983, 281-87. 

Menaul, Stewart. The Geostrategic Importance of the Iberian Peninsula. 
(Conflict Studies, No. 133.) London: The Institute for the Study 
of Conflict, 1981. 

Menges, Constantine Christopher. Spain: The Struggle for Democracy 
Today. (Washington Papers, No. 58, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington.) Beverly Hills: Sage Publi- 
cations, 1978. 



375 



Spain: A Country Study 

Meny, Yves. "The Political Dynamics of Regionalism: Italy, France, 

Spain." Pages 1-28 in Regionalism in European Politics. London: 

Policy Studies Institute, 1987. 
Meny, Yves, and Vincent Wright (eds.). Centre-Periphery Relations 

in Western Europe. Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1985. 
Merkl, Peter (ed.) Western European Party Systems. New York: Free 

Press, 1980. 

Miranda, Carlos. "The Gibraltar Claim." Pages 108-13 in Joyce 
Lasky Shub and Raymond Carr (eds.), Spain: Studies in Political 
Security. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

"Perspectives for Future Spanish-US Cooperation in Secu- 
rity Matters," International Spectator [Rome], 21, January-March 
1986, 47-53. 

Moran, Fernando. ' 'Principles and Goals of Spanish Foreign Pol- 
icy." Pages 21-32 in Joyce Lasky Shub and Raymond Carr 
(eds.), Spain: Studies in Political Security. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

Morgan, Roger (ed.). Regionalism in European Politics. London: Policy 
Studies Institute, 1987. 

Mujal-Leon, Eusebio. Communism and Political Change in Spain. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983. 

. "Decline and Fall of Spanish Communism," Problems of 

Communism, 35, March-April 1986, 1-27. 

. "The PCE in Spanish Politics," Problems in Communism, 

27, July-August 1978, 15-37. 

' ' Rei(g)ning in Spain, ' ' Foreign Policy, 5 1 , Summer 1 983 , 

101-17. 

Nash, Elizabeth. "The Spanish Socialist Party Since Franco." 
Pages 29-62 in David S. Bell (ed.), Democratic Politics in Spain: 
Spanish Politics After Franco. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 

Newton, Mike. "The Peoples and Regions of Spain." Pages 98-131 
in David S. Bell (ed.), Democratic Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics 
After Franco. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 

Nourry, Philippe. Juan Carlos: un roipour les republicains (2d ed.) Paris: 
Editions du Centurion, 1986. 

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence 
Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for 
Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 

Palau, Juan Cadarso, and Jose W. Fernandez. "The Spanish Con- 
stitution of 1978: Legislative Competence of the Autonomous 
Communities in Civil Law Matters," Vanderbilt Journal of Trans- 
national Law, 15, Winter 1982, 47-62. 

Payne, Stanley G. "The Foreign Relations of Democratic Spain," 
AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, 6, No. 2, 1986, 29-36. 



376 



Bibliography 



. The Franco Regime, 1936-1975. Madison: University of 

Wisconsin Press, 1987. 

"The Role of the Armed Forces in the Spanish Transi- 
tion." Pages 79-96 in Robert P. Clark and Michael H. Haltzel 
(eds.), Spain in the 1980s. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger 
Publishing, 1987. 

Payne Stanley G. (ed.). Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain. 
New York: Franklin Watts, 1976. 

Penniman, Howard R., and Eusebio M. Mujal-Leon (eds.). Spain 
at the Polls, 1977, 1979, and 1982: A Study of the National Elections. 
Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press for the Ameri- 
can Enterprise Institute, 1985. 

Perez, M. "Socialism with a Pragmatic Face," Reason, 16, March 
1985, 33-36. 

Perez-Llorca, Jose Pedro. "The Beginning of the Transition 
Process." Pages 15-24 in Robert P. Clark and Michael H. 
Haltzel (eds.), Spain in the 1980s. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Ballinger Publishing, 1987. 

Pike, Frederick B. "Latin America." Pages 181-212 in James W. 
Cortada (ed.), Spain in the Twentieth-Century World: Essays on Spanish 
Diplomacy, 1898-1978. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1980. 

Pollack, Benny. "The 1982 Spanish General Election and Beyond," 
Parliamentary Affairs [London], 36, Spring 1983, 201-17. 

Preston, Paul. The Triumph of Democracy in Spain. New York: 
Methuen, 1986. 

Preston, Paul, and Denis Smyth (eds.). Spain, the EEC, and NATO. 
(Chatham House Papers, 22.) London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1984. 

Prevost, Gary. "The Spanish Labor Movement." Pages 125-43 

in Thomas D. Lancaster and Gary Prevost (eds.), Politics and 

Change in Spain. New York: Praeger, 1985. 
Pridham, Geoffrey. "Party Government in the New Iberian 

Democracies," The World Today [London], 40, January 1984, 

12-21. 

Rexach, Eduardo Serra. "Spain: Politics and Change," The 
Washington Quarterly, 10, No. 1, Winter 1987, 23-27. 

Robinson, Robert. "From Change to Continuity: The 1986 Span- 
ish Election," West European Politics [London], 10, No. 1, Janu- 
ary 1987, 120-25. 

Robles Piquer, Carlos. "Spain in NATO: An Unusual Kind of 
Participation." The Atlantic Community Quarterly, 24, No. 4, Winter 
1986-87, 325-30. 



377 



Spain: A Country Study 



Ruperez, Javier. "Spain, the United States, and NATO: Politi- 
cal and Strategic Dilemmas." Pages 13-20 in Joyce Lasky Shub 
and Raymond Carr (eds.), Spain: Studies in Political Security. New 
York: Praeger, 1985. 

Sagardoy Bengoechea, Juan A. "The Spanish Workers' Statue," 
International Labour Review [Geneva], 120, No. 2, March- April 

1981, 215-29. 

Salisbury, William T. "Spain's Foreign Policy." Pages 202-18 
in Thomas D. Lancaster and Gary Prevost (eds.), Politics and 
Change in Spain. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

. "Western Europe." Pages 97-120 in James W. Cortada 

(ed.), Spain in the Twentieth-Century World: Essays on Spanish 
Diplomacy, 1898-1978. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1980. 

Sanchez-Gijon, Antonio. "Spain's Identity and Role in the Con- 
temporary World." Pages 33-40 in Joyce Lasky Shub and 
Raymond Carr (eds.), Spain: Studies in Political Security. New York: 
Praeger, 1985. 

"Spain's Role in the Atlantic Alliance," NATO Review 

[Brussels], 31, No. 3-4, 1983, 16-21. 
"The Spanish Press in the Transition Period." Pages 

123-38 in Robert P. Clark and Michael H. Haltzel (eds.), Spain 

in the 1980s. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing, 

1987. 

Schumacher, Edward. "Spain's New Face," New York Times, 
June 22, 1986, 26-28, 30, 32-33. 

Semprun, Jorge. "La Democratic, sans plus," Le Debat [Paris], 
42, November-December 1986, 3-15. 

Serfaty, Meir. "Political Pragmatism in Spain," Current History, 
85, November 1986, 377-80, 391-92. 

"Spain's Socialists: A New Center Party?" Current His- 
tory, 83, April 1984, 164-68, 183-84. 

Shabad, Goldie, and Richard Gunther. "Language, Nationalism, 
and Political Conflict in Spain," Comparative Politics, 14, July 

1982, 443-77. 

Share, Donald. "Democratization of Spain," The Center Magazine, 
19, May-June 1986, 54-59. 

"Dilemmas of Social Democracy in the 1980s: The Span- 
ish Socialist Workers Party in Comparative Perspective," Com- 
parative Political Studies, 21, No. 3, October 1988, 408-35. 

. The Making of Spanish Democracy. New York: Praeger, 1986. 

"Two Transitions: Democratisation and the Evolution of 

the Spanish Socialist Left," West European Politics [London], 8, 
January 1985, 82-103. 



378 



Bibliography 



Shneidman, J. Lee. "Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union." Pages 
155-80 in James W. Cortada (ed.), Spain in the Twentieth-Century 
World: Essays on Spanish Diplomacy, 1898-1978. Westport, Con- 
necticut: Greenwood Press, 1980. 

Shub, Joyce Lasky, and Raymond Carr (eds.). Spain: Studies in Po- 
litical Security. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

Shubert, Adrian. "The Military Threat to Spanish Democracy: 
A Historical Perspective," Armed Forces and Society, 10, No. 4, 
Summer 1984, 529-42. 

"Spain." Pages 534-40 in Arthur S. Banks (ed.), Political Hand- 
book of the World, 1987. New York: CSA Publications, 1987. 

"Those Unexcitable Southerners," The Economist [London], Janu- 
ary 4, 1986, 35-38. 

Treverton, Gregory F. "Spain: Domestic Politics and Security 
Policy," Adelphi Papers [London], No. 204, Spring 1986, 1- 
45. 

Tura, Jordi Sole. "The Spanish Transition to Democracy." Pages 
25-34 in Robert P. Clark and Michael H. Haltzel (eds.), Spain 
in the 1980s. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing, 
1987. 

United States. Congress. 100th, 1st Session. House of Represen- 
tatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. United States Political- 
Military Relations with Allies in Southern Europe. (Report of a staff 
study mission to Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey.) 
Washington: GPO, 1987. 

Valls-Russell, Janice. "Problems of Sovereignty: Spain's Rocky 
Straits," The New Leader, 69, November 17, 1986, 6-8. 

"Socialist Strategy: Offering Retirement to the ETA," 

The New Leader, 70, November 30, 1987, 9-10. 

Vilanova, Pedro. "Spain: The Army and the Transition." Pages 
147-64 in David S. Bell (ed.), Democratic Politics in Spain: Spanish 
Politics After Franco. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 

Wiarda, Howard J. "The Significance for Latin America of the 
Spanish Democratic Transition." Pages 157-78 in Robert P. 
Clark and Michael H. Haltzel (eds.), Spain in the 1980s. Cam- 
bridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing, 1987. 

"Spain and Portugal." Pages 298-328 in Peter Merkl 

(ed.), Western European Party Systems. New York: Free Press, 1980. 

Wiarda, Howard J. (ed.). The Iberian-Latin American Connection: Im- 
plications for U. S. Foreign Policy. (Westview Special Studies on Latin 
America and the Caribbean.) Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1986. 

Wigg, Richard. "Socialism in Spain: A Pragmatic Start," The 
World Today [London], 39, February 1983, 60-67. 



379 



Spain: A Country Study 



(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Economist [London], January 
1980-June 1988; El Pais [Madrid] , January 1985-June 1988; Finan- 
cial Times [London] , January 1985-June 1988; Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, Daily Report: West Europe, January 1980-June 
1988; Joint Publications Research Service, West Europe Report, Janu- 
ary 1980-June 1988; Keesing's Contemporary Archives [London] , Janu- 
ary 1980-June 1988; Le Monde [Paris] , January 1986-June 1988; 
New York Times, January 1986-June 1988; Times [London], Janu- 
ary 1986-June 1988; and Washington Post, January 1980-June 1988. 



Chapter 5 

Alba, Victor. "Spain's Entry into NATO." Pages 97-113 in 
Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo 
Luraghi (eds.), NATO and the Mediterranean. Wilmington, Dela- 
ware: Scholarly Resources, 1985. 

Allin, George R. "Spain's NATO Dilemma," Military Review, 65, 
No. 1, January 1985, 61-73. 

Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report, 1987. London: 
1987. 

Boyd, Carolyn P., and James M. Boy den. "The Armed Forces 
and the Transition to Democracy in Spain." Pages 94-124 in 
Thomas D. Lancaster and Gary Prevost (eds.), Politics and Change 
in Spain. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

Druckman, Daniel. "Stages, Turning Points, and Crises: Negotiat- 
ing Military Base Rights, Spain and the United States," Jour- 
nal of Conflict Resolution, 30, No. 2, June 1986, 327-60. " 

Ford, Robert E. "The Spain- NATO-United States Triangle: Who 
Controls the Negotiations?" Fletcher Forum, 12, No. 2, Summer 
1988, 321-39. 

Garcia, M.C. "The Armed Forces: Poor Relations of the Franco 
Regime." Pages 23-47 in Paul Preston (ed.), Spain in Crisis: The 
Evolution and Decline of the Franco Regime. New York: Harper and 
Row, 1976. 

Garia Santamana, Cristina. "Las chicas seran guerreras," Cam- 
bio 16 [Madrid], No. 842, January 18, 1988, 36-37. 

Graham, Robert. Spain: A Nation Comes of Age. New York: St. Mar- 
tin's Press, 1984. 

Grimmett, Richard F. U.S. Spanish Bases Agreement. Washington: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1988. 

Heiberg, William L. The Sixteenth Nation: Spain's Role in NATO. 
(National Security Affairs Monograph Series, 83-1.) Washing- 
ton: National Defense University Press, 1983. 



380 



Bibliography 



Hewitt, Christopher. "The Costs of Terrorism: A Cross-National 
Study of Six Countries," Terrorism: An International Journal, 11, 
No. 3, 1988, 169-80. 

Hill, Ron. "Spain's Legion: End of an Era for Professional Ad- 
ventures," Soldier of Fortune, 13, No. 2, February 1988, 32-39. 

Hooper, John. The Spaniards: A Portrait of the New Spain. New York: 
Penguin Books, 1987. 

International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 
1987-88. London: 1987. 

Jackson, Paul. "Isolated Iberians?" A ir International [Bromley, Kent, 
United Kingdom], 34, No. 3, March 1988, 111-20. 

. "NATO's Quixotic Member?" Armed Forces [Weybridge, 

Sussex, United Kingdom], 6, No. 2, February 1987, 64-66. 

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1987-88. London: Jane's, 1987. 

Keegan, John. "Spain." Pages 533-38 in John Keegan (ed.), World 
Armies. Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. 

King, Robert, and Benjamin F. Schemmer. "With Full NATO 
Membership, Spain's Defense Industry Takes on a New Image," 
Armed Forces Journal, 124, No. 1, August 1986, 90-91. 

Korn, David A. "State Terrorism: A Spanish Watergate?" Free- 
dom at Issue, No. 105, November-December 1988, 15-20. 

Lancaster, Thomas D., and Gary Prevost (eds.). Politics and Change 
in Spain. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

Lopez Garrido, Diego. El aparato policial en Espana: historia, sociolo- 
gia e ideologia. Barcelona: Ariel, 1987. 

MacDonald, Ian R. "The Police System of Spain." Pages 215-54 
in John Roach and Juergen Thomaneck (eds.), Police and Public 
Order in Europe. London: Croom Helm, 1985. 

"Spain's 1986 Police Law: Transition from Dictatorship 

to Democracy," Police Studies, 10, No. 1, Spring 1987, 16-22. 

Manwaring, Max G., and Alan Ned Sabrosky. "Iberia's Role in 
NATO's Future: Strategic Reserve, Reinforcement, and 
Redoubt," Parameters, 16, No. 1, Spring 1986, 43-54. 

Marquina Barrio, Antonio. "Spain and Its North African En- 
claves." Pages 1 14-17 in Joyce Lasky Shub and Raymond Carr 
(eds.), Spain: Studies in Political Security. New York: Praeger, 1987. 

Menaul, Stewart. The Geostrategic Importance of the Iberian Peninsula. 
(Conflict Studies, No. 133.) London: Institute for the Study of 
Conflict, 1981. 

Midlane, Matthew. "The Spanish and Portuguese Defense 
Forces." Pages 126-56 in L.H. Gann (ed.), The Defense of Western 
Europe. Dover, Massachusetts: Auburn House, 1987. 

Milton, T.R. "Airpower in Iberia," Air Force Magazine, 69, No. 6, 
June 1986, 94-99. 



381 



Spain: A Country Study 



Miranda, Carlos. "The Gibraltar Claim." Pages 108-13 in Joyce 
Lasky Shub and Raymond Carr (eds.), Spain: Studies in Political 
Security. New York: Praeger, 1985. 

"Perspectives for Future Spanish-US Cooperation in Secu- 
rity Matters," International Spectator [Rome], 21, No. 1, January- 
March 1986, 47-53. 

Moxon-Browne, Edward. Spain and the ETA: The Bid for Basque 
Autonomy. London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 
1987. 

Muniz-Arguelles, Luis, and Migdalia Fraticelli-Torres. "Selection 
and Training of Judges in Spain, France, West Germany, and 
England, ' ' Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 
8, No. 1, Winter 1985, 1-37. 

Paricio, Jesus M. Para conocer a nuestros militares. Madrid: Tecnos, 
1983. 

Preston, Paul, and Denis Smyth (eds.). Spain, the EEC, and NATO. 
(Chatham House Papers, 22.) London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1984. 

Prevost, Gary. "Spain and NATO: The Socialists' Decision," 
Atlantic Community Quarterly, 23, No. 4, Winter 1985-86, 349-55. 

Quero Rodiles, Felipe. "La Nueva Estructura del Ministerio de 
Defensa," Reconquista [Madrid], No. 432, February 1987, 30-34. 

Reinares, Fernando. "Nationalism and Violence in Basque Poli- 
tics," Conflict, 8, No. 2-3, 1988, 141-55. 

Robles Piquer, Carlos. "Spain in NATO: An Unusual Kind of 
Participation," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, 24, No. 4, Winter 
1986-87, 325-30. 

Ruperez, Javier. "Spain, the United States, and NATO: Politi- 
cal and Strategic Dilemmas." Pages 13-20 in Joyce Lasky Shub 
and Raymond Carr (eds.), Spain: Studies in Political Security. New 
York: Praeger, 1985. 

Salkin, Yves. "Regard strategique sur l'Espagne," Defense Nationale 
[Paris], 44, March 1988, 103-16. 

Scott-Manson, John A. "Force Reductions in the Spanish Army," 
Jane's Defence Weekly [London], 8, No. 15, October 17, 1987, 
895-96. 

Scaramanga, Philip K. "The Spanish Legion: Professional Core 

of Spain's Rapid Deployment Force?" International Defense Review 

[Geneva], No. 3, 1988, 273-74. 
Sepulveda, Francisco L. de. "Restructuring Spain's Defense 

Organization," International Defense Review [Geneva], No. 10, 

1984, 1431-37. 

Shub, Joyce Lasky, and Raymond Carr (eds.). Spain: Studies in Po- 
litical Security. New York: Praeger, 1985. 



382 



Bibliography 



Shubert, Adrian. "The Military Threat to Spanish Democracy: 
A Historical Perspective," Armed Forces and Society, 10, No. 4, 
Summer 1984, 529-42. 

Snyder, Jed C. Defending the Fringe: NATO, the Mediterranean, and 
the Persian Gulf. (SAIS Papers in International Affairs, No. 11.) 
Washington: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1987. 

"Spain." Pages 1029-41 in DMS Market Intelligence Reports. Green- 
wich, Connecticut: Defense Marketing Services, 1986. 

Spain. Ministerio de Defensa. Secretaria General Tecnica. Ministerio 
de Defensa: Memoria Legislatura, 1982-86. Madrid: Centro de Pub- 
licaciones, 1986. 

"Spanish Air Force." Pages 257-63 in International Air Forces and 
Military Aircraft Directory. Essex, United Kingdom: Aviation Ad- 
visory Services, 1987. 

"The Spanish Defence Industry," NATO's Sixteen Nations, 28, 
No. 2, 1983, 58-69. 

Spracher, William C. "The Geopolitics of Gibraltar," Military 
Review, 63, No. 7, July 1983, 14-25. 

United States. Congress. 100th, 1st Session. House of Represen- 
tatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. United States Political- 
Military Relations with Allies in Southern Europe. (Report of a staff 
study mission to Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey.) Wash- 
ington: GPO, 1987. 

United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1986: Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions, U.S. Senate, and Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of 
Representatives. Washington: GPO, 1987. 

Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1987: Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
U.S. Senate, and Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Represen- 
tatives. Washington: GPO, 1988. 

"La verdad sobre las retribuciones militares," Reconquista [Madrid], 
No. 406, July-August 1984, 6-11. 

Vilanova, Pedro. "Spain: The Army and the Transition." Pages 
147-64 in David S. Bell (ed.), Democratic Politics in Spain: Spanish 
Politics After Franco. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 

Vilar, Sergio. La Decada Sorprendente, 1976-1986. Barcelona: Planeta, 
1986. 

Vinas, Angel. "Spain, the United States, and NATO." Pages 
40-58 in Christopher Abel and Nissa Torrents (eds.), Spain: Con- 
ditional Democracy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 

(Various issues of the following publications also were used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Economist [London], January 1986- 



383 



Spain: A Country Study 



June 1988; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: 
West Europe, January 1980-June 1988; Jane's Defence Weekly [Lon- 
don], January 1982-June 1988; Joint Publications Research Ser- 
vice, West Europe Report, January 1980-June 1988; Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives [London] , January 1980-June 1988; New York 
Times, January 1986-June 1988; El Pais [Madrid], January 
1986-June 1988; Reconquista [Madrid], January 1983-June 1988; 
and Washington Post, January 1986-June 1988.) 



384 



Glossary 



Council of Europe — Founded in 1949 to foster parliamentary 
democracy, social and economic progress, and unity among 
its member states. Membership is limited to those European 
countries that respect the rule of law and the fundamental 
human rights and freedoms of all those living within their 
boundaries. As of 1988, its membership consisted of twenty- 
one West European countries. 

European Community (EC— also commonly called the Commu- 
nity) — The EC comprises three communities: the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic 
Community (EEC, also known as the Common Market), and 
the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Each 
community is a legally distinct body, but since 1967 they have 
shared common governing institutions. The EC forms more 
than a framework for free trade and economic cooperation: the 
signatories to the treaties governing the communities have 
agreed in principle to integrate their economies and ultimately 
to form a political union. Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany) are charter members of the EC. Britain, Denmark, 
and Ireland joined on January 1, 1973; Greece became a mem- 
ber on January 1, 1981; and Portugal and Spain entered on 
January 1, 1986. 

European Currency Unit (ECU)— Instituted in 1979, the ECU is 
the unit of account of the EC (q.v.). The value of the ECU 
is determined by the value of a basket that includes the cur- 
rencies of all EC member states. In establishing the value of 
the basket, each member's currency receives a share that reflects 
the relative strength and importance of the member's economy. 
In 1988 one ECU was equivalent to about one United States 
dollar. 

European Economic Community (EEC) — See EC. 

European Free Trade Association (EFT A) — Founded in 1961, 
EFTA aims at supporting free trade among its members and 
increasing the liberalization of trade on a global basis, but par- 
ticularly within Western Europe. In 1988 the organization's 
member states were Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. 

Gross domestic product (GDP) — The total value of goods and ser- 
vices produced by the domestic economy during a given period, 



385 



Spain: A Country Study 



usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed 
by each sector of the economy in the form of profits, compen- 
sation to employees, and depreciation (consumption of capi- 
tal). Most GDP usage in this book was based on GDP at factor 
cost. Real GDP is the value of GDP when inflation has been 
taken into account. 

Gross national product (GNP) — Obtained by adding GDP (q. v. ) 
and the income received from abroad by residents less pay- 
ments remitted abroad to nonresidents. GNP valued at mar- 
ket prices was used in this book. Real GNP is the value of GNP 
when inflation has been taken into account. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q. v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations that takes responsibility for 
stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The 
main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its mem- 
bers when they experience balance-of-payment difficulties. 
These loans often carry conditions that require substantial in- 
ternal economic adjustments by the recipients. 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) — Established in 1961 to replace the Organisation for 
European Economic Co-operation, the OECD is an interna- 
tional organization composed of the industrialized market econ- 
omy countries (twenty-four full members as of 1988). It seeks 
to promote economic and social welfare in member countries 
as well as in developing countries by providing a forum in which 
to formulate and to coordinate policies. 

peseta — Basic Spanish currency unit. Consists of 100 centimos, but 
these are no longer in legal use. In terms of the United States 
dollar, the exchange rate averaged 60 pesetas in 1965, 56 pesetas 
in 1975, 79 pesetas in 1980, 126 pesetas in 1982, 173 pesetas 
in 1984, 154 pesetas in 1985, 134 pesetas in 1986, 107 pesetas 
in 1987, and 113 pesetas in 1988. 

VAT — Value-added tax. A tax applied to the additional value 
created at a given stage of production and calculated as a per- 
centage of the difference between the product value at that stage 
and the cost of all materials and services purchased as inputs. 
The VAT is the primary form of indirect taxation applied in 
the EEC (q.v.), and it is the basis of each country's contribu- 
tion to the community budget. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 



386 



Glossary 



Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund ad- 
ministered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to fur- 
nish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier 
terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, found- 
ed in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through 
loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the 
growth of productive private enterprises in less developed coun- 
tries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD 
hold the same positions in the IFC . The three institutions are 
owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their 
capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states 
must first belong to the IMF (q.v.). 



387 



Index 



Abbasids, 9 

Abd al Krim, 31 

Abd al Rahman, 9 

Abd al Rahman III, 9 

abortion, xxxi, 68, 78, 108, 253 

Acenor (steel company), 176 

Africa, North (see also Maghreb), 6, 
12-13; potential threat of, 291; 
presence of Spain in, 54, 270-72 

agreements: with Allies in WW II, 50-51 ; 
Basel agreement on EC currency, 203; 
Concordat with Vatican, 52, 111-12, 
252-53; Economic and Social Agree- 
ment, 156; for limited U. S. military 
presence, 236-37; Lisbon Agreement 
(1980), 269; nonintervention in Civil 
War, 39; Pact of Madrid (U. S. mili- 
tary bases), 52, 140, 169, 173, 265-66, 
284, 291; preferential trade agreement 
(1970) with EC, 52-53, 202, 262 

agricultural sector (see also land ownership; 
latifundio system; minifundios): along Rio 
Guadalquivir, 76; arable land of, 156- 
57; economic performance of, xxviii, 
141, 158-60; employment in, 148; 
migration from, xxix-xxx; regional vari- 
ation in, 161-62 

airbases, xxxiv, 237, 266-67, 298, 304, 
317, 321-22 

aircraft industry, 313-14 

air force (Ejercito del Aire), 280, 302-4, 
317 

airline companies, 174, 194 
airports, 194 

Air Transport Command (Mando Aereo 

de Transporter MATRA), 303 
Al Andalus (Islamic Spain), 9-10, 13 
Alava Province, 83 
Alegria, Diego, 286 
Alexander IV (pope), 16 
Alfonso XII (king of Spain), 29 
Alfonso XIII (king of Spain), 30, 32 
Algeciras (port), 168 
Al Mansur (Ibn Abi Amir), 9-10 
Almeria Province, 97, 163 
Almohads, 13 
Almoravids, 12-13 
Altos Homos del Mediterraneo, 176 



Altos Homos de Vizcaya, 176 
Amadeo of Savoy, 28 
Amnesty International, 332 
Ampurias, 5 

Andalusia, 6, 20; agriculture of, 162; as 

autonomous region, 80-82, 97-99, 223; 

health care responsibility of, 130 
Andalusian Plain, 70, 74, 77 
Andalusians, 80, 87, 97-99 
Andorra, 11, 69, 73 
Anguita, Julio, xxxv, 241 
anticlericalism, xxxi, 27, 47-48 
Anti-Comintern Pact, 50 
antiterrorist activity, xxxvii-viii, 233, 

328, 320-32, 335-36 
Antiterrorist Liberation Group (Grupo 

Antiterrorista de Liberation: GAL), 

336 

AP. See Popular Alliance (Alianza Popu- 
lar: AP) 

Arab-Israeli War (October 1973), 323 

Arabs, 8-13, 15, 272 

Aragonese, 79 

Aragon, 11-15, 81 

Argentina, 86, 201, 268 

Arias Navarro, Carlos, 49, 55 

the Armada, 19, 281 

Armada Comyn, Alfonso, 287 

Armed and Traffic Police (see also National 
Police), 324, 329 

armed forces (see also Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor: 
JUJEM); military sector): Blue Divi- 
sion in WW II, 50, 284; constitutional 
provisions for, 211; first organization 
of, 281; Organic Laws pertaining to, 
293, 295; reorganization and reform of, 
xxxiv, 256, 281; support by Franco 
regime of, 255; women in, 309 

arms industry, 313-14 

army (see also officer corps): at end of Civil 
War, 279, 281, 286; equipment of, 
299-300; organization of, 296-98; reac- 
tionary faction of, 207; reorganization 
of, 284-85, 296; Spanish Legion in, 
299; troop strength of, 298 

artillery forces, 297-98 



389 



Spain: A Country Study 



assassinations, xxxii, 49, 115, 208, 233, 
334-36 

Assault Guards, 38 

Astilleros Espafioles, SA (AESA), 179 

Asturians, 79 

Asturias, 10-11, 81, 172 

Ataulf (Visigoth king), 7 

Atlantic Ocean: as boundary, 69; Canary 
Islands in, 74; coastal trade of, 13; fish- 
ing in, 168 

Atlas Mountains, 77 

Augustus (Roman emperor), 6 

autarchy, xxviii, 140, 173 

automobile industry. See motor vehicle 
assembly industry 

autonomous communities, xxxvi, 60, 
79-80, 130; administration and pow- 
ers of, 224-26; court system of, 224; 
elections in, 213, 223, 245; elements of 
central control of, 223-25; political par- 
ties in, 245 

Aviation y Comercio (AVIACO), 174, 
194 

Aviles (port), 194 

Avion Experimental: AX, 314 

Azana, Manuel, 33-36, 37 

Aznar, Jose Maria, xxxv 

Azores, 16 

Aztecs, 17 

balance of payments, 199 

Balboa, Vasco Nunez de, 17 

Balearic Islands, 11, 69-70, 74, 90, 92; 
agriculture in, 162, 163; military role 
of, 296, 298, 317; as tourist area, 
195-96 

bank credit, 143 

banking industry (see also credit institu- 
tions), 186; private banks of, 187; sav- 
ings banks of, 188-89; as special 
interest group, 251 

Bank of Spain, 187, 203 

Bank Reform Law (1962), 187 

Barcelona, 11-12, 21; during Civil War, 
36, 37, 283-84; as industrial region, 
172; migration to, 82-84; Olympic 
Games (1992), 201; as port, 194; in 
War of Spanish Succession, 21 

Barcelona Province, 90 

Bardenas Reales, 322 

Barnes, Samuel, 104-5 

Basel agreement (on EC currency), 203 



Basic General Academy of Noncommis- 
sioned Officers (Academia General Bas- 
ica de Suboficiales: AGBS), 310 

Basic Law on Local Government (Ley 
Reguladora de las Bases de Regimen 
Local: LRBRL), 226 

Basque Country: as autonomous region, 
80-81, 89, 94-97, 223, 228, 334; as 
industrial region, xxvii, 173; police 
force of, xxxvii, 329; political parties in, 
245 

Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Euskadi 
Ta Askatasuna: ETA), xxxvii, 48-49, 
233, 237, 334; ETA Political-Military 
Front, 245, 334; Military Front (ETA 
Militar: ETA-M), 233, 245, 334-36 

Basque (Euskera) language, xxxv, 67, 
88-89, 97, 335 

Basque Left (Euskadiko Ezkerra: EE), 
245 

Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Na- 
cionalista Vasco: PNV), xxxv, 153, 
209, 233, 245, 249, 334 

Basque Republic, 37 

Basques, xxxvi, 5, 79-80, 87, 95, 222; ter- 
rorism of, xxxvi-xxxviii, 58, 60, 208, 
232-33, 235, 237, 287, 332, 334-36 

Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna: 
EA), 245 

Basque Workers' Solidarity (Eusko Langil- 
leen Alkartasuna-Solidaridad de 
Trabajadores Vascos: ELA-STV), 153, 
155, 249 

Bay of Biscay, 69, 73, 74, 79, 94, 96, 128 

Berbers, 8-10, 12, 31-32 

Berenguer, Ramon, 11 

Bilbao (port), 194 

birth control, 78 

birth rate, 78 

Black Sea, 12 

Bonaparte, Joseph (king of Spain), 23 
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 22-23, 282 
boundaries, 69-70, 73 
Brazil, 16 
Britain, 39 

Brotherhood of Spanish Priests, 252 

budget deficits, 144 

business interest groups, 250-51 



cabinet. See Council of Ministers 
Cadena de Ondas Populares Espanolas: 
COPE, 259 



390 



Index 



Cadiz, 5, 24-25, 168 

Cadiz Province, 97, 228 

Caliphate of Cordoba, 9-10 

Calvo Sotelo, Jose, 36 

Calvo Sotelo, Leopoldo, 61, 264, 266 

Canary Islands, 16, 69-70, 74, 168, 223; 

agriculture in, 162, 163; military role 

of, 296, 298, 299, 300, 302, 303, 316, 

318; as tourist area, 196 
Canary Islands Air Command (Mando 

Aereo de Canarias: MACAN), 303 
capital, foreign. See investment, direct 

foreign 

Carlists, 26, 36; civil wars of, 282; militia 
of, 39 

Carrero Blanco, Luis, 49, 115, 334 

Carrillo, Santiago, 62, 240-41 

Cartagena (port), 194 

Carthage, 5-6 

Castellon Province, 163 

Castile, 11, 15; economic and social struc- 
ture of, 13-14; exploration and settle- 
ment by, 16-17 

Castilians, 79 

Castilian Spanish, 67, 87-89, 223 
Castilla-La Mancha: as autonomous 

region, 80-82; land erosion in, 157 
Castilla y Leon (autonomous region), 

80-82 

Castro Ruz, Fidel, 268 

Catalan language, 67, 88-90, 92 

Catalans, xxxvi, 79, 87, 222 

Catalonia, 5, 11, 13-14, 20, 21, 90; 
agriculture of, 161; as autonomous 
region, 80-81, 89-90, 92, 223; civil war 
in, 40; health care responsibility of, 
130; as industrial region, xxvii, 172; 
police force of, 329; political parties in, 
245; in War of Spanish Succession, 21 

Catholic Action, 252 

Catholic Action Workers' Brotherhood 
(Hermandad Obrera de Accion Catol- 
ica: HO AC), 152 

Catholics. See Roman Catholic Church 

CCOO. See Workers' Commissions (Com- 
isiones Obreras: CCOO) 

CDS. See Democratic and Social Center 
(Centro Democratico y Social: CDS) 

CEDA. See Spanish Confederation of the 
Autonomous Right (Confederacion Es- 
panola de Derechas Autonomas: 
CEDA) 

Celtiberians, 4-5 



Celts, 4 
censorship, 257 
Central America, 268-69 
central bank (Bank of Spain), 138, 187, 
203 

Central University, 122 

Ceuta (city enclave), 54, 69, 208, 228, 

264, 270-72, 288, 291, 296, 299 
Charles I (king of Spain), 1 7 
Charles II (king of Spain), 20 
Charles III (king of Spain), 22 
Charles IV (king of Spain), 22-23 
Charles V (Holy Roman emperor), 17 
Charter of Rights (1945) (fundamental 

law), 42 
chemical industry, 179-80 
Chief of the Defense Staff Qefe del Estado 
Mayor de la Defensa: JEMAD), 279, 
288, 295-96 
Christianity (see also Inquisition; Recon- 
quest; Roman Catholic Church): efforts 
to regain control, 10-11; in Islamic 
Spain, 9-10, 13; in Roman Empire, 6, 
7-8; in Spain, 15 
Churchill, Winston, 51 
Citroen Hispania, 178 
citrus crops, 158, 161, 162-63 
Civil Guard (Guardia Civil), 38, 61, 98, 
281, 287, 323-25; Intelligence Service 
of, 330; organization and functions of, 
325, 327-28 
civil service: reforms in, xxxii; resistance 

to change of, 207, 228-29 
civil unrest, 36, 47-49, 222, 232-33, 235 
Civil War (1936-39), 3, 36-40; com- 
munists in, 240; effect of, xxvii, 
139-40, 158, 169; Nationalist and 
Republican forces in, 283-85; nonin- 
tervention agreement concerning, 39 
class structure, 103-5 
climate, 69, 76-77 

CNT. See National Confederation of 
Labor (Confederacion Nacional del 
Trabajo: CNT) 

coal industry, 174-75, 181, 184-85 

coastal regions, 74, 161, 163 

Collective Bargaining Law (Ley de Con- 
venes Colectivos) (1958), 152 

Columbus, Christopher, 16-17 

Committee for Communist Unity (Mesa 
para Unidad de los Comunistas: 
MUC), 241 

Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 209 



391 



Spain: A Country Study 



communications (telephone and tele- 
graph), 194-95 

Communist Party of Spain (Partido 
Comunista de Espafia: PCE), 35, 
56-57, 155; decline of, 62; development 
and role of, 240-42; as force in labor 
movement, xxxiv, 153, 155, 248; legali- 
zation of, xxxiii, 255-56, 286, 334; 
opposition to NATO membership by, 
316; splinter groups of, 241 

Communist Party of Spain: Marxist- 
Leninist (Partido Comunista de Es- 
pafia: Marxista-Leninista: PCE-ML), 
241 

Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain 

(Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de 

Espafia: PCPE), 241 
Compama Arrendataria del Monopolio 

de Petroleos (CAMPSA), 139, 183-84 
Complutense University, 122 
Concordat with Vatican, 52, 111-12, 

252-53 
Condor Legion, 39 

Confederation of United Workers' Unions 
(Confederation de Sindicatos Unitarios 
de Trabajadores: CSUT), 249 

Congress of Deputies. See Cortes 

conscription, 308-9 

Constituent Law of the Cortes (1942) 
(fundamental law), 42 

constitution (see also laws, fundamental): 
under Alfonso XII, 29-30; of First Re- 
public, 28 

Constitution (1978), 60; dissemination of 
information under, 257; drafting of, 58, 
60, 208-10; establishes regional autono- 
mous governments, xxxvi, 67-68, 80, 
207, 212, 222-23; prohibition of ar- 
bitrary arrest, 331; provisions for 
armed forces in, 293; provisions for 
Council of State in, 220; provisions for 
General Council of the Judiciary, 221; 
provisions for king in, 216-19; provi- 
sions of, xxxii, 210-12; religious free- 
dom under, 112; rights of unions in, 
246-47; rule of law in, 207, 208; sepa- 
ration of church and state under, xxxi, 
253, 279; separation of military and 
police under, 324; tolerance for ethnic 
differences in, 87-88, 223 

Constitutional Committee of the Cortes, 
58, 223 

Constitutional Court, 221, 225 



Construcciones Aeronauticas (CASA), 

174,314 
construction industry, 180 
Contadora Group, 268-69 
contraception, 68, 78, 107-8, 111 
Convergence and Union (Convergencia 

i Unio: CiU), xxxv, 245 
conversos, 15-16, 19 

Coordinating Committee for Multilateral 

Export Controls (COCOM), 314 
Cordillera Cantabrica, 70, 73, 74, 290 
Cordoba Province, 97 
Cortes: composition and functions of, 

213-16; elements and effect of, 24-25 
Cortes, Hernando, 17 
Council of Europe, 262 
Council of Ministers, 219-20 
Council of State, 220 
Council of the Indies, 17, 18 
coup d'etat: attempted (1981), xxxvii, 61, 

223, 256, 281, 287; by military (1936), 

36 

court system, 220-22, 224, 311, 331-32 
CP. See Popular Coalition (Coalition 

Popular: CP) 
credit institutions, 186 
crime rate, 332-33 

criminal justice (see also military justice), 
331-34 

crops, 162-66; citrus, 162-63; diverse 
areas of, 157-58, 160-61; permanent, 
157 

Cros, 179 

Cuba, 25, 30, 268, 283 

cuerpos (civil service), 228-29 

currency: depreciation of, 141; devalua- 
tion of, xxviii, 170; participation in 
EMS of, xxix, 203-4 

current account receipts, 199 



dairy industry, 167 

decentralization (see also autonomous com- 
munities), xxxvi, xxxviii, 58, 207, 222; 
military's objection to, xxxvi, 287 
defense budget. See spending, defense 
Defense Communications System (DCS), 

U.S., 321 
defense industrial base, 313-14 
defense production. See defense industri- 
al base 

del Campo, Salustiano, 104 



392 



Index 



Democratic and Social Center (Centro 
Democratico y Social: CDS), xxxv- 
xxxvi, 235, 236, 243-44 

Democratic Coalition (Coalition Demo- 
cratica: CD), 242 

Democratic Military Union (Union Mili- 
tar Democratica: UMD), 286 

democratic transition, xxvii, xxxii-xxxiii, 
54-62, 255-56 

Democratic Reformist Party (Partido 
Reformista Democratico: PRD), 244 

Democrats, 27, 28 

Deposit Guarantee Fund, 187 

d'Hondt system of proportional represen- 
tation, 212-13 

Directorate General for State Assets (Di- 
rection General del Patrimonio del Es- 
tado: DGPE), 146-47, 173, 189 

disease, 68-69, 124-26 

divorce, xxxi, 68, 78, 108-10, 111, 253 

Don Carlos {see also Carlists), 26 

DPGE. See Directorate General for State 
Assets (Direction General del Patrimo- 
nio del Estado: DGPE) 

drought, 77, 156 

Ebro Basin, 70, 74; agriculture in, 162; 

precipitation in, 76 
EC. See European Community (EC) 
Economic and Social Agreement, 156 
economic assistance {see also Pact of 
Madrid), 143; exclusion from Marshall 
Plan, 46, 51, 169; from United States, 
46, 51-52, 140 
economic performance, xxvii-xxviii, 
46-47, 137; after Civil War and World 
War II, 139-40; of Basque region, 96; 
crisis in, 58; effect of link to EC on, 
xxix; as outcome of Stabilization Plan, 
46, 142-43, 159, 169-70; post-Franco, 
xxix, 143-46, 170; recession in, 155, 
171-72 

economic policy {see also Moncloa Pacts): 
to develop high-technology industries, 
174; government intervention in, 173; 
reform measures of, xxix, 140; of social- 
ist government, xxix, xxxiii, 144, 
231-32; Stabilization Plan (1959), 
xxviii, 46, 142-43, 159, 169, 200 

economic system: disparities in, xxx, 81; 
feudal, 13-14; transformation of, xxvii, 
67, 141-43 



education: constitutional provisions for, 
212; higher, xxx, 121-23; of military 
personnel, 309-11; one-year program 
(Curso de Orientation Universitaria: 
COU), 119-20; primary (Education 
General Basica: EGB), 119, 121; role 
of Opus Dei in, 254; secondary (Bachil- 
lerato Unificado Polivalente: BUP), 
119; vocational (Formation Profes- 
sional: FP), 119-20 

educational system {see also General Law 
on Education (Ley General de Educa- 
tion: LGE)): achievements of, 117-18; 
expenditures for, 116; primary and 
secondary schools in, 118-21; ratio of 
public to private schools in, 116-17; 
reforms in, xxxi, xxxiv, 68, 117, 232; 
role of Roman Catholic Church in, 
xxxi, 116, 121, 237, 253; structure of, 
118-23; university system of, 121-23 

EFE news agency, 258-59 

EFTA. See European Free Trade Associa- 
tion (EFT A) 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 52 

electoral system, 56, 212-13 

electricity {see also coal industry; hydro- 
electric power; nuclear power; thermal 
power), 184-86 

electronics industry, 313 

El Escorial, 18 

Elliot, J. H., 15 

El Salvador, 268 

emigration, xxix, 67, 82, 85-87, 106, 142, 

159; to Cuba, 30 
Employment Promotion Programs, 150 
Empresa National Bazan de Construc- 

ciones Navales Militares (Bazan), 179, 

313 

Empresa National de Autocamiones S.A.: 

ENASA (Pegaso), 313 
Empresa National del Gas (ENAGAS), 

184 

Empresa Nacional de Santa Barbara de 
Industrias Militares (Santa Barbara), 
175, 313 

Empresa Nacional Hulleras del Norte 

(HUNOSA), 174-75, 184 
Empresa Nacional Siderurgica (ENSIDE- 

SA), 175, 176 
energy resources, 182-86 
Enlightenment, 22 
environmental issues, 126-28 
Episcopal Conference, 252 



393 



Spain: A Country Study 



Escriva de Balaguer y Albas, Jose Maria, 
115, 254 

Estes, Richard, 124 

ETA. See Basque Fatherland and Free- 
dom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna: ETA) 

ETA-M. See Basque Fatherland and Free- 
dom (Euskadi Ta Askasuna: ETA) 

ETA-PM. See Basque Fatherland and Free- 
dom (Euskadi Ta Askasuna: ETA) 

ETA Military Front (ETA Militar: ETA- 
M). See Basque Fatherland and Freedom 
(Euskadi Ta Askasuna: ETA) 

ETA Political-Military Front (ETA Polfti- 
co-Militar: ETA-PM). See Basque 
Fatherland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta 
Askasuna: ETA) 

ethnic groups, 67, 87-88, 222; constitu- 
tional provisions for, 212 

European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), 176 

European Community (EC): Ceuta and 
Melilla as part of Spain in, 271-72; 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of, 
161, 203, 263; exclusion of Spain from, 
52-53, 262; final integration into (1992), 
201; integration process into, 198, 201- 
4, 262-63; membership of Spain in, 
xxix, 138, 176, 202-3, 208, 233-34; 
preferential trade agreement with 
(1970), 52-53, 202, 262; requirement to 
abandon state-owned enterprises by, 
184; standards for foreign investment, 
200-201; trade with, 199-200 

European Currency Units (ECUs), 203 

European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 
142 

European Monetary Cooperation Fund, 
203 

European Monetary System (EMS), xxix, 
203 

Euskera (Basque) language, xxxvi, 67, 
88-89, 96-97, 335 

exchange rate system, 169 

exports, xxviii, 198-99; of arms, 314; of 
automobiles, 176-77; of foodstuffs, 158, 
160, 162, 164, 199; of manufactured 
products, 199; of raw materials, 199 

Extremadura, xxix, 81, 166, 168 

Fabrication de Automoviles, SA (FAS A, 

Renault), 177 
Falange party, 37, 44, 45, 46, 50 



Falkland Islands (Malvinas), 268 
family structure, 67, 68, 108-10 
Federation of Iberian Anarchists (Federa- 
tion Anarquista Iberica), 31 
Feminist Party (Partido Feminista: PF), 
245 

Ferdinand III of Castile, 11, 13, 281 
Ferdinand VII (king of Spain), 23-26 
Ferdinand of Aragon, 3, 15, 19 
Fernandez Ordonez, Francisco, 269 
fiscal policy, 147; adoption of corporate tax 

system, 141; deduction for donations to 

Catholic Church, 112-13 
fishing industry, 168, 203 
Flanders, 17 

food processsing industry, 169 
footwear industry, 180 
Ford Espafia, 177-78, 200 
Foreign Legion, 39 

foreign relations: with European, Commu- 
nity (EC) 261-63; with France, 273-74; 
after Franco, 62-63; of Franco regime, 
50-54, with Latin America, 267; with 
Middle East, 272; with Morocco, 270- 
72; with North Adantic Treaty Orga- 
nization (NATO), 263-65, 270; with 
Soviet Union, 272-73; with United 
States, 265-67 

forestry, 167 

Fosforico Espanol, 180 

Fraga Iribarne, Manuel, xxxv, 234, 242- 
43 

France: assistance in Civil War by, 38; 
assistance in antiterrorism, xxxvii, 335- 
36; assistance with Stabilization Plan, 
142; boundary with, 69, 73; interven- 
tion in Spain by, 26; relations with, 273; 
trade with, 200 

Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), 28 

Franco y Bahamonde, Francisco, 3, 36; 
administration of (1939-75), xxvii- 
xxviii, 40-54; armed forces in regime of, 
292; as head of state, 36-37; as leader 
in Civil War, 36-39; as leader of Na- 
tionalist forces, 283-84; opposition to 
regime of, 48; policy for social homo- 
geneity of, 87; repression of PSOE by, 
238 

Franks, 11 

freedom of religion, 112, 210, 211-12 
freedom of the press, 257 
Free Galician Guerrilla People's Army, 
337 



394 



Index 



French Revolution, 22 
fruit crops, 163 



Galicia: agriculture of, 161; as autono- 
mous region, 81, 92, 223; fishing indus- 
try in, 168; nationalism of, 93; 
terrorism in, 337; tourism in, 196 

Galicians, 79, 87, 222 

General Air Academy, 309 

General Bureau for Radio Broadcasting 
and Television, 259 

General Confederation of Small and 
Medium-Sized Firms of Spain (Con- 
federation General de las Pequenas y 
Medianas Empresas del Estado Espa- 
nol: COPYME), 250-51 

General Council of the Judiciary, 220 

General Highways Plan, 191 

General Law on Education (Ley General 
de Education: LGE), 116, 118, 122 

General Military Academy, 309 

General Motors Espana, 177-78, 200 

General Social Security Treasury, 130 

General Union of Workers (Union Gen- 
eral de Trabajadores: UGT), xxxiv, 31 , 
33-34, 39-40, 153, 155, 236, 238, 
247-50; militia of, 38 

Geneva Conference (1975), 259 

geography, 69-77 

Germanic people, 7 

Germany: assistance from Spain in WW 
II, 50, 284; assistance in Civil War by, 
39, 50 

Germany, West: Spanish investment in, 
201; trade with, 200 

Gerona province, 90 

Gibraltar, 8; boundary with, 69-70; Brit- 
ish possession of, 21, 53-54, 62, 69; 
effect on military, 290-91, 318, 320; 
goal for Spanish possession of, 208, 
264, 269-70, 288; Soviet Union sup- 
port of Spain for, 273 

Gijon (port), 194 

Gilmore, David, 106 

Gil Robles, Jose Maria, 34-36 

Godoy, Manuel de, 22-23 

Golfo de Cadiz, 69, 74 

Gonzalez Marquez, Felipe, 57, 60, 62, 
137, 144, 147, 156, 208; armed forces 
reforms of, 279-80; one-party govern- 
ment of, xxviii-xxix, xxxiii, 231, 234; 



position on NATO membership of, 
234, 236, 316; revives PSOE, 239 

government, central. See Constitution 
(1978); Cortes; king; legislative branch; 
monarchy; provinces 

government, local, 226-28 

government, regional. See autonomous 
communities; regions 

government intervention: in economy, 
xxviii-xxix, 137-44, 146-48, 154-56, 
169-71, 173-75, 182-87, 189-90, 201- 
04, 261-63, 313; in information dis- 
semination, 257-61 

Graham, Robert, 140-41 

grain crops, 164 

Granada, 10, 13, 15 

Granada Province, 97 

Gran Canaria (island), 74 

Greeks, 5 

Grupo Patrimonio. See Directorate Gen- 
eral for State Assets (Direction General 
del Patrimonio del Estado: DGPE) 

Guatemala, 268 

Guerra, Alfonso, 238-39 

Gunther, Richard, 88, 103-4 

Gutierrez Mellado, Manuel, 292, 293 

Guzman, Gaspar de, 20 

Gypsies, 87; gitanos and hungaros, 99, 102; 
persecution of, 99, 102 

Habsburg dynasty, 17-21 
Hadrian (Roman emperor), 6 
Hannibal, 5 
Hanseatic League, 13 
HB. See Popular Unity (Herri Batasuna: 
HB) 

health care {see also public health), 68-69, 

124-25, 130 
Hernandez Mancha, Antonio, 236, 243 
Higher Air School, 310 
Higher Army School, 310 
Higher Defense Intelligence Center (Cen- 

tro Superior de Information de la 

Defensa: CESID), 330 
Higher Police Corps, 324 
high-technology industries, 174 
Hisham II, 9 
Hispania, 6 

Hitler, Adolf, 50, 139, 284 
Holy Roman Empire, 17 
Honorius (Roman emperor), 7 
hospital facilities, 124-25 



395 



Spain: A Country Study 



housing, xxx, 128-29 
Huelva (port), 168, 194 
Huelva Province, 97 
Huesca Province, 90 
human rights violations, 332 
hydroelectric power, 185 

Iberia Airlines, 174, 194 

Iberian Atlantic Command (IBER- 

LANT), 318, 320 
Iberian Peninsula, 5, 7, 23-24, 79 
Iberians, 4-6 
Iberico region, 70 
Iglesias, Gerardo, 241 
Iglesias, Pablo, 238 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 

imports, xxviii, 198-99; of agricultural 
products, 164-65; of fuels, 182-85, 199; 
of manufactured goods, 199 

import substitution, 140, 157 

Incas, 17 

income distribution, xxx, 81, 105 

Index of Net Social Progress (INSP), 124 

industrial sector {see also defense industrial 
base; manufacturing sector): develop- 
ment of, xxvii, 169-72; employment in, 
148, 170-71; regional concentration of, 
172-73; regional economic performance 
of, xxvii; self-sufficiency concept for, 
xxvii-xxviii, 140, 173 

inflation, xxix, 140-41, 145, 154, 169 

information dissemination, 257-61 

infrastructure, 190-91 

INI. See National Industrial Institute (Insti- 
tuto Nacional de Industria: INI) 

Inquisition, 16, 110-11 

insurance: health, 130; pension, 130; un- 
employment, 130-31 

intelligence services, 330 

International Brigade, 38 

International Monetary Fund (IMF): 
advice of, 204; economic assistance 
from, 143; member of, 142 

investment, direct foreign, xxviii, 143, 
144, 179, 200-201; of Spain, 201 

investment, domestic, 171, 174 

IR. See Republican Left (Izquierda Repub- 
licana: IR) 

irrigation, 69, 157-58, 162 

Isabella II (queen of Spain), 26-28, 281 

Isabella of Castile, 3, 15, 19 



Islam, 12-13 

Islam, Spanish, 8-15 

island territory, 11, 16, 69-70, 74 

Israel, 54, 272 

Italy, 13, 17-18, 39, 50, 322 



Jaen Province, 97, 162 
Japan, 200 

Jehovah's Witnesses, 113 

JEMAD. See Chief of the Defense Staff 

Qefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa: 

JEMAD) 
Jesuits, 22 

Jews, 9; conversion to Christianity by, 
15-16; persecution of, 99 

jihad (holy war), 9-10 

John Paul II (pope), 254 

Joint Assembly of Bishops and Priests, 252 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (Junta de Jefes de Es- 
tado Mayor: JUJEM), 292, 293, 295 

Juan Carlos de Borbon (king), xxxii, 
xxxvii, 3-4, 48, 54-61, 111, 143, 217, 
255-56, 287 

judicial system, 220-22, 311, 324, 331-34 



king (constitutional definition), 216-19 
Kuwait Investment Office (KIO), 180 



Labor Charter (1938) (fundamental law), 
41-42 

labor force: contracts with employers of, 
155; distribution of, 102-3; employment 
in, 159; expansion of, 47, 148, 150; 
remittances of workers abroad, xxviii, 
143, 199; unemployment in, xxviii, xxx, 
137-38, 150-51, 154 

labor movement, 152-56, 246-50 

labor unions, xxxiv, 31, 34-35, 39-40, 
152-56, 236, 238, 246-50 

La Coruna (port), 168 

La Coruna Province, 92 

land erosion, 157 

land ownership, 106, 158-60 

languages, 67; Basque (Euskera), xxxvi, 
67, 88-89, 97, 335; Castilian Spanish, 
67, 87-88; Catalan, xxxvi, 88-90, 92; 
co-official status with Castilian Spanish 
of, 68, 88-89, 223; Galician, xxxvi, 67, 
88-89, 93-94; Majorcan, 88; Romany, 
99; Valencian, 88 



396 



Index 



Largo Caballero, Francisco, 33-35, 39-40 
La Rioja autonomous region, 162 
latifundio system, 6, 97-98, 157, 158 
Latin America: colonies in, 16-17, 25, 

283; investment in, 201; relations with, 

267-69 

Law of Succession (1947) (fundamental 
law), 43 

Law on Referenda (1945) (fundamental 
law), 42, 56 

Law on Religious Freedom (1967) (fun- 
damental law), 48 

Law on the Principles of the National 
Movement (1958) (fundamental law), 
43 

Law on University Reform (Ley de 
Reforma Universitaria: LRU), 68, 122 

laws, fundamental, 41-43 

legislative branch, 213-16 

Lemoniz Nuclear Power Plant, 186 

Leon (kingdom), 11 

Leo XIII (pope), 34 

Lerida province, 90 

Lerroux, Alejandro, 31, 33-35 

LGE. See General Law on Education (Ley 
General de Educacion: LGE) 

liberalism {see also anticlericalism), 24-25, 
27 

Liberal Party (Partido Liberal: PL), 
26-27, 31, 234, 243-44 

Liberal Union Party, 28 

Libya, 292 

lignite deposits, 184 

linguistic groups. See languages 

Lisbon Agreement (1980), 269 

literacy rate, 117 

livestock industry, 166-67 

LOAPA. See Organic Law on the Har- 
monization of the Autonomy Process 
(Ley Organica de Armonizacion del 
Proceso Autonomico: LOAPA) 

LODE. See Organic Law on the Right to 
Education (Ley Organica del Derecho 
a la Educacion: LODE) 

Lopez Pina, Antonio, 104-5 

Louisiana, 23 

Louis XIV (king of France), 20-21 

Louis XVIII (king of France), 26 

lowland regions, 74 

Lucini, Angel Liberal, 296 

Lugo Province, 92 

Lyon Conference (1936), 39 



McDonough, Peter, 104-5 

Machiavelli, Niccolo, 15 

Madrid, 18; as autonomous region, 80- 

81; in Civil War, 36, 37, 40, 283-84, 

285; as industrial region, 172-73, 177; 

location of, 79; migration from, 85; 

migration to, 82-84; Sistema Central 

in vicinity of, 70 
Magellan, Ferdinand, 17 
Maghreb, 13 
Majorca, 74 

Malaga Province, 97, 228 
Malvinas (Falkland Islands), 268 
Manglano, Emilio Alanso, 330 
manufacturing sector (see also defense in- 
dustrial base): performance of, xxviii, 
170, 176-80 
Maravall Herrero,Jose Maria, 118, 123, 
232 

Marcus Aurelius (Roman emperor), 6 

Man'a Cristina (regent), 26-27 

marines, 301-2 

marriage, 78, 109-10, 111 

martial law (1936-48), 45 

Marxism, xxxiii, 56-57, 239 

mass media, 257-61 

Massilia (Marseilles), 5 

Maura, Antonio, 31 

Mauritania, 54 

Maximilian I (Habsburg emperor), 17 
Mediterranean coastal regions, 77, 161, 

163, 195-96 
Mediterranean Sea, 4, 12, 69, 73, 74, 

290-91, 300, 317, 321 
Melilla (city enclave), 54, 69, 208, 228, 

264, 270-72, 288, 291 
Merida, 6 

Merigo, Eduardo, 144 

Meseta Central (plateau), 69-70; agricul- 
ture in, 162; mountains in and around, 
70, 73; precipitation in, 76; Sistema 
Central of, 70 

Mexico, 17, 38 

Middle East, 272 

migration, 67, 82-87, 128; from Andalu- 
sia, 97, 98-99; effect of, xxxi-xxxii; 
from Galicia, 93; from rural regions, 
xxix-xxx, 148, 159 
Miguel, Amando de, 103 
Milans del Bosch, Jaime, 287 
military assistance, U. S., 52, 173, 279, 
284, 321 



397 



Spain: A Country Study 



military bases, U. S., 52, 140, 169, 173, 
321 ; demand for reduction of forces in, 
xxxiv, 236, 322 

military courts, 221-22 

military equipment, 299-300; industry of, 
313 

military justice, 311 

Military Penal Code, 311 

military sector {see also air force; armed 
forces; army; conscription; navy; officer 
corps; pronunciamiento rule): decline of 
importance of, 281-82; intervention in 
politics of, xxxviii, 255-56, 280, 282, 
285-88; modernization of, xxxiv; re- 
forms in personnel system of, 305, 308; 
role in Franco regime of, 45, 285-86; 
role in society of, 288, 290; unrest in, 
58, 61 

military vehicle industry, 313 
mineral resources, 181-82 
minifundios, 92-93, 157, 158, 159, 161, 
166 

mining industry {see also coal industry), 
181-82 

Ministry of Defense, 279, 292-93, 
295-96, 299, 310 

Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Com- 
merce, 146, 147, 186, 190 

Ministry of Education and Science, 113, 
116, 122 

Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs, 
129 

Ministry of Industry and Energy, 173 
Ministry of Interior, 228, 233, 325 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 
129 

Ministry of Public Works and City Plan- 
ning, 191 

Ministry of Transportation, Tourism, 
and Communications, 147, 195, 198, 
258 

Minorca, 21 

Moderates, 27-28 

Mola, Emilio, 36 

monarchy, 216-19 

Moncloa Pacts, 58, 154, 260 

Montes de Toledo, 70 

Moors, 8-9, 99 

Moran, Fernando, 268-69 

Moriscos, 15-16, 19 

Mormons, 113 

Morocco, 31-32, 263; campaign against 



(1907-27), 283; claim to Ceuta and 
Melilla by, 54, 270-72, 291-92 

mortality rate, 69, 78, 126 

Mossad, 330 

motor vehicle assembly industry, 172, 

174, 175, 176-78, 200, 203 
mountains, 69-70, 73-74, 76 
Mozarabs, 10 
Mudejars, 16 
Muhammad (prophet), 10 
Mulhacen mountain, 73 
Municipal Commission, 227 
Municipal Council, 226-27 
municipalities, 226-27 
Musa ibn Nusair, 8 
Muslims, 15-16 
Mussolini, Benito, 39, 139 



Naples, 13-14 
National Block, 36 

National Confederation of Labor (Con- 

federacion Nacional del Trabajo: 

CNT), 31, 34, 153, 249 
National Defense Council, 292, 293 
National Energy Plan (Plan Energetico 

Nacional: PEN), 182, 185, 186 
National Front (Frente Nacional: FN), 

244 

National Galician Workers Union (Inter- 
sindical Nacional de Trabaj adores 
Gallegos: INTG), 249 

National Health Institute (Instituto Na- 
tional de Salud: INSALUD), 130 

National Housing Plan, 128 

National Industrial Institute (Instituto 
Nacional de Industria: INI), 146, 
173-75, 179, 184, 313; financial losses 
and restructuring of, 174-75 

National Institute for Hydrocarbons (In- 
stituto Nacional de Hidrocarburos: 
INH), 183-84 

National Institute for Social Services (In- 
stituto Nacional de Servicios Sociales: 
INSERSO), 130 

nationalism, xxxvi, 222 

Nationalist organization, 36-37 

nationalization: of central bank, 187; of 
industry, 173; of railroads, 191; of tele- 
phone system, 194 

National Movement, 43-45, 55-56, 237 

National Police, 324 



398 



Index 



National Police Corps (Cuerpo Nacional 
de Poliria), 324, 325; General Commis- 
sariat of Intelligence, 330-31; organi- 
zation and functions of, 328-29; Special 
Operations Group (Grupo Especial de 
Operaciones: GEO), 328 

National Social Security Institute (Insti- 
tuto Nacional de Seguridad Social: 
INSS), 130 

National Telephone Company of Spain 
(Compama Telefonica Nacional de 
Espana: CTNE), 146, 194 

National Tourist Company, 198 

natural gas industry, 185 

natural resources, 179, 181 

naval air base, U.S., 321 

naval base, U.S., 321 

Naval Military School, 309 

Naval Warfare School, 310 

Navarre: as autonomous region, 81; 
police force of, 329 

Navarrese, 79 

Navarro, Manuel, 104 

navy (Armada) (see also marines), 280; 
historical importance of, 281-82; vessels 
of, 300-301; zonal commands of, 300 

Negrm, Juan, 40 

the Netherlands, 17-18, 20, 21; Spainish 
investment in, 201 

news agency (EFE), 258-59 

newspapers, 257-58 

Nicaragua, 268-69 

noise pollution, 127-28 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), 208, 234; coordination of 
fighting forces with, 281; effect of Brit- 
ish possession of Gibraltar on, 320; 
effect of Spanish possession of Ceuta 
and Melilla on, 292, 318; excludes 
Spain, 52, 263-64; Gibraltar as naval 
base of, 270; Nuclear Planning Group 
of, 320; participation in, 316-320; 
question of membership in, xxxiii- 
xxxiv, 316; requirement for U. S. mili- 
tary reduction, 322-23; Spain joins 
(1982), 62, 256, 264-65, 280, 316 

nuclear power, 186 

O'Donnell, Leopoldo, 28 
OECD. See Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD) 



OEEC. See Organisation for European 

Economic Co-operation (OEEC) 
officer corps, 280-81; discontent after 

Civil War of, 285-87; reform proposals 

of, 286; in society, 288 
Official Credit Institute (Instituto de 

Credito Oficial: ICO), 189-90 
oil industry, 139, 182-83 
oil price shock, xxviii, 137, 143-44, 150, 

170, 198 

Opus Dei (Work of God), 46, 115, 141; 
as special interest group, 253-54 

Orense Province, 92 

Organic Law 1: 1984 (related to armed 
forces), 295 

Organic Law 6: 1980 (related to armed 
forces), 293, 295 

Organic Law of the State (1966) (funda- 
mental law), 43, 48 

Organic Law on the Constitutional Court 
(1979), 221 

Organic Law on the Financing of the 
Autonomous Communities, 225 

Organic Law on the Harmonization of the 
Autonomy Process (Ley Organica de 
Armonizacion del Proceso Autonomi- 
co: LOAPA), xxxvii, 223 

Organic Law on the Right to Education 
(Ley Organica del Derecho a la Educa- 
tion: LODE), 68, 117, 118-19, 212 

Organic Law on the Security Corps and 
Forces (1986), 324-25 

Organic Law on Trade Union Freedom 
(1985), 247 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), 142, 262 

Organisation for European Economic Co- 
operation (OEEC), 142, 143, 262 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), 200 

Ortega, Daniel, 269 

OSE. See Spanish Syndical Organization 
(Organization Sindical Espanola: OSE) 

Oslo Convention, 128 

Overseas Trade Bank (Banco Exterior de 
Espana), 146, 189 



Pacific Ocean, 17 

Pact of Madrid (1953), 52, 140, 169, 173, 

265-66, 284, 291, 320-21 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 

272 



399 



Spain: A Country Study 



PCE. See Communist Party of Spain (Par- 
tido Comunista de Espafia: PCE) 

PDP. See Popular Democratic Party (Par- 
tido Democrata Popular: PDP) 

Peace of the Pyrenees, 20 

Peace of Westphalia, 20 

Pelayo (king of Oviedo), 10 

Penal Code, 324, 331 

Penibetico region, 70 

Penon de Velez de la Gomera, 54 

pensions, 130 

People's Party (Partido Popular: PP), 

XXXV 

periodicals, 259 
Peron, Juan, 51 
Peru, 17 

Peter III (king of Aragon), 13 
Philip II (king of Spain), 17-18, 79 
Philip III (king of Spain), 20, 282 
Philip IV (king of Spain), 20 
Philip V (king of Spain), 20-21; centrali- 
zation by, 79 
the Philippines, 30, 261, 283 
Phoenicians, 5 

Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), 
123 

Pico de Aneto, 73 

Picos de Europa, 73 

pipeline (gas), 185 

Pizzaro, Francisco, 17 

PL. See Liberal Party (Partido Liberal: PL) 

plains, coastal, 70, 74 

plateau region (see also Meseta Central), 
69-70, 162 

PNV. See Basque Nationalist Party (Par- 
tido Nacional Vasco: PNV) 

police system: human rights violations of, 
332; national, 324-29; regional, 329 

political parties: changing goals of, xxxi; 
formation of, 57, 238; legalization of, 
56; regional, 245; small parties, 244- 
45; stabilization of, 207-8; support and 
opposition to NATO membership of, 
62-63, 234, 316 

Political-Social Brigade, 330 

political system, Franco regime, 40-45, 
207 

Pontevedra Province, 92 

Poor Spain, 81, 82 

Popular Action (Accion Popular), 34 

Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular: AP) 
(see also People's Party (Partido Popu- 
lar: PP)), xxxv, 57, 62, 232, 234, 236, 



244; development and role of, 242-43 
Popular Coalition (Coalition Popular: 

CP), 234, 244 
Popular Democratic Party (Partido 

Democrata Popular: PDP), 234, 244 
Popular Unity (Herri Batasuna: HB), 

233, 245, 334-35 
population (see also birth rate; migration; 

mortality rate; urbanization): aging of, 

131-32; densities of regions and cities, 

84; growth of, 77-78; migration of, 67; 

urbanization of, 83-84, 113 
ports, 76, 168, 194 

Portugal: boundary with, 69, 74; explo- 
ration and settlement by, 16; in Iberian 
federation, 3; investment in, 201; Sis- 
tema Central in, 70 

Postal Service, 195 

Potsdam Conference, 51 

POUM. See Trotskyite Workers' Party of 
Marxist Unification (Partido Obrero de 
Unification Marxista: POUM) 

poverty, 82 

press law (see also newspapers; freedom of 

the press), 256 
price controls, 154 
Prieto, Indalecio, 36 
Prim, Juan, 28 

prime minister (office), 218-20 
Primo de Rivera, Jose Antonio, 37 
Primo de Rivera, Miguel, 32, 139, 240, 

280-81, 283 
prisons, 333-34 

Progressive Federation (Federation Pro- 

gresista: FP), 244 
Progressives, 27, 28 
pronunciamiento rule, 25-26, 36, 255, 282- 

83 

protectionism. See trade policy 
Protestant denominations, 113 
provinces, government of, 227-28 
Provincial Council, 227-28 
PSOE. See Spanish Socialist Workers' 
Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espa- 
nol: PSOE) 
public health, 124-28, 129-30 
Puerto de la Luz (port), 194 
Puerto Rico, 25, 30, 283 
Puigserver Roma, Gonzalo, 296 
Punic Wars: First (264-41 B.C.), 5; Sec- 
ond (218-201 B. C), 5 
Pyrenees mountains, 4, 5, 69-70, 73-74, 
261, 290 



400 



Index 



Qadhafi, Muammar al, 292 

Radical Republicans, 31, 34 

Radio Cadena Espaiiola: RCE, 259 

Radio Nacional Espaiiola: RNE, 259, 260 

radio networks, 259 

Radio-Television Espaiiola: RTVE, 260 

railroads, 186, 191 

rainfall, 76-77, 156 

Reagan, Ronald, 266 

Reconquest, 10-15, 110 

Redondo, Nicolas, 236, 249 

reforestation, 167 

regions: differences among, 222; police 
forces of, 329; Rich Spain and Poor 
Spain, 81 

regions, autonomous. See autonomous com- 
munities; decentralization 

regions, natural, 70 

religion, 110-16; changing role of, xxxi; 
constitutional provisions for, xxx-xxxi, 
112, 210-12 

RENFE. See Spanish National Railroad 
Network (Red Nacional de los Ferro- 
carriles Espanoles: RENFE) 

Repsol (oil company), 184 

Republic, First (1873-74), 28 

Republic, Second, xxxi, 33, 45 

Republican Left (Izquierda Republicana: 
IR), 33-36 

Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya), 35 

rias, 76 

Rich Spain, 81 

Riego, Rafael de, 25 

Rio Duero, 4, 73, 76, 166 

Rio Ebro, 4, 11, 40, 73-74, 76, 161, 162 

Rio Guadalquivir, 73, 76, 165 

Rio Guadiana, 73, 74, 76 

Rio Jucar, 73 

Rio Miiio, 76 

Ri'o Tajo (Tagus River), 7, 70, 74, 76 

Rio Tinto Explosives, 179-80 

rivers, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 191 

RNE. See Radio Nacional Espaiiola: RNE 

roads, 190-91 

robots, industrial, 178 

Roderic (king), 8 

Roman Catholic Church (see also Jesuits; 
Opus Dei): changes in role of, xxx, 
114-16; constitutional provisions for, 
211-12; educational program of, xxxi, 



116; government contributions to, 
112-13; links to labor movement of, 
152; named official religion, 43, 111; 
opposition to social change by, 68; po- 
litical activity of, 34, 43-45, 114; ra- 
dio network of, 259; recognition of 
Franco government by, 52, 111; role 
in Franco regime of, xxx-xxxi, 111; 
role in Reconquest, 3, 15-16; as spe- 
cial interest group, 251-53; university 
system of, 121 
Roman Empire, 5-7 



safety, public, 126-28 

Sahara, Spanish: ceded to Morocco and 

Mauritania, 54 
Sani, Giacomo, 103 
Sanjurjo, Jose, 32, 33, 36-37 
Santa Cruz de Tenerife (port), 194 
SEAT. See Sociedad Espaiiola de Auto- 

moviles de Turismo (SEAT) 
Securities and Market Reform Act (1988), 

190 

Security Police Council, 329 

self-sufficiency concept. See autarchy 

Senate. See Cortes 

Serra i Serra, Narcis, 296 

service sector, 186-98; employment in, 

148; performance of, xxviii 
Seville, 10; Expo 92 in, 201; migration 

to, 85; as port, 76, 194 
Seville Province, 97 
Shabad, Goldie, 88, 103 
shipbuilding industry, 170, 175, 178-79, 

313 

shipping, 191, 194 
Sicily, 13 

Sierra de Guadalupe, 70 

Sierra Morena, 70, 73-74 

Sierra Nevada, 73 

Sistema Central, 70, 73, 76 

Sistema Iberico, 73-74, 76 

Sistema Penibetico, 73-74, 77 

Socialists' Party of Catalonia (Partit dels 

Socialistes de Catalunya: PSC), 245 
social security system, 129, 131-32, 144; 

proposed reform for, 232 
social structure (see also class structure), 

102-6; feudal, 13-14; transformation 

of, xxx, 67-68 
social values, xxx-xxxvii, 106-10 



401 



Spain: A Country Study 



Sociedad Espanola de Automoviles de 
Turismo (SEAT), 174, 175, 177 

Sociedad Espanola de Radiodifusion: 
SER, 259 

Soult, Nicholas, 24 

Soviet Union: advisers and arms in Civil 
War, 36-38; German invasion of, 50; 
relations with, 272-73 

Spain Commando, 336 

Spanish-American War (1898), 30, 261, 
265, 267, 283 

Spanish Arms Manufacturers Associa- 
tion, 314 

Spanish Confederation of Employers' Or- 
ganizations (Confederacion Espanola 
de Organizaciones Empresariales: 
CEOE), 155, 250 

Spanish Confederation of Small and 
Medium-Sized Firms (Confederacion 
Espanola de Pequenas y Medianas 
Empresas: CEPYME), 250 

Spanish Confederation of the Autono- 
mous Right (Confederacion Espanola 
de Derechas Autonomas: CEDA), 
34-35 

Spanish Green Party (Partido Verde Espa- 

fiol: PVE), 244 
Spanish Integration Committees (Juntas 

Espanolas de Integration), 244 
Spanish language (Castilian). See Castilian 

Spanish 
Spanish Legion, 299 
Spanish March, 11 

Spanish National Railroad Network (Red 
Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Espafioles: 
RENFE), 191 

Spanish Popular Front, 35-36 

Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Espaiiol: PSOE), 31, 
33-35, 57, 60, 108, 114, 153, 208; civil 
service reform by, 229; economic and 
social reform of, xxxiii, 231-32, 
236-37; foreign policy of, 233, 237; 
gains strength, 61-62, 238-39; labor 
union of, xxxiv, 31, 33-34, 39-40, 153, 
236, 238, 247-50; majority in Cortes 
of, xxviii-xxix, xxxiii; opposition to, 
xxxiv-xxxv, 234-36; oppostion to 
NATO membership of, xxxiii, 234, 
316; as rival to PCE, 240 

Spanish Syndical Organization (Orga- 
nization Sindical Espanola: OSE), 152, 
153 



Spanish Workers' Party-Communist Unity 
(Partido de los Trabajadores de Espana- 
Unidad Comunista: PTE-UC), 241 
special interest groups, 246-56 
Special Operations Group (Grupo Espe- 
cial de Operaciones: GEO), 328 
spending, defense, 280, 312-13 
spending, government: aid to Catholic 
Church as, 112-13; for health care, 
124; levels of, 147-48; limitations on, 
142; for private and public schools, 
116-17; on university education, 122- 
23 

Stabilization Plan (1959), xxviii, 46, 

142-43, 159, 169, 200 
Stalin, Joseph, 35, 39, 272 
standard of living (see also Index of Net 

Social Progress (INSP)), xxvii, xxx, 

123-32, 141 
state-owned enterprises, xxviii, 146-47, 

174-75, 176, 179, 183-84, 191, 194, 

198, 258-59, 313 
Statutes of Autonomy (1979), 329 
steel industry, 170, 175, 176 
stock exchanges, 190 
Strait of Gibraltar, 290-91, 320, 321 
Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers, 

U.S., 322 

strikes, xxxiv, 34-36, 47-49, 153, 232, 
236, 249-50 

Suarez Gonzalez, Adolfo, 3-4, 55-61, 
143, 154, 209, 229, 235, 255; foreign 
policy of, 268; as leader of UCD, xxxv- 
xxxvi, 238, 242-43; reforms of armed 
forces by, 292; succeeds Franco, xxxii- 
xxxiii 

subsidies, government, 128, 175; to Catho- 
lic Church, 253; to the press, 257 
Suevi, 6, 7 
summer, 76-77 

Supreme Allied Commander (SACLANT), 
318 

Supreme Council of Military Justice, 311 
Supreme Court, 220-21, 224, 311 
Supreme Staff, 292 



Tabacalera, 146 
Tacito, 252 

Tactical Air Command (Mando Aereo 

Tactico: MATAC), 302 
Tagus River. See Rio Tajo 
taifas, 10, 12 



402 



Index 



Tariq ibn Ziyad, 8 

Tarragona Province, 90, 172 

tax system, 141-42 

Tejero Molina, Antonio, 61, 287 

telegraph system, 195 

telephone system, 194-95 

Television Espanola: TVE, 260 

television networks, 259-61 

Tenerife (island), 74 

Terra Lliure (Free land), 336-37 

terrorism: of antigovernment groups, 
334; of Basque groups, xxxvi-xxxviii, 
58, 60, 208, 232-33, 235, 237, 287, 
335-36; of Catalan group, 336-37; of 
Galician group, 337; support of France 
against, xxxvii, 274, 335-36 

textile industry, xxvii, 180 

thermal power, 185 

Thirty Years' War, 282 

Toledo, 7, 12 

topography, 69 

Torquemada, Tomas de, 16 

tourism industry, xxviii, 106-7, 143, 144, 
180-81, 195-98, 199; effect of, xxxi 

toxic waste, 128 

trade, international, 198-99 

trade policy: liberalization of, xxviii, 169- 
70; protectionist elements of, xxvii- 
xxviii, 173, 198, 202 

Trade Preference Treaty (1970), 52-53 

Trajan (Roman emperor), 6 

transportation: airlines, 194; nationaliza- 
tion of (1926), 139; roads and railroads 
in system of, 190-91; shipping, 191, 
194 

transportation system, xxx 
Trastamara, House of, 14, 17 
Trade Preference Treaty (1970), 52-53 
Treaty of Accession (1985) (into EC), 

184, 233-34, 263 
Treaty of Alcagovas (1479), 15 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 

(1976), 266 
Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), 16 
Treaty of Utrecht (1713), 21, 53, 90, 269 
Treaty of Westphalia (1648), 20 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 

Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 1968, 320 
Trotskyite Workers' Party of Marxist 

Unification (Partido Obrero de Unifi- 

cacion Marxista: POUM), 37, 40 
Truman, Harry S, 51 



UCD. See Union of the Democratic 
Center (Union de Centro Democratico: 
UCD) 

UGT. See General Union of Workers 
(Union General de Trabaj adores: 
UGT) 

Umayyad dynasty, 9 

underground economy (economia sumer- 
gida), 151-52 

uniforms, ranks, and insignias, 304-5 

Union of Small and Medium-Sized Firms 
(Union de la Pequena y Mediana 
Empresa: UNIPYME), 251 

Union of the Democratic Center (Union 
de Centro Democratico: UCD), 57, 60, 
109, 154-55, 238, 242, 244; as coali- 
tion, 229; decline in Cortes represen- 
tation of, 61-62; fragmentation of, 
xxxiii, 60-61; support for NATO mem- 
bership of, 316 

United Left (Izquierda Unida: IU), xxxv, 
235 

United Nations (UN): approves member- 
ship for Spain (1955), 52, 261; denial 
of membership in, 51; membership in, 
4 

United States: air and naval bases of, 4; 
economic assistance by, 46, 51, 143; 
Export-Import Bank assistance, 143; 
investment of, 201; military personnel 
of, 321; mutual defense agreement of 
(Pact of Madrid), 52, 140, 169, 173, 
261, 265-66, 279, 284, 291; recogni- 
tion of Spain's strategic importance by, 
4, 51-52; in Spanish American War, 
30; support in Cuba (1895), 30; trade 
with, 200; Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation with, 266 

United Syndicate (Sindicato Unitario: 
SU), 249 

universities, 121-23 

urbanization, xxix-xxx, 83-84 

USO. See Workers' Syndical Union (Union 
Sindical Obrera: USO) 



Valencia, 6, 10, 11-13, 40, 92, 157, 177, 

194, 304 
Valencians, 79-80 
value-added tax (VAT), 203 
Vandals, 6, 7 
Vascones. See Basques 
Vatican Council, Second, xxx, 111, 252 



403 



Spain: A Country Study 



Vigo, 168 

Villar Palasi, Jose Luis, 118 
vineyards, 163-64 
Visigoths, 6-10 
Volkswagen, 177 



War of Devolution (1667-68), 20 
War of Independence (1808-14), 23-24, 
282 

War of the Spanish Succession (1702-14), 
21 

Warriors of Christ the King, 252 
Warsaw Pact countries, 272 
welfare programs, 129-32 
Wellesley, Arthur (Duke of Wellington), 
24 

Western European Union (WEU), 265 

Weyler, Valerio, 30 

Wilfred the Hairy, 1 1 

winds (Leveche and Levante), 77 



winter, 76-77 

women: in armed services, 309; discrimi- 
nation against married, 109; educational 
attainment of, 118, 123; status of, xxxii, 
67-68, 78, 110; in workplace, 108-9, 
150 

Workers' Commissions (Comisiones Obre- 
ras: CCOO), xxxiv, 152-53, 155, 236, 
240, 247-50 
Workers' Statute (1980), 154, 247 
Workers' Syndical Union (Union Sindi- 
cal Obrera: USO), 153, 155, 248-49 
World Bank, 78; member of, 142, 262 
World War I, xxvii, 31, 138-39 
World War II, 139-40; Spanish collabo- 
ration with Axis powers during, 46, 50, 
139-40, 169, 261, 284; Spanish neu- 
trality in, 50-51 

Zamora, Niceto Alcala, 33-36 
Zaragoza, 6, 10, 13, 177 



404 



Published Country Studies 



(Area Handbook Series) 



550-65 


Afghanistan 


550-87 


Greece 


550-98 


Albania 


550-78 


Guatemala 


550-44 


Algeria 


550-174 


Guinea 


550-59 


Angola 


550-82 


Guyana and Belize 


550-73 


Argentina 


550-151 


Honduras 


550-1 69 


An Qtral l c\ 


550-165 


Hi in era rv 
xiuiicax y 


550-176 


Austria 


550-21 


India 


550-175 


Bangladesh 


550-154 


Indian Ocean 


550-170 


Belgium 


550-39 


Indonesia 


550-66 


Bolivia 


550-68 


Iran 


550-20 


Brazil 


550-31 


Iraq 


550-168 


Bulgaria 


550-25 . 


Israel 


550-61 


Burma 


550-182 


Italy 


550-50 


Cambodia 


550-30 


Japan 


550-166 


Cameroon 


550-34 


Jordan 


550-159 


Chad 


550-56 


Kenya 


550-77 


Chile 


550-81 


Korea North 


550-60 


China 


550-41 


Korea, South 


550-26 


Colombia 


550-58 


Laos 


550-33 


Commonwealth Caribbean, 


550-24 


Lebanon 




Islands of the 






550-91 


Congo 


550-38 


Liberia 


550-90 


Costa Rica 


550-85 


Libya 


550-69 


Cote d'lvoire (Ivory Coast) 


550-172 


Malawi 


550-152 


Cuba 


550-45 


Malaysia 


550-22 


Cyprus 


550-161 


Mauritania 


550-158 


Czechoslovakia 


550-79 


Mexico 


550-36 


Dominican Republic and 


550-76 


Mongolia 




Haiti 






550-52 


Ecuador 


550-49 


Morocco 


550-43 


Egypt 


550-64 


Mozambique 


550-150 


El Salvador 


550-35 


Nepal and Bhutan 


550-28 


Ethiopia 


550-88 


Nicaragua 


550-167 


Finland 


550-157 


Nigeria 


550-155 


Germany, East 


550-94 


Oceania 


550-173 


Germany, Fed. Rep. of 


550-48 


Pakistan 


550-153 


Ghana 


550-46 


Panama 



405 



550-156 


Paraguay 


550-53 


Thailand 


550-185 


Persian Gulf States 


550-89 


Tunisia 


550-42 


Peru 


550-80 


Turkey 


550-72 


Philippines 


550-74 


Uganda 


550-162 


Poland 


550-97 


Uruguay 


550-181 


Portugal 


550-71 


Venezuela 


550-160 


Romania 


550-32 


Vietnam 


550-37 


Rwanda and Burundi 


550-183 


Yemens, The 


550-51 


Saudi Arabia 


550-99 


Yugoslavia 


550-70 


Senegal 


550-67 


Zaire 


550-180 


Sierra Leone 


550-75 


Zambia 


550-184 


Singapore 


550-171 


Zimbabwe 


550-86 


Somalia 






550-93 


South Africa 






550-95 


Soviet Union 






550-179 


Spain 






550-96 


Sri Lanka 






550-27 


Sudan 






550-47 


Syria 






550-62 


Tanzania 







406 



PIN: 017702-000 



